Another specific measure implemented in the plan is a prohibition on the "generalization" of halal. Not only does the CIA’s dictate limit the application of halal to labels regarding foodstuffs, but it further mandates that halal must only apply to animal products. Moreover, the plan specifically calls for increased training on the proper applications of halal to be undertaken by the CIA. In practice, these measures severely limit believers’ ability to observe halal standards and override scriptural authorities’ definitions of halal to insert a state-sponsored one instead. In this way, the CIA uses regulatory power to police daily habits of practice.

A final provision empowers the CIA to police "foreign" influence on Islam. The plan specifically names the Tablighi Jamaat as an illegal foreign extremist organization. Further, the plan stipulates that donations to mosques must be scrutinized for ties to foreign extremist groups. The CIA also mandates the strict prohibition of "materials containing extremist ideology" and foreign teachers. These mandates effectively label any version of Islam from outside China, and any religious texts not produced by the CIA, to be illegal and extremist. The latter of these provisions suggests that the CIA has been vested with the formal authority to enact book bans in mosque spaces.

Taken together, these calls to increase regulation empower the CIA and constrain Islamic ritual and lifestyle practices to only those party-state-approved forms. In mandating a central role for the CIA in the appointment of mosque personnel and the enforcement of regulations on halal labeling, the educational system, financial donations, and contact with foreign Islamic communities, the Five-Year Plan seeks to eliminate any avenues for independent religious association and effect the centralization of religious authority under the umbrella of party-state oversight.

Strengthening of "Chinese" elements in Islamic culture

After outlining methods by which to increase regulation and oversight of religious practice, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan puts forward directives for actively promoting Chinese cultural elements within Islam. The document contends that the overarching goal of cultural improvement is to foreground "Chinese aesthetics and Chinese elements" in Islamic culture within China. Taking such actions, the CIA contends, is necessary for the improvement of the "cultural self-confidence" of China’s Muslims. In contrast to previous sections that focus on theological, ritual, or ideological concerns, these measures target material practices and aesthetics in architecture and dress. Within these provisions, the CIA gives instruction about how these measures ought to be publicized to larger audiences, including those in Muslim-majority countries beyond China.

As in previous sections, the CIA prescribes increased study under party-state supervision in order to inculcate the "correct" attitudes toward traditional Chinese culture. Specifically, clergy are instructed to incorporate lessons about "exceptional Chinese traditional culture" into mosque educational programming, training of imams, and communications to lay believers. Specifically, the plan flags the 2017 report issued by the Central Committee and the State Council entitled "Opinions on the Implementation of the Development Project to Promote Exceptional Traditional Chinese Culture" (于实施中华优秀传统文化传承发展工程的意见) as necessary for religious communities to study.

The plan devotes a significant portion of text to discussing specifics related to the integration of Chinese cultural elements into mosque construction and other architectural forms. Regarding the issue of mosque architecture, the report dictates that communities ought to familiarize themselves with the "Conference Minutes on Mosque Architectural Style" (清真寺建筑风格研讨会纪要). The report stipulates that renovation of existing mosques as well as any construction of new ones must follow legal stipulations on aesthetics and be "suited to China’s characteristics and highlight Chinese elements." In addition, the plan charges that mosque construction must observe norms related to frugality and modesty and should not "chase after large and exotic features, nor should they take foreign architectural styles as their standard."

By mandating that mosques should emphasize "Chinese elements," the CIA has delimited the permissible forms of architectural expression. The plan not only deems "foreign" styles inappropriate for construction but also establishes them as "exotic" and inconsistent with the principle of frugality. These designations enable the CIA to alter mosques on the grounds that they are misusing funding on ornate and non-native elements. Non-Chinese style mosques are not only out of line with the cultural imperatives of the Sinicization campaign but also scrutinized for crimes related to financial misuse.

Beyond the regulations imposed on mosque construction, the plan intends to standardize other elements of Islamic culture—namely dress and language. Firstly, the report dictates that religious dress for the purposes of ritual, including the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, should "reflect Chinese styles." The report continues to stress the importance of maintaining Sinicized standards of dress in the face of pressures to adopt non-native habits. It mandates that clergy should "correct those people who deliberately uphold the incorrect practice of imitating foreign styles of dress." These declarations empower the CIA to ban religious garments, particularly hijabs. A final measure demands that Islamic communities must conduct religious affairs (specifically "preaching and evangelism") in standard Mandarin. This provision is yet another means of establishing the linguistic hegemony of Chinese and displacing Arabic from use in Muslim communities.

