In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
To curb this threat and reinforce Chinese cultural, linguistic, and aesthetic supremacy, the document makes several proposals. It advises that any newly constructed Islamic spaces must “highlight Chinese style” in their architecture. Additionally, the document stipulates that further cultural protections must be given to “traditional” Chinese-style mosques.64 Further measures establish prohibitions on the recognition of Arabic as a minority language and affording Arabic special status in education. It warns that Arabic schools must not be allowed to offer religious lessons or to be used for religious activities.65
Proposal sixteen declares that religion must not obstruct the functions of secular society or the interests of the state.66 Included under this broad umbrella, the document lists education, marriage, family planning, judicial process, and other unspecified functions of the state. The document follows by establishing a strict separation of religion and the state, particularly in education, specifying that Islamic spaces are not permitted to serve as educational institutions for underaged students. The section also recommends a more thorough adherence to the principles of Xi Jinping Thought and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the educational curriculum as a preventative measure.67
Following on, proposal seventeen offers protections against another perceived form of foreign influence identified by the “Three Transformations” discourse: pan-halalification. The document justifies placing limitations on halal labeling to prevent the “overgeneralization” of the concept. It proclaims that such measures are necessary to protect the “legitimate rights and interests” of minority communities. Only matters pertaining to the use of food—specifically animal products—may be subject to halal designations.68 The document continues to justify such interventions in the name of keeping public order, adding that markets should not be interfered with “in the name of halal.”69 Moreover, the document rejects the use of expanded halal branding for the purpose of increasing foreign trade or exports.70
The document’s extensive outlining of the dangers of “foreign” influence and the need to guard against the “Three Transformations” reflects a greater fear of “de-Sinicization.” Fears that the erasure of “traditional” Chinese culture might be brought on by the adoption of “foreign”—specifically Arab—cultural and ideological systems became a prominent theme among China’s academic policymaking establishment prior to the beginning of the campaign.71 In prohibiting any measures that might carve out special status for Islam, the Arabic language, or halal certification, the document stresses the need for Islamic practice to conform to a perceived “Chinese” (and implicitly, Han) cultural core of nationhood. The emphasis on vigilance against the infiltration of domestic Islamic communities from outside also recalls Maoist-era tropes of Muslims being vulnerable to manipulation by those who would harm China.72
The fifth large section of the document concerns recommendations for managing service to migrant Muslims, with special emphasis placed on educating migrants to “respect local customs, religious traditions, and historical patterns.” In proposal eighteen, the document suggests that local Islamic associations ought to work in tandem with local governments to monitor and control migrants’ religious activities. The justification for such oversight is to stem the dissemination of sectarian ideologies and stop “the spread of negative remarks.”73 Local Islamic associations are tasked with preventing outsiders from preaching at mosques. While proposals nineteen and twenty are missing from the leaked document, the header’s focus on the proper management of migration suggests that they, too, likely deal with the subject.
These measures reflect the party-state’s preoccupation with migration more generally. Since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has prioritized extensive oversight and management of migration. Crackdowns on resource and service distribution to migrants in the Xi era have reinforced the household registration (hukou) system’s status as an internal bordering regime.74 The party-state’s justifications for these types of interventions that place limitations on movement and service provision frequently invoke the principle of “stability maintenance”—an increasingly critical component of the CCP’s legitimating narratives.75 Notions that rural migrants possess lower levels of “quality” (素质) illustrate another tie between levels of economic development and the sense of threat from extremism in party-state narratives. Here, the party-state construes migrant mobility as vulnerable or susceptible to malign foreign influence. Implicit in these judgments is a linkage between rurality, lower levels of development, and exposure to “incorrect” or “extreme” versions of Islam that might subvert party-state authority.
In the final segments, the document lays out roles for the China Islamic Association (CIA) and its local branches in Sinicization processes. The document declares in proposal twenty-one that “the China Islamic Association is a bridge for the party and the government to unite and communicate with religious figures and the majority of the faithful.”76 As such, the document recommends increased ideological training to strengthen the CIA and provides direction for its regulatory and oversight work. In this bridge-building capacity, the document suggests that the CIA should be empowered to dictate proper matters of training clergy, setting standards for religious and scriptural interpretation, and resolving ethnic or religious conflicts.
Expanding on the roles and responsibilities to be undertaken by the CIA, the document’s pronouncements in proposal twenty-two empower the association to organize and oversee the operation of schools for training clergy in scriptural interpretation, subject to approval by the religious work department. The document highlights the need to limit the capacity of these institutions, stating the CIA must “strictly control the scale and scope of enrollments.”77 Proposal twenty-three builds on these suggestions by listing specific criteria for student acceptance and certification. As a means of standardizing and formalizing “mosque education,” the document recommends entry thresholds as well as standardized curricula and assessments. These measures would formalize what has been traditionally localized and overseen by imams directly.78 Additionally, the proposal stipulates that graduates, once scriptural education is complete, must undertake studies on the PRC’s ethnic and religious law as well as Chinese culture.
The final set of suggestions concerns the proper management of communication about Islam and Islamic identity—particularly in online spaces. Proposal twenty-four charges the CIA as well as religious work departments with control of online discourse about religious matters, including enacting strict crackdowns against those who set up “illegal” religious communities online or use online spaces for proselytization. Proposal twenty-five argues that the party-state’s religious work organs must promote positive messaging to “enhance the people’s understanding of Islam and religious believers in China.”79
In its conclusion, the document drives home that the management of Islam is of critical interest to both national and local governments. Governments and party committees in “key areas” are implored to consider the management of Islamic communities as a matter of the highest priority. Officials are reminded to be “firm Marxist atheists,” and ethnic minority cadres are implored to “lead the way in maintaining a lifestyle in keeping with modern civilization.” In a closing exhortation, cadres are implored to uphold the principles of the mass line and to strive to unite people of all ethnic backgrounds. Borrowing a favorite phrase from Xi himself, the document closes by reminding cadres that these acts should be done in the name of working towards “the realization of the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”80
2.2 Summary: Implications of Document No. 10
The directives in Document 10 operationalize previous remarks made by Xi in the aftermath of attacks in 2014. The specific directives to establish party-state control over the aesthetics of Islamic spaces have been the single most visible aspect of the Sinicization campaign as it has been carried out beyond Xinjiang. However, in articulating a need for party-state interventions in matters of scriptural interpretation, Islamic education, halal branding, the flow of Muslim migrants, online communication, and myriad other matters, the document provides directives for the full range of policies that have become associated with the campaign. In very broad terms, the document provides a set of benchmarks for local governments and local Islamic Associations to work toward in their implementation of the campaign. While the prescriptions in some cases provide only broad sketches, they also illustrate the party-state’s priorities in managing Islam.
Of similar importance is the document’s clear and specific designation of the China Islamic Association as a bridge entity between the party-state apparatus and local communities. The enlistment of the CIA and local branches in the efforts to enforce standards of correctness in all matters ranging from architectural aesthetics, curricular content in schools, certification and branding of foodstuffs, and spiritual and ideological communication illustrates both the organization’s centrality to the success of the project and its close relationship with the party-state itself.
Expanding the party-state’s role in registering mosques, policing the content of sermons, monitoring the flow of migrants, administering religious schools, and other matters places almost all religious activity in Islamic communities under centralized control. While consolidating measures may affect little change in places with an established CIA presence, for those communities that traditionally operated outside of CIA supervision, these measures make dramatic changes in the structure of religious authority, the conduct of religious ritual, the communication of religious doctrine, and the training of clergy.
In short, Document 10’s mandates envision a homogeneous, culturally Sinicized community of faith, tightly supervised by the party-state.
