Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim (In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful).

They say Chicago has the most beautiful skyline in all of America, and you’d better believe it. Gaze at the city from the north or south along the shore of Lake Michigan—which feels more like an ocean, Subhan'Allah—and you'll be captivated by a stunning tapestry of skyscrapers. The crown jewel of that skyline, the one that really catches your eye, is the 442-meter tall, black Sears Tower. When it was built, it was the tallest kid on the block. But what most people don't know is that the tower's chief architect was a brother in Islam, a devout Muslim.
 


Fazlur Rahman Khan, a Bengali-American structural engineer, was the genius behind the structural systems for both the Sears Tower and the John Hancock Center. For his work, he’s hailed as the "father of the tubular design" for high-rises and was a pioneer in Computer-Aided Design (CAD). And Fazlur Khan is hardly the only Chicago Muslim to earn worldly acclaim. Just ask about Dr. Hussein Abd Al-Sattar, a professor of pathology at the University of Chicago Medical School, often called the father of American pathology. To the local Muslim community, he is even better known for his deep taqwa (God-consciousness). Dr. Sattar, now in his 50s, came to Chicago with his parents from Pakistan back in the '80s. Alhamdulillah (all praise is due to God), the city of Chicago alone is a powerful answer to those who ask what Islam or Muslims have done for the modern world.
 


The success of these two men from South Asia is no fluke; it reflects how the city has been a magnet for immigrants seeking to build a new life. The pioneers of Chicago’s ummah (Muslim community) were the Bosnians and Arabs, who had already established their own Muslim associations in the early 20th century. The history of Palestinians in Chicago is especially prominent; in fact, Cook County is affectionately known as “America’s Palestinian hometown.” Palestinian Muslims began their hijra (migration) to Chicago in the early 1900s, and the political turmoil following the establishment of Israel in 1948 brought even more. By the late 1940s, Palestinians began to put down roots and build a community in Bridgeview, on the edge of the South Side's African-American neighborhoods. If you ask any local where to find “Little Palestine,” they’ll point you straight to Bridgeview. Other Arab Muslims who were not Palestinian started arriving in the mid-1950s.

Head over to the north side, to Devon Avenue, and you'll find a place locals have nicknamed “Little India.” Walking down Devon, surrounded by all kinds of halal South Asian restaurants, supermarkets, and Islamic bookstores, you know right away you’re in a South Asian Muslim enclave. It is here that Dr. Sattar, seeking to spread 'ilm (sacred knowledge), established his own masjid (mosque) and learning center: the Sacred Learning Center.

Today, Chicago is home to the second-largest Muslim community in the United States, a true testament to the barakah (blessings) of this city. Since the 1965 immigration reforms, the diversity of the local Muslim community has blossomed. In just forty years, from the 1960s onward, the number of masjids in the Greater Chicago area skyrocketed from a mere five to over one hundred. South Asian Muslims, in particular, have had a profound impact on community institutions in recent years. More than half of the region's mosques primarily serve a South Asian congregation, with several of these located in suburbs where the income is well above the regional average.

Beyond that, Masha'Allah (as God has willed), Chicago has built a complete ecosystem of Muslim educational institutions, from kindergarten all the way up to university. This deep commitment to tarbiyah (Islamic education and upbringing) is on full display every year when Chicago hosts the national forum for Muslim school educators.
 
 

 
 
The Story of the First Minaret in Chicago

Islamic Cultural Center of Greater Chicago (ICCGC)

1800 Pfingsten Rd, Northbrook, IL 60062

The story of this community began way back in 1906, when our Bosnian brothers and sisters founded the "Muslim Mutual Aid and Benevolent Society of Illinois" (Muslimansko Potpomagajuce Drustvo Dzemijetul Hajrije) in the city's Near North Side. Masha'Allah, it stands today as the oldest Muslim organization in the entire history of the United States. Fast forward to the 1970s, the original Bosnian masjid (mosque) on North Halsted Street packed up and moved to the northern suburb of Northbrook. The new center was given a name reflecting its broader mission: the "Islamic Cultural Center of Greater Chicago."
 


On Saturday, September 8, 1974, a groundbreaking ceremony was held on a little over two acres of land, a blessed day attended by representatives from both the Muslim and non-Muslim communities. By the grace of Allah, Phase I of the center—which included administrative offices, a library, classrooms for weekend school, a nursery, and a social hall—officially opened its doors on March 21, 1976.

The call to build a proper house of worship grew stronger, and on June 29, 1984, the community broke ground for Phase II: the masjid and its minaret. This second phase, completed in 1988, added a beautiful musalla (prayer hall) that could hold 500 worshipers, a lecture hall for 200, and a towering minaret—the first and, at that time, the only one in the entire state of Illinois. Allahu Akbar (God is the Greatest).
 


The first Imam (spiritual leader) of the center was a Bosnian, Kamil Avdich, who served the ummah (community) faithfully until his passing in December 1979. May Allah grant him Jannah (paradise). The center's most famous Imam, however, has to be Dr. Mustafa Cerić, a real heavy-hitter in Bosnia and Herzegovina with massive influence in both religious and political circles. From 1993 to 2012, Dr. Cerić served as the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina and even ran for a seat on the Bosnian presidency in 2014.

Today, the center’s members come from many different backgrounds, though the majority are still from Bosnia, Montenegro, and other parts of the Balkans. It's a sad reality, though, that most of the time you’ll find the doors to this beautiful masjid locked outside of the prescribed prayer times.

“Little Palestine” of Bridgeview

Take a drive southwest from downtown Chicago into Bridgeview, and before you know it, you’re in Little Palestine. It's a dead giveaway. Just drive down Harlem Avenue in the heart of the Bridgeview community, and you'll see Arabic script everywhere—on signs for shops, law offices, barbers, and restaurants.

The Palestinian presence in this city goes way back to the 1890s. The first arrivals were willing to get their hands dirty, taking any job they could find and selling goods in the city's undeveloped areas. Their early success laid the groundwork for the waves of Palestinians to come. It’s no surprise, then, that in the wake of the 1948 Nakba (The Catastrophe), when over 700,000 Palestinians were tragically displaced from their homeland, a good number of them came here to settle. Today, Cook County is home to more than 22,000 Palestinians—more than anywhere else in the United States.

The shopping plazas in Little Palestine have a flavor all their own. The signs are proudly written in both Arabic and English. You can easily find authentic Arab sweet shops, sizzling shawarma joints, and stores selling traditional clothing and everyday goods. But it’s more than just commerce; it's a community that wears its heart on its sleeve. The walls outside shops are often adorned with posters of the Shahada (the declaration of faith) and beautiful du'as (prayers). Inside, you’ll find information on how to give sadaqa (charity) to support those in Palestine and messages of unwavering solidarity.

Sometimes, even the food carries a deeper meaning. One fried chicken joint in the neighborhood, in an act of defiant creativity, named its chicken tenders the “Gaza Strips.” They are not afraid to make their stance known, doing what they can to give you a gut-punch of a reminder of the ethnic cleansing happening in Gaza as we speak.
 

 


The first local masjid in this area, now known as the Mosque Foundation, got its start in 1954. In 1982, it set up a new home in the southwest suburb of Bridgeview and later added two state-accredited Muslim schools. Subhan'Allah (glory be to God), the Mosque Foundation is a magnificent sight. It’s the anchor of the neighborhood, and it seems like most of the villas surrounding it are owned by Muslims—it's a common sight to spot a beautiful piece of calligraphy with an ayah (verse) from the Qur'an posted on the front doors.

Even though it’s a good ways from downtown, come Dhuhr (noon prayer) time, the main prayer hall is packed to the gills with brothers standing shoulder-to-shoulder. Right next to the mosque's courtyard, you’ll find its affiliated Islamic elementary school, the Aqsa School, and a Muslim high school, the Universal School. Together, they provide a private K-12 education where students dive deep into Islamic studies, the Arabic language, and the Holy Qur'an. The school's motto says it all: "Where Islam and Education Come Together."
 
 
 
Muslim Foundation 
 


Villa Park and Lombard

Out in the western suburbs of Chicago, Villa Park and Lombard are home to a booming Muslim population. The two crown jewels of the community out here are the Islamic Foundation and Masjid DarusSalam.

Islamic Foundation of Villa Park

300 W Highridge Rd, Villa Park, IL 60181
 
 


The Islamic Foundation (IF) was established in 1974 to serve the ummah in Chicago's western suburbs. The Islamic Foundation Masjid is considered one of the largest in North America, a massive project that was completed in 1998 after three years of construction. Today, the campus is the whole nine yards: it includes a bookstore, a library, a community center, a hall for banquets and lectures, a modern kitchen, conference rooms, and offices for the foundation's staff.
 
 


Their commitment to tarbiyah (Islamic upbringing) is serious business. Back in 1975, the community started a weekend Islamic school in a rented space with just 36 students. From those humble beginnings, the foundation purchased a former public school building in 1983 to create the campus they have today. The Islamic Foundation School (IFS) is now a fully accredited K-12 institution with about 650 full-time students from over 400 families, making it one of the largest Islamic schools in North America, Alhamdulillah.
 



Masjid DarusSalam

21W525 North Ave, Lombard, IL 60148
 
 


Completed in 2013, Masjid DarusSalam in Lombard serves Muslims from about 20 surrounding communities. The campus is a behemoth, with 87,000 square feet of building space. It not only provides beautiful prayer spaces for brothers and sisters but also includes over 20 classrooms, a library, funeral facilities for handling the Janazah (funeral prayer), an NCAA-standard gymnasium, a banquet hall, a fitness center, a kitchen, and plenty of parking.

This masjid is also home to the DarusSalam Seminary, a national institution dedicated to teaching traditional Islamic sciences. This is where they are forging the next generation of 'ulama (scholars) and community leaders, insha'Allah (if God wills).
 
 


Irving Park Avenue

Hop off the Blue Line train at the Irving Park station, and after a short walk, you'll find the Muslim Community Center (MCC). You're in the heart of a Muslim hub here; within a stone's throw of the MCC, there are as many as seven masjids.

Muslim Community Center (MCC Chicago)

4380 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60641
 


On a cold Sunday in February 1969, after much heartfelt discussion, members of the Yugoslavian-Bosnian Muslim Religious and Cultural Home decided to form the Muslim Community Center (MCC). It was officially registered as a non-profit that same year and is considered the mother organization for many other centers and masjids that came later. It’s one of the oldest and largest Muslim organizations in Chicagoland.

The MCC is a membership-based masjid where all decisions are made based on the Qur'anic principle of Shoora (consultation). They currently have over 1,600 paying members (and they post every single name!). But between its two affiliated mosques, the weekly Jumu'ah (Friday sermon) attendance tops 3,000 souls.
 


The MCC headquarters on Elston Avenue is a real head-turner because the building used to be the Rivoli Theater, built back in 1923. Inside, the main musalla (prayer hall) still keeps the original theater structure. You pray where the main audience used to sit, with a raised stage area and even the second-floor balcony converted into a prayer space for the sisters. It’s a sight to see.
 
 

 
MASOM （Midwest Association of Shia Organized Muslim）

4353 W Lawrence Ave, Chicago, IL 60630

A few other spots in the neighborhood:

MASOM (Midwest Association of Shia Organized Muslim): Established in 1994, this is the center for South Asian Twelver Shia Muslims. You can't miss the distinctive Shia flags and the Hand of Fatima (Hamsa) flying outside, marking their unique identity.
 

 
 
Masjid Dar Al-Hadeeth

4809 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60630
 

 
 
 
MASJID AL RAHMAN

4846 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60630
 


Masjid Dar Al-Hadeeth & MASJID AL RAHMAN: Two more local masjids on the same street. When I stopped by Masjid Al Rahman, it was time for the Asr (afternoon) prayer, but wouldn't you know it, the doors were locked.
 


Chicago's South Side

Al-Sadiq Masjid

4448 S Wabash Ave, Chicago, IL 60653
 


In 1920, the first missionary from the Ahmadiyya movement in Islam, Mufti Muhammad Sadiq, made his way to Chicago. By 1922, he had established America's first Ahmadiyya mosque right here on South Wabash Avenue, and it served as the movement's national headquarters until 1950. The mosque has a claim to fame as being the very first masjid in Chicago, and some say in all of America. The original 1922 building is long gone, but the current one was rebuilt on the very same spot in 1994.
 
 


Mosque Maryam

7351 S Stony Island Ave, Chicago, IL 60649

Mosque Maryam (also known as Muhammad Mosque No. 2) is the national headquarters for the Nation of Islam (NOI). The building itself has a wild history; it was originally the Saints Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Church. In 1972, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad bought the building, securing a $3 million loan from Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to convert the church into a temple. After Elijah Muhammad passed away in 1975, his son, Imam Warith Deen Mohammed, undertook a momentous task. He dissolved the Nation of Islam, steered the entire community towards the path of orthodox Sunni Islam, and re-established the organization as the American Muslim Mission. A powerful chapter in the story of Islam in America.
 
 

 
 
In 1981, former Nation of Islam (NOI) member Louis Farrakhan and his followers held the traditional Saviours’ Day gathering in Chicago and officially brought back the “Islamic Nation of North America” name. In his keynote address, Farrakhan pledged to work toward restoring the organization based on the teachings of Elijah Muhammad. By 1988, Farrakhan had repurchased and reopened the old mosque, naming it “Masjid Maryam” in honor of Maryam (Mary), the mother of ‘Isa (Jesus). Right next door sits Muhammad University of Islam, an educational institution founded by the NOI that offers classes from pre-K through 12th grade for both boys and girls—think of it as a full-fledged Islamic madrasah right in the heart of Chicago.
 


Masjid Al-Faatir
1200 E 47th St, Chicago, IL 60653
 

 


Masjid al-Faatir opened its doors in 1987 in the Kenwood neighborhood of Chicago. It was established by Jabir Herbert Muhammad—the late boxing legend Muhammad Ali’s manager and son of Elijah Muhammad—who donated the land, while Ali himself kicked in significant funds for construction. The masjid’s striking design features two interlocking octagonal halls, two standalone minarets, and a grand central dome. On Jummah days, it can accommodate up to 3,000 worshippers praying Salah side by side, shoulder to shoulder, in a powerful testament to ummah unity.
 


When his father set up the NOI headquarters in Chicago, Jabir Herbert Muhammad took on the role of Chief Business Manager, running restaurants, bakeries, laundromats, and more under the organization’s umbrella. He also oversaw the publication of Muhammad Speaks, the group’s newspaper. From 1966 to 1991, he served as Muhammad Ali’s manager—talk about wearing multiple kufi caps! Fun fact: Elijah Muhammad’s home and Muhammad Ali’s residence were just two streets away from Masjid al-Faatir, making that stretch of Chicago a real hub of Islamic heritage.

In “The Loop”

Downtown Islamic Center
231 S State St #4, Chicago, IL 60604

Easily the most accessible masjid in Chicago’s Loop, the Downtown Islamic Center hides behind a tiny door in a street-side office building. Head up to the fourth floor and you’ll find a cozy prayer hall where the call to prayer echoes off glass and steel—a real urban oasis for your daily salah.
 
 


Little India District

Tucked between Ridge Avenue and Kedzie Avenue along West Devon Avenue, this “Little India” corridor boasts more than ten masajid, plus Islamic bookstores, halal eateries, and markets. One standout is:

Masjid E-Noor
6151 N Greenview Ave, Chicago, IL 60660
 
 


This unique masjid, seemingly repurposed from an old church, draws a diverse crowd—especially faces from Central Asia. On Jummah, you’ll hear the mix of Farsi, Urdu, and Arabic, echoing beneath its vaulted ceilings.

Evanston

Home to the prestigious Northwestern University, Evanston also hosts two notable masajid:

Baitul Huda (House of Guidance)
A converted church that now serves as a vibrant community center for Jummah prayers and youth programs.

Dar-us-Sunnah Masjid
A brand-new standalone building with a spacious musalla, echoing with the recitation of Quran during Taraweeh in Ramadan.
 

 


Des Plaines

Des Plaines Downtown Masjid (DDM)
733 Lee St, Des Plaines, IL 60016
A large complex housing both a masjid and an Islamic seminary. I tried popping in for Zuhr, but the doors were locked—turns out they run on strict school hours.

Islamic Community Center of Des Plaines (ICCD)
Just a ten-minute drive from O’Hare Airport, making it a handy stop for travelers looking to freshen up for Dhuhr and Asr prayers en route.
 

 


Tasting Kyrgyz Delights

Chicago’s melting-pot vibe means you can snag authentic eats from all over the ummah. From budget-friendly Arabic feasts (think lamb platter with salad and flatbread for just $16) to an upscale, alcohol-free Italian spot run by Kyrgyz chefs—yes, you read that right, Kyrgyzstan-style spaghetti! There’s even a Central Asian joint dishing out manti (dumplings) and rice bowls, just like back in the day in Xinjiang.
 
 



Arzan Café

Funny enough, two of my three sit-down meals (tip expected, of course) were at Kyrgyz spots. At the Italian place, all the chefs and waitstaff were unmistakably Central Asian. Curious, I asked one server why so many Kyrgyz folk call Chicago home. She shrugged, “Hard to say exactly—no reliable stats—but we’re over 13,000 strong here now. Ten years ago, that number was way smaller.” She herself came from Russia five years ago, echoing a trend of Kyrgyz leaving the Motherland to avoid conscription into the Moscow–Kyiv conflict.