Combined, these measures have produced the most visible evidence of the Sinicization campaign. The CIA, through the provisions made in these sections, has the authority to enact measures that force the renovation of "foreign" or "Arabic-style" mosques and place limitations on the wearing of "foreign" religious dress. These sections entrench Chinese aesthetic styles as the standard for Islamic communities and specifically designate elements that might be considered "foreign" as suspect. The designation of these styles as not just "incorrect" for the Chinese context but as extravagant and wasteful makes them more than mere aesthetic choices. Instead, wearing "foreign" clothes or building "foreign" buildings is rendered a marker of extremist intent.

Having established the criteria for what might be considered "Chinese elements" of Islamic culture to be promoted, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan further stipulates that Islamic communities must be active promoters of the narratives connected to the Sinicization Campaign. The plan urges the promotion of official publications from the Association, namely the magazine Chinese Muslim (中国穆斯林), as critical for disseminating positive messaging about the campaign. Moreover, the plan recommends the use of the app Chinese Muslim Portal (华伊之窗) for broadcasting success stories and "telling the story of Sinicization well." Implicit in this mandate is the narrative foregrounding of Sinicized mosques as well as the integration of Chinese culture or philosophical teachings into mosque curricula.

This focus on outward-facing publicity also extends to international exchanges with majority-Islamic states. The plan urges continued cooperation on joint efforts, particularly those connected to curbing "extremism." As such, the CIA stresses the need to continue to build relationships with the Islamic world, even as Islamic practices seen as "foreign" to China are tagged as a sign of potential danger.

These dictates to "strengthen cultural construction" place a central aesthetic, linguistic, and theological emphasis on "Chinese" elements as the core of Islam in China. By characterizing "foreign" aesthetics as wasteful spending of public resources and marks of latent extremism, the Five-Year Plan ties Sinicization efforts to party-state objectives related to both poverty alleviation and anti-corruption. In citing the need to promote "traditional" styles of art, architecture, and scriptural interpretation, the Five-Year Plan places Sinicization under the umbrella of policies related to heritage preservation.


5. Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns

The CIA deepens its commitments to party-state objectives by declaring that Sinicization plays a key role in the ‘Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’. In accordance with such directives, the CIA Five-Year Plan stresses the need for Islamic communities to participate in “developing charitable activities to serve the public good.” These initiatives are directly linked to the party-state’s larger narratives on poverty alleviation and China’s overall developmental goals.

The Five-Year Plan states that Islamic charitable organizations will “be active participants in the mission for poverty alleviation,” and specifically will “implement precise support for poverty alleviation targets.” Further, the plan specifies that these poverty-alleviation efforts will work in coordination with the UFWD, and its designated areas for poverty relief. These passages directly link Sinicization to the state’s program of developmental aid.

Additionally, the plan outlines ways in which religious charity will be aligned with state-based initiatives, remarking how the CIA may expand “public interest” charitable campaigns connected to the observation of Ramadan. These charitable drives are directly linked to party-state-backed initiatives. The section closes by compelling local branches to use mosque-centered events like the celebration of Eid al-Fitr or Eid al-Adha to conduct “public interest charity” aimed at poverty reduction.

These dictates from the CIA serve to justify Sinicizing interventions as necessary for the reduction of poverty in rural communities. Combined with the previous sections concerning prohibitions on “exotic” mosque construction, the CIA casts “foreign” aesthetics in architecture or decoration as antithetical to the party-state’s drive to eliminate poverty. In imploring mosque communities to take a role in “public interest charity” for the purpose of poverty relief, the Five-Year Plan enables the CIA to play a supervisory role in how mosque finances are conducted, and where resources for mosque communities are allocated.

6. Establishment of party-state supervision and control over recruitment of clergy and other personnel

The final set of directives covered in the Five-Year Plan concern recruitment and training of religious clergy and mosque staff. The CIA specifies that training programs for clergy must be set up to be “suitable for our country.” Further, the plan stipulates that personnel trained to be Islamic clergy will be relied upon to provide support for the Sinicization of Islam, and thus aspects of the program must be included in training. Among the primary objectives of the curricular reform is to increase oversight over the China Islamic Institute, which is chosen by the plan to become “the pinnacle for cultivating Islamic talent in China” as well as “the base for training patriotic Islamic personnel.”

