Hui Muslims
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 996 views • 2025-03-02 06:09
Another specific measure implemented in the plan is a prohibition on the "generalization" of halal. Not only does the CIA’s dictate limit the application of halal to labels regarding foodstuffs, but it further mandates that halal must only apply to animal products. Moreover, the plan specifically calls for increased training on the proper applications of halal to be undertaken by the CIA. In practice, these measures severely limit believers’ ability to observe halal standards and override scriptural authorities’ definitions of halal to insert a state-sponsored one instead. In this way, the CIA uses regulatory power to police daily habits of practice.
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
view all
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
view all
Another specific measure implemented in the plan is a prohibition on the "generalization" of halal. Not only does the CIA’s dictate limit the application of halal to labels regarding foodstuffs, but it further mandates that halal must only apply to animal products. Moreover, the plan specifically calls for increased training on the proper applications of halal to be undertaken by the CIA. In practice, these measures severely limit believers’ ability to observe halal standards and override scriptural authorities’ definitions of halal to insert a state-sponsored one instead. In this way, the CIA uses regulatory power to police daily habits of practice.
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
China local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse muslim community opposition.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1034 views • 2025-03-02 06:00
The party-state provided funding for renovations, primarily channeled through the United Front Work Department and via the relevant branches of the CIA. Qujing City, Yunnan, estimated in 2021 that it had spent 19m RMB on supporting renovations over the preceding year. Estimates for renovations to 19 mosques in Qinghai, to be completed over two years, were costed at close to 27m RMB, according to figures in a widely circulated PPT of proposed renovations. In Xining, that would put the cost of renovations to a single mosque at around 1.4m RMB apiece. These estimates likely do not represent the full costs of renovations, as they do not include costs for adding “Chinese” decorative elements following the removal of pagodas and domes, as occurred in several Xining mosques (such as Shulinxiang Mosque, pictured below) following the initial removal of domes and minarets. This oversight reflects the logic of the campaign: “foreign” architectural elements were first removed as dangerous precursors to extremism, before appropriately “Chinese” elements were added to replace them.
Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.
As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.
In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.
Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.
Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.
Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.
view all
Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.
As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.
In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.
Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.
Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.
Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.
view all
The party-state provided funding for renovations, primarily channeled through the United Front Work Department and via the relevant branches of the CIA. Qujing City, Yunnan, estimated in 2021 that it had spent 19m RMB on supporting renovations over the preceding year. Estimates for renovations to 19 mosques in Qinghai, to be completed over two years, were costed at close to 27m RMB, according to figures in a widely circulated PPT of proposed renovations. In Xining, that would put the cost of renovations to a single mosque at around 1.4m RMB apiece. These estimates likely do not represent the full costs of renovations, as they do not include costs for adding “Chinese” decorative elements following the removal of pagodas and domes, as occurred in several Xining mosques (such as Shulinxiang Mosque, pictured below) following the initial removal of domes and minarets. This oversight reflects the logic of the campaign: “foreign” architectural elements were first removed as dangerous precursors to extremism, before appropriately “Chinese” elements were added to replace them.
Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.
As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.
In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.
Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.
Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.
Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1136 views • 2025-03-02 05:55
4.1 Mosque and Architectural Renovations
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam. Like other aspects of aesthetic Sinicization, the determination that ‘Arabic’-style elements in mosque architecture must be corrected dates to the emergence of the ‘Three Transformations’ campaign in Ningxia.
The China Islamic Association first held a conference on mosque architecture in Xi’an in April 2017. The conference concluded that in the previous decade, there had been a trend towards Arabization in mosque architecture across the country that must be corrected. In addition, mosques had grown overly large, overly ostentatious, and had exceeded approved construction specifications. Remarks made at the conference further noted that, in compliance with party-state dictates, mosques should not serve as landmarks, nor become tourist destinations. Delegates to the conference were reminded by the President of the CIA that only when Islam “integrates with Chinese culture” will it be able to “take root and grow in this land of China.” Delegates were also taken on site visits to several historic mosques in Shaanxi, including Xi’an’s famous Huajuexiang Mosque. The resulting “Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style” were dispersed through the country-wide network of Islamic Associations for study.
In mid-2018, as the large-scale removal of Arabic script began across the northwest, evidence of the removal of “Arab-style” or otherwise “foreign” architectural elements from mosques and other public buildings first emerged. In practice, renovations have targeted domes, tall minarets in a non-pagoda style, and Islamic symbols, such as the crescent moon and star commonly placed atop mosque roofs. Although most of the media coverage of architectural Sinicization focuses on mosques, renovations have also targeted non-religious buildings constructed with decorative Islamic elements, such as domes or arched windows. For example, in Jinan, Shandong Province, the famous halal restaurant, Bainian Yunting Hui Hotpot Restaurant, situated next to the city’s Great Southern Mosque, removed its prominent ornamental golden domes and the Arabic script on its sign by May 2016. By July 2022, images from Baidu Maps’ street view indicated that all mentions of halal had vanished from the storefront’s branding.
Before 2017, this was a common practice for buildings located near prominent mosques (as was the case with those buildings surrounding Yinchuan’s Nanguan Mosque), or areas with a strong Hui heritage.
Often, the adoption of these Islamic architectural motifs was a deliberate choice on the part of the local authorities to promote their regions as destinations for foreign businesses or tourism. Renovations to city districts to remove architecture intended to celebrate Islamic heritage have taken place in Hohhot, Jilin, and cities throughout Ningxia (most notably, Yinchuan). In Linxia, the local government reported the removal of Islamic decorative elements from the roofs of 14 multi-storey buildings, in addition to a widespread campaign that replaced almost 1,000 shop signs with Arabic elements in 2018.
As with other aspects of the campaign, different provinces have implemented different timetables for Sinicizing mosque architecture. Mosques in Ningxia were Sinicized first — roughly between 2018-2020 — in keeping with the broader identification of Ningxia as a priority destination for Sinicization work. The campaign was subsequently implemented across the country. Several major mosques in Yunnan were among the last targeted, only undergoing Sinicization in late 2023. Much of the architectural work to renovate mosques was completed during Covid-19 lockdowns, when mosques were formally closed to worshippers. Within this broader pattern, however, authorities have worked to carefully prepare plans for renovations to mosques of particular size or historic significance to Muslim communities across China.
