Qinghai Xunhua area was holding basketball competition, but The Chinese military use the weapons to threaten the hui people and Tibet people. The point is: why don’t the EU or the US use the military to keep the security of stadiums like China? 
 
watch video:https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw ... J.mp4 Collapse Read »

Restaurant Name           Cuisine Type                       Address                                              Contact Number
The Halal Guys             Middle Eastern                Multiple locations                                          (347) 527-1505
Kebab Empire                  Turkish               815 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10017                         (212) 888-4100
Mamoun's Falafel         Middle Eastern               Multiple locations                                            (646) 964-5194
Kabab King                 Pakistani/Indian       730 9th Ave, New York, NY 10019                           (212) 581-3072
Taïm                           Middle Eastern                 Multiple locations                                               (212) 691-1287
Sammy's Halal         Middle Eastern                   Multiple locations                                                (917) 566-6310
Al Baraka                    Middle Eastern          862 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10017                            (212) 888-9588
Chickpea                    Middle Eastern                 Multiple locations                                                (212)  786-2068
Karam                        Middle Eastern           851 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10017                             (212) 355-5025
Wafa's Express         Middle Eastern            812 4th Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11232                                (718) 369-8868
Halal Kitchen           Middle Eastern                    Multiple locations                                                   (212) 686-6666
Bolivian Llama Party   Bolivian                            Multiple locations                                                    (212) 256-0073
La Goulette                Tunisian                             Multiple locations                                                    (917) 819-2139
Kwik Meal               Middle Eastern              45th St & 6th Ave, New York, NY 10020                          (212) 730-4690
Royal Grill Halal Food Pakistani/Indian         7th Ave & 56th St, New York, NY 10019                      (646) 535-1885
Biryani Cart           Pakistani/Indian                46th St & 6th Ave, New York, NY 10036                      (917) 744-7999
Gyro II                   Middle Eastern                  60th St & 5th Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11220                       (718) 439-7089
The Halal Spot      Middle Eastern                  465 6th Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11215                                 (718) 369-6569
King of Falafel & Shawarma       Middle Eastern               30th St & Broadway, Astoria, NY 11106                          (718) 838-8029
Brooklyn Halal Grilled Chicken & Gyro       Middle Eastern              28-05 Steinway St, Astoria, NY 11103                     (718) 777-1111 Collapse Read »

   ​China’s Ethnic Hui Community at Risk of Erasure

A joint submission to

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

for its

3rd Periodic Review of the Implementation by the People’s Republic of China

of the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Submitting organizations:

Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)

A coalition of Chinese and international human rights non-governmental organizations. The network is dedicated to the promotion of human rights through peaceful efforts to push for democratic and rule of law reforms and to strengthen grassroots activism in China.

[email protected]

https://www.nchrd.org/

Hope Umbrella International Foundation

An organization whose mission is to preserve the cultural, religious, and intellectual heritage of the Hui people. The organization also documents the effects of government policies that violate the human rights of Hui communities in China.

Date of Submission: January 15, 2023
 
 
Executive Summary

1. China’s Hui population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—numbering over a million—has been among the groups targeted by crimes against humanity in the government’s counter-terrorism campaign in the region. Beginning in 2014 and escalating in 2017, this is the same counter-terrorism campaign that has received widespread international coverage for targeting Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic-speaking groups. The campaign has resulted in the detentions of a plausible estimate of more than 100,000 Hui in re-education centers, in addition to pre-trial detentions and imprisonments. The Hui have also been subject to restrictions aimed at eliminating “signs of extremism” that include what the OHCHR has referred to as religious and cultural expression protected under the Covenant, and intrusive surveillance of public and private life.

2. The Hui are an ethno-religious group of primarily Chinese-speaking adherents of Islam who are descendants of Han Chinese and immigrants from Central Asia and the Middle East via the Silk Road trade. A few ethnically distinct Muslim groups in China are also classified as Hui by the Chinese government. There are 11.4 million Hui in China according to the most recent national census, making them the third most populous of the officially recognized ethnic groups in China.1 Hui communities are concentrated in various regions in China, with the largest number in the northwestern provinces.

3. This submission also covers violations of Hui cultural and religious rights throughout China. Through the government’s “Sinification” campaign, authorities have tried to forcibly integrate religious groups into the government and Party system and to eliminate aspects of cultural expression that are seen by authorities as being incompatible with Han Chinese culture. Authorities have intimidated and detained lawyers taking up cases of Hui persecuted for exercising their cultural rights and censored online content about Hui and Islam, while permitting officials to foment hate speech and campaigns attacking Hui communities on Chinese social media.

4. “Poverty alleviation” is another Chinese government policy with a significant impact on Hui social, cultural, and economic rights. Officials have implemented two major poverty alleviation programs among Hui communities that require relocation: “ecological migration” and domestic “labor transfers” to more economically developed regions within China. In designing these programs, authorities have failed to conduct consultations with the communities that would be seriously affected. Officials have stated that the goals of these policies include assimilation of minority groups. These policies have forced the integration of ethnic minority communities into Han Chinese-dominant cities, where Hui find their employment opportunities limited to unstable and low-paying wage work.