This year, the U.S. Census Bureau even added “Kyrgyz” as its own category in community surveys. As a sanctuary city, Chicago has long been a beacon for immigrants and asylum seekers. During our meal, the server asked, “Where are you from?” I replied, “China.” She probed, “Uyghurs?” I explained, “No, we’re Hui—Mandarin-speaking Chinese Muslims.” She lit up: “Alhamdulillah! I know of the Dungan people too!” I beamed back, “Exactly—we’re from eastern China, my wife from central China.” It was such a heartwarming exchange we bumped our tip by an extra 5%—hey, a little sadaqah for good conversation never hurts!
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Ramadan in the Big Apple: My 2025 islamic Journey to Manhattan, NYC

As the southbound train gently rolled into Brooklyn on the East Coast, looking out the window, you suddenly see those towering skyscrapers of Manhattan. At that moment, you can't help but exclaim, "We've made it to New York!" I quickly pulled out my phone and snapped a couple of shots. It's that feeling you get looking at the Lujiazui skyline from the Bund in Shanghai – it's like a calling card, as if it is the entire city. Of course, to truly appreciate the beauty of such urban grandeur, it's always better to keep your distance, to remain an observer.

Eventually, our train pulled into Penn Station, right in Midtown Manhattan. This, my friends, is the busiest train station in all of America, sitting near Times Square, with its entire concourse and waiting areas completely underground. Unlike back home, here there isn't just one rail company. The waiting areas are split into three sections – Amtrak, Long Island Rail Road, and NJ Transit – each managed by their own company. Amtrak and NJ Transit are on the first basement level, while Long Island Rail Road is on the second basement level. We got off the train and made our way through the Moynihan Train Hall to street level. As an old-school NBA fan, I was absolutely stunned to realize that the building right above the station was Madison Square Garden, the home of the New York Knicks! There I was, wearing my Brooklyn Nets jacket, feeling just a tad out of place. Subhanallah, what a welcome!
 


Navigating the NYC Subway: A Leap of Faith

Our first day in New York happened to be a Monday, and we'd already planned to hit the Metropolitan Museum of Art, which was open. I stared at the complex subway map, finally picking a line that didn't require any transfers – we'd get off and just walk through Central Park to the Met. I'd heard stories before coming here: the New York subway runs 24/7, and there are no barriers between the platforms and the tracks, just like the old Shanghai Metro Line 3/4. Word on the street was that people waiting on the platforms always choose to stand against the wall because some crazy person might just push you onto the tracks. Others warned that the NYC subway reeked, rats scurried everywhere, and you'd see all sorts of eccentrically dressed characters, plus rumors of anti-Asian violence. It sounded like a no-go zone, a place to avoid at all costs, as if this bizarre underworld gathered all the evil of the city.
 


But honestly, the thing that chapped my hide the most was buying a subway ticket. You can't buy tickets from a human; you're stuck using these ancient-looking, grandpa-era ticket machines on the wall. Since we didn't have enough cash, my wife and I tried our credit cards a gazillion times, but it was a bust every time. We finally had to scrounge up some coins from a passerby to buy our tickets. Later, when I was venting about this to Wasim (the young brother I met in Flushing), he just chuckled and told me you could actually just tap your credit card directly on the turnstile. My actual experience riding the subway, however, felt perfectly normal: the same crowds, the same bumps and jostles. Every now and then, you'd see someone leaning against the door, their eyes closed, swaying precariously, looking like they were about to keel over onto you at any moment. May Allah protect us all.

Central Park: A Spiritual Oasis

After getting off the subway, we crossed the street to the west entrance of Central Park. Our plan was to cut through the park to reach the Met on the east side. This route turned out to be an absolute winner. Central Park is simply breathtaking; the city's usual hustle and bustle just stops cold here. It's crawling with people walking their dogs, jogging, and just strolling along. Central Park is massive, like a sharp sword plunged right into the heart of the city.
 


The park feels like a sanctuary for the soul, pulling you away from the heavy burden of work, if only for a short while, and healing the wounds within. The park is surrounded by a dense forest of skyscrapers, and behind them are the crowded streets. The roads separate the park from the buildings that rise abruptly from the ground, almost like a dividing line between reality and an ideal. Central Park has been around for over a hundred years, and it hasn't been developed into housing projects as the city grew. In fact, it's even gotten bigger. The city's planners clearly see it as a balance between work and leisure, a true ni'mah (blessing) for the residents.

Islamic Cultural Center of New York: A Thriving Ummah

Lately, my social media has been flooded with posts from my brothers and sisters in New York. They're back to performing Tarawih (Ramadan night prayers) in Times Square. They cordon off a rectangular area amidst the crowds, standing with their backs to that iconic, gigantic screen. Even with a light rain, the Imam leading the prayer recited the beautiful Quran into a microphone, his melodious voice cutting through the surrounding clamor. The dhul-jism (Muslims) behind him, their lips moving, quietly recited along with the Imam, completely undisturbed by the environment. By now, most New Yorkers probably don't even bat an eye at this sight. When you look at the number of mosques and the Muslim population, New York might just be considered the halal capital of America. Data from 2018 showed that over 750,000 Muslims lived in New York City, making it the city with the largest Muslim population in the U.S. Roughly 9% of New York City residents are Muslims, accounting for 22.3% of America's total Muslim population. And New York City boasts over 200 mosques, scattered in every corner of the metropolis. Masha'Allah, the Ummah is truly thriving here.
 
 
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The Islamic Cultural Center of New York: A Beacon of Faith

Perhaps it all began with the completion of the Islamic Cultural Center. In Manhattan, no other mosque stands out quite like the Islamic Cultural Center of New York, located between East 96th and 97th Streets in the Upper East Side. Due to the need to face the Kaaba for prayer, the entire building is angled about thirty degrees to the street. This Islamic Cultural Center is New York's first purpose-built mosque and one of the largest in the city. When this mosque, with its dome soaring 27 meters high and minaret reaching 40 meters, was completed, Islam seemed to suddenly burst onto the scene for New Yorkers. The dedication of this masjid felt like New York granting a new identity card to its Muslims, acknowledging and embracing their presence in the city. After its opening, Muslim culture, by the grace of Allah, truly became an integral part of this vibrant metropolis.
 


The ambitious plan to establish a large Islamic center in New York was first conceived in the late 1960s. The initial Islamic center operated on a small scale in a modest townhouse. Later, the board of directors envisioned a grander center to elevate the prestige of Islam and to become one of New York City's iconic landmarks. Eventually, a comprehensive project including a mosque, a school, a library, a museum, and an auditorium was planned. After years of delays, including fundraising from Muslim countries, lengthy tenant relocations, and the eventual demolition of existing structures on the site, construction of the Islamic Cultural Center finally began in October 1984. The mosque itself started construction on May 28, 1987, a day that perfectly coincided with the end of Ramadan. Construction was even further delayed during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War. Finally, the mosque officially opened its doors on April 15, 1991, which was the blessed day of Eid al-Fitr. Throughout this monumental process, over 46 Muslim nations contributed to the center's $17 million construction cost, with Kuwait alone donating a staggering two-thirds of the total. Truly, this center embodies the hopes of Muslims from nearly every country in the world; even in this place, famously known as the "center of the universe," Islam continues to flourish. Allahu Akbar!

This mosque just so happened to be near the museum we were visiting. We arrived after the Asr prayer time had passed, so we performed our salah individually. The constant stream of people coming and going was incredible; new prayer congregations were forming one after another. I even witnessed a truly fascinating sight: a New York Police Department (NYPD) officer, in full uniform, became a temporary Imam, leading a few Muslim brothers behind him in prayer. In that moment, there was no law enforcement and no civilians, only ikhwah (brothers) bowing together towards the Kaaba. Near the entrance of the mosque, there was also a small shop selling books and various Muslim essentials. Before leaving, I bought a black prayer cap, and my wife picked up a box of dates. After settling the bill, we were about to head out when the shop owner suddenly called us back. She must have gathered from our brief chat that we were tourists. She then gave us some extra dates, explaining they were from Madinah, and also handed us two bottles of water. Mind you, we had only spent twelve bucks in total, and the items the kind sister gave us were easily worth at least five dollars. May Allah bless her for her generosity!
 


It was a bit of a bummer, though, that only the first floor of this mosque was open during our visit. The doors to the second and third floors were firmly locked, so we couldn't explore them fully.

Manhattan's "Rest Stops" for the Faithful

Aside from a handful of mosques whose unique architecture immediately gives them away, most mosques in Manhattan are incognito from the outside, blending seamlessly with office buildings and townhouses. You often have to get close and rely on the name of the mosque on the doorplate and the Muslims going in and out to confirm its identity.

More often than not, a mosque in Manhattan is like a mini "Central Park" for Muslims. The peaceful prayer hall inside is a world apart from the bustling environment outside the door. Muslims come and go, entering through an inconspicuous little door, quickly heading to the wudu facilities in the basement to perform their ablution. After that, they quietly perform their salah, and if they're tired, they lean against a wall for a quick rest. When it's time for work or if they have an urgent matter, they quickly leave. Traveling during Ramadan can be a bit tiring, so I gave up on my specific plans to visit every mosque. Instead, I just started treating them as places to rest. If I felt weary, I'd find a mosque, step inside for a breather, and then continue my journey. Alhamdulillah for these havens.

The Islamic Society of Mid Manhattan on 55th Street (154 E 55th St, New York) is a prime example of such a mosque. It doesn't have a grand entrance or stand alone; it looks just like the surrounding apartment buildings, accessed through a small door. Braving the rainy weather, we followed the directions from a fellow Muslim brother outside and easily entered the mosque. After walking in, you go down a long corridor, almost like a wormhole, and suddenly you've transported from the chaos of Manhattan to the quiet peace of home.
 


The wudu area wasn't as clean as it could be, probably due to the high foot traffic and the rainy weather, making the floor and restrooms a bit dirty. This might indicate a lack of regular upkeep, but it definitely highlighted the significant number of people using this mosque. After performing wudu, I headed straight to the men's prayer hall. As I entered, a Black brother was standing by the door, and I greeted him with a salam. His response was quite animated: his arm went halfway up, then swung down in a semicircle, firmly grasping my hand. With a rhythmic cadence, he repeatedly said, "Welcome, brother," "How are you doing?" and "You're doing great!" (likely approving of my enthusiastic response to him). After prayer, I leaned against the wall, and people kept greeting me. Compared to other places, New Yorkers are pretty well-informed. Folks elsewhere had no clue where I was from, but New York Muslims asked me more than once, "Are you Indonesian?"
 


NYC's Halal Food Carts: A Culinary Blessing

Speaking of halal food in New York, you simply can't skip the halal food carts – they're a huge part of New York's halal culinary scene. If you instinctively search "halal" on your map, most of the results you'll get are these food carts. These carts usually have fixed locations, and the map will show their spot along with customer reviews. The types of food they sell are pretty similar across the board: meat platters, rice bowls, hot dogs, and falafel. Some even have fried chicken if they're feeling a bit more adventurous.
 


On my first evening in Flushing, I broke my fast (iftar) with food from a cart. I ordered chicken over rice. The turmeric-colored long-grain rice was piled high with tender chicken, topped with a generous squeeze of white sauce and hot sauce. Even before I took a bite, my mouth was watering! And for a heaping container of that deliciousness, it only cost me $7. I immediately ordered another one to take for my suhoor (pre-dawn meal), grabbed a drink, and the total was $15. No exaggeration, this might just be the cheapest meal you can get in New York that's worth its salt. Of course, carts in Manhattan might charge a little more, but still usually under $10. Alhamdulillah for these blessings!
 
A Test of Faith in Manhattan: Halal Carts and Humble Mosques

Fasting while walking through the bustling streets of Manhattan is a massive test of sabr (patience). Despite my rumbling stomach, the tempting aroma from those halal food carts would waft into my nostrils every now and then. You know for sure that scent is halal, and sometimes you can't help but take an extra sniff or two, but there's nothing to do but sigh and hurry past. This temptation and the urge to buy don't just vanish. When you think you've missed out on a delicious meal, you turn the next corner and lo and behold, you find another cart. Look further down, and there's yet another halal food cart at the next intersection. By the time Iftar (breaking of fast) rolls around, you've probably passed a good dozen or so carts, and at that point, you're so famished you don't even want to explore which one has the most variety or the best taste.

Masjid Awliya of Allah: A Hidden Gem

As Iftar time drew near, my wife and I were walking around Times Square, passing one food cart after another, our eyes glued to the prize. I suggested we find a masjid to settle down and rest for a bit, then grab our food once it was time to break our fast, and head to the train station to go home. So, I searched and found this mosque: Masjid Awliya of Allah (Friends of Allah Mosque, located at 327 W 36th St., New York, NY 10018). It's probably the closest mosque to Times Square. We made a beeline for it, and as soon as we got to the entrance, my wife stared in disbelief and asked, "Are you sure this is a mosque?"

And honestly, at first glance, you'd think you'd stumbled into the Halal Food Cart Association. The entrance, as marked on the map, led into a huge warehouse chock-full of food carts waiting to be stocked up for their day's business. We asked someone inside, and he confirmed it was indeed the masjid. Then, he led us on a winding path, weaving through rows of food carts until we finally reached a staircase. Lo and behold! The actual masjid entrance was hidden behind this dense array of food trucks! We ascended to the second floor, where we found a small prayer room. Even with such limited space, they had a dedicated area for the sisters, masha'Allah. I quickly scanned the people resting; by their attire, most seemed to be delivery drivers or food cart vendors. This place had clearly become their perfect refuge from the elements, a spot to enjoy a moment of tranquility amidst their busy lives. The only downside was that the wudu (ablution) area in this mosque had no partitions, just a large communal water basin. It wasn't very convenient for the sisters to perform wudu, so we decided to head out.

The Ever-Present Mercy (of Allah)

Back on the street, my wife and I were beat, our feet killing us. I pointed to the map and said, "There's another masjid not too far. Let's make a dash for it." At this point, I was pinning all my hopes on that one, praying it would be a more "conventional" masjid, a place where I could charge my phone and my body could get a quick recharge too. Our train home was less than two hours away, so time was of the essence. We decided to grab some food from the "Tianshan" restaurant we'd just passed, saving it for tomorrow's suhoor (pre-dawn meal).

Walking up to the restaurant, we saw the menu taped to the window, filled with familiar dishes: "wontons," "roasted samosa-like buns," "stir-fried noodles with meat." We walked in, our hearts singing, thinking this must be authentic Chinese cuisine. At the ordering counter, my wife looked at a familiar-looking young man and started, "Hey, so, can I have a—" I cut in, blurting out, "Wontons!" The young man replied in Chinese, "Sorry, no wontons." We both looked at each other and shared a laugh. He asked about our situation, and we, in turn, asked about his. This young man, who had been in the U.S. for six years, told us his parents had also moved to New York. Hearing that, the slight tension in my brow eased a bit, as if a worry had lifted off my shoulders. I said, "That's the real deal." The young man, seeing we weren't planning to sit down, asked, "Are you also fasting?" Fearing he might misunderstand, I quickly said, "Yes, that's right! I'm taking it to go for suhoor." The young man wasn't questioning us; he just wanted to give us some dates, and with that, he started to head to the kitchen. We quickly stopped him, explaining that we already had plenty of dates, both ones we'd bought and some given to us for free at the masjid. But he insisted on giving us more. When we finally got our takeout bag, we saw a box of dates placed right next to our roasted buns. We thanked him profusely, saying, "Jazak Allah Khayr!" The young man waved us goodbye, calling out, "Come back anytime!"
 



Masjid al-Rahman: A True Sanctuary

With our suhoor taken care of, we made a beeline for our next masjid: Masjid al-Rahman (The Mosque of The Most Merciful). As we hurried along, I could already see men in kufis and women in hijabs gathered at the entrance from a distance. I told my wife, "Do you see that group of Muslim brothers and sisters up ahead? This time, we definitely haven't come to the wrong place!" The mosque had two roll-up doors, one covering the prayer hall and the other serving as the entrance. After confirming there was a designated women's prayer area and a women's wudu station, we couldn't wait to go inside and recharge.

After praying, I took a moment to truly examine this masjid. It wasn't small at all. As Iftar time drew near, the number of people was substantial. There were small groups chatting by the walls, and others reciting Quran to a teacher. Through their official website, I learned that the jama'ah (congregation) in this area had been gathering and renting places for Jumu'ah since the 1990s, enduring three relocations before finally settling here. The first floor was the main prayer hall, and the basement held another surprise. The masjid had covered the entire basement with tablecloths, waiting for those breaking their fast to arrive.
 


I leaned against a pillar, charging my phone and resting. A study circle behind me caught my interest. Some young men were sitting around an elder, who was clearly imparting ilm (knowledge). About twenty minutes passed, and I figured my phone was charged enough. I quickly unplugged it and discreetly slipped into a spot next to a brother, not wanting to miss anything. I whispered to him, "Is this a halaqah (study circle) for new Muslims?" The brother whispered back, explaining that it covered basic Islamic knowledge, Quranic studies, and more. Our whispering must have disturbed the elder, as he paused his talk and reminded us to be quiet. We awkwardly sat upright in our places.