To accomplish these objectives, the plan designates broad authority to the CIA to compile and supervise the establishment of a common curriculum. This mandate places all regional Islamic Institutes under the CIA’s management and names the CIA as responsible for producing a common set of teaching materials to reflect the overarching goal of Sinicization. As in previous sections, the plan mandates that these course materials should “use the common national language and minority languages,” as primary modes of instruction. These designations reinforce the linguistic supremacy of the Chinese language and simultaneously marginalize the study of texts written in Persian and Arabic. Further, the plan decrees that the curriculum of Islamic Institutes should “increase the number of courses about the classic works of Chinese Islam, and add strength to courses about Chinese history and culture, contemporary Chinese society, and the general situation of religion in China.”

The plan also makes similar declarations regarding the status of “mosque education,” and aims to increase the CIA’s ability to supervise the training of imams outside of Islamic Institutes. Like the provisions made for standardization of education at the Islamic Institutes, the plan mandates that mosques conducting clerical education adopt a standardized curriculum built around patriotic education, and include instruction in Chinese culture, history, geography, and the core socialist values. Importantly, the plan specifies that the handbook, “Methods for Supervising Islamic Mosque Education” (《伊斯兰教经堂教育管理办法》) be used as a common resource for the oversight of such programs.

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3.4 Imam Training and Appointments

Imams have always been required to attend occasional training on Party doctrine; as community leaders, working with United Front — and hence the Party-state — has always been a part of their role. However, the number of political training sessions required of imams has dramatically increased since 2014, as has oversight of the content taught within mosques (see 5.0 Cultural Control). In particular, the state has taken much closer control of imam appointments, and has further tightened systems for the appointment, management, and training of religious professionals. This has included:
a) audits of existing religious personnel and the creation of a public SARA database of religious clergy,
b) crackdowns on unregistered imams,
c) tightened appointment regulations for imams, and
d) increased political requirements placed on imams.

Imam licenses are issued by regional Islamic Associations, and are valid for five years. Most provinces have had regulations requiring some formal revalidation of credentials for license renewal for some years, although the requirements for revalidation varied by province. However, audits have intensified in recent years, with some regions requiring all imams to retrain and register. In 2019, Qingtongxia, Ningxia, conducted a complete audit and “clean-up” of all mosque religious personnel, requiring them all to exchange their licenses, likely as part of a province-wide audit ordered after the identification of serious failures in religious work in Ningxia. 115 Linxia similarly audited religious students in mosques across 2017-18, checking for “over-quota” enrollments, and students below the age of 18. As part of the process, Linxia established detailed logs of students in the city. 116 The newly established databases of registered clergy provide further heft to the increased oversight of religious professionals. Launched in May 2023 on the SARA website, the database contains extensive information on individuals, including names, ID numbers, photographs, and titles. 117 It allows users to swiftly check the credentials of any imam (or indeed religious professionals of other faiths). 118

In-post evaluations of imams have also been substantially enhanced, with a focus on political performance. Islamic Associations across the country have established codes of conduct for imams, requiring them to work to actively promote cultural change and Sinicization. Assessment procedures and reviews provide teeth to ensure imams must work towards Party ends. In 2021, Wuhan Islamic Association required imams and mosque leaders to sign “target pledges,” committing them to the work objectives outlined at their conference, a process overseen by representatives from the city’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee. 119 Qinghai Islamic Association has published new, detailed regulations (currently in a pilot phase) for the annual assessment of imams in the province. 120 Under this system, imam performance is to be assessed on an annual basis through a series of inspections and year-end assessments. Although led by the Islamic Association, evaluation committees may include local cadres and cadres from Religious Affairs. Political thought is the category of performance given the greatest weight within the evaluation, and underperforming imams are given a warning and provided with suggestions for improvement. Without improvement, they can be unilaterally dismissed. 121 United Front and local cadre involvement in annual reviews of imam performance is evident in other provinces as well. 122

The tightening of oversight over existing imams is matched by increased oversight of imam appointments. Although imam appointments are theoretically overseen by mosque management committees, both the new standards for appointment processes and oversight of the mosque management committees ensure that only imams acceptable to the Party can be appointed. Once again, the rhetorical justification around such changes is about “standardization,” and ensuring the quality of personnel. Both the “Measures for the Qualifications of Islamic Clergy” and “Measures for the Appointment of Major Clerical Positions in Islamic Activity Venues” contain regulations intended to favor in-province candidates, and ensure final approval of imams and imam appointments is determined by the local Islamic Association. 123

