Foundations of Sinicisation: Historical Background and Policy Development
1.0 Introduction
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities.
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities.