The Wisdom of Obligation Versus Tradition

When I joined, it was exactly during the Q&A session. A brother across from me, with the trendiest dreadlocks, was casually leaning against the wall, legs stretched out. Suddenly, the elder turned to him and asked gravely, "What are the seven external conditions for Salat (prayer)?" The young man immediately straightened up, knelt with his thighs upright, placed his hands on his thighs, closed his eyes tightly, and answered the Shaykh's question precisely: "Purity of body, purity of clothes, purity of place of prayer, covering the awrah (modesty), praying on time, facing the qibla, and having the correct niyyah (intention)!" At that moment, he sat rigidly, looking just like a student called to task. The Shaykh then asked about the essential elements of prayer and wudu. Finally, he asked him to recite Surah Al-Ikhlas ("The Chapter of Sincerity"). After answering all this, the young man slumped back into his original relaxed posture, like a balloon that had lost its air.

This teaching method was quite insightful. If we reflect on our own learning process for things like wudu, we often don't explicitly differentiate between its fardh (obligatory) and Sunnah (Prophetic tradition) elements. Instead, the focus is on formal instruction, teaching the entire wudu procedure as a whole. The same goes for salat. Every movement, every recitation is ingrained in our bones, but if you're pressed to explain what's fardh and what's Sunnah, you might not remember it with such clarity. This somewhat pragmatic approach, not emphasizing the distinction, can lead us to treat fardh and Sunnah as equally essential in practice. In special circumstances, our memory gets blurry, and it feels like everything is fardh and shouldn't be omitted. However, if we clearly understand that fardh are absolute obligations, and Sunnah are not strictly mandatory (referring only to special circumstances, as emphasized Sunnah implies you shouldn't casually abandon it!), then the issue becomes clear as daylight. I recall a brother recently asking in our group chat about the validity of wudu if one cannot rinse their mouth due to illness. How did the Imam answer? He said rinsing the mouth is Sunnah, so the wudu is still valid without it. Indeed, our Deen is one of ease.

 
 

 
 
 
The Abundance of Allah's Provision

Seeing the time was almost up, I told my wife to wait for me by the door while I quickly performed my wudu (ablution). When I emerged, my wife had a takeout container in her hand. She explained that one of the uncles at the masjid had seen us leaving and insisted she take a meal for iftar (breaking fast), a true blessing from Allah. We didn't have time to dwell on it; our minds were still set on the food carts we'd been eyeing, eager to get our actual iftar there.

After walking for less than five minutes, we finally settled on a large food cart. The young man working the cart seemed a bit green; he was out of pretty much everything we wanted, only having rice bowls and meat wraps left. We had no choice but to settle for what we could get. Just then, a Black uncle came bustling over. Without a word to the vendor, he grabbed some water from the cart, paid, and was about to leave. He seemed to notice my wife and I by our attire, and he extended a warm salam (peace greeting) to us. Masha'Allah.

After he left, I told my wife, "Subhanallah, there are so many Muslims here!" No sooner had the words left my mouth than the uncle reappeared. This time, he was carrying a bag overflowing with fruits and dates. He pulled out some bananas and oranges and insisted we take them, shoving them into our hands. The other people waiting for food around us looked on, perplexed, wondering what in the world was going on. After the uncle left, I smiled at an auntie nearby and tried to explain, "We're Muslims, fasting, and he gave us food." The auntie just smiled back. It was clear she didn't speak English and didn't understand my explanation, but the gesture of brotherhood transcended language.

A Sister in Need, A Prophet's Wisdom

Just that morning, we were wondering what we'd eat, and now we had a whole bag full of food. It felt as though Allah's grace was continuously flowing into our lives. Alhamdulillah (all praise is due to Allah)! As we waited, a young woman wearing a white hijab (headscarf) came over to buy food. I pointed to the dates in our bag and gestured for my wife to offer her some. The girl took the dates, and her previously serious expression instantly lit up with a smile. My wife chatted with her, while I pointed her in the direction of the masjid. It turned out this sister had no idea where there was a mosque nearby where she could break her fast. Subhanallah! It was a perfect moment for a small act of kindness.

This experience brought to mind the beautiful Hadith (Prophetic tradition) where the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was asked, "Which act in Islam is the most excellent?" He replied, "To feed others and to greet with salam (peace) those whom you know and those whom you do not know." (Recorded in Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim).

As we walked through the bustling streets of New York, my wife turned to me and said, "I feel so content with this trip." And how could I not feel the same? Indeed, Subhanallah, what a blessed journey!
 

 
 
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Ramadan in the Big Apple: A Muslim's Journey

The last two days of the first week of Ramadan, my wife and I finally embarked on our long-awaited trip to New York. We were at the train station by the crack of dawn, before 7 AM, with the sky still dark. Even for a Monday, the station was buzzing with people; I figured a lot of folks, like us, were taking advantage of spring break. We'd planned this trip over a month ago. My wife's main goal was to see a special exhibition at the Asian Society Museum. I threw in, "Let's check out the Metropolitan Museum of Art while we're at it!" But as for what to do with the rest of our time, we were drawing a blank. My wife basically just threw up her hands, saying aside from wanting some good eats (most trips for us Muslims eventually boil down to that one line: "Let's get some good food"), she had no other demands.

When I think of New York these days, my mind doesn't immediately go to iconic landmarks like the Statue of Liberty or the World Trade Center. It feels like "freedom" and the concept of "global trade" are showing signs of continuous decline, perhaps on the brink of being swallowed by the tides of history once again. Instead, what pops into my head are the rumors floating around: daily shootings, rats scurrying through the subways, and all that jazz. The reports and the spread of these stories aren't really about genuinely caring whether New Yorkers are doing well; it's more about proving that folks in New York are worse off than we are. Faced with that kind of information environment, I just decided to go with the flow and document whatever I saw and heard, getting a firsthand feel for everything.

Flushing, Queens: The New Chinese Capital in America

We booked our hotel in Flushing, Queens. When we made the reservation, there was only one reason for choosing that spot: it was cheap. After a full day of hitting the museums, we got back to Flushing around 8 PM. New York, which had been bright and sunny all day, was now buffeted by strong winds, with icy raindrops occasionally hitting us. As my wife and I shivered our way out of the subway station, the streets were still packed with people. Suddenly, my wife shouted, "Sugar-roasted chestnuts!" I gazed at the sign, which looked just like the ones back home in China, and felt a bit disoriented. I said, "We've really come home this time." When I spotted a "Zhang Liang Malatang" (a popular Chinese hotpot chain), I was even more convinced. Most of the people walking around were Chinese faces, the sidewalks teeming with pedestrians, just like Shanghai's People's Square during rush hour. Mandarin was understood everywhere, and most of the signs on both sides of the street were written in Chinese. If you stepped away from the bustling commercial strips into the residential areas, you'd hear passersby talking on the phone with family in a Northeastern Chinese dialect, while a mother behind you might be reminding her school-aged daughter in Mandarin to study hard. If an American were knocked out cold and thrown into a sack, then dropped onto a street in Flushing, they'd wake up in a panic, convinced they'd been sold to China.

Of course, if you're looking for a quiet and safe place in New York, Flushing and its surrounding areas can probably fit the bill. Otherwise, Chinese people wouldn't choose to settle here. Compared to the old Chinatown downtown, a brother I met at the mosque who lives in Flushing put it this way: "It's safer here. Old Chinatown is Manhattan, after all, and you've got all sorts of characters there." I readily agreed. Following the Chinese is the way to go. Chinese people are known for "voting with their feet"—if more and more Chinese are flocking to a place, it pretty much tells you it's at least safe to live there. My wife and I chose a Malaysian restaurant there for our iftar (breaking the fast) that night. The restaurant had a halal certification, but the staff told us the Hainanese chicken rice wasn't halal. In the States, you see this kind of restaurant quite a bit. It’s a good reminder to always ask, even with a halal sign, because when it comes to halal, you can never be too careful.
 

 
 
 
 
Masjid Syed Jamaluddin Afghani: A Dawn Prayer Revelation

This mosque, Masjid Syed Jamaluddin Afghani, is one of four in the Flushing area, named after the renowned modern scholar, Afghani. You can tell from the name that it was founded by the Afghan community. Naming mosques after people is nothing out of the ordinary and pretty common. Not far from here, there's Masjid Hazrati Abu Bakr Siddique, and the Islamic Center in Midtown Manhattan is Masjid Usman Bin Affan. There are countless mosques named after Ali, too. So, a mosque named after a person doesn't really tell you much. This mosque is about two blocks from me, so I decided to go there for Fajr (dawn prayer).

I left home a little before 5:45 AM, and folks in Flushing were still fast asleep. The only people out on the streets were those like me, responding to the call that "prayer is better than sleep," and Koreans heading to church activities. It was my first time seeing churches hold events so early. As I walked, I kept looking at the churches along the road; people were constantly going in, and the music was already blaring inside.

It took about fifteen minutes to get to the mosque. It was too dark to see the whole building, but luckily, a few people wearing hats went in ahead of me, showing me where the door was. Once inside, Fajr hadn't started yet, but there were already about twenty people gathered, mostly South Asian faces, all silently waiting for the Imam to arrive. About five minutes later, there was still no sign of the Imam, and at this point, some folks started to get a little antsy. Someone quickly pushed an elder from the community forward to lead the prayer. An older gentleman in front of me seemed to have a different opinion, suggesting we wait another five minutes, and if the Imam still didn't show, then start. But nobody paid him any mind; they stuck to the schedule and prayed on time.
 



Post-Prayer Greetings: A Lingering Connection

After the prayer, I, as usual, shook hands with the people passing by who were also praying. The others in the mosque weren't in a rush to leave after the prayer; instead, they greeted each other and chatted. Greeting everyone after prayer can actually take a fair bit of time; when there are a lot of people, you feel like you're saying salam a hundred times. Have you ever experienced the "hand-shaking" (shaking hands and exchanging salams) after Eid prayers? I go through this almost every morning after Fajr in our "P-town" (Princeton). After the Imam finishes saying salam to the left and right, the crowd slowly starts to stir. Two strangers who meet will shake hands, smile, and say salam. If you've met a few times, you'll also ask, "How are you doing?" And if you're really familiar, it's like old friends who haven't seen each other in eight hundred years; their eyes meet, a look of surprise and delight crosses their faces simultaneously, then comes the handshake, the salam, and that's not even enough for the ritual. They'll also give each other a hug and exchange a few pleasantries. As other familiar faces pass by, the cycle begins anew.

About ten minutes later, most of the people in the mosque had pretty much left. At this point, the main prayer hall was filled with the sound of an old man and a younger man arguing. They seemed to disagree on the time for imsak (the start of fasting before Fajr). The old man spoke with great conviction, saying that most of the Ulama (scholars) believe that the Fajr time and imsak are the same, and you can pray after imsak. As for ending 15 minutes earlier, that's just for caution. His powerful voice seemed a bit out of place with his frail, trembling body. The younger brother, who was likely the mosque's spokesperson, spoke much softer and more politely. He was probably explaining to the old man what the mosque's regulations were, and so on. The old man cut him off, sticking to his point, and told him, "I don't want to hear what the mosque says. What the mosque decides has nothing to do with me. I just want to tell you what the scholars explain." With that, he limped off, leaning on his cane.

Honestly, it took me years to figure out this issue myself. Imsak is simply the beginning of Fajr time, and iftar (breaking fast) is the beginning of Maghrib time. Ending imsak 15 minutes early and delaying iftar by two or three minutes is purely a precautionary measure. Once you understand that, it becomes much easier to grasp the timing of imsak and iftar. Of course, this was a prime example of the confusion I experienced in my earlier years due to not knowing any better. Understanding the Deen greatly helps in practicing it; a muddled account simply means a muddled life.
 



A Sudanese Brother and a Tire Thief's Den

While they were arguing, I sat against the wall, reciting Quran and eavesdropping (as they say in Northeast China) on their "chit-chat." A young man sitting across from me seemed undisturbed by their discussion; every time I looked his way, he was quietly reading the Quran. When only the two of us were left in the mosque, I got up and walked over to him, pretending to look at the bulletin board above his head, all while trying to figure out how to strike up a conversation. To my surprise, as soon as I got in front of him, he greeted me: "Brother, where are you from?" My heart leapt with joy, and the floodgates of conversation immediately opened. We briefly introduced ourselves. He was Sudanese, named Wasim, and a medical student.

Soon after, another older uncle joined us. They seemed to know each other. The uncle asked Wasim if he was busy, and the young man said, "You know how it is in the hospital; I can only bounce between the mosque and the hospital." I asked, "So you don't go shopping then? How do you get your groceries and stuff?" He just said, "Amazon." The uncle, listening in, chuckled and said, "I still prefer to buy things myself, especially fruits and vegetables. I have to see them with my own eyes." We chatted casually about various topics. They asked me about the situation in China, and I shared my thoughts on Flushing. I told them that what surprised me most about Flushing was how Chinese people online always complained about people here stealing tires. I asked if it was true. Wasim thought for a moment and said that theft is pretty common. "There's a well-known shop around here," he explained, "if you lose something, you go to that shop, and nine times out of ten, you'll be able to buy your stolen item back."

Chinese Muslims in Flushing: A Scattered Community

Compared to Wasim, the uncle was an old hand, very familiar with Flushing. I asked these two brothers living in Flushing if they had ever seen any Chinese Muslims here. The young man thought for a bit and said he knew a young man named Omar, whom he often saw on Fridays and at some hadith (Prophetic tradition) study classes. Besides him, he hadn't seen anyone else. The uncle seemed to know Omar too. He said that the first time he saw that Chinese man, he had long hair. The uncle gestured with his hand to show the approximate length. He told Omar, "Hair this long isn't very good." The second time the uncle saw Omar, he was surprised to find that Omar's hair was cut very, very short. I asked, "Besides Omar?" They tried hard to remember. "Yes, there was one more, but not Hui Muslim like you." I pressed a bit further, "Was Omar a convert or born Muslim?" They said he was a convert.

I then voiced my confusion. I told them it seemed difficult to find Chinese people in the mosque, and it wasn't like the Indo-Pakistani or other ethnic groups who have their own mosques. The uncle immediately corrected my second point. He said, "Mosques are the same everywhere, so there's no need for Chinese people to have their own mosque. That's Islam." The uncle told me to observe the churches in Flushing; there are so many of them, almost every denomination has its own church, and people from different denominations usually don't go to each other's churches. "But here, all the mosques are the same. Chinese people can go to any mosque. Every mosque has the same prayer, the same Jumu'ah. People from different backgrounds can enter confidently. Maybe Chinese Muslims are just spread out among all the mosques." The uncle's words were confirmed later during my stroll; there was one main road where almost every intersection had a Korean church.

The Mosque's True Form: A Hidden Gem

After about an hour of chatting, the uncle got up and motioned for us, inviting us to see the mosque's true "form." The place where we had just prayed was probably less than 100 square meters, and I was thinking, in such a large city, how much room could there possibly be for imagination? Following the uncle's lead, we walked out of the main prayer hall and turned towards a basement entrance. I followed him skeptically. When he opened the door, Wasim and I were both blown away, exclaiming that it was a whole other world! It turned out the place where we had just prayed was just a temporary side hall; the real mosque hadn't been used in winter because the heating hadn't been fixed. Including the basement, this mosque had three floors. The basement was a common area, with even a room for washing the deceased (ghusl). The second and third floors were the men's and women's prayer halls, respectively.

I asked the uncle, "Are there many women?" The uncle said that on Eid, the third floor was packed. I estimated that would be a few hundred people. I asked the uncle how much such a mosque cost and if it was funded by Muslim donations. The uncle said, "About $3 million. Donations from ordinary Muslims definitely aren't enough. There are always some wealthy individuals who cover the vast majority of the costs." Next, we followed the uncle to the first floor. The uncle pointed to a small room by the entrance of the main prayer hall, explaining that it was a restroom for those who didn't have time to go downstairs for wudu. I remarked, "New York is different; everyone's always on the go." The uncle then pointed to an uninstalled iron gate leaning against the wall and mysteriously said, "This iron gate was bought from China." My eyes bulged out as I confirmed with him, "Are you saying this iron gate with the crescent moon decoration on it?" It's quite ironic, I thought. Back home, we might not even be allowed to use such decorations, yet you bought them from China. The uncle chuckled and said, "Chinese people can sell anything!" And he cracked up.
 

 


A Mosque's Distinct Identity & Community Pushback

Stepping outside, the day had also brightened up considerably. The uncle pointed to the entrance. "That spot used to be the original main door," he explained. "We moved the door inward a bit so we could squeeze in two more parked cars." Space is at a premium here, so making smart use of every square foot is absolutely crucial.

I looked back at the mosque again, and it was then that I truly saw its distinct identity as a mosque. The not-so-tall minarets on either side stood in clear contrast to the surrounding buildings. Mosques like this are actually a rare find in urban areas. When you factor in the cost, having a dome and minarets means you need a completely undeveloped plot of land, which is practically a pipe dream in Manhattan.

Of course, they also run into some bumps in the road here. For instance, neighboring residents complain that during Jumu'ah (Friday congregational prayer), there are too many people, the loudspeakers are too loud, and they demand the mosque keep its windows closed, and so on. The uncle, with a slight hint of disdain, scoffed, "The prayer itself is only half an hour, and it's not like it's every single day. They clearly just don't want a mosque here and are looking for trouble."