5. Finally, this report covers violations of Hui economic rights in the context of forced labor in Xinjiang and the threatened deprivation of social benefits in both the Xinjiang counter-terrorism campaign and the nationwide “Sinification” campaign. Hui throughout China have also faced discrimination in the job market and the workplace, and this discrimination has worsened because of the stigmatizing effect of the government campaigns marginalizing and criminalizing Hui religious and cultural practices.

Chapter 1. Counter-Terrorism Policies Targeting Hui in Xinjiang

1.1 Targeting Hui for Exhibiting “Signs of Extremism” (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues pars. 12, 29)

6. Beginning in 2014 and escalating in 2017, the Chinese government’s “strike hard” campaign to counter “terrorism” and “extremism” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang or XUAR) has resulted in egregious violations of the social, economic, and cultural rights of the over one million Hui persons in region.2 Though the resulting crimes against humanity directed at Uyghurs and Kazakhs have drawn more widespread attention, China’s Hui population has also been among the targeted groups.

7. As part of the “strike hard” campaign, authorities have implemented a series of laws3 and policies that have been used to impose severe sanctions on a wide range of activities that government officials have designated “signs of extremism.”4 Authorities have rounded up members of the Hui community and held them in detention centers and re-education camps and sentenced some of them to prison for engaging in Hui religious and cultural activities such as praying at home5 or in mosques,6 watching7 or discussing8 religious content online, traveling to Muslim-majority countries,9 having funded mosque construction,10 going on Hajj pilgrimages,>11 being an imam, both with12 and without13 state licenses, and keeping religious paraphernalia in the home.14Such government measures targeting Hui persons for the above-listed activities violate their rights under the ICESCR to non-discrimination (article 2.2) and to take part in cultural life (15.1.a).

8. In further violation of the Hui community’s cultural rights under article 15.1.a, authorities have prohibited Hui communities in Xinjiang from engaging in religious and cultural activities such as observing Ramadan and Eid-al-Adha and have required Hui individuals to renounce their religion under duress.15 Authorities have required Hui families of those who had been detained in re-education camps to attend weekly flag-raising ceremonies16 and evening classes with “anti-religious” curriculum and demanded that attendees report on the religious observance of friends and family, threatening to send those who failed to report to a re-education camp.17
 
 
1.2 Detention of Hui & Mistreatment in Detention (Articles 11 & 12)

9. As part of the counter-terrorism campaign beginning in 2014, Hui in Xinjiang have been detained in pre-trial detention centers and re-education camps and sentenced to prison. The Chinese government has made little information public about the number or ethnicity of those detained in the campaign. In the absence of official data, researcher Gene Bunin has found that many witness testimonies from former detainees who later fled to Kazakhstan mention that Hui were detained alongside them in Xinjiang; Bunin also found that a report of 43 persons detained in Xinjiang in one predominantly Hui village of 60 households was comparable to expert estimates of the proportion detained in Uyghur communities in Xinjiang.18 Using researchers’ conservative estimate of 10 percent for the proportion of those detained in Uyghur communities,19 it is plausible to estimate that perhaps more than 100,000 Hui may have been deprived of liberty in connection with the campaign in Xinjiang.

10. The conditions in which Hui persons have been held in custody have resulted in serious violations of their rights to an adequate standard of living (article 11) and to physical and mental health (article 12). Uyghur, Kazakh, and other majority Muslim groups have reported significant physical and psychological abuse in custody,20 and reports indicate that Hui in custody have been subject to similar treatment,21 such as being crowded in squalid conditions of around 40 detainees to a cell with space so limited they could only sleep in shifts, being deprived of sunlight, and malnutrition so severe that detainees suffered from life-threatening anemia and weight loss.22 Like other detainees, Hui have been handcuffed and shackled for long periods,23 with at least one account having emerged of a Hui man dying in detention after being restrained in a tiger chair for 78 hours.24

1.3 Surveillance in Public and Private Life (Articles 2, 10, 12, & 13)

11. The detentions described above underpin a broader system of surveillance and restrictions aimed at eliminating the aforementioned “signs” of religious “extremism” in public and private life in the XUAR. The implementation of such policies has violated the rights of Hui individuals to non-discrimination (Article 2.2) These measures include close scrutiny of the movements and activities of Hui and other non-Han persons residing in the XUAR through security checkpoints,25 forced inspection of social media history,26 random cellphone checks,27 home inspections,28 regular questioning by police in person and over social media,29 and assigning public employees to stay in homes to monitor for religious observance and other “signs of extremism.”30

12. To facilitate monitoring by local authorities, Hui persons have also been subjected to discriminatory travel, residence, and employment restrictions, with reports of local authorities selectively requiring Hui to return to their registered hometowns.31 Authorities have also prohibited Hui from relocating within Xinjiang by reportedly refusing to register them as new residents.32

13. Authorities have also subjected Hui persons to physically and psychologically intrusive surveillance of their private lives. As part of the “becoming family” homestay program, public employees have reportedly monitored people in their homes for long periods of time with highly intrusive methods—continuously taking pictures of their activities, asking children about their parents’ activities,33 and even sleeping with families in their beds.34 The program constitutes a serious, coercive disruption of family life (Article 10.1) and also violates the right to enjoyment of mental health (Article 12.1) and to ensure the religious and moral education of one’s children (Article 13.3).

