The History of Prophets and Kings: Deep Dive into Tabari's Authentic Islamic Historical Narratives and Methodology
[Internet Repost]
This deep dive explores volumes 16 and 17 of the monumental history written by Tabari (838–923 AD), an encyclopedic scholar of the Abbasid Caliphate. We’ll break down his historical methodology—specifically his use of parallel transmission chains (isnad) and his objective approach to documenting diverse historical accounts—as well as the roots of his Jariri school of thought.
The content here is drawn from volumes 16 and 17 of The History of al-Tabari. Tabari was the most authoritative historian of the Abbasid era, living during the time when the founders of the major legal schools were active. He studied under great scholars like Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Dawud al-Zahiri, the founder of the Zahiri school. While he mastered all their theories, he eventually established his own, the Jariri school, named after his father.
His school survived for 200 years after he passed away before fading out. The Jariri school was often described as semi-rationalist—a bit like the Shafi'i school but leaning toward the Zahiri. He believed that consensus (ijma) had to be anchored to the Quran and Sunnah and was only valid among the first generation of the Prophet's companions (Sahaba). He also placed a heavy emphasis on independent legal reasoning (ijtihad). The Zahiri school, by contrast, insisted on a strictly literal interpretation of religious texts, rejecting analogical reasoning (qiyas). For example, if the Prophet prohibited interest in direct trades of gold, silver, dates, salt, wheat, or barley, the Zahiris wouldn't extend that ban to other goods. However, they did accept religious logic; for instance, because a Hadith instructs believers to wash a bowl seven times if a dog has licked it, the Zahiris concluded that dogs are inherently impure, accepting that level of inference.
In Tabari's list of the four major schools, he only recognized the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Zahiri schools, notably excluding the Hanbali school. At the time, the Andalusian Maliki jurist Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, who shared Tabari’s perspective, also firmly kept Hanbali views out of his Sunni legal texts. Tabari lived to be 86, and in his later years, his opinion of the Hanbalis turned quite sour. He stopped considering their input on legal matters, famously pointing out that Ibn Hanbal wasn't a jurist at all, but merely a collector of Hadith. The police chief of Baghdad once tried to organize a debate between Tabari and the Hanbalis to settle their rift. Tabari showed up, but the Hanbalis didn't; instead, they threw stones at his house. This constant threat of violence from the Hanbalis followed him for the rest of his life. He passed away in Baghdad in 923. It wasn't until the Mamluk Sultanate and later the Ottoman Empire that the Sunni tradition was codified into the four schools we know today, which include the Hanbali school while dropping the Zahiri one.
Tabari’s works—ranging from his Quranic exegesis (tafsir) and chronicles to his biographies of the prophets—are incredibly detailed and rich. He had a great sense of humor, was a gifted speaker, and a brilliant writer, yet he remained rigorous in his academic approach. He was fluent in Persian and understood the origins of loanwords in Arabic borrowed from various languages. He made extensive use of oral history, traveling across the empire to record interviews. By carefully documenting these, he kept his transmission chains clear, always tracing information back to eyewitnesses, which makes his work an invaluable historical resource.
Summary of content in volumes 16 and 17 of The History of al-Tabari:
After the assassination of the third Caliph, Uthman, the community fractured, leading to two major questions:
1. Who is the legitimate successor?
2. What is the definition of the true community?
The Shia faction championed Ali as the legitimate spiritual leader against secular opportunists.
Opponents argued that Ali and his followers were the true source of the unrest.
The Abbasid family stance: They were hostile toward the Umayyad family, but also respected the descendants of the Prophet's family, while simultaneously criticizing the reactionary tendencies of the Shia faction.
Tabari recorded these conflicting versions exactly as they were reported, without offering personal judgment.
After Uthman was killed, Medina pledged allegiance to Ali. The companions Talha and Zubayr were pressured to swear allegiance. Later, using the excuse of seeking vengeance for Uthman’s death, they joined forces with the Prophet’s wife, Aisha, to march on Basra. Ali then departed Medina for Kufa to secure support.
Version 1 recorded by Tabari: Ali had no intention of taking power and declined repeatedly. The companions insisted on electing him Caliph. Ali set conditions, stating he would only hold the keys to the state treasury and would not spend a single cent without the public's permission; only then did he accept the position.
Version 2: Talha and Zubayr were forced to swear allegiance under duress and remained insincere. Historical records clearly show that several companions refused to pledge, including Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas and Abdullah ibn Umar, choosing to remain neutral.