As of 2024, analysis suggests that all major mosques across China have now been Sinicized. A Financial Times satellite survey from 2023 found that three-quarters of the 2,132 mosques identified as having ‘Arabic’ elements had been modified or destroyed. Whilst the differing implementation timetables, and indeed the cost, scale, and complexity of the work required, mean that it is possible that some smaller mosques remain unaffected to date, it can be anticipated that ultimately all mosques in China deemed to have unacceptable architectural features will be subject to renovation.
In the earliest stages of the campaign, renovations were often crude. Given the political weight placed on the Three Transformations campaign and the definition of mosque rectification work as part of combatting extremism, authorities moved fast to renovate mosques, with little concern for the quality of work done or the state in which mosques were left. Domes and other unacceptable elements were simply torn off, sometimes in a manner so blunt that extensive damage was done to the remaining fabric of the mosque. Numerous photographs from this time period show domes stripped off mosques and simply left lying in the courtyards below. In the case of a newly refurbished mosque in Zheqiao, Gansu, the 2019 operation to remove its dome, minarets, and decorative elements to its doors and windows effectively destroyed the mosque itself. Residents were warned not to circulate images or videos of the damaged mosques. Some who posted longer videos of the demolition and damage done to the mosque were later arrested for doing so.
Early mosque Sinicization work also overlapped substantially with the moves to close or demolish mosques “lacking the correct permissions” (未批先建清真寺) and other unregistered religious venues (see 7.0 Mosque Closures). In August 2018, for instance, the local government moved to demolish Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia on the grounds that it had constructed an extension that exceeded the scope of the building permits it had obtained for the work. Following fierce opposition and protests that attracted international attention, the government backed down from the plan to demolish the mosque. However, after defusing the protest, the mosque was later Sinicized, with pagoda roofs replacing its domes.
As the campaign has progressed, forced renovations have moved towards replacing ‘Arabic’ features with Chinese equivalents. As most mosques are not rebuilt wholesale — and indeed the wood-built traditional mosques held up as models to emulate are much more expensive to build — renovation often means simply replacing domes with tiled roofs and capping off shortened minarets. The resulting hybrid mosques, with their original walls unchanged, are stylistically awkward, with little harmony between original design and the new impositions. Standards for what aspects of architectural design are considered acceptable vary considerably. In a tender for renovations to a mosque in Ningxia in 2022, in addition to stating that the proposed buildings should be traditionally Chinese in style, the call also stated that the exterior colour of the mosque should be adjusted to remove any green elements. This stands in contrast to guidelines issued for mosque renovations in Hualong, Qinghai, which stated that renovations to the nine local ‘Arabic-style’ mosques should be “practical, economic, green [Islamic] and beautiful.” In one exceptional case in Jinan, even party-approved slogans in Arabic failed to meet standards of appropriateness. The outer wall of the Chinese-style Great Southern Mosque of Jinan bore the party slogan “Love Your Country, Love Your Faith” in calligraphic Arabic. However, after Sinicization, the script was hastily removed and replaced by the Twelve Core Socialist Values in Chinese (see photos on following page).
view all
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam. Like other aspects of aesthetic Sinicization, the determination that ‘Arabic’-style elements in mosque architecture must be corrected dates to the emergence of the ‘Three Transformations’ campaign in Ningxia.
The China Islamic Association first held a conference on mosque architecture in Xi’an in April 2017. The conference concluded that in the previous decade, there had been a trend towards Arabization in mosque architecture across the country that must be corrected. In addition, mosques had grown overly large, overly ostentatious, and had exceeded approved construction specifications. Remarks made at the conference further noted that, in compliance with party-state dictates, mosques should not serve as landmarks, nor become tourist destinations. Delegates to the conference were reminded by the President of the CIA that only when Islam “integrates with Chinese culture” will it be able to “take root and grow in this land of China.” Delegates were also taken on site visits to several historic mosques in Shaanxi, including Xi’an’s famous Huajuexiang Mosque. The resulting “Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style” were dispersed through the country-wide network of Islamic Associations for study.
In mid-2018, as the large-scale removal of Arabic script began across the northwest, evidence of the removal of “Arab-style” or otherwise “foreign” architectural elements from mosques and other public buildings first emerged. In practice, renovations have targeted domes, tall minarets in a non-pagoda style, and Islamic symbols, such as the crescent moon and star commonly placed atop mosque roofs. Although most of the media coverage of architectural Sinicization focuses on mosques, renovations have also targeted non-religious buildings constructed with decorative Islamic elements, such as domes or arched windows. For example, in Jinan, Shandong Province, the famous halal restaurant, Bainian Yunting Hui Hotpot Restaurant, situated next to the city’s Great Southern Mosque, removed its prominent ornamental golden domes and the Arabic script on its sign by May 2016. By July 2022, images from Baidu Maps’ street view indicated that all mentions of halal had vanished from the storefront’s branding.
Before 2017, this was a common practice for buildings located near prominent mosques (as was the case with those buildings surrounding Yinchuan’s Nanguan Mosque), or areas with a strong Hui heritage.
Often, the adoption of these Islamic architectural motifs was a deliberate choice on the part of the local authorities to promote their regions as destinations for foreign businesses or tourism. Renovations to city districts to remove architecture intended to celebrate Islamic heritage have taken place in Hohhot, Jilin, and cities throughout Ningxia (most notably, Yinchuan). In Linxia, the local government reported the removal of Islamic decorative elements from the roofs of 14 multi-storey buildings, in addition to a widespread campaign that replaced almost 1,000 shop signs with Arabic elements in 2018.
As with other aspects of the campaign, different provinces have implemented different timetables for Sinicizing mosque architecture. Mosques in Ningxia were Sinicized first — roughly between 2018-2020 — in keeping with the broader identification of Ningxia as a priority destination for Sinicization work. The campaign was subsequently implemented across the country. Several major mosques in Yunnan were among the last targeted, only undergoing Sinicization in late 2023. Much of the architectural work to renovate mosques was completed during Covid-19 lockdowns, when mosques were formally closed to worshippers. Within this broader pattern, however, authorities have worked to carefully prepare plans for renovations to mosques of particular size or historic significance to Muslim communities across China.
As of 2024, analysis suggests that all major mosques across China have now been Sinicized. A Financial Times satellite survey from 2023 found that three-quarters of the 2,132 mosques identified as having ‘Arabic’ elements had been modified or destroyed. Whilst the differing implementation timetables, and indeed the cost, scale, and complexity of the work required, mean that it is possible that some smaller mosques remain unaffected to date, it can be anticipated that ultimately all mosques in China deemed to have unacceptable architectural features will be subject to renovation.
