CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2022: Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture
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During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.]
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.]