1.4. Recommendations

14. We urge the Committee to recommend that the State party:

Indicate any concrete steps taken to adopt comprehensive legislation or to review the existing laws, including “counter-terrorism” legislation, for eliminating discrimination and violations of social, cultural, and economic rights against ethnic groups including the Hui.
Provide information on the measures taken, and their effectiveness, to combat widespread social stigma and discrimination against ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Hui, in the country’s counter-terror campaigns.
Provide statistical data on children of ethnic or religious minorities including the children of Hui persons, who have been separated from their families, without adequate care, when parents are taken to “vocational training” camps.

Indicate the measures taken to improve access to health-care services, particularly among persons living in rural ethnic minority regions, including the Hui regions, and detainees and prisoners.
Provide information on the measures taken to ensure the freedom of Hui parents to determine the religious and moral education of their children.

Chapter 2. Discriminatory Policies and Practices Violating Hui Cultural and Religious Rights

2.1 “Sinification” Policy Undermines Hui Religious Freedom and Identity (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues par. 30)

15. In CESCR’s List of Issues, paragraph 30, the Committee asks the state to “indicate the measures taken to ensure that the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of ethnic minority groups is not undermined by the assimilation policy of the State party, known as “Sinification.”

16. Much of the Sinification campaign has targeted the Hui people, which appears to be authorized and coordinated via secretive directives35 from the PRC State Council and the United Front Work Department. Implementation of the campaign has had the effect of expunging communities of their connections to Hui culture, religion, and each other so thoroughly that some leaders view the erasure of a meaningful Hui identity within another generation as being a likely possibility.36

17. A classified 2018 State Council directive called for eliminating signs of Arab cultural influence in Islamic venues, dress, and religious observance, prohibiting waqf charitable funds from being independently held and administered by local Islamic communities, and barring Islamic organizations from running programs involving minors—from kindergartens to Arabic language schools and study abroad programs.37

18. Among the forms of “Arab influence” being targeted for removal since 2016 are Arabic lettering and motifs on buildings, in public areas, and in people’s homes.38 Islamic dietary restrictions have also been targeted as an unacceptable expression of Hui identity: since 2016 across China, restaurants and groceries have been forced to remove halal signage,39 and by 2019 authorities in Ningxia, Beijing, and elsewhere were no longer allowing food, dairy, and wheat producers and restaurants to certify food as halal.40

19. The Sinification campaign also aims to prevent transmission of cultural and religious heritage across generations. Minors under 18 have been prohibited from entering mosques and other religious venues in many areas, and Arabic language and Islamic schools have been shut down by authorities. In Gansu, extremely limited quotas for Arab language and religious instruction have made it impossible for most children to access instruction.41

20. In 2018, the Chinese Islamic Association—the state-sanctioned leadership organization for Islamic religious leaders—released measures regarding the Sinification of mosques and Islamic doctrine.42 The policy was referred to as the “four entries,” and directed local officials to ensure that “four” things make their “entry” into Hui, Uyghur, and all other mosques: the national flag, the Chinese constitution and laws, core socialist values, and Chinese traditional culture.43 Mosques were reportedly required to raise national flags,44 which were often accompanied by slogans exhorting patriotism, ethnic unity, and social stability.45

21. The “four entries” also heralded the intrusion of official surveillance into the religious and private life of Hui. Surveillance cameras have been installed by local police to monitor activity inside mosques in Ningxia and Henan.46 Hui have also been expected by the government to report on the religious activities of friends and families, with monetary rewards offered to informants.47

22. Authorities have sought to introduce the last two “entries”—core socialist values and Chinese traditional culture—through Hui religious leaders. Imams are only able to openly preach contingent on whether they demonstrate loyalty to the government’s Sinification program.48 Mosques without licensed imams have been shut down entirely.49 Officials in Ningxia and Henan now require imams to attend monthly training sessions regarding Party ideology and official policies governing ethnic minorities; for renewal of their imam license they must pass yearly tests regarding Party ideology.50 Imams are closely policed to monitor their deviation from officially prescribed interpretations of Islam.51

23. Meanwhile, the Sinification policy seeks to change the very beliefs of Islam by inserting “core socialist values” into the religious doctrine itself. The state-led China Islamic Association began leading conferences in December 2020 for the purpose of generating official re-interpretations of Islamic theology from the perspective of Confucianism and “core socialist values” so that they can be in line with “Chinese traditional culture.”52 Officials have worked methodically to remove signs of Arabic influence from mosques: the call to prayer in Arabic was prohibited in at least Ningxia and Gansu and replaced with the sound of a siren; as with all other buildings, Arabic inscriptions and motifs were removed from mosque walls.53

24. The Sinification measure that has provoked the strongest reaction in Hui communities is the forced demolition of mosque domes and minarets and their replacement with traditional Chinese roof designs.54 Authorities have retaliated against those opposing the demolitions. Following mass protests in Tongxin, Ningxia over the attempted removal of a mosque dome in August 2018, authorities visited each Hui household in the community requiring each to give consent to the replacement of the dome, issuing threats such as job loss for family members who were public employees.55

2.2 Intimidation and Detention of Lawyers Taking up Cases of Hui Cultural Rights (Article 2, List of Issues par. 4)

25. In its List of Issues (paragraph 4), the Committee asks the government to provide information about the intimidation of lawyers taking up cases of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Chinese authorities have harassed, threatened, and detained lawyers for representing Hui clients charged in connection with their religious identity or activities. Instead, authorities forced Hui detainees to be represented by government-appointed attorneys.