However, there are exceptions. Wasim mentioned that his landlord, who is Chinese, has actually been eager to visit the mosque with him. I encouraged him, saying, "You've absolutely got to bring him. Don't forget about our Chinese brothers and sisters!"

Dar Al Taqwa Islamic Center: Another Welcoming Spot

After wrapping up my chat with them, I made my way to another mosque, and this one was much more polished by comparison. Wasim had told me about this mosque, saying that scholars often give lectures there, and he really enjoys going. The people at this mosque were also very courteous. When they saw me come in, they warmly asked where I was from and then inquired about where I was planning to break my fast that evening, insisting that I come back because they had iftar (breaking fast) meals ready. Before I left, one of them pointed to the door and said, "The mosque door is always open. You're welcome to come any time." Alhamdulillah!
 

 


Streets Lined with Diverse Houses of Worship
 
 

As I walked along the main thoroughfares, it was striking to see church after church, often right next to each other, especially Korean churches at almost every intersection. It truly made me ponder the diverse religious landscape of this city.
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From Steeple to Minaret: A Growing Trend

Last year, I heard from the news that a Muslim group in Buffalo, New York, was planning to convert St. Ann Catholic Church, a local landmark, into a mosque. This Gothic-style building had been closed for five years before the Muslims bought it. The group plans to invest at least $22.5 million in renovations. News like this often spreads like wildfire within the Muslim community, seen as a kind of spiritual conquest in the West: Christianity is supposedly declining, while Islam is flourishing. But this change in building use isn't just about some psychological intent by Muslims (though, yes, there might be a preference for churches). From an economic standpoint, it simply makes perfect sense: there are too many abandoned Christian churches, and with a constant increase in Muslim immigrants and converts, a slight modification to a church – removing the idols from the sanctuary – makes it a natural prayer hall.

If you can't change their faith, change their architecture. While in the East, this might be seen as an affront or a test of obedience from an authority figure to a group, in the West, it's more about going with the flow. Nowadays, I hardly bat an eye at this kind of news anymore. "Church-to-mosque" conversions have clearly become a trend, a growing reality. Even though I haven't specifically sought out these converted mosques, I've come across enough of them to dedicate an entire article to the ones I've encountered. It's not just churches; mosques have even been theaters, or get this, even nightclubs!
 


Mosques Across the States: From Churches to Nightclubs

Let me share some of the fascinating transformations I've witnessed, from coast to coast.

Massachusetts Mosques

Dar al-Islam of Boston

138 Tremont St, Boston, MA 02111

Located right in downtown Boston, Dar al-Islam is the only publicly accessible place where you can find Jumu'ah (Friday congregational prayer). Dar al-Islam is probably the weirdest example on this list because it genuinely is a church: St. Paul Catholic Church, and it still has all its church facilities intact. But it's not just a church; Muslims aren't simply borrowing the church for Jumu'ah prayers (which is actually pretty common in North America, as churches often lend their space to Muslims for Jumu'ah before a proper mosque is established in an area). No, this is a legitimate usage because the Muslim community actually helped sponsor its construction. So, you get this bizarre sight: this church has special sinks for Muslims to perform wudu (ablution). Of course, this particular church only functions as a prayer space on Fridays.

 
 
 


Islamic Society of Greater Worcester

57 Laurel St, Worcester, MA 01605

The Islamic Society of Greater Worcester's building was originally bought and built as a church by Finnish Evangelicals in 1906. In 1957, it converted to a Lutheran church. By 1977, the church faced problems like a dwindling active membership, insufficient funds, and a deteriorating surrounding neighborhood. Finally, in 1979, it was sold for $27,000 to the Islamic Foundation of North America, and by 1980, the building officially became a mosque.

During the conversion, the pews were removed, and the church's second floor was transformed into the main prayer hall. There was even a debate for a while about the qibla (direction of prayer), leading to prayers being conducted in two different directions for some time! Ultimately, the community agreed on the qibla direction based on publications from the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA).
 

 
 


Rhode Island Mosques

Masjid Ali

575 Charles St, Providence, RI 02904

This mosque has a really odd layout. To perform wudu, you have to walk through the main prayer hall, then enter a door next to the qibla. While heading to the basement for wudu, I bumped into the mosque's manager. When he heard I was from China, he immediately started speaking Chinese! Turns out, the uncle had worked in Guangzhou about a decade ago. As we chatted, I learned that this mosque was only established a year and a half ago, and he seemed to be the one who founded it. The reason for the strange layout? It used to be a bank, so it still has the old vault doors! I asked the uncle if he leads prayers, and he said several people do. I then asked why they don't invite an Imam, and he simply replied they couldn't afford one. Despite not having a full-time Imam, this small mosque, with less than a hundred people on Friday, still offers Quran classes for kids. It's a true case of being small but mighty, having everything you need.
 
 


Chicago Mosques

Muslim Community Center (MCC Chicago)

4380 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60641

The MCC headquarters on Elston Avenue in Chicago really catches your eye because this building was once the Rivoli Theater, built in 1923. The interior of the mosque still retains the original architectural structure of the theater. The main prayer hall is the former performance hall, complete with a raised stage and a sunken audience area, and the second-floor balcony has also been repurposed into a prayer area.
 

 


Chicago Merkez Camii

3617 W Belle Plaine Ave, Chicago, IL 0618

Founded in 2011, Chicago Merkez Camii, or Chicago Central Mosque, was previously St. Andrew’s Church. It was later converted into a Muslim community center and mosque, primarily serving the Turkish community.
 
 


Islamic Oasis Center and Mosque

4201 N Monticello Ave, Chicago, IL 60618

Established in 2008, the Islamic Oasis Center and Mosque is just two blocks away from Merkez Camii and quite similar to it. This mosque was also converted from a church; its predecessor was the United Methodist Church, built in 1898. This mosque not only provides local Islamic learning, social services, and after-school tutoring but also engages in humanitarian work overseas, supporting charity efforts in places like Bangladesh and Syria.
 

 


Masjid E Noor

6151 N Greenview Ave, Chicago, IL 60660

This mosque has a very distinctive exterior, and it also appears to be a church conversion. When I prayed Jumu'ah there, I saw many Central Asian faces.

Dar-us-Sunnah Masjid (House of Guidance Mosque) also underwent a church conversion.
 
 
 


Baitul Huda (House of Guidance)

1136 Wesley Ave, Evanston, IL 60202
 



Portland

Al Furqan Islamic Center

7410 NE Martin Luther King Jr Blvd, Portland, OR 97211

As I looked at the exterior of this mosque, I thought the building's theme was a bit strange. There was a prominent sign-like protrusion on the roof that read "Moon Star." Once inside, I asked a young man who was leading prayers, and he explained that before its conversion, this place was a nightclub! Allahu Akbar! From the dance floor to the prayer mat – only Allah could orchestrate such a transformation.
 
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A Little Bit of Rhode Island, A Whole Lot of Faith

Now, Rhode Island, in New England, is the smallest state in the U.S. – it's even tinier than Shanghai if you lop off its Pudong New Area. But here's the kicker: Rhode Island isn't even an island; it's a coastal state defined by its ocean vibes. Before I landed in the States, I didn't know a thing about this place. And honestly, that's no surprise – even Americans often mistake it for Long Island, New York, when I tell them where I'm from. Its biggest claims to fame are probably Newport, where The Great Gatsby was filmed, and that sweet old Judge Caprio from Caught in Providence, who's let countless folks off the hook for their traffic tickets.

So, when I found out there's an Islamic School in this little state with just over a million people, I was more than a little surprised. After all, compared to Massachusetts next door, Rhode Island's education system has always had its share of critics. Public schools are often underfunded, good teachers can be hard to come by, and top-notch schools are as rare as hens' teeth. What's more, in a state like Rhode Island, which is considered a liberal stronghold, the education scene is a hotbed of ideological clashes. Just last year, a local parent who questioned her daughter's kindergarten curriculum filed a public records request and ended up getting sued by the teachers' union. This case really shines a light on some conservative parents' worries about issues like Critical Race Theory (CRT) and radical gender education. In this kind of environment, it makes perfect sense that some more conservative Muslim families would choose to send their kids to an Islamic school.

My First Visit to the Muslim School

For a long time, I'd been itching to see how this school actually ran. As luck would have it, one of the Shaykhs who leads prayers at the mosque – he's a Quran teacher at this very school. He'd actually invited me a year ago to share my Quran recitation experiences with his students. He chuckled and said:

"Shanghai (that's his nickname for me, subhanallah!), I tell my students, 'You know what? I know a Chinese guy whose Quran recitation is fantastic. He doesn't even know Arabic, but he can learn to recite. What's your excuse, you Arabs, for not learning properly?'"

Hearing that, I felt a sense of contentment on one hand, but also a touch of irony. In this small, provincial corner of the world, "a Chinese person who can recite the Quran" had become a big deal, a rare sight. Nevertheless, I accepted Shaykh's invitation. Yet, in the days that followed, our conversations always seemed to get stuck on "What day are you free?" and "Definitely next week." It wasn't until late 2024 that the visit finally came to fruition.

The school's location is pretty out of the way, which was one reason I'd dragged my feet for so long. The school itself isn't huge, just two buildings: one for classrooms and a gym. As the only Muslim institution in the area, the gym doubles as a prayer space during Ramadan, and it's also open every Friday for teachers, students, and the local community to perform Jumu'ah (Friday congregational prayer). Even with limited facilities, the school offers a broad education, covering everything from kindergarten all the way to eighth grade (in the U.S., high school is grades nine through twelve). The school boasts computer labs, meeting rooms, and other multi-purpose classrooms – it's truly a case of being small but mighty, with everything you need.
 

 

 

 

 

 
 
 
 
School Operations and Curriculum: A Balancing Act

This school, by the way, has got its teaching license directly from the state government. The principal, proud as punch, told me:

"Our school is just like any other. Our students participate in state activities, and some of our graduates have even gotten into Brown University."

Even though it's called an Islamic School, the main learning during the day revolves around regular subjects like science, math, English, and history. The religion-related classes – things like Arabic and Quran studies – are saved for after school. This setup means students hit all their regular academic targets, but it also stretches the school day a bit longer. Public schools usually let out around 3:30 PM, but the Muslim school's classes don't wrap up until 5:30 PM, which is a real convenience for a lot of parents picking up their kids.

Shaykh gathered all the students from different grades together. I took a seat in the front, recited a couple of pages from the Quran, and chatted with the kids. After I shared my own learning journey, the students and teachers were chock-full of questions about China. Some asked, "Is it easy to find halal restaurants in China? Which cities should we go to for a Muslim experience?" or "Do you get picked on for your faith in China?" Still, a few of the older boys were dozing off the whole time. In that moment, I felt like I was back in my teaching shoes again.
 



 

 



Campus Life and Community Support: A Family Affair

After the event, I took a stroll around the campus with Shaykh. Peeking into the classrooms from the back door, each one was decorated brightly and colorfully, showing off that typical American school vibe. The desks and chairs were set up just like a traditional classroom, but with so few students in each class, the rooms felt pretty spacious. Even the kindergarteners were sitting in neat rows, good as gold. The teachers led the kids in learning Arabic letters through nursery rhymes, showing how deeply Arabic education is woven into their daily lives from a young age.

The Muslim school in Rhode Island has been going strong for twenty years through thick and thin. And none of it would be possible without the community's support. Every Ramadan, the school throws a fundraising gala because, let's be real, running on just $6,000 in annual tuition fees is a non-starter. But the school offers a trustworthy option for local Muslim families. Just last week, I happened to run into a graduate from this school at the mosque. He was part of the school's second graduating class, and now he's a father, successful in his career, and on his way to becoming a qualified doctor. His Quran memorization is top-notch, and he often leads the recitation during prayers. Shaykh remembered him clearly and brought up quite a few old stories.

Another Option: Sunday School

Besides the full-time school, the mosque's Sunday school is another popular choice for parents. The Sunday school divides students into classes based on their knowledge level, focusing on Arabic letters, recitation rules, Arabic grammar, and the Prophet's (PBUH) life story. The curriculum is set up much like a regular school, with quizzes and final exams throughout the semester. Students who graduate from the highest level of Sunday school generally have a solid grasp of Arabic grammar, are familiar with recitation rules, and can recite the last two Juz' (parts) of the Quran from memory.
 


Freedom to Thrive: Why This Land Still Beckons

The relaxed environment for free speech and the freedom to run schools are big reasons why this land still attracts immigrants. At least here, the requirements for running a religious school are pretty straightforward. You can grow a long beard without anyone giving you grief, and nobody bats an eye if you pray in public. Before I came here, I could hardly imagine Islam appearing so "uninhibitedly" in any corner of the West. Even at top universities, schools actually budget to hire Imams to serve Muslim students on campus and specifically set aside a room for Muslim student activities. Honestly, just over a decade ago, during those wild, anything-goes years, our universities were just as open. The seeds sown in those years easily took root in our hearts. Who knows when the season of rampant sowing will come again, insha'Allah (God willing).
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Unveiling Islam in Taiwan: A Muslim Traveler's Perspective

For the longest time, the idea of "Taiwan" and "Islam" in the American mind felt like two completely unrelated concepts. It's tough for folks to naturally picture a place there where Muslims could truly put down roots and thrive. If it even crossed their minds, it was usually imagined much like other Northeast Asian countries: a need for foreign laborers due to an aging population. These workers, often from Muslim nations, toiled in low-wage jobs within an unfamiliar culture, all while clinging to religious beliefs that locals might find "odd and out of place."

Thanks to the rapid growth of the internet over the past decade, the Hui Muslim community in mainland China has definitely gained a deeper understanding of their Taiwanese counterparts. In Shanghai, especially, there are more chances to connect with Muslim friends, relatives, or workers from the island. These interactions give us a peek behind the curtain, offering a glimpse into their lives. Taiwan's relatively open publishing industry has also allowed a wealth of Islam-related Chinese books to flow back to the mainland, building crucial bridges between East and West, and between different faiths and cultures.
 
 

 


Truth be told, Taiwan's modern Muslim history is far richer than most people imagine. It's a story that globalizes local Hui history, tracing their journey from the mainland, heading south into Myanmar and Thailand, and eventually finding their home in Taiwan. Their individual experiences paint a hidden yet grand picture of East Asian Islam. My trip this time was only ten days – not enough time to tell the whole enchilada, but I hope to leave a few clues for others to chew on later.

Taipei: Muslim-Friendly Amenities Galore

The Taipei Grand Mosque is certainly no longer an "isolated island" of faith, and Islamic beliefs are no longer confined within mosque walls. The Taiwanese authorities have been pushing a "Muslim-Friendly Policy" in recent years, setting up convenient facilities for Muslims in transportation hubs, universities, and major tourist spots. We're talking prayer rooms, dedicated facilities for wudu (ablution), and the like. The very first day I arrived in Taipei, I spotted clear signs for Muslim facilities in the downtown Taipei Main Station. Following the directions, it was a piece of cake to find both the restrooms and the prayer room.



Even though I didn't actually need to pray at that moment, I specifically asked a kind cleaning lady to open the wudu room door, just to see if it was the real deal or just for show. To my surprise, she was super enthusiastic, opened the door right away, and even proactively told me where the prayer room was and how to use it. In that moment, my tired body and soul immediately felt a boost – Taiwan really made a fantastic first impression. When someone extends a hand of kindness, we shouldn't just gladly accept it; we should also respond positively. If every Muslim doesn't overlook these readily available conveniences, then those who set up these facilities will also truly feel the meaning and necessity of their efforts.
 
 
 
 
Descendants of the "Lonely Army" on Myanmar Street

The very first day I landed in Taipei, even before checking into my hotel, I was in a hurry-scurry to get to the Taipei Grand Mosque, right next to Daan Forest Park. I rolled up just in time for a funeral, and honestly, seeing the family all dressed in black, lined up in two rows on the way to the wudu room, really caught me off guard. The deceased was there, waiting to be washed. I, with my luggage in tow, walked into the wudu room under their somewhat puzzled gazes. I naturally figured most of these family members weren't Muslim and probably wondered why a rushed traveler like me was heading into a washroom meant for the departed. Without a second to spare, I quickly performed wudu and headed to the main prayer hall, waiting for Dhuhr (midday prayer).

Glancing around at the people waiting for prayer, my eyes immediately landed on the "legendary" newly appointed young Imam. I went over and gave him a salam, and we agreed to chat after prayers. After we finished, we all stood for the Janazah (funeral prayer) for the deceased. Afterward, we started talking, and when the young Imam mentioned the deceased, he told me the person might be a descendant of Yunnan Hui Muslims from Myanmar, a young man from Myanmar Street, not even 30 years old. He also mentioned he was heading to "Myanmar Street" that evening to grab some food. I was all ears, quickly asking what the connection was between Myanmar Street and Muslims. To my surprise, the Imam explained that a significant part of Taiwan's Muslim community is made up of these Yunnanese Muslims, and Myanmar Street is one of their main hangouts. My aimless Taiwan trip suddenly had a bullseye: Myanmar Street.
 