In the earliest stages of the campaign, renovations were often crude. Given the political weight placed on the Three Transformations campaign and the definition of mosque rectification work as part of combatting extremism, authorities moved fast to renovate mosques, with little concern for the quality of work done or the state in which mosques were left. Domes and other unacceptable elements were simply torn off, sometimes in a manner so blunt that extensive damage was done to the remaining fabric of the mosque. Numerous photographs from this time period show domes stripped off mosques and simply left lying in the courtyards below. In the case of a newly refurbished mosque in Zheqiao, Gansu, the 2019 operation to remove its dome, minarets, and decorative elements to its doors and windows effectively destroyed the mosque itself. Residents were warned not to circulate images or videos of the damaged mosques. Some who posted longer videos of the demolition and damage done to the mosque were later arrested for doing so.
Early mosque Sinicization work also overlapped substantially with the moves to close or demolish mosques “lacking the correct permissions” (未批先建清真寺) and other unregistered religious venues (see 7.0 Mosque Closures). In August 2018, for instance, the local government moved to demolish Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia on the grounds that it had constructed an extension that exceeded the scope of the building permits it had obtained for the work. Following fierce opposition and protests that attracted international attention, the government backed down from the plan to demolish the mosque. However, after defusing the protest, the mosque was later Sinicized, with pagoda roofs replacing its domes.
As the campaign has progressed, forced renovations have moved towards replacing ‘Arabic’ features with Chinese equivalents. As most mosques are not rebuilt wholesale — and indeed the wood-built traditional mosques held up as models to emulate are much more expensive to build — renovation often means simply replacing domes with tiled roofs and capping off shortened minarets. The resulting hybrid mosques, with their original walls unchanged, are stylistically awkward, with little harmony between original design and the new impositions. Standards for what aspects of architectural design are considered acceptable vary considerably. In a tender for renovations to a mosque in Ningxia in 2022, in addition to stating that the proposed buildings should be traditionally Chinese in style, the call also stated that the exterior colour of the mosque should be adjusted to remove any green elements. This stands in contrast to guidelines issued for mosque renovations in Hualong, Qinghai, which stated that renovations to the nine local ‘Arabic-style’ mosques should be “practical, economic, green [Islamic] and beautiful.” In one exceptional case in Jinan, even party-approved slogans in Arabic failed to meet standards of appropriateness. The outer wall of the Chinese-style Great Southern Mosque of Jinan bore the party slogan “Love Your Country, Love Your Faith” in calligraphic Arabic. However, after Sinicization, the script was hastily removed and replaced by the Twelve Core Socialist Values in Chinese (see photos on following page).
view all
4.1 Mosque and Architectural Renovations
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam. Like other aspects of aesthetic Sinicization, the determination that ‘Arabic’-style elements in mosque architecture must be corrected dates to the emergence of the ‘Three Transformations’ campaign in Ningxia.
The China Islamic Association first held a conference on mosque architecture in Xi’an in April 2017. The conference concluded that in the previous decade, there had been a trend towards Arabization in mosque architecture across the country that must be corrected. In addition, mosques had grown overly large, overly ostentatious, and had exceeded approved construction specifications. Remarks made at the conference further noted that, in compliance with party-state dictates, mosques should not serve as landmarks, nor become tourist destinations. Delegates to the conference were reminded by the President of the CIA that only when Islam “integrates with Chinese culture” will it be able to “take root and grow in this land of China.” Delegates were also taken on site visits to several historic mosques in Shaanxi, including Xi’an’s famous Huajuexiang Mosque. The resulting “Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style” were dispersed through the country-wide network of Islamic Associations for study.
In mid-2018, as the large-scale removal of Arabic script began across the northwest, evidence of the removal of “Arab-style” or otherwise “foreign” architectural elements from mosques and other public buildings first emerged. In practice, renovations have targeted domes, tall minarets in a non-pagoda style, and Islamic symbols, such as the crescent moon and star commonly placed atop mosque roofs. Although most of the media coverage of architectural Sinicization focuses on mosques, renovations have also targeted non-religious buildings constructed with decorative Islamic elements, such as domes or arched windows. For example, in Jinan, Shandong Province, the famous halal restaurant, Bainian Yunting Hui Hotpot Restaurant, situated next to the city’s Great Southern Mosque, removed its prominent ornamental golden domes and the Arabic script on its sign by May 2016. By July 2022, images from Baidu Maps’ street view indicated that all mentions of halal had vanished from the storefront’s branding.
Before 2017, this was a common practice for buildings located near prominent mosques (as was the case with those buildings surrounding Yinchuan’s Nanguan Mosque), or areas with a strong Hui heritage.
Often, the adoption of these Islamic architectural motifs was a deliberate choice on the part of the local authorities to promote their regions as destinations for foreign businesses or tourism. Renovations to city districts to remove architecture intended to celebrate Islamic heritage have taken place in Hohhot, Jilin, and cities throughout Ningxia (most notably, Yinchuan). In Linxia, the local government reported the removal of Islamic decorative elements from the roofs of 14 multi-storey buildings, in addition to a widespread campaign that replaced almost 1,000 shop signs with Arabic elements in 2018.
As with other aspects of the campaign, different provinces have implemented different timetables for Sinicizing mosque architecture. Mosques in Ningxia were Sinicized first — roughly between 2018-2020 — in keeping with the broader identification of Ningxia as a priority destination for Sinicization work. The campaign was subsequently implemented across the country. Several major mosques in Yunnan were among the last targeted, only undergoing Sinicization in late 2023. Much of the architectural work to renovate mosques was completed during Covid-19 lockdowns, when mosques were formally closed to worshippers. Within this broader pattern, however, authorities have worked to carefully prepare plans for renovations to mosques of particular size or historic significance to Muslim communities across China.
As of 2024, analysis suggests that all major mosques across China have now been Sinicized. A Financial Times satellite survey from 2023 found that three-quarters of the 2,132 mosques identified as having ‘Arabic’ elements had been modified or destroyed. Whilst the differing implementation timetables, and indeed the cost, scale, and complexity of the work required, mean that it is possible that some smaller mosques remain unaffected to date, it can be anticipated that ultimately all mosques in China deemed to have unacceptable architectural features will be subject to renovation.