26. One Hui interviewee told CHRD in 2022 that in 2017, a lawyer was disappeared by authorities in Xinjiang for several days after being engaged to represent Hui religious leader Jin Dehuai, who was convicted for separatism based on religious activities such as preaching in his home, encouraging proselytizing, and organizing religious conferences with participants from abroad.56 The lawyer canceled representation after being released by authorities.

27. The same interviewee informed CHRD that authorities in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 2019 warned lawyers against attempting to represent Hui defendants who had been detained for their refusal to consent to the government’s removal of a mosque minaret. The defendants were members of the leadership committee of the Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia’s Tongxin county,57 Consequently, the defendants were assigned government-appointed lawyers and later convicted for “criminal syndicate activity.”58 Charges involving “criminal syndicates” have allowed for expedited prosecution and lower levels of judicial scrutiny under a major national anti-corruption campaign initiated in 2018 known as “Sweep Away the Dark Forces and Eliminate the Evil” (saohei chu’e).59

2.3 Internet Censorship (Article 15; List of Issues par. 31)

28. Chinese internet regulations have led to the selective censorship of content from Hui internet users while allowing denigrating and hateful speech about Hui and Islam to proliferate on social media. This combined with the encouragement of hate speech by public figures in official positions has contributed to worsening discrimination against Hui persons in Chinese society more generally.

29. In March 2022, a state ban on independent publication of “religious information” online went into effect, allowing only officially registered organizations vetted by the government to publish information online about “religious doctrine, knowledge, culture, or activities.”60 Prior to this ban, websites and online platforms popular among users in the Hui community had already been shut down.

30. For example, the website Zhongmu (www.2muslim.com) was shut down when a user-posted an open letter to Xi Jinping calling for the release of political prisoners was reposted by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Xi Wuyi on Chinese social media platform Sina Weibo as evidence of Hui subversion.61 The website had been online for over 13 years and included forums for 77 local communities throughout China, and former users searching for “Zhongmu” on Chinese social media found that searches on these platforms produced no results, thus preventing them from reconnecting.62 In addition to Zhomgmu, the personal websites of leading Hui cultural figures such as imam Li Yunfei and writer Zhang Chengzhi were shut down in 2020 and 2021, respectively.63

31. Individual Hui Internet users have also encountered censorship online. Researchers reported in a 2018 study that Hui users frequently found that their online posts about Islam or official ethnic policies were deleted or their accounts blocked, while state-approved imams have been allowed to discuss Islam online.64 Such targeted censorship has effectively prevented Hui persons from freely exchanging ideas and information on the internet.

32. While websites and Hui Internet users have been censored, discriminatory and hateful speech about Islam and Muslims has flourished on Chinese-language social media platforms. Academic experts have observed that such anti-Muslim rhetoric online has been indirectly encouraged by state media, which almost always portrays Muslims as the grateful beneficiaries of state programs or as violent extremists.65 Studies also find that social media platforms selectively fail to remove Islamophobic content clearly in violation of platform policies,66 which experts note is itself a reflection of suspicion of Muslim groups among Chinese authorities67 because authorities have significant control over what content appears online.68 Islamophobic hate speech also comes in the form of vicious online attacks against social media users identified as Hui, which has caused many Hui internet users to avoid engaging on issues related to Islam online.69

33. Government officials are often both the source and propagators of some of the most vitriolic comments about Muslims and Islam on Chinese social media. Scholar of Marxism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Xi Wuyi (mentioned above) has led numerous online campaigns against accommodations for or acknowledgment of Muslim members of Chinese society.70 Another government figure who has mobilized online followers to target the Hui community is a government propaganda and cyberspace official named Cui Zijian, who said it was part of his “professional and patriotic duty” to lead a 2017 online campaign to shut down the construction of a mosque in Hefei, provincial capital of Anhui.71 The status of such officials as in government capacity further legitimates hate speech about Muslims in mainstream discourse.
 
2.4 Recommendations

34. The Committee should recommend that the State Party:

• Provide information on the efforts undertaken to promote and protect the culture, religion and language of ethnic minority groups, including the Hui, and show how the measures taken to ensure that the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of ethnic minority groups including the Hui are not undermined by the assimilation policy of the State party, known as “Sinicization.” Please also comment on reports that the State party has attempted to eradicate the culture, religion, and language of Hui through the destruction of sacred cultural and religious sites and bans on engaging in religious activity.
• Provide information about avenues for accountability, redress, and compensation for lawyers and law firms subject to intimidation, detention, and retaliation for taking up cases of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Also provide information on the measures taken to provide an enabling environment for lawyers and human rights defenders to advocate and promote economic, social and cultural rights, particularly for Hui persons.
• Provide information on any measures taken to ensure the free exchange of ideas and information online without interference to the enjoyment of Hui persons to cultural rights and religious freedom.

