In the saline-alkali land (mainland China), the Hui People have already completely lost their religious freedom.
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.
When a person spends a long time in a place without freedom, like a mental institution or a prison, they lose their independence and develop deficiencies in their ability to survive in society.
This is the sickness of institutionalization.
People who are institutionalized for a long time develop mental health problems and become dependent on the very system that harms them.
They think they are trying to survive, but in reality, they are on a path to extinction.
The reason the Huimin have been able to survive in the saline-alkali land (mainland China) until today is mainly due to a kind of cultural independence, not the sort of localized adaptation that academics often discuss.
In fertile soil, adaptation might be a good thing.
But in the saline-alkali land (mainland China), where the flower of civilization cannot blossom, adaptation will lead to one's own demise.
Therefore, the great scholar Hu Dengzhou established the Jingtang (madrasah) education, rejecting the socialization of the saline-alkali land, setting up his own schools, and using the bestowing of robes and certificates as the standard for recognizing an ahong's qualifications.
And the Huimin mosque communities would only hire ahongs who were certified according to this standard.
Regarding the authority to certify an ahong, it comes from the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) authorizing his disciples to carry on his sacred mission. In the context of the Huimin's Jingtang education, this was ritualized when a senior teacher would wrap a turban and bestow robes on his student to grant him the qualification of an ahong and the authority to begin teaching.
This authority to certify ahongs is both a matter of religious freedom and a right of a minority group.
The United Nations human rights covenants state: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."
The governments of all signatory countries have a human rights obligation in this regard.
The Huimin should rightfully defend this right of theirs.
For the Huimin to maintain their cultural independence, the most important thing is freedom.
In education, they need the autonomy to run their own schools; for an ahong's qualification, they need certification by a senior teacher according to the master-disciple tradition; and for an ahong's appointment, they need the democratic choice of the mosque community.
—All of these must exclude the interference of secular authority.
If the Huimin could have freedom in these areas, even if they cannot realize the grand vision of spreading Islam in China, they would not perish.
But now, the authorities are systematically squeezing this space for freedom.
The most vivid aspect of this squeezing of freedom is none other than the architectural imprints expressing official ideology that are forcibly added to destroyed mosques.
It tells the Huimin that they have penetrated the most central areas of their community life.
The Huimin see it every day and deeply feel its expression of power.
The Huimin have lost the freedom to express their architectural culture in this land.
And the freedom of publication and freedom of speech have also long been lost.
The state-run Islamic institutes and ahong certificates further strip freedom from Huimin society.
When the Huimin completely lose the freedom of cultural education and ahong certification, that will be the moment their spirit withers and dies, both as an ethnic group and as a religious community.
The Huimin must understand that the official ideology is incompatible with religion.
Leaving aside the few so-called "left-leaning" special periods, let's look at Document 19, which represents the era of reform and opening up; it also states—"In the history of humanity, religion is ultimately bound to disappear; however, it will only disappear naturally after the long-term development of socialism and communism, when all the objective conditions are in place."
"The figures from religious colleges are to create a corps of young religious professionals who politically love the motherland, support the Party's leadership and the socialist system, and also have considerable religious knowledge."
"The only correct and fundamental way to solve the religious problem can only be, under the premise of guaranteeing freedom of religious belief, to gradually eliminate the social and cognitive roots of religion's existence through the gradual development of socialist material and spiritual civilization."
In other words, under normal circumstances, they wait for it to disappear naturally; in special periods, they help accelerate its disappearance.
There is not much to say about this official ideology; this is just the ecosystem of the saline-alkali land (mainland China).
Everything depends on the Huimin themselves.
If they can struggle with all their might to survive, I think no one could refuse to accept the objective fact of their existence; but if they cannot survive, then for others, their disappearance is for the best.
If the Huimin do not wish to disappear, they must avoid creating the conditions for their own disappearance.
But now, we see that on the two most important rights—cultural education and the certification of ahongs—the Huimin are rushing one after another towards institutionalization.
There's a line in The Shawshank Redemption that says: "These walls are funny. First you hate 'em, then you get used to 'em. Enough time passes, you get so you depend on 'em."
As everyone lines up to march towards institutionalization, to avoid extinction, there must be a counter-institutional force.
At this moment, the spirit of the Huimin ancestors from the Cultural Revolution era must be carried on by this counter-institutional force.
They should, in every possible way, preserve the freedom of cultural education and ahong certification, so that in the saline-alkali land (mainland China), they can rely on this bit of independence in their social existence to make a flower bloom that connects the past to the future.
Mosque schools, Arabic language schools, study groups, and da'wah groups, as long as they are de-institutionalized and independent, have taken on an extraordinary significance.
They are the reality within the illusion, the embers of the revival of our Deen after a period of madness.
Allah says: "Allah will bring forth a people He will love and who will love Him, [who are] humble toward the believers, powerful against the disbelievers; they strive in the cause of Allah and do not fear the blame of a critic." (Al-Ma'idah 5:54)
When a person spends a long time in a place without freedom, like a mental institution or a prison, they lose their independence and develop deficiencies in their ability to survive in society.
This is the sickness of institutionalization.
People who are institutionalized for a long time develop mental health problems and become dependent on the very system that harms them.
They think they are trying to survive, but in reality, they are on a path to extinction.
The reason the Huimin have been able to survive in the saline-alkali land (mainland China) until today is mainly due to a kind of cultural independence, not the sort of localized adaptation that academics often discuss.
In fertile soil, adaptation might be a good thing.
But in the saline-alkali land (mainland China), where the flower of civilization cannot blossom, adaptation will lead to one's own demise.
Therefore, the great scholar Hu Dengzhou established the Jingtang (madrasah) education, rejecting the socialization of the saline-alkali land, setting up his own schools, and using the bestowing of robes and certificates as the standard for recognizing an ahong's qualifications.
And the Huimin mosque communities would only hire ahongs who were certified according to this standard.
Regarding the authority to certify an ahong, it comes from the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) authorizing his disciples to carry on his sacred mission. In the context of the Huimin's Jingtang education, this was ritualized when a senior teacher would wrap a turban and bestow robes on his student to grant him the qualification of an ahong and the authority to begin teaching.
This authority to certify ahongs is both a matter of religious freedom and a right of a minority group.
The United Nations human rights covenants state: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."
The governments of all signatory countries have a human rights obligation in this regard.
The Huimin should rightfully defend this right of theirs.
For the Huimin to maintain their cultural independence, the most important thing is freedom.
In education, they need the autonomy to run their own schools; for an ahong's qualification, they need certification by a senior teacher according to the master-disciple tradition; and for an ahong's appointment, they need the democratic choice of the mosque community.
—All of these must exclude the interference of secular authority.
If the Huimin could have freedom in these areas, even if they cannot realize the grand vision of spreading Islam in China, they would not perish.
But now, the authorities are systematically squeezing this space for freedom.
The most vivid aspect of this squeezing of freedom is none other than the architectural imprints expressing official ideology that are forcibly added to destroyed mosques.
It tells the Huimin that they have penetrated the most central areas of their community life.
The Huimin see it every day and deeply feel its expression of power.
The Huimin have lost the freedom to express their architectural culture in this land.
And the freedom of publication and freedom of speech have also long been lost.
The state-run Islamic institutes and ahong certificates further strip freedom from Huimin society.
When the Huimin completely lose the freedom of cultural education and ahong certification, that will be the moment their spirit withers and dies, both as an ethnic group and as a religious community.
The Huimin must understand that the official ideology is incompatible with religion.
Leaving aside the few so-called "left-leaning" special periods, let's look at Document 19, which represents the era of reform and opening up; it also states—"In the history of humanity, religion is ultimately bound to disappear; however, it will only disappear naturally after the long-term development of socialism and communism, when all the objective conditions are in place."
"The figures from religious colleges are to create a corps of young religious professionals who politically love the motherland, support the Party's leadership and the socialist system, and also have considerable religious knowledge."
"The only correct and fundamental way to solve the religious problem can only be, under the premise of guaranteeing freedom of religious belief, to gradually eliminate the social and cognitive roots of religion's existence through the gradual development of socialist material and spiritual civilization."
In other words, under normal circumstances, they wait for it to disappear naturally; in special periods, they help accelerate its disappearance.
There is not much to say about this official ideology; this is just the ecosystem of the saline-alkali land (mainland China).
Everything depends on the Huimin themselves.
If they can struggle with all their might to survive, I think no one could refuse to accept the objective fact of their existence; but if they cannot survive, then for others, their disappearance is for the best.
If the Huimin do not wish to disappear, they must avoid creating the conditions for their own disappearance.
But now, we see that on the two most important rights—cultural education and the certification of ahongs—the Huimin are rushing one after another towards institutionalization.
There's a line in The Shawshank Redemption that says: "These walls are funny. First you hate 'em, then you get used to 'em. Enough time passes, you get so you depend on 'em."
As everyone lines up to march towards institutionalization, to avoid extinction, there must be a counter-institutional force.
At this moment, the spirit of the Huimin ancestors from the Cultural Revolution era must be carried on by this counter-institutional force.
They should, in every possible way, preserve the freedom of cultural education and ahong certification, so that in the saline-alkali land (mainland China), they can rely on this bit of independence in their social existence to make a flower bloom that connects the past to the future.
Mosque schools, Arabic language schools, study groups, and da'wah groups, as long as they are de-institutionalized and independent, have taken on an extraordinary significance.
They are the reality within the illusion, the embers of the revival of our Deen after a period of madness.
Allah says: "Allah will bring forth a people He will love and who will love Him, [who are] humble toward the believers, powerful against the disbelievers; they strive in the cause of Allah and do not fear the blame of a critic." (Al-Ma'idah 5:54)
