sinicization of Islam
China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1014 views • 2025-03-02 05:00
2.3 China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)
The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.
The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.
In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”
In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”
As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.
Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:
Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel
1. Intensification of patriotic education
The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.
2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”
To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”
3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith
In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.
Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.
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The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.
The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.
In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”
In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”
As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.
Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:
Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel
1. Intensification of patriotic education
The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.
2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”
To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”
3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith
In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.
Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.
view all
2.3 China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)
The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.
The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.
In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”
In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”
As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.
Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:
Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel
1. Intensification of patriotic education
The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.
2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”
To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”
3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith
In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.
Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.
Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1030 views • 2025-03-02 04:37
2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
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2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
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2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
The current system of Islam Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1019 views • 2025-03-02 04:18
1.2 Policy Development
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml view all
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml view all
1.2 Policy Development
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml
Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978) and Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 969 views • 2025-03-02 04:11
Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978)
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020. view all
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020. view all
Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978)
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020.
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020.
Foundations of Sinicization: Historical Background and Policy Development
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1011 views • 2025-03-02 04:01
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened level of awareness arose in international news media about the Chinese party-state’s programme of coercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic community spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the phenomenon of sinicization of Islam became a concern among human rights and policy activists, journalists and policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this widespread campaign focused on its impact on architecture in specific cases. Thus, the campaign for sinicization became synonymous with a particular repertoire of actions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing minarets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in public spaces. However, a closer examination of the sinicization campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Beyond architecture, the campaign touches on matters connected to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque employment, among others. Understanding sinicization, then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it has been implemented nationwide. This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicisation of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Following a brief historical overview of the origins of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview of the campaign itself. In part one, we focus on the documents which establish the campaign. In part two, we take a detailed look at its enforcement. The rhetoric of the sinicisation campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicisation policy. Through this analysis, we reveal the framework, ambitions, and proposed measures which this sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on two key documents that elucidate these standards of appropriateness and empower the state’s capacity to enforce them: the General Office of the State Council’s “Opinions on Suggestions for Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work under the New Situation”, more commonly known as Document No. 10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year Plan for Maintaining Progress toward the Sinicization of Islam in Our Nation (2018-2022).” Together, these documents provide a blueprint for radical transformation of Islamic communities and social organisation, and lay the groundwork for further measures, including those which reduce the numbers of mosques in China, and implement additional means of surveillance of Muslim migrants within China.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
view all
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
view all
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened level of awareness arose in international news media about the Chinese party-state’s programme of coercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic community spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the phenomenon of sinicization of Islam became a concern among human rights and policy activists, journalists and policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this widespread campaign focused on its impact on architecture in specific cases. Thus, the campaign for sinicization became synonymous with a particular repertoire of actions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing minarets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in public spaces. However, a closer examination of the sinicization campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Beyond architecture, the campaign touches on matters connected to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque employment, among others. Understanding sinicization, then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it has been implemented nationwide. This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicisation of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Following a brief historical overview of the origins of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview of the campaign itself. In part one, we focus on the documents which establish the campaign. In part two, we take a detailed look at its enforcement. The rhetoric of the sinicisation campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicisation policy. Through this analysis, we reveal the framework, ambitions, and proposed measures which this sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on two key documents that elucidate these standards of appropriateness and empower the state’s capacity to enforce them: the General Office of the State Council’s “Opinions on Suggestions for Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work under the New Situation”, more commonly known as Document No. 10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year Plan for Maintaining Progress toward the Sinicization of Islam in Our Nation (2018-2022).” Together, these documents provide a blueprint for radical transformation of Islamic communities and social organisation, and lay the groundwork for further measures, including those which reduce the numbers of mosques in China, and implement additional means of surveillance of Muslim migrants within China.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of Islam programs on Hui communities from 2017 to the present.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 936 views • 2025-03-02 02:54
This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of islam programme on hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Further, because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identifi ed in this report present a profound threat to muslim identity and practice within the people’s republic of china (prc). Th e concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed. view all
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed. view all
This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of islam programme on hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Further, because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identifi ed in this report present a profound threat to muslim identity and practice within the people’s republic of china (prc). Th e concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed.
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed.
China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1014 views • 2025-03-02 05:00
2.3 China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)
The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.
The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.
In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”
In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”
As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.
Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:
Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel
1. Intensification of patriotic education
The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.