In the earliest stages of the campaign, renovations were often crude. Given the political weight placed on the Three Transformations campaign and the definition of mosque rectification work as part of combatting extremism, authorities moved fast to renovate mosques, with little concern for the quality of work done or the state in which mosques were left. Domes and other unacceptable elements were simply torn off, sometimes in a manner so blunt that extensive damage was done to the remaining fabric of the mosque. Numerous photographs from this time period show domes stripped off mosques and simply left lying in the courtyards below. In the case of a newly refurbished mosque in Zheqiao, Gansu, the 2019 operation to remove its dome, minarets, and decorative elements to its doors and windows effectively destroyed the mosque itself. Residents were warned not to circulate images or videos of the damaged mosques. Some who posted longer videos of the demolition and damage done to the mosque were later arrested for doing so.
Early mosque Sinicization work also overlapped substantially with the moves to close or demolish mosques “lacking the correct permissions” (未批先建清真寺) and other unregistered religious venues (see 7.0 Mosque Closures). In August 2018, for instance, the local government moved to demolish Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia on the grounds that it had constructed an extension that exceeded the scope of the building permits it had obtained for the work. Following fierce opposition and protests that attracted international attention, the government backed down from the plan to demolish the mosque. However, after defusing the protest, the mosque was later Sinicized, with pagoda roofs replacing its domes.
As the campaign has progressed, forced renovations have moved towards replacing ‘Arabic’ features with Chinese equivalents. As most mosques are not rebuilt wholesale — and indeed the wood-built traditional mosques held up as models to emulate are much more expensive to build — renovation often means simply replacing domes with tiled roofs and capping off shortened minarets. The resulting hybrid mosques, with their original walls unchanged, are stylistically awkward, with little harmony between original design and the new impositions. Standards for what aspects of architectural design are considered acceptable vary considerably. In a tender for renovations to a mosque in Ningxia in 2022, in addition to stating that the proposed buildings should be traditionally Chinese in style, the call also stated that the exterior colour of the mosque should be adjusted to remove any green elements. This stands in contrast to guidelines issued for mosque renovations in Hualong, Qinghai, which stated that renovations to the nine local ‘Arabic-style’ mosques should be “practical, economic, green [Islamic] and beautiful.” In one exceptional case in Jinan, even party-approved slogans in Arabic failed to meet standards of appropriateness. The outer wall of the Chinese-style Great Southern Mosque of Jinan bore the party slogan “Love Your Country, Love Your Faith” in calligraphic Arabic. However, after Sinicization, the script was hastily removed and replaced by the Twelve Core Socialist Values in Chinese (see photos on following page).
Mosque Management Committees in China
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1044 views • 2025-03-02 05:31
3.3 Mosque Management Committees (寺管会)
Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.
Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.
The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.
In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.
Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.
Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.
Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.
The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.
There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.
view all
Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.
Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.
The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.
In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.
Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.
Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.
Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.
The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.
There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.
view all
3.3 Mosque Management Committees (寺管会)
Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.
Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.
The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.
In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.
Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.
Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.
Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.
The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.
There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.
Foundations of Sinicisation: Historical Background and Policy Development
Articles • leo posted the article • 0 comments • 726 views • 2025-02-12 04:50
1.0 Introduction
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities. view all
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities. view all
1.0 Introduction
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities.
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities.
The Communist Party of China often emphasizes the freedom of ethnic and religious affairs, but strictly controls Muslims and their beliefs in Linxia Hui Autonomous…
News • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 799 views • 2025-01-26 06:17
The Communist Party of China often emphasizes the freedom of ethnic and religious affairs, but strictly controls Muslims and their beliefs in Linxia Hui Autonomous…
view all
view all
The Communist Party of China often emphasizes the freedom of ethnic and religious affairs, but strictly controls Muslims and their beliefs in Linxia Hui Autonomous…
Hui Muslims who fled oppression in China are concerned about the president-elect’s vows to tighten asylum policy.
News • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 861 views • 2025-01-26 05:39
They survived re-education camps in China’s western Xinjiang region. They were released from detention centers and psychiatric hospitals. They watched their loved ones disappear one by one and feared when it would be their turn.
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.” view all
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.” view all
They survived re-education camps in China’s western Xinjiang region. They were released from detention centers and psychiatric hospitals. They watched their loved ones disappear one by one and feared when it would be their turn.
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.”
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.”
Hundreds of Hui Muslims Protest Arrest of Respected Imam in Yunnan Province, China Mainland
News • davidlo posted the article • 0 comments • 959 views • 2024-12-17 21:10
Hundreds of Hui Muslims Protest Arrest of Respected Imam in Yunnan Province, China Mainland
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country. view all
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country. view all
Hundreds of Hui Muslims Protest Arrest of Respected Imam in Yunnan Province, China Mainland
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country.
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country.
CECC Annual Report 2022 | ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Human Rights • leo posted the article • 0 comments • 931 views • 2022-11-21 11:50
The infos from CECC Annual Report 2022
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies. view all
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies. view all
The infos from CECC Annual Report 2022
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies.
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies.
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2022: Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture
Human Rights • leo posted the article • 0 comments • 922 views • 2022-11-21 11:32
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.] view all
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.] view all
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.]
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.]
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 996 views • 2025-03-02 06:09
Another specific measure implemented in the plan is a prohibition on the "generalization" of halal. Not only does the CIA’s dictate limit the application of halal to labels regarding foodstuffs, but it further mandates that halal must only apply to animal products. Moreover, the plan specifically calls for increased training on the proper applications of halal to be undertaken by the CIA. In practice, these measures severely limit believers’ ability to observe halal standards and override scriptural authorities’ definitions of halal to insert a state-sponsored one instead. In this way, the CIA uses regulatory power to police daily habits of practice.
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
view all
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
view all
Another specific measure implemented in the plan is a prohibition on the "generalization" of halal. Not only does the CIA’s dictate limit the application of halal to labels regarding foodstuffs, but it further mandates that halal must only apply to animal products. Moreover, the plan specifically calls for increased training on the proper applications of halal to be undertaken by the CIA. In practice, these measures severely limit believers’ ability to observe halal standards and override scriptural authorities’ definitions of halal to insert a state-sponsored one instead. In this way, the CIA uses regulatory power to police daily habits of practice.
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.
Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.
Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture
After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.
As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.
The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."
By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.
Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.
Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.
Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.
This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.
These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.
5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.
The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.
Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.
These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.
6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel
The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”
To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”
The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.
China local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse muslim community opposition.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1034 views • 2025-03-02 06:00
The party-state provided funding for renovations, primarily channeled through the United Front Work Department and via the relevant branches of the CIA. Qujing City, Yunnan, estimated in 2021 that it had spent 19m RMB on supporting renovations over the preceding year. Estimates for renovations to 19 mosques in Qinghai, to be completed over two years, were costed at close to 27m RMB, according to figures in a widely circulated PPT of proposed renovations. In Xining, that would put the cost of renovations to a single mosque at around 1.4m RMB apiece. These estimates likely do not represent the full costs of renovations, as they do not include costs for adding “Chinese” decorative elements following the removal of pagodas and domes, as occurred in several Xining mosques (such as Shulinxiang Mosque, pictured below) following the initial removal of domes and minarets. This oversight reflects the logic of the campaign: “foreign” architectural elements were first removed as dangerous precursors to extremism, before appropriately “Chinese” elements were added to replace them.
Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.
As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.
In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.
Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.
Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.
Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.
view all
Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.
As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.
In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.
Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.
Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.
Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.
view all
The party-state provided funding for renovations, primarily channeled through the United Front Work Department and via the relevant branches of the CIA. Qujing City, Yunnan, estimated in 2021 that it had spent 19m RMB on supporting renovations over the preceding year. Estimates for renovations to 19 mosques in Qinghai, to be completed over two years, were costed at close to 27m RMB, according to figures in a widely circulated PPT of proposed renovations. In Xining, that would put the cost of renovations to a single mosque at around 1.4m RMB apiece. These estimates likely do not represent the full costs of renovations, as they do not include costs for adding “Chinese” decorative elements following the removal of pagodas and domes, as occurred in several Xining mosques (such as Shulinxiang Mosque, pictured below) following the initial removal of domes and minarets. This oversight reflects the logic of the campaign: “foreign” architectural elements were first removed as dangerous precursors to extremism, before appropriately “Chinese” elements were added to replace them.
Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.
As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.
In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.
Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.
Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.
Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1136 views • 2025-03-02 05:55
4.1 Mosque and Architectural Renovations
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam. Like other aspects of aesthetic Sinicization, the determination that ‘Arabic’-style elements in mosque architecture must be corrected dates to the emergence of the ‘Three Transformations’ campaign in Ningxia.
The China Islamic Association first held a conference on mosque architecture in Xi’an in April 2017. The conference concluded that in the previous decade, there had been a trend towards Arabization in mosque architecture across the country that must be corrected. In addition, mosques had grown overly large, overly ostentatious, and had exceeded approved construction specifications. Remarks made at the conference further noted that, in compliance with party-state dictates, mosques should not serve as landmarks, nor become tourist destinations. Delegates to the conference were reminded by the President of the CIA that only when Islam “integrates with Chinese culture” will it be able to “take root and grow in this land of China.” Delegates were also taken on site visits to several historic mosques in Shaanxi, including Xi’an’s famous Huajuexiang Mosque. The resulting “Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style” were dispersed through the country-wide network of Islamic Associations for study.
In mid-2018, as the large-scale removal of Arabic script began across the northwest, evidence of the removal of “Arab-style” or otherwise “foreign” architectural elements from mosques and other public buildings first emerged. In practice, renovations have targeted domes, tall minarets in a non-pagoda style, and Islamic symbols, such as the crescent moon and star commonly placed atop mosque roofs. Although most of the media coverage of architectural Sinicization focuses on mosques, renovations have also targeted non-religious buildings constructed with decorative Islamic elements, such as domes or arched windows. For example, in Jinan, Shandong Province, the famous halal restaurant, Bainian Yunting Hui Hotpot Restaurant, situated next to the city’s Great Southern Mosque, removed its prominent ornamental golden domes and the Arabic script on its sign by May 2016. By July 2022, images from Baidu Maps’ street view indicated that all mentions of halal had vanished from the storefront’s branding.
Before 2017, this was a common practice for buildings located near prominent mosques (as was the case with those buildings surrounding Yinchuan’s Nanguan Mosque), or areas with a strong Hui heritage.
Often, the adoption of these Islamic architectural motifs was a deliberate choice on the part of the local authorities to promote their regions as destinations for foreign businesses or tourism. Renovations to city districts to remove architecture intended to celebrate Islamic heritage have taken place in Hohhot, Jilin, and cities throughout Ningxia (most notably, Yinchuan). In Linxia, the local government reported the removal of Islamic decorative elements from the roofs of 14 multi-storey buildings, in addition to a widespread campaign that replaced almost 1,000 shop signs with Arabic elements in 2018.
As with other aspects of the campaign, different provinces have implemented different timetables for Sinicizing mosque architecture. Mosques in Ningxia were Sinicized first — roughly between 2018-2020 — in keeping with the broader identification of Ningxia as a priority destination for Sinicization work. The campaign was subsequently implemented across the country. Several major mosques in Yunnan were among the last targeted, only undergoing Sinicization in late 2023. Much of the architectural work to renovate mosques was completed during Covid-19 lockdowns, when mosques were formally closed to worshippers. Within this broader pattern, however, authorities have worked to carefully prepare plans for renovations to mosques of particular size or historic significance to Muslim communities across China.
As of 2024, analysis suggests that all major mosques across China have now been Sinicized. A Financial Times satellite survey from 2023 found that three-quarters of the 2,132 mosques identified as having ‘Arabic’ elements had been modified or destroyed. Whilst the differing implementation timetables, and indeed the cost, scale, and complexity of the work required, mean that it is possible that some smaller mosques remain unaffected to date, it can be anticipated that ultimately all mosques in China deemed to have unacceptable architectural features will be subject to renovation.
In the earliest stages of the campaign, renovations were often crude. Given the political weight placed on the Three Transformations campaign and the definition of mosque rectification work as part of combatting extremism, authorities moved fast to renovate mosques, with little concern for the quality of work done or the state in which mosques were left. Domes and other unacceptable elements were simply torn off, sometimes in a manner so blunt that extensive damage was done to the remaining fabric of the mosque. Numerous photographs from this time period show domes stripped off mosques and simply left lying in the courtyards below. In the case of a newly refurbished mosque in Zheqiao, Gansu, the 2019 operation to remove its dome, minarets, and decorative elements to its doors and windows effectively destroyed the mosque itself. Residents were warned not to circulate images or videos of the damaged mosques. Some who posted longer videos of the demolition and damage done to the mosque were later arrested for doing so.