Chapter 3. “Poverty Alleviation” Policies Disperse Hui Communities and Facilitate Cultural Assimilation

3.1 Political Goals and Effects of “Poverty Alleviation” Programs (Articles 2, 11 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

35. In its List of Issues (paragraph 24), the Committee asks the Chinese government to “specify the efforts made … to involve the affected individuals and communities in designing and implementing various poverty alleviation projects, especially those entailing relocation and resettlement of residents[.]” CHRD finds that few, if any, such efforts have been made with Hui communities.

36. Chinese officials have implemented two major poverty alleviation policies among Hui communities that require relocation: “ecological migration” and domestic “labor transfers” to more economically developed regions within China. “Ecological migration” has been touted by President and Party Chairman Xi Jinping as part of a series of the government’s ethnic minority policies that would create “mutually embedded social structures,” “intermingle ethnic groups,” and “guide people of different ethnic groups to correctly understand ethnic relations and issues.”72 Meanwhile, officials involved in a 2020 “labor transfer” recruitment effort targeting Hui workers cited the importance of “ensuring social stability and harmony” and “strengthening national unity.”73

37. In practice, such policies force the integration of ethnic minority communities into Han Chinese-dominant society, where they find employment opportunities limited to unstable and low-paying wage work. In designing these programs, authorities have failed to conduct consultations with the Hui communities that would be seriously affected by their implementation. The Chinese government’s implementation of “ecological migration” and “labor transfer” policies has violated the rights of Hui persons to an adequate standard of living (article 11) and/or to participate in cultural life (article 15). The design and execution of these programs have also negatively impacted the rights of the Hui persons to non-discrimination (article 2) by targeting Hui for dispersal to achieve political goals.
 
3.2 “Ecological migration” (Articles 2, 11 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

38. The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (Ningxia) hosts the world’s largest planned “ecological migration” project in terms of people affected. Begun in 1983, the government has relocated more than 1.1 million residents, out of a total of 7.2 million people in the region to achieve “environmental” and “poverty alleviation” goals.74 Scholars have contended that the policies are also a cover for dispersing and dislocating ethnic minority groups.75 Ecological migration projects have been used to disperse hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities in other areas: 710,000 people—72 percent ethnic minority—were resettled across 506 resettlement areas in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region between 2016 and 2020. The design of the resettlement plan emphasized relocating people from Zhuang, Miao, Yao, Maonan, and other ethnic minority groups and resettling them in mixed communities to promote “ethnic unity.”76 In Ningxia, although Hui make up 35% of the population, the majority of those resettled have been Hui.77

39. In one example, journalists found that Hui were forced to abandon independent farming for poorly remunerated jobs on industrial farms when 7,000 of them were relocated from Yejiahe Village in the Xihaigu region to the newly established Miaomiao Lake Village.78 Authorities denied farm subsidies and water pipelines to households that chose to remain.79 The relocated villagers were not compensated for the land they relinquished in their original village, and they were required to pay a “resettlement fee” of 14,000 RMB (USD $2,100) per household.80 Local officials told Chinese media that in exchange each household received 300 square meters for housing,81 but journalists found that relocated families of as many as eleven people were living in 50-square-meter, 2-bedroom apartments.82

40. Despite government promises that some families would be able to support themselves by farming allotted land in the new village, officials forced families to lease their plots to an agricultural company at low rates that the company allegedly stopped paying after the first year.83 A quarter of the 350,000 people84 relocated between 2011 and 2015 were not allotted any land for farming.85 Officials justified this by insisting that proximity to highways and urban areas amounted to an improvement in quality of life and encouraging residents to work in nearby cities.86 Officials boasted a high employment rate at 93 percent, but these figures were contested by local residents who reported that men were unable to find construction work and families relied on government loans to meet expenses.87 By 2021, Chinese media reported that garment work had been brought onsite to the village in a trailer.88

3.3 Domestic “labor transfers” (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

41. The other major “poverty alleviation” policy resulting in relocation and dispersal for Hui communities is the practice of domestic “labor transfers” coordinated by authorities in Ningxia89, Gansu,90 Qinghai,91 and Yunnan,92 where majority-Hui communities are concentrated. Government officials run these programs in conjunction with companies and other cities or regions seeking workers.

42. These “labor transfer” programs have displaced hundreds of thousands of people at any given time. In 2020, the Ningxia government had coordinated the “labor transfer” of 817,600 residents to work in the coastal province of Fujian and other parts of China as of August.93 In Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 550,000 out of 2 million total residents of the province was working as transferred labor outside of Gansu, according to numbers reported in 2020.94 Some of these local governments have been engaged in labor transfers of their residents for decades—Ningxia and Qinghai began enlisting residents to work for companies in coastal areas such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Shanghai as early as 2005.95

43. Although there is no available official data tracking the exact number and proportion of Hui people involved in “labor transfers,” there are indications that the Hui people in particular are significantly impacted. A free trade-zone official from Ningbo met with government leaders from both the Ningxia region and Linxia Prefecture in Gansu Province in 2020 to recruit Hui workers specifically, citing the importance of “ensuring social stability and harmony,” and “strengthening national unity.”96 Such “labor transfer” coordination is discriminatory as it targets Hui communities to achieve political goals.