 
 
 
 

Myanmar Street: Home to the "Lonely Army's" Descendants

Hua Xin Street, nestled in Taipei's Zhonghe District, is widely known as "Myanmar Street." It's a vibrant hub for Burmese Chinese and, crucially, a stopping point for Hui Muslims from Yunnan. These folks are descendants of what's often called the "Burma-Thailand Lonely Army," gradually settling here after the 1980s. The "Lonely Army," also known as the "Yunnan-Burma Lonely Army" or "Remnants of the KMT Army," refers to Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) troops who retreated to Myanmar after the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. A significant number of Yunnanese Muslim soldiers and their families moved with them, forming a distinct Muslim community within the ranks of this "Lonely Army." Early on, a large number of these Muslim families found a base in the border regions of Myanmar's Shan and Kachin states. Another segment later migrated to northern Thailand, making their lives along the Mekong River.
 


For most Taiwanese, these folks are cultural and geographical "outsiders." The Imam, with a touch of melancholy, recently told me that young people aren't really into Islam anymore, and many religious practices have simply become "customs." You could see this plain as day among the young folks at the funeral. While the older aunties wore their headscarves, the younger generation opted for general funeral attire – black to show respect – looking no different from any other non-Muslim from the outside. The Initium (a Chinese digital media outlet) even published an article titled "The Outsiders" that delves into the identity struggles of a young person from Myanmar Street. These Muslim descendants grapple with a unique "Yunnan-Myanmar-Taiwan" triple cultural identity, a blend of Chinese culture, Islamic faith, and Southeast Asian influences. But they don't quite belong to Myanmar, and it seems they don't fully belong to Taiwan either. Even their Yunnan accent has become a source of discrimination. Myanmar Street is their Huifang – their Muslim quarter. For the younger generation "from the block," stepping outside this Huifang might feel like a more "fitting" integration, while holding onto your turf makes you a stubborn outsider. It’s the bitter taste of growing up in the Huicamps. Perhaps it’s not until they can truly think for themselves that they can appreciate the preciousness of what they already possess.
 

 


Despite all this, Myanmar Street remains their Huifang. Burmese signs are everywhere you look, and the names of street snacks like "Ersi" (rice noodles) and "Ganba" (dried beef) betray their Yunnan roots. Here, you can still confidently enjoy halal food that’s both Burmese and Yunnanese. The older sister running the "Yongli" snack shop told me she only arrived in Taiwan a few years ago and isn't quite used to living here. If her husband hadn't been here for decades, she never would have considered moving. Everything is just so different. Speaking in a somewhat broken Yunnan-inflected Mandarin, she warned me, "Young folks gotta be careful and protect yourselves, okay? Yesterday, a young guy died in a motorcycle accident, only in his twenties." I quickly chimed in, "I stood for the Janazah at the mosque today for the deceased. You must be talking about that very same person!"
 
 
Longgang: Another Haven for Yunnan Muslims in Taiwan

These days, Longgang, over in Taoyuan's Zhongli District, is another super important spot where Yunnan Muslims have really set down roots. Back in the 1950s, the Taiwanese government brought over the Dian-Myanmar "Lonely Army" and their families from Thailand and Myanmar, settling them all right here. To keep their faith alive and kicking, the Muslim community pooled their resources and built the Longgang Mosque. It's not just a place for salat (prayers); it's a vibrant hub where their culture and spirit come together. The fact that every single mosque in Taiwan has a Yunnanese Imam really shows just how big a deal these Yunnan descendants are within the Taiwanese Muslim community.
 
 

 

 

 

 
Lukang: Where History and Faith Whisper (Quietly)

My first footprint on the mainland Hui Muslim journey in Taiwan was in Lukang, a town absolutely bursting with incense smoke. As I made my way south from Taipei to Taichung, my Aunt Ma, who I'd been in touch with, kept bringing up taking me to Lukang. I was a bit in the dark, honestly, wondering what this little town had to do with Hui Muslims. Once I hit Taichung, Sister Shi, who picked me up with my aunt, was a local from Lukang herself. She told me she was a descendant of the famous General Shi Lang, and that Lukang was one of the very first places mainlanders settled in Taiwan. Lukang’s temples are crammed with worshipers; Sister Shi mentioned they get tens of millions of visitors every year. Walking near the old street, temples and ancestral halls are everywhere, and as Aunt Ma put it, "The idols have taken over this place."
 


Sister Shi, with her headscarf, definitely sticks out like a sore thumb here. But even before she embraced Islam, she wasn't part of the mainstream. She used to be a devout Christian, knew her Bible inside and out, and could debate scripture with anyone.

But the Lukang I want to talk about is a different side of it – this is where Taiwan first intersected with Hui Muslims. As early as the late Ming Dynasty, some descendants of Hui Muslims living in the Quanzhou region followed the migration waves to Taiwan, settling in what is now Lukang and Taisi. This marked the earliest recorded presence of Muslims in Taiwan. Today, Lukang is primarily home to the Chen-dai Ding and Guo families. The earliest observations of them date back to the 1920s, when scholars noted there wasn't a single trace of Islamic practice left in their lives. Their descendants even revealed that their ancestors had a strict rule: "Hide the fact that you are Muslim at all costs." Despite fully adopting Han customs, their family genealogies still record their connections to the mainland and their Muslim ancestors. The Ding clan in Lukang still knows they are descendants of the 18th generation. Some of their unique ancestral worship rituals might also hint at their special identity. For instance, the Ding family has a peculiar custom during funerals called "Guan Mao" (pouring water from the roof into a well) where the family patriarch or eldest grandson pours three cups of wine into a bowl. The Ding family's main house is a siheyuan (quadrangle courtyard), which from above forms the Chinese character "回" (Hui/return), unlike the local sanheyuan (three-sided courtyard). Plus, there are no ancestral tablets in their ancestral hall. For the Guo clan, not using pork in their ancestral worship is perhaps more direct evidence of their Muslim lineage. The Guo family also doesn't invite Taoist priests to chant scriptures; instead, they specifically invite someone familiar with Guo family customs to perform the rituals. There's even a rumor that a local temple called Bao'an Temple was originally a mosque, later converted into an ancestral hall.

Unlike the Yunnanese descendants who came to Taiwan in the 1980s, Lukang presents a much more localized form of Muslim history, and you won't find many visible signs of Islam here. There's only one small prayer spot for Indonesian migrant workers, maintained and managed by two Taiwanese converts to Islam. The converts and the deeply assimilated Hui descendants form a stark contrast. Modern Lukang is booming with traditional worship, but it's also stubbornly resistant to change. Grandpa Xue, a convert from Kaohsiung, picked up his Iman (faith) after converting and started Da'wah (religious outreach) in a park not far from the Lukang Mosque. In over ten years, he only managed to guide one person to Islam – and that person was my guide, Sister Shi.
 
 

 

 

 

 
 


 
Kaohsiung: Tracing the Footsteps of Our Elders


Kaohsiung holds a special place, as it was one of the first cities in Taiwan to establish a mosque. The early Kaohsiung Mosque was originally located at 117 Wufu 4th Road in Yancheng District – that spot is actually a Hong Kong-style tea restaurant now. Back then, the second floor had tatami mats laid out for prayer, a small space, until they eventually moved to Linsen 1st Road. Not far from this old prayer hall, there was a Beijing Halal Restaurant that was a regular hangout spot for the "people of the faith."

The owner of that halal restaurant was a man named Zhao Mingyuan from Qingzhou, Shandong. During the Republic of China era, he actually recommended Imam Wang Jingzhai to serve at the Qingzhou Mosque. Even after coming to Taiwan with the Kuomintang in '48, his heart remained devoted to the Deen (faith). He was one of the original founders, along with twelve others, who established the Kaohsiung Mosque. When I mentioned Zhao Mingyuan, a teacher named Y from Taipei told me that the Zhao clan of Qingzhou was a prominent family, a big deal in the Muslim community, and they contributed a ton to the Deen. Nowadays, the Zhao family gatherings are practically international events, with their descendants found from mainland China all the way to North America. There’s even a Chinese-American Imam named Zhao in the States who's part of that very family. But perhaps even more well-known in Taiwan is the grandson of elder Zhao Mingyuan, the famous former Imam of the Taipei Grand Mosque, Dr. Zhao Xilin. Today, the Kaohsiung Mosque has been at its current location on Jianjun Road in Lingya District since 1992. The first Imam of the new Kaohsiung Mosque, Chen Yongwu, hails from Myanmar and is still serving there today, carrying on the rich tradition of the Dian-Myanmar Muslims.

Of course, there are also some less visible Hui Muslims who quietly live in Kaohsiung, like my own grand-uncle. After being forced to retreat to Taiwan with the larger army as a wounded soldier, my grand-uncle lived alone on this land. He didn't seem to interact with these active "people of the faith." I often wondered, as a Hui Muslim from Northeast China, how he managed to make a life for himself all alone here. Following the address my dad sent me, which had been mailed from Taiwan, I went to his old place. Now, it's just a parking lot – nothing left of what it used to be.
 

 

 

 


 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 

 
 
A Mix of Sacred and Secular: Indonesian Prayer Spots

Given Taiwan's geography and terrain, the island's east coast has always been pretty off the beaten path, with very few people living there. So, finding a sizable Muslim community there is practically a pipe dream. Even so, you can still scout out some places to pray in a few cities. The thing is, these prayer spots aren't necessarily what you'd call serene or super peaceful. When I followed my map to two Indonesian prayer spots in Hualien City, the noisy surroundings honestly made me cringe a little bit.

At one of them, the first floor was a bustling restaurant, and the third floor was the prayer hall. But get this: sandwiched right in between, on the second floor, was a hidden dance hall! So, there I was, praying on the third floor, prostrating to Allah (SWT), and feeling the vibrations of the speakers and hearing the faint sounds of singing wafting up from the floor below. Subhanallah! It was a truly unique experience, a test of focus, no doubt.

At the other prayer spot in Hualien, the secular world had seeped in even more thoroughly. The prayer room was still upstairs, but the first floor was like a reception area, or maybe a community hangout. As soon as you walked in, there was a living room setup, complete with a kitchen. Indonesian folks were busy preparing meals right there for others sitting downstairs. I gave a friendly nod to the "hosts" on the first floor and headed upstairs to pray. Just when I thought this might be a quieter spot, a wave of smoke from downstairs started drifting up, making the second floor feel all hazy and ethereal – and not in a good way, if you catch my drift.

Ultimately, though, much like the laborers themselves, the Deen (faith) here is something that's been brought in from elsewhere. Beyond these two prayer spots, even finding a single halal restaurant was a tall order, almost a luxury. It truly put into perspective the challenges faced by our brothers and sisters in places where Islam isn't the dominant culture. May Allah make it easy for them.
 

 

 

 

 
 

 
 
 
Taichung Mosque: A Hub of Faith

Taichung is home to a pretty active Muslim community, and my main reason for coming to Taiwan this time around was to visit my Uncle and Aunt Ma, who live there. Now, Uncle Ma, bless his heart, is an engineer by trade, not some academic from an Islamic studies program. But in his free time, he dedicates himself to a word-by-word morphological and grammatical analysis of the Quran, then pays out of his own pocket to print and publish his findings online for others to learn from. Aunt Ma, for her part, is the quiet force behind the scenes, a true pillar of strength for the Taichung Mosque. They've been my gateway to understanding Taiwan's Muslim community, and getting to know them has really opened my eyes.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Culture Mosque: A Community-Driven Space

As one of only two real mosques in Taipei, the Culture Mosque doesn't have a permanent Imam. So, it's usually run by amateur Imams. There's one particular Pakistani uncle who prays there regularly; he's gotten Taiwanese citizenship through marriage and is now a bona fide Taiwanese citizen. Masha'Allah!

Food Chronicles: Beef and Its Vegetarian Buddies

Long story short, if you're on the west side of Taiwan, you won't have any trouble finding halal food. But head east, and you're pretty much out of luck. There are no more than two halal spots in Taitung, and maybe three at most in Hualien... it's a tough nut to crack if you're trying to keep things strictly halal.
 


 


Halal Bites Across the Island

Halal cuisine at Taipei Airport (A true blessing when you're traveling!)
 
 


Taiwan's chain fried chicken shops (Always a crowd-pleaser!)
 

 

 

 


Halal beef noodle soup joint in Kaohsiung (A warm bowl of goodness!)
 



Halal beef noodle shop in Taipei (Classic comfort food, Muslim-style!)
 


 


A halal Roujiamo (Chinese meat burger) spot (A little taste of home for many!)
 

 




Postscript: The Unfolding Journey

Taiwan really brought to mind a topic we often discuss: migration. For an individual, migration can be quite a conscious choice, a proactive step. But for an entire community, it feels like there's no escaping the gears of destiny and the call of Qadar (Divine decree), no matter where you go. The reality that descends upon a community can't be faced by constantly running away. Some might ask if Taiwan is suitable for Muslims to live in. If you consider food, clothing, and education, simply existing as a Muslim here is a huge test. Yet, you can't really tell those who've already put down roots here to find a more "Muslim-friendly" country. Looking back at them, they've constantly been on the move, and while Taiwan might not be the ideal Jannah (paradise), it has given them a chance to catch their breath. We, as humans, merely pass through this life fleetingly. It's only by accepting hardships that we can truly overcome them and face the Hereafter with peace. Finding glimmers of light – good people and good deeds – amidst the chaos was truly enough to uplift my ruh (spirit) and strengthen my iman. Alhamdulillah for all His blessings.
 
 
 
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Assalamu Alaikum!
I’m looking for a shared accommodation (female only) in Brooklyn, preferably in Bay Ridge, starting mid-August. My budget is $700–$1,000/month (including utilities if possible). If you have any leads or suggestions, please let me know.
More details: I am an incoming Master's student at NYU Tandon, so I am looking for an accommodation that I can rent for a year or more.
  view all

Assalamualaikum everyone. I am female student looking for a separate room in long island area(New Hyde park, bellerose, floral park, mineola or Hicksville). House must be near by lirr or bus stop max 5 minutes walking distance. Budget is $500-$600.
Thank you.
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Hi, I am coming to newyork between mid June and I am looking for a room or an apartment with facilities and cleanliness maintained, with a good Muslim family or preferably with a decent Muslim female. (Near Kew Gardens Area Queens) view all

 
 
 

Salaam,
Looking for 1 bedroom apartment in Forest Hills, Rego Park area for under $1800.
Thanks in advance.
 DM 

4.2 Arabic Script

Bans on the use of Arabic script in public places reflect the principles contained in Document 10 that Arabic should not be considered an ethnic minority language, and that the use of Arabic is itself a sign of the recent ‘Saudization’ and ‘Arabization’. By extension, the party-state offers no formal legal protection for Arabic language education for Muslim minorities (see 5.3 Removal of Arabic Provision and 5.4 Control of Publishing), nor for the usage of Arabic calligraphic inscriptions as a distinctive marker of Hui culture.

As with other measures, removals of Arabic signage followed province-by-province implementation and were unevenly enforced. ‘Halal’ signs in Arabic were removed from shops and restaurants in Ningxia beginning in March 2018, in the wake of similar measures applied to businesses in Xinjiang. Such removals often took place overnight, with previous decor clumsily painted over. Arabic halal signs were replaced with a simple government-issued logo (see 4.3 Pan-Halalification). Following this initial implementation in Ningxia, mandates to remove Arabic signage were slowly enacted across the rest of China, with the majority coming into effect across 2019-2020.

The severity of the bans on Arabic language has varied. In some places, removals have extended to blacking out Arabic script on vases inside mosques. Elsewhere, Arabic calligraphy displayed in the interior of mosques in other locations has remained untouched. In some regions, the directives against halal signage and Arabic script have broadened to encompass businesses with Islamic-sounding Chinese names, forcing them to rebrand.

Almost 1000 signs in Linxia, Gansu, were replaced in 2018, in addition to further bans on halal labeling. In 2020, residents in Hebei and Shandong were required to cover the du’a plaques that decorate gateways to private homes. In 2018 in Pingliang, Gansu, famous for its Muslim-Chinese calligraphers and where hanging du’a is a prized local tradition, party-state officials reportedly threatened locals, stating that their doors and gates would be “broken” if they did not cover them.

Such variation in the standards for when Arabic script should be considered acceptable is further complicated by pressure from Islamophobic activists who circulate guides online detailing how to employ government tiplines to spur further crackdowns from local government. One such guide published on the question-and-answer website Zhuanlan Zhihu (roughly similar to Quora), details how in 2018, an activist used a hotline to the mayor of Ordos, Inner Mongolia, to report a signboard outside the Dongsheng Mosque in that city for containing content that “greatly overstepped the confines of religious activities” (for further details of this case, see 6.0 Surveillance and Monitoring). The signboard outside the mosque was removed as a result, and the activist’s report led to a further investigation that forced the removal of Arabic calligraphic decorations and Islamic symbols inside the mosque premises. Intervention by activists effectively ensured the local authorities had to take action that exceeded the original targets of the Sinicization campaign. Similarly, in May 2023, Islamophobic netizens reported a restaurant in Beijing for hanging a Chinese-language plaque reading “the Lord grant peace” (主赐平安). Although the sign was in Chinese, the ensuing investigation nevertheless ordered the restaurant to take their plaque down.