Early mosque Sinicization work also overlapped substantially with the moves to close or demolish mosques “lacking the correct permissions” (未批先建清真寺) and other unregistered religious venues (see 7.0 Mosque Closures). In August 2018, for instance, the local government moved to demolish Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia on the grounds that it had constructed an extension that exceeded the scope of the building permits it had obtained for the work. Following fierce opposition and protests that attracted international attention, the government backed down from the plan to demolish the mosque. However, after defusing the protest, the mosque was later Sinicized, with pagoda roofs replacing its domes.
As the campaign has progressed, forced renovations have moved towards replacing ‘Arabic’ features with Chinese equivalents. As most mosques are not rebuilt wholesale — and indeed the wood-built traditional mosques held up as models to emulate are much more expensive to build — renovation often means simply replacing domes with tiled roofs and capping off shortened minarets. The resulting hybrid mosques, with their original walls unchanged, are stylistically awkward, with little harmony between original design and the new impositions. Standards for what aspects of architectural design are considered acceptable vary considerably. In a tender for renovations to a mosque in Ningxia in 2022, in addition to stating that the proposed buildings should be traditionally Chinese in style, the call also stated that the exterior colour of the mosque should be adjusted to remove any green elements. This stands in contrast to guidelines issued for mosque renovations in Hualong, Qinghai, which stated that renovations to the nine local ‘Arabic-style’ mosques should be “practical, economic, green [Islamic] and beautiful.” In one exceptional case in Jinan, even party-approved slogans in Arabic failed to meet standards of appropriateness. The outer wall of the Chinese-style Great Southern Mosque of Jinan bore the party slogan “Love Your Country, Love Your Faith” in calligraphic Arabic. However, after Sinicization, the script was hastily removed and replaced by the Twelve Core Socialist Values in Chinese (see photos on following page).
view all
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam. Like other aspects of aesthetic Sinicization, the determination that ‘Arabic’-style elements in mosque architecture must be corrected dates to the emergence of the ‘Three Transformations’ campaign in Ningxia.
The China Islamic Association first held a conference on mosque architecture in Xi’an in April 2017. The conference concluded that in the previous decade, there had been a trend towards Arabization in mosque architecture across the country that must be corrected. In addition, mosques had grown overly large, overly ostentatious, and had exceeded approved construction specifications. Remarks made at the conference further noted that, in compliance with party-state dictates, mosques should not serve as landmarks, nor become tourist destinations. Delegates to the conference were reminded by the President of the CIA that only when Islam “integrates with Chinese culture” will it be able to “take root and grow in this land of China.” Delegates were also taken on site visits to several historic mosques in Shaanxi, including Xi’an’s famous Huajuexiang Mosque. The resulting “Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style” were dispersed through the country-wide network of Islamic Associations for study.
In mid-2018, as the large-scale removal of Arabic script began across the northwest, evidence of the removal of “Arab-style” or otherwise “foreign” architectural elements from mosques and other public buildings first emerged. In practice, renovations have targeted domes, tall minarets in a non-pagoda style, and Islamic symbols, such as the crescent moon and star commonly placed atop mosque roofs. Although most of the media coverage of architectural Sinicization focuses on mosques, renovations have also targeted non-religious buildings constructed with decorative Islamic elements, such as domes or arched windows. For example, in Jinan, Shandong Province, the famous halal restaurant, Bainian Yunting Hui Hotpot Restaurant, situated next to the city’s Great Southern Mosque, removed its prominent ornamental golden domes and the Arabic script on its sign by May 2016. By July 2022, images from Baidu Maps’ street view indicated that all mentions of halal had vanished from the storefront’s branding.
Before 2017, this was a common practice for buildings located near prominent mosques (as was the case with those buildings surrounding Yinchuan’s Nanguan Mosque), or areas with a strong Hui heritage.
Often, the adoption of these Islamic architectural motifs was a deliberate choice on the part of the local authorities to promote their regions as destinations for foreign businesses or tourism. Renovations to city districts to remove architecture intended to celebrate Islamic heritage have taken place in Hohhot, Jilin, and cities throughout Ningxia (most notably, Yinchuan). In Linxia, the local government reported the removal of Islamic decorative elements from the roofs of 14 multi-storey buildings, in addition to a widespread campaign that replaced almost 1,000 shop signs with Arabic elements in 2018.
As with other aspects of the campaign, different provinces have implemented different timetables for Sinicizing mosque architecture. Mosques in Ningxia were Sinicized first — roughly between 2018-2020 — in keeping with the broader identification of Ningxia as a priority destination for Sinicization work. The campaign was subsequently implemented across the country. Several major mosques in Yunnan were among the last targeted, only undergoing Sinicization in late 2023. Much of the architectural work to renovate mosques was completed during Covid-19 lockdowns, when mosques were formally closed to worshippers. Within this broader pattern, however, authorities have worked to carefully prepare plans for renovations to mosques of particular size or historic significance to Muslim communities across China.
As of 2024, analysis suggests that all major mosques across China have now been Sinicized. A Financial Times satellite survey from 2023 found that three-quarters of the 2,132 mosques identified as having ‘Arabic’ elements had been modified or destroyed. Whilst the differing implementation timetables, and indeed the cost, scale, and complexity of the work required, mean that it is possible that some smaller mosques remain unaffected to date, it can be anticipated that ultimately all mosques in China deemed to have unacceptable architectural features will be subject to renovation.
In the earliest stages of the campaign, renovations were often crude. Given the political weight placed on the Three Transformations campaign and the definition of mosque rectification work as part of combatting extremism, authorities moved fast to renovate mosques, with little concern for the quality of work done or the state in which mosques were left. Domes and other unacceptable elements were simply torn off, sometimes in a manner so blunt that extensive damage was done to the remaining fabric of the mosque. Numerous photographs from this time period show domes stripped off mosques and simply left lying in the courtyards below. In the case of a newly refurbished mosque in Zheqiao, Gansu, the 2019 operation to remove its dome, minarets, and decorative elements to its doors and windows effectively destroyed the mosque itself. Residents were warned not to circulate images or videos of the damaged mosques. Some who posted longer videos of the demolition and damage done to the mosque were later arrested for doing so.