After his election, Ali faced the dilemma of how to handle Uthman’s assassins. Talha and Zubayr demanded Ali punish them severely. Ali argued that the rebels behind the assassination were powerful and already controlled Medina, requiring a careful, long-term approach; a forced crackdown would only trigger a larger civil war. This became the opposition's excuse to accuse Ali of protecting the murderers.
Regarding personnel, Ali replaced the provincial governors from the Uthman era. His companion Ibn Abbas advised Ali to temporarily keep the Syrian governor, Muawiyah, in place to ensure regional stability before making changes. Ali insisted on replacing everyone, which pushed Muawiyah to raise the banner of vengeance for Uthman in Syria, openly defying Ali. This decision led to factional fighting in every province, creating two camps across the empire: those supporting Ali and those opposing him.
Talha and Zubayr requested to leave Medina under the guise of performing Umrah (lesser pilgrimage). Even though Ali knew there was a risk, he granted their request. Upon arriving in Mecca, they linked up with Aisha. Aisha had previously criticized Uthman’s policies, but upon hearing of his murder, she concluded that Ali was shielding the killers and began calling for vengeance. The remnants of the Umayyad family and various anti-Ali factions gathered in Mecca.
Aisha, Talha, and Zubayr discussed their plans, deciding to skip an attack on the heavily defended Medina and instead pivot to Basra, reasoning that Talha and Zubayr held significant influence there and could rally local forces.
The former governor of Yemen, Ya'la ibn Umayya, provided 600,000 dirhams and 600 camels to support Aisha. When the army reached a watering hole called Hawab, the local dogs barked fiercely at Aisha’s camel litter. Aisha recalled a prophecy (Hadith) and cried out, fearing it signaled disaster, and wanted to turn back. However, Zubayr's son, Abdullah, lied and claimed the location's name was wrong, forcing the army to push forward.
Aisha’s coalition entered Basra and clashed with the governor appointed by Ali. Aisha sent emissaries to lobby the people of Basra to demand justice for Uthman. Basra's society immediately split, though Ali's governor, Uthman ibn Hunayf, held his ground in the city. After Aisha’s forces defeated him, they shaved his beard and eyebrows and whipped him before releasing him. Once she controlled Basra, Aisha continued to write letters to Kufa and Syria, calling on the people to avenge Uthman.
When Ali learned that Basra had fallen, he raised an army from Medina. Originally planning to deal with Muawiyah first, he changed his course toward Iraq. Ali sent his son Hassan and Ammar ibn Yasir to Kufa to recruit soldiers. The governor of Kufa, Abu Musa, stayed neutral, citing a Hadith that during times of civil strife (fitna), sitting still is better than participating in war, and urged the people not to take sides. After a period of intense internal debate, many Kufan warriors decided to follow Ali, totaling 9,000 troops, who traveled to join his camp by both land and water.
The Umayyad family hoped to regain power, while Talha and Zubayr each had their own ambitions for the Caliphate. Ali maintained that he had been legally elected, that Uthman’s death was a tragic result of civil unrest rather than his fault, and that the internal slaughter of the civil war was a grave sin in itself.
Aisha leading an army to battle was highly controversial at the time. Many cited traditional teachings, arguing that the Prophet’s wives should remain quietly in their homes rather than going to the front lines. One poet criticized them directly, saying: 'You send the Prophet’s wife to the battlefield, but you leave your own wives safely at home.'
Ali crushed Talha and Zubayr and even took Aisha captive, but the Syrian governor, Muawiyah, refused to back down, continuing to rally behind the cause of avenging Uthman to oppose Ali.
Ali set up his base in Kufa while Muawiyah held control over Syria. Both sides sent negotiators back and forth, but Muawiyah’s bottom line was clear: Ali had to hand over those who killed Uthman, or he wouldn't swear allegiance. Ali kept refusing, arguing that the timing just wasn't right.
The Syrian army made a move and seized the water access on the Euphrates River, effectively cutting off the supply for Ali’s forces. Ali’s troops attacked and reclaimed the water, but Ali immediately ordered them not to block the Syrians from getting their own supply. He even laid down strict rules of engagement: no chasing down retreating soldiers, no harming the wounded, no attacking women, and no looting homes.
The Battle of Siffin resulted in a huge loss of the Prophet’s companions, including the veteran soldier Ammar ibn Yasir. There was a well-known hadith (prophetic tradition) that warned, 'Ammar will be killed by the oppressive faction,' which became a deeply significant point for future generations.