44. We do not currently have evidence that these government-coordinated labor transfers are coercive in nature, in contrast to the labor transfer programs organized by local governments in Xinjiang (see Section 4.1).97 However, surveys suggest that the transfers are neither planned nor implemented in consultation with the affected communities, who have found that labor transfers disrupt social and cultural life in undesirable ways.

45. One 2014 study of the labor transfer programs in Zhangjiachuan Hui Autonomous County in Gansu province found that the 70 percent Hui population preferred to continue individual farming and to earn income without having to leave the region and work in other parts of the country.98 A survey of Muslim “labor transfer” participants from Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu province found that transferred laborers faced language barriers, difficulty finding Halal food, and lack of accommodation for religious observance, particularly for those traveling to eastern coastal cities where there was not a significant Muslim presence.99 Despite their preferences, such communities have become dependent on the labor transfer system for income—in 2021, remittances from labor transfers were more than half of local GDP in Zhangjiachuan county (1.77 billion RMB out of 3.39 billion RMB).100

3.3 Recommendations

46. The Committee should recommend that the State Party:

Specify the efforts made by the State party to involve the affected individuals and communities in designing and implementing various poverty alleviation projects in ethnic Hui regions, especially those entailing both temporary (as in the case of labor transfers) and permanent relocation of residents (as in the case of ecological migration), and to carry out those projects in accordance with its obligations under the Covenant. Please provide statistical data, disaggregated by region, on the number of land expropriations carried out and the number of persons relocated accordingly.
Provide information on the steps taken to address the reportedly persistent discrimination faced by ethnic minority persons with rural household registration in accessing employment, social security, housing, health care, education and other social services.

Chapter 4. Violations of Hui Economic Rights

4.1 Forced Labor in Xinjiang (Articles 6 & 11; List of Issues par. 16)

47. There is evidence suggesting that Hui detainees in Xinjiang (see Section 1.2) have been subjected to forced labor: Hui persons have served for periods in and around Ürümchi at Wujiaqu Prison and Badaowan Vocational Education and Training Center where forced labor has been documented;101 in one case, authorities have sent a Hui person to work in factories rather than allowing them to return home after being released from re-education camps.102

48. Xinjiang authorities have also promulgated official policies intended to forcibly displace residents for the purpose of performing forced labor as part of a political and cultural reform program. In 2018, the Yanqi Hui Autonomous County government in the XUAR issued Document No. 99 outlining a government-administered system of coercive relocation for labor, stating that “those who are transferred for work are not allowed to return without permission,” workers would be assessed based on “ideological education,” and administrative units would report on their progress in ideological training to the local Political Legal Committee and the Public Security Bureau.103

49. The scale of detentions of Hui and other Muslim-majority persons has also directly impoverished entire communities in the region. For example, a 2020 report describes 43 men in a village of around 60 households in Tacheng prefecture being sent to re-education camps. Without their labor, the main economic activity in the village, farming, was largely discontinued and the families remaining in the farming community no longer have sufficient income for necessities.104 Thus, the mass detentions have infringed on the right of the families of the detained to an adequate standard of living (Article 11).

4.2 Deprivation of Social Benefits, Rights to Work and Education (Articles 6, 9 & 13)

50. Chinese government officials have denied or threatened to deny public education, pensions, and other social benefits to compel Hui persons to comply with certain counter-extremism policies. This is in violation of their rights to work (article 6), social security (article 9), and education (article 13). For example, a Hui woman in Karamay prefecture in Xinjiang was threatened with the loss of her pension and her son’s minimal living allowance if she did not renounce her religion.105 In some cases, officials have coerced Hui migrants in Xinjiang to other parts of the regions to return to their registered residential locations by denying employment and public education for their children in the cities where they had been found work and lived for a long time.106

4.3 Employment Discrimination against Hui Muslims (Articles 2, 6; List of Issues par. 15)

51. Hui have historically faced discrimination in the job market and the workplace. In recent years this discrimination has worsened because of the stigmatizing effect of government campaigns marginalizing and criminalizing Hui religious and cultural practices described in preceding sections. A 2020 academic study found that Muslim job seekers in China are more than 50 percent less likely to advance beyond an initial interview than Han Chinese job seekers, discrimination that would primarily affect Hui, Uyghur, other predominantly Muslim groups. The study also found that despite government mandates to prioritize ethnic minority applicants, state-owned enterprises are as likely as private companies to engage in discriminatory hiring.107

