China local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse muslim community opposition.

The party-state provided funding for renovations, primarily channeled through the United Front Work Department and via the relevant branches of the CIA. Qujing City, Yunnan, estimated in 2021 that it had spent 19m RMB on supporting renovations over the preceding year. Estimates for renovations to 19 mosques in Qinghai, to be completed over two years, were costed at close to 27m RMB, according to figures in a widely circulated PPT of proposed renovations. In Xining, that would put the cost of renovations to a single mosque at around 1.4m RMB apiece. These estimates likely do not represent the full costs of renovations, as they do not include costs for adding “Chinese” decorative elements following the removal of pagodas and domes, as occurred in several Xining mosques (such as Shulinxiang Mosque, pictured below) following the initial removal of domes and minarets. This oversight reflects the logic of the campaign: “foreign” architectural elements were first removed as dangerous precursors to extremism, before appropriately “Chinese” elements were added to replace them.

Due to the sheer numbers of mosques identified as in need of renovation, a number of building companies have advertised themselves as capable of undertaking mosque renovation projects on the basis of previous redesign projects, using architectural renderings of remodeled mosques to illustrate their work. In an ironic parallel with the official rhetoric that celebrates mosque Sinicization as a return to ‘traditional’ mosque architecture in China, many of the companies undertaking this work specialize in heritage projects. The growth in companies advertising for such tenders indicates the profitability of the projects. One company advertising their availability for renovation work priced their services at 349 RMB/square meter.

As the campaign to forcibly renovate mosques progressed, local authorities deployed a range of tactics to defuse community opposition. These practices often include pre-circulation of designs to proposed renovations to mosque committees as part of ‘consultation’ processes. The logic of Sinicization, and PRC policy-making in general, means that such renovations should appear to be supported by the community. Renovation work is often further overseen and inspected by local Islamic Association cadres, deepening their supervision of mosque affairs. For example, through an inspection of mosques in the Dongchuan district of Kunming, Yunnan, in 2022, Islamic Association cadres asserted the need for further training of imams, and thorough implementation of Party-state religious policy.

In some instances, mosque officials and religious personnel have been taken on study tours to areas where mosques had previously been Sinicized. In Pingliang, Gansu, reluctant imams were taken on study tours to Guyuan, Ningxia. As with other such study tours, this tour constitutes both a threat to the imams in question, and a demonstration by the government that Sinicization is inevitable. Other measures deployed include house-to-house visits made by cadres or PSB officials to congregation households, and threats of tax audits or salary cuts to government employees and businesses if they do not support Sinicization work. As with other policies, threats to remove licenses from imams or replace mosque committees who do not agree to the changes are also deployed to coerce individuals into agreement.

Overall, representatives of the Party-state have sought to manufacture the appearance of consent to the renovations from Muslim communities, often in the teeth of intense local opposition. Extensive efforts to shape and coordinate online conversations around renovations are also in evidence. Long essays purporting to be written by Muslim commentators in support of Sinicization circulate online, while commentators protesting renovations are censored almost instantly. Locals are generally warned not to ‘spread rumors’ about renovations online or talk to the press, and mosques are often closed to the public during renovations to prevent protests.

Despite this work and despite the existence of guides to ‘managing public opinion’ around mosque renovations, several localized protests have resisted mosque Sinicization, resulting in numerous arrests. Occasionally these protests attract international attention as was the case with those opposing renovations to the Najiaying Mosque in Yunnan in 2023. However, it is likely that many more small-scale protests have unfolded without reporting. In 2021, an imam from Zhaotong was arrested for opposing the demolition of the minaret of his mosque. Other reports state that Muslim cadres and local entrepreneurs in Yunnan have also either been arrested or removed from their posts following opposition to renovations across Yunnan. Local residents similarly reported that the imam and head of the management committee for Dongguan Great Mosque in Xining were detained and forced to sign documents supporting the renovations in 2021. Locals were again warned not to talk to the press or spread images or news. In Buga, Yunnan, after attempting to coerce the local community into signing forms giving them permission to rectify the Baoshan Mosque, the local authorities eventually deployed riot police to ensure that the demolitions proceeded. Although in the case of some famous mosques, renovations were delayed to defuse protests, ultimately proposed renovations have gone ahead. As these examples — especially the previously mentioned cases of Najiaying, Weizhou, and Zheqiao — attest, forced architectural renovations to mosques have been a flashpoint issue. Mosques are symbols of community pride, and mosque building, renovation, and expansion projects are normally funded by the community themselves.

Communities have also reported punitive actions taken against them in the wake of protests. Imams or mosque committees who spearhead opposition are replaced by figures aligned with the Party-state (see 3.0 Organization). In Yunnan, tight restrictions on fasting for Ramadan for officials in 2024 were widely perceived as punishment for public opposition to mosque Sinicization the year before. Efforts to coerce communities to accept unwanted mosque renovations provide a visible demonstration of the ‘irresistibility’ of the Sinicization program. These shows of force enhance the influence of local Islamic Associations within the mosque community and break the ability of locals to resist other changes. In general, architectural Sinicization functions as the opening move in bringing the Party-state into the mosque. Once achieved, the Party-state may impose further transformations of practice, culture, and education within mosque walls.