Emerging local regulations suggest that implementation is going further than required by Islamic Association regulations. For instance, regulations on imam appointment trialed in 2023 in the Ningxia city of Zhongwei’s Shapotou district begin with a strong assertion of the role of imams in “conscientiously implementing the important theories of General Secretary Xi Jinping on religious work,” ensuring Sinicization, and their duty to ceaselessly strengthen the identification of their congregations with “our great motherland, the Chinese peoples, Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party and Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The document further stipulates that imams be licensed by the Ningxia Islamic Association, and that mosque management committees are not permitted to draw up their own shortlists. Instead, they will be presented with a shortlist of 3-5 candidates chosen by the local Religious Bureau. Two candidates selected from the list by the mosque management committee will then be interviewed by local government, PSB, undergo a formal written examination, and a sermon competition overseen by the United Front. 124 The whole process ensures that political acceptability of candidates is prioritized over any wishes of the congregation, and further makes it impossible for a mosque to appoint an imam from outside Ningxia. Additionally, registered imams are required to report any travel plans that would take them outside the province to their village, township, and local Religious Bureau for approval. 125

The tightening of control over non-compliant imams is backed by threats to strip them of their credentials. In Hualong, for instance, imam Ma Guoxiang was detained for fifteen days in 2018 and stripped of his credentials as an imam for “spreading extreme opinions and inappropriate language” in his preaching. 126 Online reports suggest that the removal of licenses from imams in Hualong targeted large numbers of clerics, as part of a broad parcel of actions taken to police Islamic activity including multiple mosque closures. 127 Muslim social media accounts have repeatedly posted a four-minute recording from 2019 of an official in Hualong announcing the names of numerous sanctioned imams, seemingly as a tacit protest against the measures. 128 Policing imams via control of their licenses is an ongoing tactic for control: the CIA stripped licenses from three Ningxia imams for unknown reasons in mid-2023. 129

Removal of imam credentials can have serious consequences, beyond even the deprivation of livelihood. In Henan, imam Han Daoliang was dismissed after Zhengzhou officials accused him of being Salafi, forcing him into exile in Malaysia. 130 Elsewhere, scattered evidence suggests that some unregistered imams may have been given longer jail sentences. One request seeking legal advice submitted by a poster to an online platform in late 2018 says that her husband was detained on suspicion of the crime of “disturbing public order” for being an unregistered imam. 131

Such action to control imam licenses works in tandem with previous measures to tighten control of mosque management committees, who previously had significant latitude in their choice of imam. Monitoring of imams and other Islamic scholars has also involved attempts to recruit imams to work directly on behalf of the party-state: in late 2020, NPR reported on the case of a newly appointed imam and member of the local Islamic Association, who was offered a salary and lucrative board position to secretly report back to security authorities. 132

Congregations who resist the installation of a government-approved imam can also find themselves targeted. In a 2019 case reported by Bitter Winter, a mosque in Xining was shut down during Friday prayers for purported violation of fire safety regulations. However, worshippers suggested that this was revenge for their refusal to accept the appointment of an imam whose religious stances did not reflect those of the congregation. 133 In 2018 in Hualong County, Qinghai, thirteen were arrested under the “Sweeping Black and Eliminating Evil” campaign in response to an incident in which Yaqutan Village Mosque attempted to install an imam without official approval. 134
 


3.5 Impact of Organizational Interventions

All changes to the organization share a singular goal: reducing any resistance to the implementation of Sinicization policy, and ensuring that local Islamic leadership can be coerced into the appearance of support for the campaigns. Changes to the composition of mosque management committees and village-level committees often precede renovations or other interventions into mosque affairs. By co-opting mosque management committees and grassroots Party organizations, the party-state manufactures the authority and justification for these changes. The combined campaign to control the appointments of imams, the operations of Islamic Associations and village-level governance, and to atomize mosques and provincial Islam, has been largely successful in ensuring that widescale resistance to Sinicization policy has been impossible.

This expanded party-state control not only minimizes resistance but also solidifies the party-state’s position in the community. Further surveillance, messaging and facilitation of indoctrination, and centralization of authority are all made possible by establishing such granular levels of control. In a striking example of authoritarian centralization, the party-state is using localized offices and stakeholders to draw religious communities into compliance with nationalized aims.


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3.3 Mosque Management Committees (寺管会)

Oversight of mosque management committees has increased dramatically, with new regulations intended to increase financial transparency and to ensure that mosques appoint state-approved imams. As noted above, mosque management committees in theory have decisive authority over the affairs of a single mosque. Formed by representatives of the local congregation, mosque management committees manage mosque buildings, the financial affairs of the congregation, and any property owned by the mosque, which in some instances includes rental properties. Mosque management committees also convene selection processes for imams. As imams often serve three-year terms before rotating to a different mosque, mosque management committees are often the greatest continuity in the life of a mosque community.