4.3 Pan-Halalification

Official discourse from the party-state has decried the use of halal labeling as a brand, arguing that the designation of a diverse range of products as halal in search of profit carries negative consequences for China’s economy as well as its national security. In 2016, the Party Secretary of Ningxia, Li Jianhua, denounced the overuse of halal labeling as a distortion of the market and as a danger to national security: “As expanded use of halal labeling, with products such as halal water, halal paper, halal toothpaste, and halal makeup, from the perspective of national security, we must increase our vigilance. We must recognize the slightest signs, prevent the smallest mistakes, and establish dialectical thinking, whilst also fully respecting ethnic minority customs and habits. We must work to prevent the generalization of halal labeling, seek advantage and evade harm, and provide scientific leadership.” Halal labeling has been a particular lightning rod for online Islamophobic activists, who view any use of halal labeling as a sign of spreading Islamism and de-Sinicization.

Restrictions on halal labeling began to be enforced from mid-2016, with systematic bans and regulation in place from 2018 onwards. Store owners stocking items labeled as halal outside the party-state’s narrow definition of the term have been forced to return stock to sellers or had their items confiscated and, in some instances, destroyed. In March 2017, Ningxia announced steps to remove ‘wrongly labeled’ halal products (i.e., goods labeled ‘halal’ that did not contain meat products) from markets. In early 2018, Ningxia issued new regulations on halal signage, including a standardized halal sign for businesses to display. In addition to banning the usage of any halal signage beyond the official approved provincial design, the regulations also stipulated that names, signs, and trademarks for businesses could not contain the term ‘qingzhen’ (halal) or any other words with Islamic connotations. According to the regulations, violators of halal labeling rules will receive a warning first, and will then be fined if they do not change their labels. Businesses have been threatened with removal of their business licenses or closure orders for non-compliance.

State agencies (i.e., the Food and Drug Administration, often in cooperation with local security forces or Religious and Ethnic Affairs), police businesses through frequent and far-ranging inspections to identify signs with unauthorized halal branding and stocks of products with inappropriate halal labeling. Companies found to violate these restrictions have been forced to remove halal labeling from their packaging. Indicative of the scale of such oversight, Huiji district in Zhengzhou, Henan, reported that they had conducted 25 inspections of halal produce and shopkeepers within a six-month period, and distributed over 3000 pamphlets and awareness-raising items to grassroots-level cadres and large merchants.

Inspections are sweeping in scope and can intrude significantly into business operations and space. For instance, in a neighborhood inspection conducted in 2021 in Lanzhou by the Gaolan Street Office, local businesses were reminded that halal signage must be used only on products “within the scope of halal food,” and signage at the entrances to halal restaurants must be restricted to the Chinese characters ‘qingzhen’ (清真). Display of halal signage in pinyin, English, Arabic, or Uyghur is forbidden, as is the use of Islamic symbols such as the crescent moon or a dome. Businesses were further instructed to close any prayer spaces for employees. Such measures produce substantial consequences for Muslim consumers. A lack of proper signage and branding further complicates the practice of procuring halal meat — a process already riven with ambiguities due to the lack of a nationwide standard process of certification and the proliferation of impostor halal vendors.

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Another specific measure implemented in the plan is a prohibition on the "generalization" of halal. Not only does the CIA’s dictate limit the application of halal to labels regarding foodstuffs, but it further mandates that halal must only apply to animal products. Moreover, the plan specifically calls for increased training on the proper applications of halal to be undertaken by the CIA. In practice, these measures severely limit believers’ ability to observe halal standards and override scriptural authorities’ definitions of halal to insert a state-sponsored one instead. In this way, the CIA uses regulatory power to police daily habits of practice.

A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.

Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.

Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture

After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.

As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.

The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."

By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.

Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.

Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.

Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.

This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.

These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.


5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns

The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.

The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.

Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.

These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.

6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel

The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”

To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”

The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.

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To curb this threat and reinforce Chinese cultural, linguistic, and aesthetic supremacy, the document makes several proposals. It advises that any newly constructed Islamic spaces must “highlight Chinese style” in their architecture. Additionally, the document stipulates that further cultural protections must be given to “traditional” Chinese-style mosques.64 Further measures establish prohibitions on the recognition of Arabic as a minority language and affording Arabic special status in education. It warns that Arabic schools must not be allowed to offer religious lessons or to be used for religious activities.65

Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67

Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70

The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72

The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.

These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.

In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.

Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.

The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79

In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
 


2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10

The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.

Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.

Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.

In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.


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The party-state provided funding for renovations, primarily channeled through the United Front Work Department and via the relevant branches of the CIA. Qujing City, Yunnan, estimated in 2021 that it had spent 19m RMB on supporting renovations over the preceding year. Estimates for renovations to 19 mosques in Qinghai, to be completed over two years, were costed at close to 27m RMB, according to figures in a widely circulated PPT of proposed renovations. In Xining, that would put the cost of renovations to a single mosque at around 1.4m RMB apiece. These estimates likely do not represent the full costs of renovations, as they do not include costs for adding “Chinese” decorative elements following the removal of pagodas and domes, as occurred in several Xining mosques (such as Shulinxiang Mosque, pictured below) following the initial removal of domes and minarets. This oversight reflects the logic of the campaign: “foreign” architectural elements were first removed as dangerous precursors to extremism, before appropriately “Chinese” elements were added to replace them.

Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.

As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.

In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.

Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.

Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.

Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.

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4.1 Mosque and Architectural Renovations

The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam. Like other aspects of aesthetic Sinicization, the determination that ‘Arabic’-style elements in mosque architecture must be corrected dates to the emergence of the ‘Three Transformations’ campaign in Ningxia.

The China Islamic Association first held a conference on mosque architecture in Xi’an in April 2017. The conference concluded that in the previous decade, there had been a trend towards Arabization in mosque architecture across the country that must be corrected. In addition, mosques had grown overly large, overly ostentatious, and had exceeded approved construction specifications. Remarks made at the conference further noted that, in compliance with party-state dictates, mosques should not serve as landmarks, nor become tourist destinations. Delegates to the conference were reminded by the President of the CIA that only when Islam “integrates with Chinese culture” will it be able to “take root and grow in this land of China.” Delegates were also taken on site visits to several historic mosques in Shaanxi, including Xi’an’s famous Huajuexiang Mosque. The resulting “Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style” were dispersed through the country-wide network of Islamic Associations for study.

In mid-2018, as the large-scale removal of Arabic script began across the northwest, evidence of the removal of “Arab-style” or otherwise “foreign” architectural elements from mosques and other public buildings first emerged. In practice, renovations have targeted domes, tall minarets in a non-pagoda style, and Islamic symbols, such as the crescent moon and star commonly placed atop mosque roofs. Although most of the media coverage of architectural Sinicization focuses on mosques, renovations have also targeted non-religious buildings constructed with decorative Islamic elements, such as domes or arched windows. For example, in Jinan, Shandong Province, the famous halal restaurant, Bainian Yunting Hui Hotpot Restaurant, situated next to the city’s Great Southern Mosque, removed its prominent ornamental golden domes and the Arabic script on its sign by May 2016. By July 2022, images from Baidu Maps’ street view indicated that all mentions of halal had vanished from the storefront’s branding.

Before 2017, this was a common practice for buildings located near prominent mosques (as was the case with those buildings surrounding Yinchuan’s Nanguan Mosque), or areas with a strong Hui heritage.

Often, the adoption of these Islamic architectural motifs was a deliberate choice on the part of the local authorities to promote their regions as destinations for foreign businesses or tourism. Renovations to city districts to remove architecture intended to celebrate Islamic heritage have taken place in Hohhot, Jilin, and cities throughout Ningxia (most notably, Yinchuan). In Linxia, the local government reported the removal of Islamic decorative elements from the roofs of 14 multi-storey buildings, in addition to a widespread campaign that replaced almost 1,000 shop signs with Arabic elements in 2018.

As with other aspects of the campaign, different provinces have implemented different timetables for Sinicizing mosque architecture. Mosques in Ningxia were Sinicized first — roughly between 2018-2020 — in keeping with the broader identification of Ningxia as a priority destination for Sinicization work. The campaign was subsequently implemented across the country. Several major mosques in Yunnan were among the last targeted, only undergoing Sinicization in late 2023. Much of the architectural work to renovate mosques was completed during Covid-19 lockdowns, when mosques were formally closed to worshippers. Within this broader pattern, however, authorities have worked to carefully prepare plans for renovations to mosques of particular size or historic significance to Muslim communities across China.

As of 2024, analysis suggests that all major mosques across China have now been Sinicized. A Financial Times satellite survey from 2023 found that three-quarters of the 2,132 mosques identified as having ‘Arabic’ elements had been modified or destroyed. Whilst the differing implementation timetables, and indeed the cost, scale, and complexity of the work required, mean that it is possible that some smaller mosques remain unaffected to date, it can be anticipated that ultimately all mosques in China deemed to have unacceptable architectural features will be subject to renovation.

In the earliest stages of the campaign, renovations were often crude. Given the political weight placed on the Three Transformations campaign and the definition of mosque rectification work as part of combatting extremism, authorities moved fast to renovate mosques, with little concern for the quality of work done or the state in which mosques were left. Domes and other unacceptable elements were simply torn off, sometimes in a manner so blunt that extensive damage was done to the remaining fabric of the mosque. Numerous photographs from this time period show domes stripped off mosques and simply left lying in the courtyards below. In the case of a newly refurbished mosque in Zheqiao, Gansu, the 2019 operation to remove its dome, minarets, and decorative elements to its doors and windows effectively destroyed the mosque itself. Residents were warned not to circulate images or videos of the damaged mosques. Some who posted longer videos of the demolition and damage done to the mosque were later arrested for doing so.

Early mosque Sinicization work also overlapped substantially with the moves to close or demolish mosques “lacking the correct permissions” (未批先建清真寺) and other unregistered religious venues (see 7.0 Mosque Closures). In August 2018, for instance, the local government moved to demolish Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia on the grounds that it had constructed an extension that exceeded the scope of the building permits it had obtained for the work. Following fierce opposition and protests that attracted international attention, the government backed down from the plan to demolish the mosque. However, after defusing the protest, the mosque was later Sinicized, with pagoda roofs replacing its domes.

As the campaign has progressed, forced renovations have moved towards replacing ‘Arabic’ features with Chinese equivalents. As most mosques are not rebuilt wholesale — and indeed the wood-built traditional mosques held up as models to emulate are much more expensive to build — renovation often means simply replacing domes with tiled roofs and capping off shortened minarets. The resulting hybrid mosques, with their original walls unchanged, are stylistically awkward, with little harmony between original design and the new impositions. Standards for what aspects of architectural design are considered acceptable vary considerably. In a tender for renovations to a mosque in Ningxia in 2022, in addition to stating that the proposed buildings should be traditionally Chinese in style, the call also stated that the exterior colour of the mosque should be adjusted to remove any green elements. This stands in contrast to guidelines issued for mosque renovations in Hualong, Qinghai, which stated that renovations to the nine local ‘Arabic-style’ mosques should be “practical, economic, green [Islamic] and beautiful.” In one exceptional case in Jinan, even party-approved slogans in Arabic failed to meet standards of appropriateness. The outer wall of the Chinese-style Great Southern Mosque of Jinan bore the party slogan “Love Your Country, Love Your Faith” in calligraphic Arabic. However, after Sinicization, the script was hastily removed and replaced by the Twelve Core Socialist Values in Chinese (see photos on following page).
 

















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4.0 Aesthetics

The emergence of measures under the umbrella term ‘Resisting the Three Transformations’ (反三化) was one of the earliest and most visible manifestations of the Sinicization of Islam. In both cases, ‘Saudization’ and ‘Arabization’ are loosely defined, with little concrete connection made — either in justification or implementation of policy — to practices linked to Saudi Arabia or the broader Islamic world. However, both terms infer that influences from abroad are corrupting Islam in China, leaving Muslim communities vulnerable to extremism, a danger requiring state intervention. In party-state justifications, extremism is always defined as a foreign force. Both terms reinforce perceptions that ‘foreign Islam’ is dangerous. In contrast, ‘Chinese Islam’ is implied to be ‘safe’ and ‘normal’ when appropriately guided by the party-state.

The third transformation, ‘pan-halalification,’ is distinct from the other two, as this term refers to a perceived expansion of halal labeling to products and places outside of its ‘normal’ usage as defined by the party-state (i.e., in relation to the status of animal products, especially meat). This term acts as a proxy for discussion of the spread of religious influence, implicitly defining any expansion of the visibility of Islam as a threat to the party-state and a precursor to extremism. Its appearance within the Three Transformations campaign highlights the party-state’s commitment to building a secular society, with an ever-narrower demarcation of the spaces where religion is permissible.

The concept of the Three Transformations was first articulated amid counter-terror and de-extremification measures enacted in the XUAR. References to the need to counter ‘Arabization’ and ‘Saudization’ in Islam in Ningxia first officially appear outside the XUAR in a December 2016 speech given by Ningxia Party Secretary Li Jianhua to the Ningxia Autonomous Region Religious Work Conference, where such changes are explicitly mentioned alongside work in Xinjiang. Li stated that “the central government holds that we must be strictly on guard against the phenomena of ‘Arabization’ and ‘Saudization’ of Islam in regions such as Ningxia and Xinjiang, the infiltration of foreign Islam is not a religious problem but a political problem.” Li further singled out pan-halalification as an early sign of the development of religious extremism, and signaled his opposition to the idea that Arabic is a Hui language. By singling out the Arabic language, and pointing the finger at ‘infiltration’ by ‘foreign’ practices, Li’s efforts draw clear and bright lines between party-state-approved practice and the “extremism” exemplified by the ‘Three Transformations.’

In the initial stages of the campaign against the Three Transformations, the most readily observed targets of policy measures were aesthetic: markers showcasing the influence of ‘foreign’ Islam were removed from public places — particularly where they occur in public art, signage, and architecture. In practice, so-called ‘Arabic’-style mosque architecture (including tall minarets and onion domes), overtly Islamic styles of dress and veiling, the public use of Arabic script, and halal labeling and certification have been identified as evidence of the ‘Three Transformations’ and targeted for suppression. Taken together, the interventions represent an increased policing of any visual markers of Muslim presence in public space. In many instances, the party-state’s rhetoric implies that signifiers of Islamic identity should be restricted solely to the mosque.
 







As with other aspects of Sinicization policy, party-state action to remove aesthetic markers of foreign influence was first taken in Ningxia in 2016, continuing into 2017. The measures taken to “resist the Three Transformations” were later folded into broader Sinicization policy. After the Three Transformations campaign identified unacceptable practices of Islam linked to latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan bestowed power to define ‘normal’ practice of faith on the CIA. Interventions made by the party-state under the Three Transformations also demonstrate the intersections between counter-terrorism and ‘anti-extremist’ work and the broader Sinicization campaign, as signs of the Three Transformations are explicitly understood as signifiers indicating a vulnerability to extremism. As of 2024, mosques continue to be monitored for any evidence of the Three Transformations. Policing of mosque architecture, dress, and halal labeling continues to provide a rationale for further, programmatic interventions into Muslim communities.

In the section below, we outline examples of party-state interventions taken against practices identified as exemplary of the Three Transformations. We discuss how the party-state’s crackdown targeted mosque architecture, public use of Arabic script, halal branding and certification, practices of dress, and public broadcasting of the call to prayer (adhan).
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3.4 Imam Training and Appointments

Imams have always been required to attend occasional training on Party doctrine; as community leaders, working with United Front — and hence the Party-state — has always been a part of their role. However, the number of political training sessions required of imams has dramatically increased since 2014, as has oversight of the content taught within mosques (see 5.0 Cultural Control). In particular, the state has taken much closer control of imam appointments, and has further tightened systems for the appointment, management, and training of religious professionals. This has included:
a) audits of existing religious personnel and the creation of a public SARA database of religious clergy,
b) crackdowns on unregistered imams,
c) tightened appointment regulations for imams, and
d) increased political requirements placed on imams.

