Foundations of Sinicization: Historical Background and Policy Development
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened level of awareness arose in international news media about the Chinese party-state’s programme of coercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic community spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the phenomenon of sinicization of Islam became a concern among human rights and policy activists, journalists and policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this widespread campaign focused on its impact on architecture in specific cases. Thus, the campaign for sinicization became synonymous with a particular repertoire of actions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing minarets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in public spaces. However, a closer examination of the sinicization campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Beyond architecture, the campaign touches on matters connected to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque employment, among others. Understanding sinicization, then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it has been implemented nationwide. This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicisation of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Following a brief historical overview of the origins of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview of the campaign itself. In part one, we focus on the documents which establish the campaign. In part two, we take a detailed look at its enforcement. The rhetoric of the sinicisation campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicisation policy. Through this analysis, we reveal the framework, ambitions, and proposed measures which this sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on two key documents that elucidate these standards of appropriateness and empower the state’s capacity to enforce them: the General Office of the State Council’s “Opinions on Suggestions for Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work under the New Situation”, more commonly known as Document No. 10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year Plan for Maintaining Progress toward the Sinicization of Islam in Our Nation (2018-2022).” Together, these documents provide a blueprint for radical transformation of Islamic communities and social organisation, and lay the groundwork for further measures, including those which reduce the numbers of mosques in China, and implement additional means of surveillance of Muslim migrants within China.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