Since 2017 the party-state and the CIA have moved to assert much tighter control over mosque management committees, especially in areas of dense Muslim settlement. The new “Administrative Measures for Religious Activity Venues,” issued by SARA in 2023, require the establishment of “democratic management organizations” within each individual religious venue. The rules for composition of the committees permit “other relevant figures” to sit, opening the door for cadres to direct the affairs of religious institutions as serving committee members. The first listed duty of members of the management committee (Article 30) is to teach their fellow citizens to be patriotic and to adhere to Sinicization. Registration requirements ensure that local Party offices and the relevant district associations of national religious groups (i.e., local branches of the CIA) have broad oversight of committee composition and membership. Furthermore, religious venues are required to have a supervisory mechanism to oversee committee member behavior. If a misbehaving committee member is not removed in a timely fashion, local authorities have the power to intervene. The text also states that religious venues should not have relationships to each other.

The “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques,” republished by the CIA in August 2023, can be read as the official interpretation of the SARA regulations for Islamic communities. The full regulations provide extensive regulation on the duties of the committees, and the permitted scope of mosque activities. These measures explicitly place mosque management committees under CIA guidance. The Measures also include a wide range of causes for which members of the mosque management committee must be dismissed – including refusal to abide by CIA regulations, attendance at unapproved religious events, and actions that would ‘damage internal Islamic harmony’, echoing the SARA regulations.

In numerous cases, on-the-ground stipulations for mosque management committees exceed the requirements of the new regulations. These regulations have been enforced to remove mosque management committee members who might have spearheaded opposition to changes. As with many aspects of Sinicization policy, the formal changes to regulations for mosque management committees have been preceded by years of tightening regulation.

Beginning in 2018, Qinghai has trialed a requirement that leadership of the mosque management committee has been required to be held concurrently by the village Party Secretary and the head of the Village Committee. Mosque management committee members were also required to attend political training on laws, religious policy and key Party Congresses. A document issued in 2019 by the Party committee of Tianya District, in Sanya, Hainan, contains a similar stipulation that mosque committees must contain a Party member. These changes suggest that requirements for mosque management committees to contain at least some Party members may be widespread. Under the tightened rules for Party members outlined above, they cannot display religious faith nor attend religious events, meaning that a mosque management head who is also the village Party Secretary would be formally barred from routine Islamic observance.

Overall, the picture points towards much greater oversight and attention to mosque management committees. Elections to mosque committees take place under careful management of the local United Front and local Party cadres: in a 2023 example from Tianjin, twenty chosen neighbourhood representatives participated in the voting process under the watchful eye of district cadres. Mosque management committees are increasingly given extensive training: in 2024, Sichuan required mosque management committees from 14 prefectures to attend a seven-day training, with an emphasis on Sinicization and the importance of strict governance of religion.

Changes to mosque management committees have been utilized as a precursor to pushing through further measures likely to be unpalatable to the community. In Hualong, Qinghai, the head of a mosque management committee was detained for seven days for “inappropriate language” concerning the appointment of a new imam to the Xining Dongguan Great Mosque. In the wake of his detention, “revisions” were made to the composition of the mosque management committee. In Huangniwan, a village near Linxia in Gansu, an investigation into mosque finances was used as justification for removal of mosque management committee members who might have resisted proposals to merge mosques in the village (see 7.0 Mosque Mergers). In Yunnan, following high-profile protests against architectural renovations at Najiaying Mosque in summer 2023, a notice on the renovations was issued in the name of the Najiaying Mosque Management Committee and the Najiaying Mosque Supervisory Committee – however, observers noted that in fact both committees had been dismissed and replaced by Party supporters and United Front figures.

The changes to regulation of management committees allow much greater oversight of the management of individual venues. The combined impact of the duties placed on mosque management committee members requires them also to act as agents of Party religious policy, with consequences for any who resist. The on-the-ground requirement for mosque management committees to contain a Party member found in Qinghai and elsewhere in effect transform these bodies into Party committees within mosques, whilst the reinforced directives against any relationship between mosques work to atomize mosque communities, ensuring they are connected only via the Islamic Association bodies.

There are hints of resistance to this from within communities who had been used to significant self-governance. As an example, inset text messages within an essay by an Islamophobic activist describe a particularly fraught conference held to discuss proposed renovations to mosques in Weishan, Yunnan. The writer reports that at the conference, one mosque representative made the case that, as mosques are governed by their communities, “the signatures and seals of any Islamic Association or management committee are all powerless.” However, as non-compliant committee members are removed for any resistance, the ability of communities to influence the direction of their mosques decreases. In the place of genuinely democratic mosque management committees is merely a veneer of community inclusion pasted across religious policy determined from within the Islamic Associations and the United Front.