Imam licenses are issued by regional Islamic Associations, and are valid for five years. Most provinces have had regulations requiring some formal revalidation of credentials for license renewal for some years, although the requirements for revalidation varied by province. However, audits have intensified in recent years, with some regions requiring all imams to retrain and register. In 2019, Qingtongxia, Ningxia, conducted a complete audit and “clean-up” of all mosque religious personnel, requiring them all to exchange their licenses, likely as part of a province-wide audit ordered after the identification of serious failures in religious work in Ningxia. 115 Linxia similarly audited religious students in mosques across 2017-18, checking for “over-quota” enrollments, and students below the age of 18. As part of the process, Linxia established detailed logs of students in the city. 116 The newly established databases of registered clergy provide further heft to the increased oversight of religious professionals. Launched in May 2023 on the SARA website, the database contains extensive information on individuals, including names, ID numbers, photographs, and titles. 117 It allows users to swiftly check the credentials of any imam (or indeed religious professionals of other faiths). 118

In-post evaluations of imams have also been substantially enhanced, with a focus on political performance. Islamic Associations across the country have established codes of conduct for imams, requiring them to work to actively promote cultural change and Sinicization. Assessment procedures and reviews provide teeth to ensure imams must work towards Party ends. In 2021, Wuhan Islamic Association required imams and mosque leaders to sign “target pledges,” committing them to the work objectives outlined at their conference, a process overseen by representatives from the city’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee. 119 Qinghai Islamic Association has published new, detailed regulations (currently in a pilot phase) for the annual assessment of imams in the province. 120 Under this system, imam performance is to be assessed on an annual basis through a series of inspections and year-end assessments. Although led by the Islamic Association, evaluation committees may include local cadres and cadres from Religious Affairs. Political thought is the category of performance given the greatest weight within the evaluation, and underperforming imams are given a warning and provided with suggestions for improvement. Without improvement, they can be unilaterally dismissed. 121 United Front and local cadre involvement in annual reviews of imam performance is evident in other provinces as well. 122

The tightening of oversight over existing imams is matched by increased oversight of imam appointments. Although imam appointments are theoretically overseen by mosque management committees, both the new standards for appointment processes and oversight of the mosque management committees ensure that only imams acceptable to the Party can be appointed. Once again, the rhetorical justification around such changes is about “standardization,” and ensuring the quality of personnel. Both the “Measures for the Qualifications of Islamic Clergy” and “Measures for the Appointment of Major Clerical Positions in Islamic Activity Venues” contain regulations intended to favor in-province candidates, and ensure final approval of imams and imam appointments is determined by the local Islamic Association. 123

Emerging local regulations suggest that implementation is going further than required by Islamic Association regulations. For instance, regulations on imam appointment trialed in 2023 in the Ningxia city of Zhongwei’s Shapotou district begin with a strong assertion of the role of imams in “conscientiously implementing the important theories of General Secretary Xi Jinping on religious work,” ensuring Sinicization, and their duty to ceaselessly strengthen the identification of their congregations with “our great motherland, the Chinese peoples, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party and Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The document further stipulates that imams be licensed by the Ningxia Islamic Association, and that mosque management committees are not permitted to draw up their own shortlists. Instead, they will be presented with a shortlist of 3-5 candidates chosen by the local Religious Bureau. Two candidates selected from the list by the mosque management committee will then be interviewed by local government, PSB, undergo a formal written examination, and a sermon competition overseen by the United Front. 124 The whole process ensures that political acceptability of candidates is prioritized over any wishes of the congregation, and further makes it impossible for a mosque to appoint an imam from outside Ningxia. Additionally, registered imams are required to report any travel plans that would take them outside the province to their village, township, and local Religious Bureau for approval. 125

The tightening of control over non-compliant imams is backed by threats to strip them of their credentials. In Hualong, for instance, imam Ma Guoxiang was detained for fifteen days in 2018 and stripped of his credentials as an imam for “spreading extreme opinions and inappropriate language” in his preaching. 126 Online reports suggest that the removal of licenses from imams in Hualong targeted large numbers of clerics, as part of a broad parcel of actions taken to police Islamic activity including multiple mosque closures. 127 Muslim social media accounts have repeatedly posted a four-minute recording from 2019 of an official in Hualong announcing the names of numerous sanctioned imams, seemingly as a tacit protest against the measures. 128 Policing imams via control of their licenses is an ongoing tactic for control: the CIA stripped licenses from three Ningxia imams for unknown reasons in mid-2023. 129

Removal of imam credentials can have serious consequences, beyond even the deprivation of livelihood. In Henan, imam Han Daoliang was dismissed after Zhengzhou officials accused him of being Salafi, forcing him into exile in Malaysia. 130 Elsewhere, scattered evidence suggests that some unregistered imams may have been given longer jail sentences. One request seeking legal advice submitted by a poster to an online platform in late 2018 says that her husband was detained on suspicion of the crime of “disturbing public order” for being an unregistered imam. 131

Such action to control imam licenses works in tandem with previous measures to tighten control of mosque management committees, who previously had significant latitude in their choice of imam. Monitoring of imams and other Islamic scholars has also involved attempts to recruit imams to work directly on behalf of the party-state: in late 2020, NPR reported on the case of a newly appointed imam and member of the local Islamic Association, who was offered a salary and lucrative board position to secretly report back to security authorities. 132

Congregations who resist the installation of a government-approved imam can also find themselves targeted. In a 2019 case reported by Bitter Winter, a mosque in Xining was shut down during Friday prayers for purported violation of fire safety regulations. However, worshippers suggested that this was revenge for their refusal to accept the appointment of an imam whose religious stances did not reflect those of the congregation. 133 In 2018 in Hualong County, Qinghai, thirteen were arrested under the “Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil” campaign in response to an incident in which Yaqutan Village Mosque attempted to install an imam without official approval. 134
 


3.5 Impact of Organizational Interventions

All changes to the organization share a singular goal: reducing any resistance to the implementation of Sinicization policy, and ensuring that local Islamic leadership can be coerced into the appearance of support for the campaigns. Changes to the composition of mosque management committees and village-level committees often precede renovations or other interventions into mosque affairs. By co-opting mosque management committees and grassroots Party organizations, the party-state manufactures the authority and justification for these changes. The combined campaign to control the appointments of imams, the operations of Islamic Associations and village-level governance, and to atomize mosques and provincial Islam, has been largely successful in ensuring that widescale resistance to Sinicization policy has been impossible.

This expanded party-state control not only minimizes resistance but also solidifies the party-state’s position in the community. Further surveillance, messaging and facilitation of indoctrination, and centralization of authority are all made possible by establishing such granular levels of control. In a striking example of authoritarian centralization, the party-state is using localized offices and stakeholders to draw religious communities into compliance with nationalized aims.


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3.3 Mosque Management Committees (寺管会)

Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.

Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.

The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.

In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.

Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.

Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.

Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.

The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.

There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.

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3.2 China Islamic Association

Management of local branches of the China Islamic Associations (CIA) is perceived as a precondition for CCP control of mosques and Islamic communities more broadly. The Five-Year Plan and Document 10 both envisage an expanded role for the CIA, and the national structure of Islamic Associations has effectively served as implementing organizations for Sinicization policy. Formally, the CIA does not have control of individual mosques, as it is intended to serve as a conduit between religious communities and the Party-state. Individual mosque management committees are theoretically the highest authority over the affairs of a single mosque, and mosques are required to be independent of each other. Party-state policy continues to assert the mosque management committee as a representative of the democratic control of mosque affairs by the people.

As a result, the level of influence enjoyed by the Islamic Association had previously varied by region. As Doyon notes, the relationships between local Islamic Associations and mosque management committees were previously differentiated by region: in small Muslim communities, where donations were low, the local Islamic Association had significant control of mosque affairs; in larger Muslim communities with higher levels of donations, the mosque management committees were the primary directors of mosque affairs, with the Islamic Association acting primarily as a mediator between the mosque and local government. In Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia, mosque management committees retained primary control of imam appointments, with the CIA merely approving the chosen candidates. Mosque management committees also control finances and property for individual mosques, some of which lease space to shopkeepers. Control of mosque management committees thus ensures much tighter control of imam appointments, allowing the Party-state to install members who will stringently facilitate and enforce Sinicization policies.

The 2018 incorporation of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), the bureau which previously sat above the CIA and the other official religious organizations, into the UFWD brought religious affairs back under the direct control of the Party. In addition, changes to the CIA’s Constitution in 2022 further emphasize the extent to which the Association serves the Party, with repeated references to Xi Jinping Thought added to the text. Requirements for the head of the Islamic Association stress the importance of their political credentials, while “extensive knowledge of Islam” is listed as desirable but not essential. Where earlier constitutions stated the Association “is a patriotic religious group and Islamic religious organization for Muslims of all ethnic groups in the country,” the 2022 revision states that “The Association is a national Islamic patriotic religious group and a non-profit social organization for religious affairs, formed voluntarily by Muslims and people who care about and support the cause of Islam.” This change opens the door for non-Muslim participation in the CIA and de-emphasizes ethnicity (minzu) within the Association.

Since 2016, the CIA has expanded its roles and remit within mosque communities, fulfilling the “bridge” role anticipated in Document 10. Since the 2018 passing of the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs, SARA has issued a number of ordinances designed to regularize and regulate the activity of religious organizations, in cooperation with other relevant departments. These have included the Administrative Measures for Religious Groups (宗教团体管理办法, 2019), Notice on Registration of Legal Persons of Religious Venues (关于宗教活动场所办理法人登记事项的通知, 2019), Measures for the Administration of Islamic Hajj Affairs (伊斯兰教朝觐事务管理办法, 2020), Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy (宗教教职人员管理办法, 2021) and the Measures for the Establishment of Religious Institutes (宗教院校管理办法, 2021); and Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services (互联网宗教信息服务管理办法, 2021). As a whole, the new regulations mandate greater oversight of mosque personnel and mosque administration, with stringent requirements on financial reporting and legal duties. Dissemination and study of the new regulations has been core to CIA activity, reflecting the new emphasis within their constitution on adherence to the national legal system.

To guide implementation of the above, the CIA has issued a series of specific regulations designed for Islamic communities, collectively known as the “three measures and the one code.” Respectively, these are the “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques” (清真寺民主管理办法), “Measures for the Qualifications of Islamic Clergy” (伊斯兰教教职人员资格认定办法), “Measures for the Appointment of Major Clerical Positions in Islamic Activity Venues” (伊斯兰教活动场所主要教职聘任办法), and “Code of Conduct for Islamic Clergy” (伊斯兰教教职人员行为守则). The four regulations were issued in 2019, and have since been revised in 2023. Collectively, the regulations seek to standardize the patchwork of regulation of clergy and venues that had emerged since 2017.

Additionally, CIA bodies have become the visible faces of Sinicization policy by organizing lecture tours on Sinicization, overseeing architectural renovations, and hosting preaching competitions and training sessions. Despite the lack of a formal hierarchical relationship between individual mosques and the CIA, branch associations increasingly exercise authority over individual mosques, issuing directives for policy implementation as supported by the suite of SARA regulations. For instance, regulations issued by the Hohhot Islamic Association in August 2019 include stipulations that mosques should a) not permit storage of illegal religious publications, b) strengthen management of religious personnel and should not host Tablighi Jamaat missionaries, c) not permit storage of personal property in the mosque, and d) that minors cannot be forced to attend religious activities. Duplicates of the new regulations were issued to both the city United Front Department and the Huimin city district (回民区) United Front. The Hohhot Islamic Association has since established a ‘China Exceptional Traditional Culture Activity Centre’ inside Hohhot Great Mosque, with an inauguration ceremony held in December 2020.

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As detailed in Part I above, Sinicization is a sprawling project, with implications that touch all aspects of life in affected communities. In Part II of this report, we explore how Sinicization policy has been implemented and discuss its impact on China’s Muslim communities. To do so, we divide Sinicization policy into five main areas of implementation, namely 1) organization, 2) aesthetics, 3) scripture, language, and education, 4) surveillance and monitoring, and 5) mosque mergers. These categories are loose and do not represent policy domains as defined in state documents. Moreover, these domains should not be understood as isolated from each other – rather, actions clustered in each domain work to bolster other areas of impact. Additionally, certain measures (notably the expansion of rural surveillance and tightening of control over Party committees) act to reinforce the implementation of Sinicization policy, but are themselves part of wider authoritarian policy implementation in the contemporary PRC.

To analyze these processes, we have collated a database of items dealing with the implementation of Sinicization policy. The sources collected vary widely, from China Islamic Association briefings and reports, local government policy reports, and local United Front branch updates to social media posts written by individuals with interest in the implementation of Sinicization policy. While in most instances links to the original evidence are provided, in limited instances the authors have elected to provide a code in place of the original reference for social media posts made by private individuals to protect their identities. Further information is available on request from the researchers. Much information around the Sinicization of Islam is suppressed, and affected communities are discouraged from talking publicly about measures they have experienced. As a result, although we attempt to present as full and comprehensive a picture as possible to understand Sinicization in action, inevitably there is more information available on certain aspects and on certain locations. This report should be taken as a preliminary survey of these domains.

3.0 Organization

Control of religious organizations is understood as a precondition for the implementation of religious work policies. This has entailed a tightening of policies on four fronts, namely 1) an emphasis on the behavior and responsibilities of grassroots cadres, 2) tightening control over the China Islamic Association (CIA), 3) mosque committees, and 4) mosque personnel.

3.1 Policing Cadre Behavior

Across the PRC, disciplinary inspections of cadres form a key backdrop to the implementation of Sinicization policy. Performance of atheism has always been an expectation for high-ranking party officials. However, in practice, it was often tacitly accepted that village-level officials were also sometimes religiously active. Indeed, the party-state has a long, sometimes complicated history of working with and in religious communities, creating a “middle ground” in which space is made for Islamic community, in practice and law. While increased attention to grassroots cadre behavior and campaigns for ensuring moral probity among officials have been a feature of the Xi years more broadly, measures for the Sinicization of religion have been accompanied by tightening of religious discipline for cadres across the board. The religious attitudes of local officials were identified as a key barrier to the achievement of Party policy objectives, and hence, reform of grassroots cadre behavior has been prioritized as necessary for achieving the broader policy aims of the Sinicization campaign.

Such emphasis on religious discipline is most clearly seen in the 2018 revision to the Regulations on Discipline and Punishment for Chinese Communist Party, which added a clause (Article 62) specifically stating that Party members who hold religious faith themselves should be provided with “thought education.” If, following intervention, there is no change observed in their beliefs, they should be persuaded to give up their membership or stripped of it. Those who participate in activities which “use religion as incitement” are also to be expelled. The Regulations represent the most concrete instantiation of earlier commitments to atheism as a key aspect of cadre discipline found in resolutions such as the “Certain Principles for Political Life within the Party Under the New Situation” (关于新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则), passed at the sixth Plenary Session of the 18th National Congress.

A 2018 inspection tour of Ningxia conducted under the auspices of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection found that Ningxia party organizations had ‘serious shortcomings’ in the leadership of religious work. In response, the Ningxia Party Committee launched a series of activities, intended to reassert the “Marxist view of ethnicity and religion” to cadres at all levels within the provincial system. The measures also note refinements to working practices and functional positioning for cadres dealing with ethnic and religious work. These emphasize oversight of cadres involved in such work, noting that cadres found to have taken ‘inappropriate actions’ in handling religious affairs will be strictly dealt with.

The impact of the updated Regulations can be seen across China, and especially in areas with concentrations of Islamic population. In Linxia, 4,557 cadres and party members were required to sign formal commitments of atheism. Section-level cadres were required to attend training on the spirit of the 19th National Congress of the CPC in order that they could better guide those under their supervision to realize their previously pledged commitment to atheism. Inspections were launched of all cadres found to have worn religious garments, with further monitoring of behavior following thereafter. Retired cadres in the area were also required to attend training to reassert the primacy of the Party, in a move that echoes reports from Qinghai and Ningxia that retired cadres have been banned from performing the Hajj.

In 2019, Aksai Kazakh Prefecture in Gansu reported that – in response to the issue of “Party members and public officials participating in the Hajj,” which had been raised as an issue by an earlier disciplinary inspection – the prefectural government had banned all Party members from religious belief and initiated investigations into Party members found to have previously performed the Hajj. Several were subjected to intensive personalized interventions intended to transform their thinking following these investigations, although the outcome of such interventions remains unclear from the available reports. Zhangjiachuan, Gansu, conducted similar inspections and mass training on party-state religious policies and atheism for cadres across 2020, with a particular focus on village-level cadres and on ensuring that cadres were banned from performing the Hajj. Zhangjiachuan reported improvement of pre-appointment approval mechanisms to ensure that religious believers and clergy could not serve as village cadres. The area also reported reforms to reporting procedures to ensure that responsibility for religious work could not be evaded to guarantee the implementation of religious policy at the local level.

Reassertion of the importance of cadres holding the ‘correct’ attitude to religion has functioned both as a statement of the priority that religious work has under the current regime, a rationale for the removal of cadres at the grassroots, and a tool for checking enforcement. Disciplinary oversight has further aided the development of new working methods at the grassroots level. These changes are seen most noticeably in Ningxia, which – following a 2018 disciplinary inspection – instituted a series of training for cadres on Xi Jinping Thought and approaches to religious work, as well as a series of reforms to working practices to ensure that grassroots-level officials were held accountable for fulfilling their duties in religious work. These reforms created cross-department working groups, thereby strengthening Party groups at the lowest level. These groups have allowed extensive coordination between local cadres, United Front, PSB, and other relevant organizations, effectively combating the fragmented authoritarianism that often characterizes PRC governance at the lowest level. Disciplinary inspections continue to be utilized as a method for inspecting religious work across key areas, as in the September 2023 inspection of religious work in Pingliang in Gansu.
 

Scrutinizing cadres suspected to hold religious beliefs through training and investigations – and threatening disciplinary measures for those found to be ‘two-faced’ – ensured that when instructions like those given in “Document 10” were circulated, local governments rushed to show that they were implementing them accordingly. For example, in Linxia from 2017 onwards, a number of departments that seemingly had little to do with Islamic work held meetings to study the spirit of Xi Jinping’s instructions, including Linxia Archives and the Environmental Bureau. Following its study meeting, the Environmental Bureau determined that its own remit included tackling the use of loudspeakers in mosques to broadcast the call to prayer under regulations on noise pollution. In 2018, Linxia convened an all-prefecture conference to study the spirit of Xi Jinping’s instructions on Islamic work. Later that month, local county leaders down to the township level in Hezheng County, Linxia were required to sign commitments to Sinicization and resisting the Three Transformations. In effect, the scope of religious work was expanded to all areas of government, leaving officials to determine the scope of implementation within their own domains.