Ali’s side had the upper hand and looked like they were about to win, but then Muawiyah’s strategist, Amr ibn al-Aas, came up with a plan: he had soldiers tie copies of the Quran to their spears, demanding it be used as the ultimate judge. Many of Ali’s men who had memorized the text were moved by this and begged Ali to stop fighting and accept arbitration. Ali warned them it was just a trick by the enemy, but his army refused to keep fighting.
Ali was forced to call back his top general, al-Ashtar, who was furious about the army’s decision to compromise. Muawiyah refused to recognize Ali’s title of Caliph (the leader of the believers), so Ali was forced to strike the title from the agreement, echoing what happened during the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah.
After the ceasefire, a large group of those who had pressured Ali to accept arbitration had a change of heart. They argued that mere mortals had no right to arbitrate for a Caliph and that accepting it was a grave sin. They demanded Ali break the deal and restart the war against Muawiyah, but Ali stood by his word, saying he couldn't break a signed treaty. This led them to break away from Ali entirely, forming the Kharijites. The Kharijites believed that anyone who committed a major sin was no longer a believer and could be killed, and that unjust rulers should be overthrown.
Ali launched a brutal crackdown on the Kharijites, while Muawiyah used the chaos to slowly swallow up various provinces. Egypt fell, and Ali’s comrade, the Egyptian governor Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr (the son of Abu Bakr—legend says he was wrapped in donkey skin and burned alive), was killed in the fighting. Ali lost a vital tax base, rebellions popped up across Iraq, and the Kharijites started plotting, eventually sending Ibn Muljam to assassinate Ali.
Muawiyah kept sending agents to infiltrate Iraq, stirring up unrest. A lot of people began to waver, secretly trying to get on Muawiyah's good side, and eventually, the governor of Basra, Ibn Abbas, left his post to seek refuge in Mecca.
The Kharijites plotted to take out Ali, Muawiyah, and Amr ibn al-Aas all at once. The hit on Muawiyah only caused a minor wound, the assassin sent to kill Amr accidentally killed the wrong person, and only Ibn Muljam succeeded in his mission. He attacked Ali with a poisoned sword during the morning Fajr prayer at the mosque in Kufa, leaving him severely wounded, and he passed away shortly after.
After Ali passed, Hasan briefly took power, but Muawiyah’s military strength was simply unmatched by that point, which paved the way for the Umayyad dynasty to take over the Caliphate.
To be continued...
This deep dive explores volumes 16 and 17 of the monumental history written by Tabari (838–923 AD), an encyclopedic scholar of the Abbasid Caliphate. We’ll break down his historical methodology—specifically his use of parallel transmission chains (isnad) and his objective approach to documenting diverse historical accounts—as well as the roots of his Jariri school of thought.
The content here is drawn from volumes 16 and 17 of The History of al-Tabari. Tabari was the most authoritative historian of the Abbasid era, living during the time when the founders of the major legal schools were active. He studied under great scholars like Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Dawud al-Zahiri, the founder of the Zahiri school. While he mastered all their theories, he eventually established his own, the Jariri school, named after his father.
His school survived for 200 years after he passed away before fading out. The Jariri school was often described as semi-rationalist—a bit like the Shafi'i school but leaning toward the Zahiri. He believed that consensus (ijma) had to be anchored to the Quran and Sunnah and was only valid among the first generation of the Prophet's companions (Sahaba). He also placed a heavy emphasis on independent legal reasoning (ijtihad). The Zahiri school, by contrast, insisted on a strictly literal interpretation of religious texts, rejecting analogical reasoning (qiyas). For example, if the Prophet prohibited interest in direct trades of gold, silver, dates, salt, wheat, or barley, the Zahiris wouldn't extend that ban to other goods. However, they did accept religious logic; for instance, because a Hadith instructs believers to wash a bowl seven times if a dog has licked it, the Zahiris concluded that dogs are inherently impure, accepting that level of inference.
In Tabari's list of the four major schools, he only recognized the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Zahiri schools, notably excluding the Hanbali school. At the time, the Andalusian Maliki jurist Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, who shared Tabari’s perspective, also firmly kept Hanbali views out of his Sunni legal texts. Tabari lived to be 86, and in his later years, his opinion of the Hanbalis turned quite sour. He stopped considering their input on legal matters, famously pointing out that Ibn Hanbal wasn't a jurist at all, but merely a collector of Hadith. The police chief of Baghdad once tried to organize a debate between Tabari and the Hanbalis to settle their rift. Tabari showed up, but the Hanbalis didn't; instead, they threw stones at his house. This constant threat of violence from the Hanbalis followed him for the rest of his life. He passed away in Baghdad in 923. It wasn't until the Mamluk Sultanate and later the Ottoman Empire that the Sunni tradition was codified into the four schools we know today, which include the Hanbali school while dropping the Zahiri one.