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3.2 China Islamic Association

Management of local branches of the China Islamic Associations (CIA) is perceived as a precondition for CCP control of mosques and Islamic communities more broadly. The Five-Year Plan and Document 10 both envisage an expanded role for the CIA, and the national structure of Islamic Associations has effectively served as implementing organizations for Sinicization policy. Formally, the CIA does not have control of individual mosques, as it is intended to serve as a conduit between religious communities and the Party-state. Individual mosque management committees are theoretically the highest authority over the affairs of a single mosque, and mosques are required to be independent of each other. Party-state policy continues to assert the mosque management committee as a representative of the democratic control of mosque affairs by the people.

As a result, the level of influence enjoyed by the Islamic Association had previously varied by region. As Doyon notes, the relationships between local Islamic Associations and mosque management committees were previously differentiated by region: in small Muslim communities, where donations were low, the local Islamic Association had significant control of mosque affairs; in larger Muslim communities with higher levels of donations, the mosque management committees were the primary directors of mosque affairs, with the Islamic Association acting primarily as a mediator between the mosque and local government. In Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia, mosque management committees retained primary control of imam appointments, with the CIA merely approving the chosen candidates. Mosque management committees also control finances and property for individual mosques, some of which lease space to shopkeepers. Control of mosque management committees thus ensures much tighter control of imam appointments, allowing the Party-state to install members who will stringently facilitate and enforce Sinicization policies.

The 2018 incorporation of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), the bureau which previously sat above the CIA and the other official religious organizations, into the UFWD brought religious affairs back under the direct control of the Party. In addition, changes to the CIA’s Constitution in 2022 further emphasize the extent to which the Association serves the Party, with repeated references to Xi Jinping Thought added to the text. Requirements for the head of the Islamic Association stress the importance of their political credentials, while “extensive knowledge of Islam” is listed as desirable but not essential. Where earlier constitutions stated the Association “is a patriotic religious group and Islamic religious organization for Muslims of all ethnic groups in the country,” the 2022 revision states that “The Association is a national Islamic patriotic religious group and a non-profit social organization for religious affairs, formed voluntarily by Muslims and people who care about and support the cause of Islam.” This change opens the door for non-Muslim participation in the CIA and de-emphasizes ethnicity (minzu) within the Association.

Since 2016, the CIA has expanded its roles and remit within mosque communities, fulfilling the “bridge” role anticipated in Document 10. Since the 2018 passing of the revised Regulations on Religious Affairs, SARA has issued a number of ordinances designed to regularize and regulate the activity of religious organizations, in cooperation with other relevant departments. These have included the Administrative Measures for Religious Groups (宗教团体管理办法, 2019), Notice on Registration of Legal Persons of Religious Venues (关于宗教活动场所办理法人登记事项的通知, 2019), Measures for the Administration of Islamic Hajj Affairs (伊斯兰教朝觐事务管理办法, 2020), Administrative Measures for Religious Clergy (宗教教职人员管理办法, 2021) and the Measures for the Establishment of Religious Institutes (宗教院校管理办法, 2021); and Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services (互联网宗教信息服务管理办法, 2021). As a whole, the new regulations mandate greater oversight of mosque personnel and mosque administration, with stringent requirements on financial reporting and legal duties. Dissemination and study of the new regulations has been core to CIA activity, reflecting the new emphasis within their constitution on adherence to the national legal system.

To guide implementation of the above, the CIA has issued a series of specific regulations designed for Islamic communities, collectively known as the “three measures and the one code.” Respectively, these are the “Measures for the Democratic Management of Mosques” (清真寺民主管理办法), “Measures for the Qualifications of Islamic Clergy” (伊斯兰教教职人员资格认定办法), “Measures for the Appointment of Major Clerical Positions in Islamic Activity Venues” (伊斯兰教活动场所主要教职聘任办法), and “Code of Conduct for Islamic Clergy” (伊斯兰教教职人员行为守则). The four regulations were issued in 2019, and have since been revised in 2023. Collectively, the regulations seek to standardize the patchwork of regulation of clergy and venues that had emerged since 2017.

