Imam Training and Appointments in China
3.4 Imam Training and Appointments
Imams have always been required to attend occasional training on Party doctrine; as community leaders, working with United Front — and hence the Party-state — has always been a part of their role. However, the number of political training sessions required of imams has dramatically increased since 2014, as has oversight of the content taught within mosques (see 5.0 Cultural Control). In particular, the state has taken much closer control of imam appointments, and has further tightened systems for the appointment, management, and training of religious professionals. This has included:
a) audits of existing religious personnel and the creation of a public SARA database of religious clergy,
b) crackdowns on unregistered imams,
c) tightened appointment regulations for imams, and
d) increased political requirements placed on imams.
Imam licenses are issued by regional Islamic Associations, and are valid for five years. Most provinces have had regulations requiring some formal revalidation of credentials for license renewal for some years, although the requirements for revalidation varied by province. However, audits have intensified in recent years, with some regions requiring all imams to retrain and register. In 2019, Qingtongxia, Ningxia, conducted a complete audit and “clean-up” of all mosque religious personnel, requiring them all to exchange their licenses, likely as part of a province-wide audit ordered after the identification of serious failures in religious work in Ningxia. 115 Linxia similarly audited religious students in mosques across 2017-18, checking for “over-quota” enrollments, and students below the age of 18. As part of the process, Linxia established detailed logs of students in the city. 116 The newly established databases of registered clergy provide further heft to the increased oversight of religious professionals. Launched in May 2023 on the SARA website, the database contains extensive information on individuals, including names, ID numbers, photographs, and titles. 117 It allows users to swiftly check the credentials of any imam (or indeed religious professionals of other faiths). 118
In-post evaluations of imams have also been substantially enhanced, with a focus on political performance. Islamic Associations across the country have established codes of conduct for imams, requiring them to work to actively promote cultural change and Sinicization. Assessment procedures and reviews provide teeth to ensure imams must work towards Party ends. In 2021, Wuhan Islamic Association required imams and mosque leaders to sign “target pledges,” committing them to the work objectives outlined at their conference, a process overseen by representatives from the city’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee. 119 Qinghai Islamic Association has published new, detailed regulations (currently in a pilot phase) for the annual assessment of imams in the province. 120 Under this system, imam performance is to be assessed on an annual basis through a series of inspections and year-end assessments. Although led by the Islamic Association, evaluation committees may include local cadres and cadres from Religious Affairs. Political thought is the category of performance given the greatest weight within the evaluation, and underperforming imams are given a warning and provided with suggestions for improvement. Without improvement, they can be unilaterally dismissed. 121 United Front and local cadre involvement in annual reviews of imam performance is evident in other provinces as well. 122
The tightening of oversight over existing imams is matched by increased oversight of imam appointments. Although imam appointments are theoretically overseen by mosque management committees, both the new standards for appointment processes and oversight of the mosque management committees ensure that only imams acceptable to the Party can be appointed. Once again, the rhetorical justification around such changes is about “standardization,” and ensuring the quality of personnel. Both the “Measures for the Qualifications of Islamic Clergy” and “Measures for the Appointment of Major Clerical Positions in Islamic Activity Venues” contain regulations intended to favor in-province candidates, and ensure final approval of imams and imam appointments is determined by the local Islamic Association. 123
Emerging local regulations suggest that implementation is going further than required by Islamic Association regulations. For instance, regulations on imam appointment trialed in 2023 in the Ningxia city of Zhongwei’s Shapotou district begin with a strong assertion of the role of imams in “conscientiously implementing the important theories of General Secretary Xi Jinping on religious work,” ensuring Sinicization, and their duty to ceaselessly strengthen the identification of their congregations with “our great motherland, the Chinese peoples, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party and Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The document further stipulates that imams be licensed by the Ningxia Islamic Association, and that mosque management committees are not permitted to draw up their own shortlists. Instead, they will be presented with a shortlist of 3-5 candidates chosen by the local Religious Bureau. Two candidates selected from the list by the mosque management committee will then be interviewed by local government, PSB, undergo a formal written examination, and a sermon competition overseen by the United Front. 124 The whole process ensures that political acceptability of candidates is prioritized over any wishes of the congregation, and further makes it impossible for a mosque to appoint an imam from outside Ningxia. Additionally, registered imams are required to report any travel plans that would take them outside the province to their village, township, and local Religious Bureau for approval. 125
The tightening of control over non-compliant imams is backed by threats to strip them of their credentials. In Hualong, for instance, imam Ma Guoxiang was detained for fifteen days in 2018 and stripped of his credentials as an imam for “spreading extreme opinions and inappropriate language” in his preaching. 126 Online reports suggest that the removal of licenses from imams in Hualong targeted large numbers of clerics, as part of a broad parcel of actions taken to police Islamic activity including multiple mosque closures. 127 Muslim social media accounts have repeatedly posted a four-minute recording from 2019 of an official in Hualong announcing the names of numerous sanctioned imams, seemingly as a tacit protest against the measures. 128 Policing imams via control of their licenses is an ongoing tactic for control: the CIA stripped licenses from three Ningxia imams for unknown reasons in mid-2023. 129
Removal of imam credentials can have serious consequences, beyond even the deprivation of livelihood. In Henan, imam Han Daoliang was dismissed after Zhengzhou officials accused him of being Salafi, forcing him into exile in Malaysia. 130 Elsewhere, scattered evidence suggests that some unregistered imams may have been given longer jail sentences. One request seeking legal advice submitted by a poster to an online platform in late 2018 says that her husband was detained on suspicion of the crime of “disturbing public order” for being an unregistered imam. 131
Such action to control imam licenses works in tandem with previous measures to tighten control of mosque management committees, who previously had significant latitude in their choice of imam. Monitoring of imams and other Islamic scholars has also involved attempts to recruit imams to work directly on behalf of the party-state: in late 2020, NPR reported on the case of a newly appointed imam and member of the local Islamic Association, who was offered a salary and lucrative board position to secretly report back to security authorities. 132
Congregations who resist the installation of a government-approved imam can also find themselves targeted. In a 2019 case reported by Bitter Winter, a mosque in Xining was shut down during Friday prayers for purported violation of fire safety regulations. However, worshippers suggested that this was revenge for their refusal to accept the appointment of an imam whose religious stances did not reflect those of the congregation. 133 In 2018 in Hualong County, Qinghai, thirteen were arrested under the “Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil” campaign in response to an incident in which Yaqutan Village Mosque attempted to install an imam without official approval. 134
3.5 Impact of Organizational Interventions
All changes to the organization share a singular goal: reducing any resistance to the implementation of Sinicization policy, and ensuring that local Islamic leadership can be coerced into the appearance of support for the campaigns. Changes to the composition of mosque management committees and village-level committees often precede renovations or other interventions into mosque affairs. By co-opting mosque management committees and grassroots Party organizations, the party-state manufactures the authority and justification for these changes. The combined campaign to control the appointments of imams, the operations of Islamic Associations and village-level governance, and to atomize mosques and provincial Islam, has been largely successful in ensuring that widescale resistance to Sinicization policy has been impossible.
This expanded party-state control not only minimizes resistance but also solidifies the party-state’s position in the community. Further surveillance, messaging and facilitation of indoctrination, and centralization of authority are all made possible by establishing such granular levels of control. In a striking example of authoritarian centralization, the party-state is using localized offices and stakeholders to draw religious communities into compliance with nationalized aims.