Early mosque Sinicization work also overlapped substantially with the moves to close or demolish mosques “lacking the correct permissions” (未批先建清真寺) and other unregistered religious venues (see 7.0 Mosque Closures). In August 2018, for instance, the local government moved to demolish Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia on the grounds that it had constructed an extension that exceeded the scope of the building permits it had obtained for the work. Following fierce opposition and protests that attracted international attention, the government backed down from the plan to demolish the mosque. However, after defusing the protest, the mosque was later Sinicized, with pagoda roofs replacing its domes.
As the campaign has progressed, forced renovations have moved towards replacing ‘Arabic’ features with Chinese equivalents. As most mosques are not rebuilt wholesale — and indeed the wood-built traditional mosques held up as models to emulate are much more expensive to build — renovation often means simply replacing domes with tiled roofs and capping off shortened minarets. The resulting hybrid mosques, with their original walls unchanged, are stylistically awkward, with little harmony between original design and the new impositions. Standards for what aspects of architectural design are considered acceptable vary considerably. In a tender for renovations to a mosque in Ningxia in 2022, in addition to stating that the proposed buildings should be traditionally Chinese in style, the call also stated that the exterior colour of the mosque should be adjusted to remove any green elements. This stands in contrast to guidelines issued for mosque renovations in Hualong, Qinghai, which stated that renovations to the nine local ‘Arabic-style’ mosques should be “practical, economic, green [Islamic] and beautiful.” In one exceptional case in Jinan, even party-approved slogans in Arabic failed to meet standards of appropriateness. The outer wall of the Chinese-style Great Southern Mosque of Jinan bore the party slogan “Love Your Country, Love Your Faith” in calligraphic Arabic. However, after Sinicization, the script was hastily removed and replaced by the Twelve Core Socialist Values in Chinese (see photos on following page).
view all
4.1 Mosque and Architectural Renovations
The removal of domes, minarets, and Islamic symbols from mosques across China has been the single most visible and widely reported aspect of the Sinicization of Islam. Like other aspects of aesthetic Sinicization, the determination that ‘Arabic’-style elements in mosque architecture must be corrected dates to the emergence of the ‘Three Transformations’ campaign in Ningxia.
The China Islamic Association first held a conference on mosque architecture in Xi’an in April 2017. The conference concluded that in the previous decade, there had been a trend towards Arabization in mosque architecture across the country that must be corrected. In addition, mosques had grown overly large, overly ostentatious, and had exceeded approved construction specifications. Remarks made at the conference further noted that, in compliance with party-state dictates, mosques should not serve as landmarks, nor become tourist destinations. Delegates to the conference were reminded by the President of the CIA that only when Islam “integrates with Chinese culture” will it be able to “take root and grow in this land of China.” Delegates were also taken on site visits to several historic mosques in Shaanxi, including Xi’an’s famous Huajuexiang Mosque. The resulting “Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style” were dispersed through the country-wide network of Islamic Associations for study.
In mid-2018, as the large-scale removal of Arabic script began across the northwest, evidence of the removal of “Arab-style” or otherwise “foreign” architectural elements from mosques and other public buildings first emerged. In practice, renovations have targeted domes, tall minarets in a non-pagoda style, and Islamic symbols, such as the crescent moon and star commonly placed atop mosque roofs. Although most of the media coverage of architectural Sinicization focuses on mosques, renovations have also targeted non-religious buildings constructed with decorative Islamic elements, such as domes or arched windows. For example, in Jinan, Shandong Province, the famous halal restaurant, Bainian Yunting Hui Hotpot Restaurant, situated next to the city’s Great Southern Mosque, removed its prominent ornamental golden domes and the Arabic script on its sign by May 2016. By July 2022, images from Baidu Maps’ street view indicated that all mentions of halal had vanished from the storefront’s branding.
Before 2017, this was a common practice for buildings located near prominent mosques (as was the case with those buildings surrounding Yinchuan’s Nanguan Mosque), or areas with a strong Hui heritage.
Often, the adoption of these Islamic architectural motifs was a deliberate choice on the part of the local authorities to promote their regions as destinations for foreign businesses or tourism. Renovations to city districts to remove architecture intended to celebrate Islamic heritage have taken place in Hohhot, Jilin, and cities throughout Ningxia (most notably, Yinchuan). In Linxia, the local government reported the removal of Islamic decorative elements from the roofs of 14 multi-storey buildings, in addition to a widespread campaign that replaced almost 1,000 shop signs with Arabic elements in 2018.
As with other aspects of the campaign, different provinces have implemented different timetables for Sinicizing mosque architecture. Mosques in Ningxia were Sinicized first — roughly between 2018-2020 — in keeping with the broader identification of Ningxia as a priority destination for Sinicization work. The campaign was subsequently implemented across the country. Several major mosques in Yunnan were among the last targeted, only undergoing Sinicization in late 2023. Much of the architectural work to renovate mosques was completed during Covid-19 lockdowns, when mosques were formally closed to worshippers. Within this broader pattern, however, authorities have worked to carefully prepare plans for renovations to mosques of particular size or historic significance to Muslim communities across China.
As of 2024, analysis suggests that all major mosques across China have now been Sinicized. A Financial Times satellite survey from 2023 found that three-quarters of the 2,132 mosques identified as having ‘Arabic’ elements had been modified or destroyed. Whilst the differing implementation timetables, and indeed the cost, scale, and complexity of the work required, mean that it is possible that some smaller mosques remain unaffected to date, it can be anticipated that ultimately all mosques in China deemed to have unacceptable architectural features will be subject to renovation.
In the earliest stages of the campaign, renovations were often crude. Given the political weight placed on the Three Transformations campaign and the definition of mosque rectification work as part of combatting extremism, authorities moved fast to renovate mosques, with little concern for the quality of work done or the state in which mosques were left. Domes and other unacceptable elements were simply torn off, sometimes in a manner so blunt that extensive damage was done to the remaining fabric of the mosque. Numerous photographs from this time period show domes stripped off mosques and simply left lying in the courtyards below. In the case of a newly refurbished mosque in Zheqiao, Gansu, the 2019 operation to remove its dome, minarets, and decorative elements to its doors and windows effectively destroyed the mosque itself. Residents were warned not to circulate images or videos of the damaged mosques. Some who posted longer videos of the demolition and damage done to the mosque were later arrested for doing so.
Early mosque Sinicization work also overlapped substantially with the moves to close or demolish mosques “lacking the correct permissions” (未批先建清真寺) and other unregistered religious venues (see 7.0 Mosque Closures). In August 2018, for instance, the local government moved to demolish Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia on the grounds that it had constructed an extension that exceeded the scope of the building permits it had obtained for the work. Following fierce opposition and protests that attracted international attention, the government backed down from the plan to demolish the mosque. However, after defusing the protest, the mosque was later Sinicized, with pagoda roofs replacing its domes.
As the campaign has progressed, forced renovations have moved towards replacing ‘Arabic’ features with Chinese equivalents. As most mosques are not rebuilt wholesale — and indeed the wood-built traditional mosques held up as models to emulate are much more expensive to build — renovation often means simply replacing domes with tiled roofs and capping off shortened minarets. The resulting hybrid mosques, with their original walls unchanged, are stylistically awkward, with little harmony between original design and the new impositions. Standards for what aspects of architectural design are considered acceptable vary considerably. In a tender for renovations to a mosque in Ningxia in 2022, in addition to stating that the proposed buildings should be traditionally Chinese in style, the call also stated that the exterior colour of the mosque should be adjusted to remove any green elements. This stands in contrast to guidelines issued for mosque renovations in Hualong, Qinghai, which stated that renovations to the nine local ‘Arabic-style’ mosques should be “practical, economic, green [Islamic] and beautiful.” In one exceptional case in Jinan, even party-approved slogans in Arabic failed to meet standards of appropriateness. The outer wall of the Chinese-style Great Southern Mosque of Jinan bore the party slogan “Love Your Country, Love Your Faith” in calligraphic Arabic. However, after Sinicization, the script was hastily removed and replaced by the Twelve Core Socialist Values in Chinese (see photos on following page).
Mosque Management Committees in China
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1044 views • 2025-03-02 05:31
3.3 Mosque Management Committees (寺管会)
Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.
Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.
The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.
In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.
Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.
Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.
Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.
The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.
There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.
view all
Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.
Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.
The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.
In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.
Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.
Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.
Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.
The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.
There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.
view all
3.3 Mosque Management Committees (寺管会)
Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.
Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.
The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.
In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.
Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.
Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.
Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.
The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.
There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.
Foundations of Sinicisation: Historical Background and Policy Development
Articles • leo posted the article • 0 comments • 726 views • 2025-02-12 04:50
1.0 Introduction
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities. view all
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities. view all
1.0 Introduction
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities.
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities.
The Communist Party of China often emphasizes the freedom of ethnic and religious affairs, but strictly controls Muslims and their beliefs in Linxia Hui Autonomous…
News • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 799 views • 2025-01-26 06:17
The Communist Party of China often emphasizes the freedom of ethnic and religious affairs, but strictly controls Muslims and their beliefs in Linxia Hui Autonomous…
view all
view all
The Communist Party of China often emphasizes the freedom of ethnic and religious affairs, but strictly controls Muslims and their beliefs in Linxia Hui Autonomous…
Hui Muslims who fled oppression in China are concerned about the president-elect’s vows to tighten asylum policy.
News • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 861 views • 2025-01-26 05:39
They survived re-education camps in China’s western Xinjiang region. They were released from detention centers and psychiatric hospitals. They watched their loved ones disappear one by one and feared when it would be their turn.
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.” view all
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.” view all
They survived re-education camps in China’s western Xinjiang region. They were released from detention centers and psychiatric hospitals. They watched their loved ones disappear one by one and feared when it would be their turn.
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.”
Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.
“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”
In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.
A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.
On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.
The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.
They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.
Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.
“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.
The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.
That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.
Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.
Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.
Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.
Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.
“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”
In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.
After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.
Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.
“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.
“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.”
Hundreds of Hui Muslims Protest Arrest of Respected Imam in Yunnan Province, China Mainland
News • davidlo posted the article • 0 comments • 959 views • 2024-12-17 21:10
Hundreds of Hui Muslims Protest Arrest of Respected Imam in Yunnan Province, China Mainland
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country. view all
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country. view all
Hundreds of Hui Muslims Protest Arrest of Respected Imam in Yunnan Province, China Mainland
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country.
On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.
According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.
Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.
This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.
The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.
Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.
Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.
This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country.
CECC Annual Report 2022 | ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Human Rights • leo posted the article • 0 comments • 931 views • 2022-11-21 11:50
The infos from CECC Annual Report 2022
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies. view all
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies. view all
The infos from CECC Annual Report 2022
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies.
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS
Findings
• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’
• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.
• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies.
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2022: Crackdown on Hui Religion and Culture
Human Rights • leo posted the article • 0 comments • 922 views • 2022-11-21 11:32
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.] view all
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.] view all
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.]
Full pdf link:
During this reporting year, authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui religious communities that were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture. Authorities demolished and removed features such as domes and minarets from mosques which serve Hui communities, in order to ‘‘sinicize’’ the mosques and eradicate ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influence.’’ In one case, beginning in July 2021, authorities removed the domes and minarets from the front gate of the Dongguan Mosque in Xining municipality, Qinghai province. The mosque, one of the largest in China, is viewed as symbolically important in the Hui commu- nity. In June 2022, authorities in Zhaotong municipality, Yunnan province, demolished the domes and minarets of Baoshan Mosque, and beat dozens of Hui Muslims who had attempted to guard the mosque, many of whom had to be hospitalized for their injuries. According to human rights organization Christian Solidarity World-wide (CSW), local authorities announced demolition plans in 2021, calling them part of a project to get rid of ‘‘Saudi and Arabic influ- ence.’’25 CSW reported that according to Zhaotong residents, only three out of more than 100 local mosques retained their domes and minarets, as officials had removed them from nearly all of the mosques.
An activity launched by authorities in Qinghai was another ex- ample of official actions to ‘‘sinicize’’ Islamic practices. Beginning in October 2021, provincial-level government and Party officials in Qinghai organized religious personnel to travel to mosques throughout the province, in the fourth such tour of its kind, to ‘‘pro- mote a Chinese communal national consciousness’’ and ‘‘guide the Muslim masses to unite closely around the Party and the govern- ment.’’ A Chinese scholar of folk religions told Radio Free Asia that the official aim of this type of activity was to convert religious believers into ‘‘believers in the Party.’’ [For more information on freedom of religion for Muslims in China, see Section III—Freedom of Religion and Section X—Xinjiang.]