Additionally, CIA bodies have become the visible faces of Sinicization policy by organizing lecture tours on Sinicization, overseeing architectural renovations, and hosting preaching competitions and training sessions. Despite the lack of a formal hierarchical relationship between individual mosques and the CIA, branch associations increasingly exercise authority over individual mosques, issuing directives for policy implementation as supported by the suite of SARA regulations. For instance, regulations issued by the Hohhot Islamic Association in August 2019 include stipulations that mosques should a) not permit storage of illegal religious publications, b) strengthen management of religious personnel and should not host Tablighi Jamaat missionaries, c) not permit storage of personal property in the mosque, and d) that minors cannot be forced to attend religious activities. Duplicates of the new regulations were issued to both the city United Front Department and the Huimin city district (回民区) United Front. The Hohhot Islamic Association has since established a ‘China Exceptional Traditional Culture Activity Centre’ inside Hohhot Great Mosque, with an inauguration ceremony held in December 2020.

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2.4 Summary: Implications of the “Five-Year Plan”

The “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam” makes several consequential declarations. First, it establishes the linguistic and cultural hegemony of Chinese for Islamic theology, practice, and education. By specifying in multiple instances that the proper language of scriptural exegesis, ritual observance, and religious education is the “common national language” (i.e., standard Mandarin), the CIA’s plan marginalizes Persian and Arabic as languages associated with Islamic identity. Further, the linguistic emphasis on Chinese enables the embedding of party-approved interpretations of scripture and religious texts into the canon of commonly used texts for worship.

The broad directives that allow CIA supervision of Islamic charity firmly place the management of aesthetic and material aspects of Islamic buildings under the purview of party-state development planning.

Likewise, the CIA’s plan restructures the curriculum for training practitioners of Islam in order to feature secular, Chinese commentaries. The repeated insistence that pride of place be given to the study of Chinese history and culture supplants education about the history of the transmission and development of global Islam. Instead, core texts root the practice of Islam in an almost exclusively localized tradition. In holding up Sinicized Islamic histories and exegesis as “standard,” the CIA designates those teachings and practices from abroad as extreme.

Beyond establishing control over the practice of Islam, the plan also links Sinicization directly to the state’s developmental goals. The designation of non-Chinese architectural styles as imprudently wasting public funding allows interventions by the CIA and the UFWD under the onus of pursuing anticorruption and poverty alleviation measures. The broad directives that allow CIA supervision of Islamic charity also align it with the party-state’s larger developmental agenda and firmly place the management of aesthetic and material aspects of Islamic buildings under the purview of party-state development planning.

Finally, the Five-Year Plan gives broad authority to the CIA to police what may be considered “correct” practice of Islam. In providing a strong supervisory role to the CIA over processes of scriptural interpretation, educational curriculum development, clergy and mosque personnel selection, charitable donations, and even halal branding, the plan curtails the influence of independent Islamic authority figures and centralizes power. In this empowered role, the CIA is able to act as the arbiter of standard practice of faith and also as the guarantor that Sinicization processes align with the party-state’s objectives.

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2.3 China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)

The Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) has played a key role in the formulation of Sinicization policy. Working in close cooperation with the UFWD, the CIA has been pivotal in outlining standards for “correct” practice of Islam in line with ideological priorities, distributing materials related to Sinicization, facilitating the training of clergy, and promoting messages about the campaign to clergy and the general public alike. The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018–2022)” operationalized many of the directives established by Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers.

The CIA’s “Five-Year Plan” begins by grounding the need for Sinicization in a party-state-approved retelling of the history of Islam in China. This introduction contends that Islam in contemporary China is “uniquely Chinese” due to a gradual process of integration of foreign Muslims into Chinese society. The report stresses the linkages between clergy and governmental bureaucracy, arguing that “during the Yuan Dynasty, specialized agencies for supervising and managing Islamic affairs were established in central and local governments.” After establishing this precedent for the central government’s intervention in the governance of religious affairs, the CIA emphasizes the historical use of Confucian texts for the purposes of Islamic scriptural exegesis. These legacies of direct governmental oversight and adaptation to Confucian traditions, the report suggests, have allowed Muslims in China to uphold patriotic values and participate fully in struggles for national liberation in the modern era.

In contrast, the CIA remarks that, in recent years, globalization has caused some Chinese Muslims to fall under the sway of “foreign” ideologies. Some unwitting Muslims, the report claims, have been misled into the perpetration of “violent terrorist acts” on the basis of falsehoods about the faith. Among the evidence that the CIA cites for the growth of this threat within Chinese Islamic society is the fact that “some places have blindly imitated foreign styles of mosque construction.” Likewise, the report attests that “some Muslim believers imitate foreign styles of clothing.” Moreover, the report cautions that concepts like halal have been “generalized” beyond traditional areas of application. Finally, the report contends that some Muslims have “rejected the study of the classics of Chinese Islam,” which are rooted in Confucian interpretation, and instead “one-sidedly stress adherence to foreign religious standards.”