52. More recently, such pervasive discrimination has been compounded by religious restrictions in the workplace imposed by local authorities as part of the government’s nationwide crackdown on religion in general. Since 2015, civil servants, teachers, and other public sector employees in Xinjiang have been banned from fasting during Ramadan;108 Hui make up approximately 9 percent of the population of Xinjiang of the population. As early as 2018, in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, public sector employees have been prohibited from appearing at work wearing the white caps Hui men customarily wear.109 Around 2016, the Chinese Communist Party warned its members of disciplinary measures if they believe in any religion, with state media publicized cases of CCP officials being subjected to disciplinary penalties for harboring religious beliefs.110

4.4 Recommendations

53. The Committee should recommend that the State party:

Provide information on any specific steps taken to ensure that no alternative or parallel system of forced labor is still in place, provide information on the steps taken to address reports about forced labour and physical and mental abuse of detainees allegedly involved in the so-called “vocational training programmes” operated by the State party, including through vocational training centres, for surplus rural workforce, particularly Uighurs, Tibetans, Huis and other ethnic minority groups; and indicate what support is provided to families whose primary breadwinner is sent to such centres.

Provide information on the trends in coverage of each social security scheme during the reporting period and the efforts made to expand the coverage of social security schemes, particularly among rural ethnic minority (including the Hui) migrant workers and workers in the informal economy or with non-standard forms of employment.

Endnotes:

1 According to the 2021 China Annual Statistical Yearbook. Cited in: https://baike.baidu.com/item/% ... ence-[4]-2699-wrap

2 China Internet Information Center, August 1, 2021.Available at: http://www.china.com.cn/opinio ... shtml

3 PRC Counterterrorism Law; XUAR Implementing Measures for the PRC Counterterrorism Law; PRC Criminal Law; XUAR Religious Affairs Regulation; 2017 XUAR Regulation on De-Extremification.

4 “新疆局地组织民众识别75种宗教极端活动” [“Local Xinjiang Authorities Organize Public to Identify 75 Signs of Religious Extremism”], Sina, December 14, 2014. Available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014 ... shtml

5 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

6 Chang Xin, “Xinjiang Woman Struggles to Care for Her Grandchildren,” Bitter Winter, February 11, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/woman ... n/%3B Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

7 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhengxiu,” May 14, 2022.

8 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhixue,” May 14, 2022.

9 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Xuexian,” December 27, 2019; Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Yuanlan,” December 27, 2019; Xinjiang Victims Database, “Wang Yali,” December 28, 2019.

10 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhongbao,” December 18, 2018.

11 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

12 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

13 Li Zaili, “Monetary Reward Offered for Muslim Man’s Recapture,” Bitter Winter, November 21, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/monet ... ture/

14 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

15 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

16 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

17 Xiang Yi, “With Husbands in Camps, Hui Women Struggle Taking Care of Families,” Bitter Winter, January 4, 2020. Available at:  https://bitterwinter.org/hui-w ... lies/

18 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

19 Jessica Batke, “Where Did the One Million Figure for Detentions in Xinjiang’s Camps Come From?” ChinaFile, January 8, 2019. Available at: https://www.chinafile.com/repo ... -come

20 Gene Bunin, “Because you had to do it very quickly, or you could be punished,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, November 1, 2019. Available at: https://livingotherwise.com/20 ... hed/. Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

21 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

22 Li Zaili, “Muslim Woman Reveals Details of Her Life in Detention,” Bitter Winter, October 30, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/musli ... tion/

23 Li Benbo, “Released from Xinjiang Camps but Forced to Lie About Them,” Bitter Winter, February 24, 2020. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/relea ... hem/. Li Zaili, “Imam Forced to Recite CCP Policies,” Bitter Winter, October 18, 2018. Available at:https://bitterwinter.org/imam- ... cies/

24 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

25 Darren Byler, “Do Coercive Reeducation Technologies Actually Work?,” Los Angeles Review of Books (Blog) , January 6, 2020. Available at: https://blog.lareviewofbooks.o ... work/

26 Gerry Shih, “China’s crackdown on Uighurs spreads to even mild critics,” Associated Press, December 28, 2017.

Available at: https://apnews.com/article/ap- ... 09ce8

27 Li Zaili, “CCP Monitors, Punishes Comments on Social Media,” Bitter Winter, December 28, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/ccp-m ... edia/

28 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

29 Darren Byler, “Do Coercive Reeducation Technologies Actually Work?,” Los Angeles Review of Books (Blog) , January 6, 2020. Available at: https://blog.lareviewofbooks.o ... work/  

30 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... ims/. For general information about the “Becoming Family” program, see UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, pars. 100-101. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/de ... t.pdf 

31 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... hur/. Li Zaili, “Imam Forced to Recite CCP Policies,” Bitter Winter, October 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/imam- ... s/%3B

32 Li Zaili, “Muslims Pushed to the Fringes of Housing Market,” Bitter Winter, November 25, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/musli ... rket/ 

33 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

34 Ivan Watson and Rebecca Wright, “The Chinese policy that makes Uyghurs feel like hostages in their own homes,” CNN, May 8, 2021. Available at: https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/08 ... html. For general information about the “Becoming Family” program, see UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, pars. 100-101. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/de ... .pdf. See also University of British Columbia Xinjiang Documentation Project, ““Hundred Questions and Hundred Examples”: Cadre Handbooks in the Fanghuiju Campaign,” accessed January 11, 2023. Available at: https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/ ... ooks/