The impact of these measures to police cadres’ behavior has been far-reaching. In areas where village cadres are now also expected to lead mosque management committees as part of further organizational changes, the presence of an official who cannot participate in the life of the community is an interruption to the normal conduct of religious affairs. In a recent case in Yunnan, Party members were explicitly banned from fasting during Ramadan, in contrast to previous years when this had been tolerated. The threat of being labelled a “two-faced official” has made that designation into a self-fulfilling prophecy: cadres who never previously saw any inherent antagonism between being a part of the party and being a member of the religious community now find themselves having to navigate complicated tensions between their professional and social worlds. Pressure to enforce the party-state’s bans by reporting those who violate them places these ‘unofficially’ religious cadres under tremendous strain.


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2.4 Summary: Implications of the “Five-Year Plan”

The “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam” makes several consequential declarations. First, it establishes the linguistic and cultural hegemony of Chinese for Islamic theology, practice, and education. By specifying in multiple instances that the proper language of scriptural exegesis, ritual observance, and religious education is the “common national language” (i.e., standard Mandarin), the CIA’s plan marginalizes Persian and Arabic as languages associated with Islamic identity. Further, the linguistic emphasis on Chinese enables the embedding of party-approved interpretations of scripture and religious texts into the canon of commonly used texts for worship.

The broad directives that allow CIA supervision of Islamic charity firmly place the management of aesthetic and material aspects of Islamic buildings under the purview of party-state development planning.

Likewise, the CIA’s plan restructures the curriculum for training practitioners of Islam in order to feature secular, Chinese commentaries. The repeated insistence that pride of place be given to the study of Chinese history and culture supplants education about the history of the transmission and development of global Islam. Instead, core texts root the practice of Islam in an almost exclusively localized tradition. In holding up Sinicized Islamic histories and exegesis as “standard,” the CIA designates those teachings and practices from abroad as extreme.

Beyond establishing control over the practice of Islam, the plan also links Sinicization directly to the state’s developmental goals. The designation of non-Chinese architectural styles as imprudently wasting public funding allows interventions by the CIA and the UFWD under the onus of pursuing anticorruption and poverty alleviation measures. The broad directives that allow CIA supervision of Islamic charity also align it with the party-state’s larger developmental agenda and firmly place the management of aesthetic and material aspects of Islamic buildings under the purview of party-state development planning.

Finally, the Five-Year Plan gives broad authority to the CIA to police what may be considered “correct” practice of Islam. In providing a strong supervisory role to the CIA over processes of scriptural interpretation, educational curriculum development, clergy and mosque personnel selection, charitable donations, and even halal branding, the plan curtails the influence of independent Islamic authority figures and centralizes power. In this empowered role, the CIA is able to act as the arbiter of standard practice of faith and also as the guarantor that Sinicization processes align with the party-state’s objectives.

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2.3 China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)

The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.

The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.

In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”

In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”

As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.

Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:

Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel

1. Intensification of patriotic education

The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.

2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”

Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”

To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”

3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith

In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.

Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.

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2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10

The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.

The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”

Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.

The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.

These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).

Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.

Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”

Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).

Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”

The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52

Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.

Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56

By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.

The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57

Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58

As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.

Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.

Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61

The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.

The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.

A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.

Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63


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Following this period of policy formulation, the party-state began the process of localized implementation of Sinicisation policies. This implementation period allowed party-state actors on subnational (and in many cases subprovincial) levels to refine tactics related to policy implementation and messaging surrounding the campaign. The localized rollout of these policies resulted in a few locations—namely, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and southern Gansu province—serving as early test cases for working out best practices related to policy implementation. Lessons learned from the implementation of policies in these initial locations were quickly applied to Islamic communities throughout the rest of China. By late 2019, Sinicisation policies were underway in provinces in East China. In the summer of 2021, processes of Sinicisation were being undertaken in Qinghai province. By mid-2023, these measures were being implemented in holdouts in conservative Hui communities like Najiaying and Shadian in southeastern Yunnan.

The processes of standardization and ideological management undertaken in this initial phase of Sinicisation served as a precursor for the implementation of the next stage of the campaign, where the party-state turned its focus to reducing the density of mosques and gaining control over personnel management. These policies intended to deepen Sinicisation, achieve consolidation of party-state control, and compel the transformation of religious communities.

To enforce and implement these policies, the party-state has utilized a number of legal instruments. The party-state often cites statutes concerning building registration and planning. Concerns for proper maintenance of registration have also been used to justify the party-state’s involvement in the policing of religious clergy and mosque personnel. In some instances, the party-state has justified interventions on economic or financial grounds. Preservation of cultural heritage stands as yet another justification for alterations to mosque architecture. Most of these justifications align with broad goals of national security and counterterrorism. At each stage of the project, the party-state’s interventions have been accompanied by targeted surveillance to monitor implementation. The surveillance undertaken as part of the Sinicisation campaign has employed both high-tech digital infrastructure as well as on-the-ground human intelligence.

Better understanding the various parameters and directives that the campaign of Sinicisation encompasses requires an overview of the two key documents—the CIA’s Five-Year Plan and Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers—which provide instruction on how the campaign ought to be implemented and detailed discussions of the broad objectives and basic functions of the campaign. In the following section, we provide an outline of these key documents and their implications for how Sinicisation has been pursued.

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1.2 Policy Development

The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
 
__________________________________________________________________________
 
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.

37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight

Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-

ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-

tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.

38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang

Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.

39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml view all

Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978)

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15

In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17

However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19

By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.

Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)

The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24

In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
 
-------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
15 Mullaney 2011.

16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15

17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15

18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.

19 Yang 2012, p. 70.

20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.

21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76

22 Gladney 2004.

23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.

24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.

25 Erie 2016.

26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020. view all

Historical Background

Though China is typically not considered part of the “Islamic World,” Muslim communities have long lived within the territorial boundaries of Chinese-administered states. At present, China’s estimated Muslim population totals just over 1.8% of China’s 1.4 billion people–approximately 25 million people in all.2
Of China’s 56 recognized nationalities (referred to as 民族, “minzu”), ten are predominantly Muslim, with Hui and Uyghurs being the largest and second largest Muslim groups respectively.3

While China’s Islamic community is overwhelmingly Sunni, Muslims in China belong to a wide array of sectarian and jurisprudence traditions. In addition to the non-Sufi, primarily Hanafi schools of the Gedimu and Yihewani sects, many of China’s Muslims belong to Sufi orders, including several in the Naqshbandiyya tradition.4 Likewise, a small percentage of China’s Muslims belong to Salafi congregations.5
Geographically, China’s Islamic heartland predominantly rests in the northwestern “Qur’an Belt” (comprising Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, eastern Qinghai and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region).6
However, significant Islamic communities also reside in Yunnan, Henan, Hebei, Hainan, Shandong, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia, and Hui enclave communities exist in most of China’s major cities.7

Short history of Islam in China prior to the PRC (approximately 700-1949)

The history of Islam in China stretches back almost as far as the beginning of the faith itself. Muslim traders first arrived in China via sea routes through the Indian Ocean as early as the 7th century.8 In addition, other Muslims arrived via overland travel along trade routes that made up the Silk Road. Yet another wave of Muslim settlement occurred with the arrival of Muslim (usually Turkic) armies of the Yuan Dynasty who conquered China in the 12th and 13th centuries.9
As a result, by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Chinese-speaking Muslim communities existed alongside Mongolic and Turkic Muslim groups throughout China, especially in Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu and eastern Qinghai.10 Islam in China thus bore the influence of the Arab, Persian and Turkic Muslims, as well as the local Chinese whom they converted or with whom they intermarried. Though at the outset these communities were regarded as temporary residents in China, intermarriage and integration gave these communities a sense of rootedness in China.11
Through this long history, the process of integrating Muslims into various Sino-centered administrative states has been uneven. Internecine sectarian conflicts between rival Sufi orders led to the outbreak of violence in Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia as well as Yunnan in the 18th and 19th centuries. These so-called “Muslim Rebellions,” which the Qing armies brutally suppressed, resulted in devastation and massive loss of human life.12
These conflicts also sowed seeds of mistrust between Muslims and non-Muslims that still influence interethnic relations in the northwest and elsewhere today.13
In the aftermath of these conflicts, the Qing attempted several “civilizing” missions in Muslim regions.
 
 
————————————————————
 
2 Estimates taken from the CIA World Factbook (accessed

September 14, 2023): https://www.cia.gov/the-world-fact-

book/countries/china/#people-and-society

3 The other groups are (from largest population to smallest):

Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik (Pamiri), Bao’an,

Uzbek, and Tatar. See, Guo 2020, p. 3-5.

4 Ha 2022.

5Al Sudairi 2016.

6 Gladney 1991, p. 27

7 See population figures in Stroup 2022.
 
8 Gladney 1987, p. 498.

9 Lipman 1997, p. 31-35.

10 Gladney 1991, Lipman 1997, Israeli 2002.

11 Benite 2005.

12 Kim 2004, Atwill 2005.

13 Stroup 2024.

14 Schluessel 2020. view all

Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened level of awareness arose in international news media about the Chinese party-state’s programme of coercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic community spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the phenomenon of sinicization of Islam became a concern among human rights and policy activists, journalists and policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this widespread campaign focused on its impact on architecture in specific cases. Thus, the campaign for sinicization became synonymous with a particular repertoire of actions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing minarets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in public spaces. However, a closer examination of the sinicization campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Beyond architecture, the campaign touches on matters connected to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque employment, among others. Understanding sinicization, then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it has been implemented nationwide. This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicisation of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Following a brief historical overview of the origins of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview of the campaign itself. In part one, we focus on the documents which establish the campaign. In part two, we take a detailed look at its enforcement. The rhetoric of the sinicisation campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicisation policy. Through this analysis, we reveal the framework, ambitions, and proposed measures which this sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on two key documents that elucidate these standards of appropriateness and empower the state’s capacity to enforce them: the General Office of the State Council’s “Opinions on Suggestions for Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work under the New Situation”, more commonly known as Document No. 10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year Plan for Maintaining Progress toward the Sinicization of Islam in Our Nation (2018-2022).” Together, these documents provide a blueprint for radical transformation of Islamic communities and social organisation, and lay the groundwork for further measures, including those which reduce the numbers of mosques in China, and implement additional means of surveillance of Muslim migrants within China.
 
 
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.

The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.

Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
 
  view all

This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of islam programme on hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Further, because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identifi ed in this report present a profound threat to muslim identity and practice within the people’s republic of china (prc). Th e concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
 
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
 
 
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed. view all

The word "ٱلْأَمْرِ" in the Holy Quran carries multiple layers of meaning, broadly encompassing:

Command or Order: This is the most frequent and direct meaning, referring to a directive, injunction, or decree. It can be a command from God, a ruler, or someone in authority.
Affair, Matter, or Event: In a broader sense, "ٱلْأَمْرِ" can denote a situation, circumstance, business, concern, or happening. It refers to "things" in a general context.
Divine Decree or Will: In theological contexts, particularly when attributed to God, "ٱلْأَمْرِ" signifies the divine command that brings things into existence instantaneously. It represents God's will and power to create and control the universe.
Authority or Governance: Related to the concept of "Ulu'l-Amr" (those in authority), the word connects to leadership, responsibility, and the execution of decisions.

To understand the full scope, let's explore its occurrences and etymology.

ٱلۡأَمۡرِ in the Holy Quran

 the triliteral root "أ م ر" (hamza-mim-ra) appears 248 times in the Quran in various derived forms. Specifically, the noun form "أَمْر" (amr), which includes "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" (Al-Amr) appears 166 times.

Here are some of the verses where the noun "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" (amr) appears, as listed by the Quranic Arabic Corpus:

Verses Related to "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" in the Quran:

Quran 2:109: "... فَاعْفُوا وَاصْفَحُوا حَتَّىٰ يَأْتِيَ اللَّهُ بِأَمْرِهِ..." (...forgive and overlook until Allah delivers His command.)
Quran 2:117: "...وَإِذَا قَضَىٰ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ" (...and when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, "Be," and it is.)
Quran 2:210: "...وَقُضِيَ الْأَمْرُ وَإِلَى اللَّهِ تُرْجَعُ الْأُمُورُ" (...and the matter will be concluded, and to Allah will [all] matters be returned.)
Quran 2:275: "...فَلَهُ مَا سَلَفَ وَأَمْرُهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ..." (...what is past is his, and his affair is with Allah...)
Quran 3:47: "...إِذَا قَضَىٰ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ" (...when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, "Be," and it is.)
Quran 3:109: "...وَإِلَى اللَّهِ تُرْجَعُ الْأُمُورُ" (...and to Allah will be returned [all] matters.)
Quran 3:128: "...لَيْسَ لَكَ مِنَ الْأَمْرِ شَيْءٌ..." (Not for you, [O Muhammad, but for Allah ], is the decision in the matter...)
Quran 3:147: "...وَإِسْرَافَنَا فِي أَمْرِنَا..." (...and our excesses in our affairs...)
Quran 3:152: "...وَتَنَازَعْتُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ..." (...and disputed about the order [given by the Prophet]...)
Quran 3:154: "...هَلْ لَنَا مِنَ الْأَمْرِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ..." (..."Is there anything for us [to have a say] in the matter?"...)
Quran 3:154: "...قُلْ إِنَّ الْأَمْرَ كُلَّهُ لِلَّهِ..." (Say, "Indeed, the matter [of victory] is all with Allah."...)
Quran 3:154: "...لَوْ كَانَ لَنَا مِنَ الْأَمْرِ شَيْءٌ مَا قُتِلْنَا هَاهُنَا..." (..."If we had anything to do with the matter, we would not have been killed right here."...)
Quran 3:159: "...وَشَاوِرْهُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ..." (...and consult them in the matter.)
Quran 3:186: "...فَإِنَّ ذَٰلِكَ مِنْ عَزْمِ الْأُمُورِ" (...then that is of the matters requiring determination.)
Quran 4:47: "...وَكَانَ أَمْرُ اللَّهِ مَفْعُولًا" (...and ever is the command of Allah accomplished.)
Quran 4:59: "...وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ..." (...and those of authority among you...)
Quran 4:83: "...وَإِذَا جَاءَهُمْ أَمْرٌ مِنَ الْأَمْنِ أَوِ الْخَوْفِ أَذَاعُوا بِهِ..." (When there comes to them a matter [regarding] security or fear, they publicize it.)
Quran 4:83: "...وَإِلَىٰ أُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْهُمْ..." (...and to those of authority among them...)
Quran 5:52: "...أَوْ أَمْرٍ مِنْ عِنْدِهِ..." ( ...or a decision from Him.)
Quran 5:95: "...لِيَذُوقَ وَبَالَ أَمْرِهِ..." (...that he may taste the penalty of his deed.)
Quran 6:8: "...لَقُضِيَ الْأَمْرُ ثُمَّ لَا يُنْظَرُونَ" (...the matter would have been decided; then they would not be reprieved.)
Quran 6:58: "...لَقُضِيَ الْأَمْرُ بَيْنِي وَبَيْنَكُمْ..." (...the matter would have been decided between me and you...)

This list is not exhaustive but provides a representative sample of verses where "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" appears, illustrating its varied meanings within the Quranic context. For a complete list, a specialized Quranic concordance would be required.



Etymology of ٱلۡأَمۡرِ

The word "ٱلۡأَمْرِ" (Al-Amr) originates from the triliteral Arabic root أ-م-ر (ʔ-m-r). This root is fundamental and prolific in Arabic, giving rise to a wide array of words with interconnected meanings.

Core Meanings of the Root (أ-م-ر):

To command, order, direct: This is the primary verbal meaning. The verb أَمَرَ (ʔamara) means "he commanded," "he ordered."
To enjoin, instruct, bid: Related to the act of giving a command or instruction.
To manage, conduct, govern: Implies taking charge and directing affairs.
To become abundant, prosperous: In some derived forms, the root also takes on meanings related to growth and abundance.
To be firm, strong, bitter, severe: Another branch of meanings, possibly related to the decisiveness and forcefulness associated with command.

Evolution and Historical Reasons:

The etymology of "ٱلۡأَمْرِ" and its related forms reveals a historical and semantic development centered around the concept of direction and control. From the basic act of commanding, the meaning expanded to encompass:

The Command itself (ٱلۡأَمْرِ): The verbal noun أَمْر (ʔamr) directly translates to "command," "order," "decree," or "injunction."
The Thing Commanded or Managed (ٱلۡأَمْرِ): The meaning broadened to include "affair," "matter," "business," "concern," "state," "condition," "event," referring to the subject or object of the command or management.
Authority and Leadership (أَمِير - Amir): Words like أَمِير (ʔamīr), meaning "commander," "prince," or "leader," are derived from the same root, highlighting the association of "ٱلۡأَمْرِ" with governance and authority.
Urgency and Decisiveness: The connection to "bitter" or "severe" might stem from the idea that commands are often delivered with firmness and carry weight, requiring decisive action.

Cognates in other Semitic Languages:

The Wiktionary entry suggests a cognate in Hebrew - אמר (amar), meaning "to say." This connection points to a deeper Semitic root associating the concept of "command" with the spoken word and authoritative utterance. It also mentions comparison to Ugaritic view all