2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”
To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”
3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith
In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.
Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.
view all
The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.
The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.
In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”
In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”
As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.
Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:
Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel
1. Intensification of patriotic education
The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.
2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”
To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”
3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith
In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.
Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.
view all
2.3 China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)
The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.
The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.
In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”
In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”
As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.
Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:
Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel
1. Intensification of patriotic education
The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.
2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”
To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”
3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith
In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.
Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.
Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1030 views • 2025-03-02 04:37
2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
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2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
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2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
The current system of Islam Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1019 views • 2025-03-02 04:18
1.2 Policy Development
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml view all
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml view all
1.2 Policy Development
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml
The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
__________________________________________________________________________
36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.
37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight
Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-
ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-
tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.
38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang
Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.
39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml
Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978) and Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 969 views • 2025-03-02 04:11
Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978)
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020. view all
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020. view all
Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978)
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020.
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15
In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17
However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19
By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.
Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)
The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24
In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
-------------------------------------------------------------
15 Mullaney 2011.
16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15
17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15
18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.
19 Yang 2012, p. 70.
20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.
21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76
22 Gladney 2004.
23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.
24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.
25 Erie 2016.
26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020.
Foundations of Sinicization: Historical Background and Policy Development
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1011 views • 2025-03-02 04:01
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened level of awareness arose in international news media about the Chinese party-state’s programme of coercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic community spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the phenomenon of sinicization of Islam became a concern among human rights and policy activists, journalists and policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this widespread campaign focused on its impact on architecture in specific cases. Thus, the campaign for sinicization became synonymous with a particular repertoire of actions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing minarets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in public spaces. However, a closer examination of the sinicization campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Beyond architecture, the campaign touches on matters connected to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque employment, among others. Understanding sinicization, then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it has been implemented nationwide. This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicisation of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Following a brief historical overview of the origins of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview of the campaign itself. In part one, we focus on the documents which establish the campaign. In part two, we take a detailed look at its enforcement. The rhetoric of the sinicisation campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicisation policy. Through this analysis, we reveal the framework, ambitions, and proposed measures which this sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on two key documents that elucidate these standards of appropriateness and empower the state’s capacity to enforce them: the General Office of the State Council’s “Opinions on Suggestions for Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work under the New Situation”, more commonly known as Document No. 10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year Plan for Maintaining Progress toward the Sinicization of Islam in Our Nation (2018-2022).” Together, these documents provide a blueprint for radical transformation of Islamic communities and social organisation, and lay the groundwork for further measures, including those which reduce the numbers of mosques in China, and implement additional means of surveillance of Muslim migrants within China.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
view all
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
view all
Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened level of awareness arose in international news media about the Chinese party-state’s programme of coercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic community spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the phenomenon of sinicization of Islam became a concern among human rights and policy activists, journalists and policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this widespread campaign focused on its impact on architecture in specific cases. Thus, the campaign for sinicization became synonymous with a particular repertoire of actions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing minarets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in public spaces. However, a closer examination of the sinicization campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Beyond architecture, the campaign touches on matters connected to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque employment, among others. Understanding sinicization, then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it has been implemented nationwide. This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicisation of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Following a brief historical overview of the origins of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview of the campaign itself. In part one, we focus on the documents which establish the campaign. In part two, we take a detailed look at its enforcement. The rhetoric of the sinicisation campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicisation policy. Through this analysis, we reveal the framework, ambitions, and proposed measures which this sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on two key documents that elucidate these standards of appropriateness and empower the state’s capacity to enforce them: the General Office of the State Council’s “Opinions on Suggestions for Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work under the New Situation”, more commonly known as Document No. 10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year Plan for Maintaining Progress toward the Sinicization of Islam in Our Nation (2018-2022).” Together, these documents provide a blueprint for radical transformation of Islamic communities and social organisation, and lay the groundwork for further measures, including those which reduce the numbers of mosques in China, and implement additional means of surveillance of Muslim migrants within China.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of Islam programs on Hui communities from 2017 to the present.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 936 views • 2025-03-02 02:54
This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of islam programme on hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Further, because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identifi ed in this report present a profound threat to muslim identity and practice within the people’s republic of china (prc). Th e concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed. view all
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed. view all
This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of islam programme on hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Further, because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identifi ed in this report present a profound threat to muslim identity and practice within the people’s republic of china (prc). Th e concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed.
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed.