Xinjiang Papers
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 946 views • 2025-03-02 06:09
To curb this threat and reinforce Chinese cultural, linguistic, and aesthetic supremacy, the document makes several proposals. It advises that any newly constructed Islamic spaces must “highlight Chinese style” in their architecture. Additionally, the document stipulates that further cultural protections must be given to “traditional” Chinese-style mosques.64 Further measures establish prohibitions on the recognition of Arabic as a minority language and affording Arabic special status in education. It warns that Arabic schools must not be allowed to offer religious lessons or to be used for religious activities.65
Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67
Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70
The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72
The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.
These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.
In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.
Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.
The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79
In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10
The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.
Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.
Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
view all
Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67
Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70
The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72
The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.
These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.
In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.
Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.
The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79
In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10
The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.
Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.
Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
view all
To curb this threat and reinforce Chinese cultural, linguistic, and aesthetic supremacy, the document makes several proposals. It advises that any newly constructed Islamic spaces must “highlight Chinese style” in their architecture. Additionally, the document stipulates that further cultural protections must be given to “traditional” Chinese-style mosques.64 Further measures establish prohibitions on the recognition of Arabic as a minority language and affording Arabic special status in education. It warns that Arabic schools must not be allowed to offer religious lessons or to be used for religious activities.65
Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67
Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70
The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72
The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.
These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.
In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.
Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.
The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79
In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10
The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.
Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.
Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1030 views • 2025-03-02 04:37
2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
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2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
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2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 946 views • 2025-03-02 06:09
To curb this threat and reinforce Chinese cultural, linguistic, and aesthetic supremacy, the document makes several proposals. It advises that any newly constructed Islamic spaces must “highlight Chinese style” in their architecture. Additionally, the document stipulates that further cultural protections must be given to “traditional” Chinese-style mosques.64 Further measures establish prohibitions on the recognition of Arabic as a minority language and affording Arabic special status in education. It warns that Arabic schools must not be allowed to offer religious lessons or to be used for religious activities.65
Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67
Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70
The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72
The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.
These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.
In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.
Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.
The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79
In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10
The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.
Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.
Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
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Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67
Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70
The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72
The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.
These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.
In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.
Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.
The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79
In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10
The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.
Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.
Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
view all
To curb this threat and reinforce Chinese cultural, linguistic, and aesthetic supremacy, the document makes several proposals. It advises that any newly constructed Islamic spaces must “highlight Chinese style” in their architecture. Additionally, the document stipulates that further cultural protections must be given to “traditional” Chinese-style mosques.64 Further measures establish prohibitions on the recognition of Arabic as a minority language and affording Arabic special status in education. It warns that Arabic schools must not be allowed to offer religious lessons or to be used for religious activities.65
Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67
Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70
The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72
The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.
These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.
In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.
Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.
The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79
In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10
The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.
Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.
Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
Human Rights • napio posted the article • 0 comments • 1030 views • 2025-03-02 04:37
2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
view all
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63
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2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10
The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.
The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”
Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.
The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.
These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).
Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.
Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”
Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).
Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”
The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52
Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.
Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56
By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.
The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57
Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58
As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.
Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.
Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61
The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.
The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.
A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.
Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63