In laying out these terms, the CIA grounds the “correct” practice of Islam in China in “traditional” Chinese cultural practices and texts written in the Chinese language. Embracing aesthetics of architecture or dress, or interpretations of scriptural exegesis from outside this narrow canon, is therefore marked as a sign of latent extremism. Sinicization, the report concludes, is the remedy to such dangers and the means by which China can pursue the “healthy development of Islam.”

As a counter to such dangers, the CIA outlines a program built on the ideological foundation of Xi Jinping Thought and the Core Socialist Values as outlined at the recently concluded 19th Party Congress. This framework, the report stresses, will allow for the promotion of the “Chinese character” of Islam by “advancing the development of Islamic scriptural ideology, institutions, and culture” in line with party-state principles. Essential to the success of these developmental efforts, the report outlines, is educating both clergy and the lay public of Muslim believers about Sinicization efforts, strengthening ties to Chinese culture. These dictates from the CIA implicitly affirm the party-state’s drive to restrict Islamic theology and practice to core texts written in Chinese. Further, they align the CIA’s goals for oversight of the faith with party-state developmental ideologies.

Specifically, the CIA plan outlines six broad aspects of Sinicization it intends to enact:

Intensification of patriotic education
Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”
Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith (particularly halal diet)
Strengthening of “Chinese” elements in Islamic culture
Linkage of religious communities to state-supported poverty alleviation campaigns
Establishment of party-state supervision and control over the recruitment of clergy and other personnel

1. Intensification of patriotic education

The CIA groups much of the ideological programming to be enacted throughout the campaign under the header of “patriotic education.” In pursuit of deepening patriotism, the CIA prescribes larger uptake and expansion of the “Four Enters” program—including via the study of Xi Jinping Thought in mosques. Further, the plan proposes that mosque communities should become vehicles for the transmission of patriotic content by hosting events like “sermon competitions” and various training sessions related to the Core Socialist Values. The document stresses that this curriculum should “draw further attention to the Chinese character and contemporary values of Islam in China.” The CIA’s plan effectively positions imams as agents of Sinicization and facilitators of patriotic education.

2. Establishment of a “correct” standard for scriptural interpretation with “Chinese characteristics”

Ensuring that clergy provide “correct” scriptural exegesis is also a core concern of the CIA’s Sinicization plan. Here, the CIA advocates “establishing a system of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics (经学思想体系中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想建设).” These measures rely heavily on the dissemination of party-approved editions of religious texts (i.e., the Qur’an and Hadith) and party supervision of religious communication (i.e., sermons). The report declares that to “correctly interpret the Qur’an and Hadith,” the CIA must oversee the publication of edited and annotated versions of these texts, which must be “in keeping with the requirements for contemporary China’s developmental progress and China’s exceptional traditional culture.”

To buttress the doctrines contained within these texts, the CIA prescribes the compilation of sermons to streamline religious communication. Specifically, the plan advocates for the expansion and updating of The New Collection of Wa’z Sermons (《新编卧尔兹演讲集》), the 7th volume of which was eventually published by the CIA’s Teaching Affairs Steering Committee (中国伊斯兰教务指导委员会) in March 2021. The Five-Year Plan stresses that these sermons should “focus on the similarities between the Core Socialist Values and the core teachings and traditional virtues of Islam.”

3. Tightening of rules and regulations regarding the observation of religious faith

In addition to correcting scriptural interpretation, the CIA’s Five-Year Plan places strong emphasis on strengthening oversight and regulation of Islamic practice. The plan focuses on establishing the primacy and superiority of Chinese law and warning against interpretations of religious doctrine that would contravene national law. It justifies such measures as means by which mosque communities may prevent illegal religious activity and achieve standardization of religious practice. Primarily, the CIA prescribes additional training of teams responsible for mosque communities—namely, the “three teams” of the Islamic Association, the Mosque Management Committees, and religious teaching staff.

Beyond matters of personnel selection and control, the Five-Year Plan also emphasizes the importance of implementing regulations to prevent religion from “interfering” with society. The document stresses that governance and the application of law should not be impeded by religious activity. In particular, the CIA advocates for the use of regulations on religious practices to prevent minors from undertaking religious education and ensuring a strict separation of education and religion. In this way, the plan curtails long-established systems of mosque-based study of religious texts among young adherents for the purpose of training clergy.

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