Tabari’s works—ranging from his Quranic exegesis (tafsir) and chronicles to his biographies of the prophets—are incredibly detailed and rich. He had a great sense of humor, was a gifted speaker, and a brilliant writer, yet he remained rigorous in his academic approach. He was fluent in Persian and understood the origins of loanwords in Arabic borrowed from various languages. He made extensive use of oral history, traveling across the empire to record interviews. By carefully documenting these, he kept his transmission chains clear, always tracing information back to eyewitnesses, which makes his work an invaluable historical resource.
Summary of content in volumes 16 and 17 of The History of al-Tabari:
After the assassination of the third Caliph, Uthman, the community fractured, leading to two major questions:
1. Who is the legitimate successor?
2. What is the definition of the true community?
The Shia faction championed Ali as the legitimate spiritual leader against secular opportunists.
Opponents argued that Ali and his followers were the true source of the unrest.
The Abbasid family stance: They were hostile toward the Umayyad family, but also respected the descendants of the Prophet's family, while simultaneously criticizing the reactionary tendencies of the Shia faction.
Tabari recorded these conflicting versions exactly as they were reported, without offering personal judgment.
After Uthman was killed, Medina pledged allegiance to Ali. The companions Talha and Zubayr were pressured to swear allegiance. Later, using the excuse of seeking vengeance for Uthman’s death, they joined forces with the Prophet’s wife, Aisha, to march on Basra. Ali then departed Medina for Kufa to secure support.
Version 1 recorded by Tabari: Ali had no intention of taking power and declined repeatedly. The companions insisted on electing him Caliph. Ali set conditions, stating he would only hold the keys to the state treasury and would not spend a single cent without the public's permission; only then did he accept the position.
Version 2: Talha and Zubayr were forced to swear allegiance under duress and remained insincere. Historical records clearly show that several companions refused to pledge, including Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas and Abdullah ibn Umar, choosing to remain neutral.
After his election, Ali faced the dilemma of how to handle Uthman’s assassins. Talha and Zubayr demanded Ali punish them severely. Ali argued that the rebels behind the assassination were powerful and already controlled Medina, requiring a careful, long-term approach; a forced crackdown would only trigger a larger civil war. This became the opposition's excuse to accuse Ali of protecting the murderers.
Regarding personnel, Ali replaced the provincial governors from the Uthman era. His companion Ibn Abbas advised Ali to temporarily keep the Syrian governor, Muawiyah, in place to ensure regional stability before making changes. Ali insisted on replacing everyone, which pushed Muawiyah to raise the banner of vengeance for Uthman in Syria, openly defying Ali. This decision led to factional fighting in every province, creating two camps across the empire: those supporting Ali and those opposing him.
Talha and Zubayr requested to leave Medina under the guise of performing Umrah (lesser pilgrimage). Even though Ali knew there was a risk, he granted their request. Upon arriving in Mecca, they linked up with Aisha. Aisha had previously criticized Uthman’s policies, but upon hearing of his murder, she concluded that Ali was shielding the killers and began calling for vengeance. The remnants of the Umayyad family and various anti-Ali factions gathered in Mecca.
Aisha, Talha, and Zubayr discussed their plans, deciding to skip an attack on the heavily defended Medina and instead pivot to Basra, reasoning that Talha and Zubayr held significant influence there and could rally local forces.
The former governor of Yemen, Ya'la ibn Umayya, provided 600,000 dirhams and 600 camels to support Aisha. When the army reached a watering hole called Hawab, the local dogs barked fiercely at Aisha’s camel litter. Aisha recalled a prophecy (Hadith) and cried out, fearing it signaled disaster, and wanted to turn back. However, Zubayr's son, Abdullah, lied and claimed the location's name was wrong, forcing the army to push forward.
Aisha’s coalition entered Basra and clashed with the governor appointed by Ali. Aisha sent emissaries to lobby the people of Basra to demand justice for Uthman. Basra's society immediately split, though Ali's governor, Uthman ibn Hunayf, held his ground in the city. After Aisha’s forces defeated him, they shaved his beard and eyebrows and whipped him before releasing him. Once she controlled Basra, Aisha continued to write letters to Kufa and Syria, calling on the people to avenge Uthman.
When Ali learned that Basra had fallen, he raised an army from Medina. Originally planning to deal with Muawiyah first, he changed his course toward Iraq. Ali sent his son Hassan and Ammar ibn Yasir to Kufa to recruit soldiers. The governor of Kufa, Abu Musa, stayed neutral, citing a Hadith that during times of civil strife (fitna), sitting still is better than participating in war, and urged the people not to take sides. After a period of intense internal debate, many Kufan warriors decided to follow Ali, totaling 9,000 troops, who traveled to join his camp by both land and water.
The Umayyad family hoped to regain power, while Talha and Zubayr each had their own ambitions for the Caliphate. Ali maintained that he had been legally elected, that Uthman’s death was a tragic result of civil unrest rather than his fault, and that the internal slaughter of the civil war was a grave sin in itself.
Aisha leading an army to battle was highly controversial at the time. Many cited traditional teachings, arguing that the Prophet’s wives should remain quietly in their homes rather than going to the front lines. One poet criticized them directly, saying: 'You send the Prophet’s wife to the battlefield, but you leave your own wives safely at home.'
Ali crushed Talha and Zubayr and even took Aisha captive, but the Syrian governor, Muawiyah, refused to back down, continuing to rally behind the cause of avenging Uthman to oppose Ali.
Ali set up his base in Kufa while Muawiyah held control over Syria. Both sides sent negotiators back and forth, but Muawiyah’s bottom line was clear: Ali had to hand over those who killed Uthman, or he wouldn't swear allegiance. Ali kept refusing, arguing that the timing just wasn't right.
The Syrian army made a move and seized the water access on the Euphrates River, effectively cutting off the supply for Ali’s forces. Ali’s troops attacked and reclaimed the water, but Ali immediately ordered them not to block the Syrians from getting their own supply. He even laid down strict rules of engagement: no chasing down retreating soldiers, no harming the wounded, no attacking women, and no looting homes.
The Battle of Siffin resulted in a huge loss of the Prophet’s companions, including the veteran soldier Ammar ibn Yasir. There was a well-known hadith (prophetic tradition) that warned, 'Ammar will be killed by the oppressive faction,' which became a deeply significant point for future generations.
Ali’s side had the upper hand and looked like they were about to win, but then Muawiyah’s strategist, Amr ibn al-Aas, came up with a plan: he had soldiers tie copies of the Quran to their spears, demanding it be used as the ultimate judge. Many of Ali’s men who had memorized the text were moved by this and begged Ali to stop fighting and accept arbitration. Ali warned them it was just a trick by the enemy, but his army refused to keep fighting.
Ali was forced to call back his top general, al-Ashtar, who was furious about the army’s decision to compromise. Muawiyah refused to recognize Ali’s title of Caliph (the leader of the believers), so Ali was forced to strike the title from the agreement, echoing what happened during the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah.
After the ceasefire, a large group of those who had pressured Ali to accept arbitration had a change of heart. They argued that mere mortals had no right to arbitrate for a Caliph and that accepting it was a grave sin. They demanded Ali break the deal and restart the war against Muawiyah, but Ali stood by his word, saying he couldn't break a signed treaty. This led them to break away from Ali entirely, forming the Kharijites. The Kharijites believed that anyone who committed a major sin was no longer a believer and could be killed, and that unjust rulers should be overthrown.
Ali launched a brutal crackdown on the Kharijites, while Muawiyah used the chaos to slowly swallow up various provinces. Egypt fell, and Ali’s comrade, the Egyptian governor Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr (the son of Abu Bakr—legend says he was wrapped in donkey skin and burned alive), was killed in the fighting. Ali lost a vital tax base, rebellions popped up across Iraq, and the Kharijites started plotting, eventually sending Ibn Muljam to assassinate Ali.
Muawiyah kept sending agents to infiltrate Iraq, stirring up unrest. A lot of people began to waver, secretly trying to get on Muawiyah's good side, and eventually, the governor of Basra, Ibn Abbas, left his post to seek refuge in Mecca.
The Kharijites plotted to take out Ali, Muawiyah, and Amr ibn al-Aas all at once. The hit on Muawiyah only caused a minor wound, the assassin sent to kill Amr accidentally killed the wrong person, and only Ibn Muljam succeeded in his mission. He attacked Ali with a poisoned sword during the morning Fajr prayer at the mosque in Kufa, leaving him severely wounded, and he passed away shortly after.
After Ali passed, Hasan briefly took power, but Muawiyah’s military strength was simply unmatched by that point, which paved the way for the Umayyad dynasty to take over the Caliphate.
To be continued...