35 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html. Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html  

36 Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

37 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... .html

38 Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... stics

39 David R. Stroup, “The de-Islamification of Public Space and Sinicization of Ethnic Politics in Xi’s China,” Middle East Institute, September 24, 2019. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publicatio ... ftn4. Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Huizhong Wu, “Sign of the times: China’s capital orders Arabic, Muslim symbols taken down,” Reuters, July 31, 2019. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/articl ... Q0JF. “China’s repression of Islam is spreading beyond Xinjiang,” The Economist, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.economist.com/chin ... iang. Keith Bradsher and Amy Qin, “China’s Crackdown on Muslims Extends to a Resort Island,” New York Times, February 14, 2021.Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/0 ... ml%3B Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

40 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... .html

41 Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

42 “中国伊斯兰教协会“四进”清真寺活动在京启动” [“China Islamic Association “Four Entries” Initiative Launches in Beijing”], Xinhua, May 18, 2018. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/polit ... 4.htm 

43 “中国伊斯兰教协会“四进”清真寺活动在京启动” [“China Islamic Association “Four Entries” Initiative Launches in Beijing”], Xinhua, May 18, 2018. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/polit ... 4.htm 

44 Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Matthew Chitwood, “China’s Crackdown on Islam Brings Back Memories of 1975 Massacre,” Foreign Policy, April 11, 2021. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021 ... obia/

45 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html. Alice Su, “China’s new campaign to make Muslims devoted to the state rather than Islam,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2020.Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world- ... gansu

46 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

47 “China’s repression of Islam is spreading beyond Xinjiang,” The Economist, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.economist.com/chin ... iang. Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

48 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

49 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

50 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2019 Annual Report, November 18, 2019, pg. 110. Available at: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... N.pdf

51 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

52 China Islamic Association, “Holding Fast to Our Country’s Direction of Islamic Sinification: 5-Year Plan of Work Outline (2018-2022)” [“坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向 五年工作规划纲要 (2018-2022)”]. Available at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/yqRJy1eNTNZdEqq8n12MKg.

53 Alice Su, “China’s new campaign to make Muslims devoted to the state rather than Islam,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2020.Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world- ... ansu.  Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html.

54 “被政府盯上的穹顶 宁夏韦州清真大寺对峙事件原委” [“Mosque in the Eye of the Government: the Story of the Ningxia Weizhou Grand Mosque Standoff”], BBC Chinese, August 10, 2018.Available at: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/s ... 6943. China Aid, “Ningxia Plots to Destroy Mosques,” February 20, 2018. Available at: https://chinaaid.org/ningxia-p ... ues/.

55 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... stics

56 CHRD interview; for more information about Jin Dehuai, see Xinjiang Victims Database, “Jin Dehuai,” September 15, 2019.

57 CHRD interview; for information about the demolition of the Weizhou Grand Mosque dome, see Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

58 PRC Criminal Law, Art. 294.

59 Supreme People’s Court Monitor, “The New Campaign to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil,” January 31, 2018. Available at: https://supremepeoplescourtmon ... evil/

60 互联网宗教信息服务管理办法 [Measures on the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/cont ... .htm. English translation: 

https://www.chinalawtranslate. ... tion/

61 “中穆网疑刊载海外留学生致习近平公开信遭封杀” [Zhongmu.com website taken down, suspected due to overseas student’s posting of public letter to Xi Jinping], Radio Free Asia,December 12, 2016. Available at: https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/ ... ified

62 CHRD interview with Hui scholar, July 2022.

63 CHRD interview with Hui scholar, July 2022.

64 Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang, “Anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise in China,” Washington Post, May 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... this/ 

65 Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang, “Anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise in China,” Washington Post, May 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... his/. Bailey Marscheck and Kangyu Mark Wang, “Islamophobia on Chinese Social Media,” China Data Lab, September 25, 2018. Available at: https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/ ... dia/. David R. Stroup, “Good Minzu and bad Muslims: Islamophobia in China’s State Media,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 27, Issue 4, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.co ... 12758

66 Wang Shuaishuai, “How Hate Speech Falls Through the Cracks of the Chinese Internet,” Sixth Tone, November 23, 2022. Available at: https://www.sixthtone.com/news ... rnet-

67 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... rget. “Islamophobia in China: A ChinaFile Conversation,” ChinaFile, May 14, 2019. Available at: https://www.chinafile.com/conv ... china

68 Mary Gallagher and Blake Miller, “Can the Chinese Government really control the internet? We found cracks in the Great Firewall,” Washington Post, February 21, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... wall/

69 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... arget

70 Phoebe Zhang, “No halal please: meet China’s pig vigilantes,” South China Morning Post, February 9, 2019.

71 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... rget. Gerry Shih, “Unfettered online hate speech fuels Islamophobia in China,” Associated Press, April 9, 2017. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/ap- ... 424fa

72 中共宁夏回族自治区委员会书记 [Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary], “全面贯彻落实党的民族政策 谱写新时代宁夏民族团结进步事业新篇章” [Fully implement the Party’s ethnic policy: write a new chapter advancing national unity in Ningxia in the new era], 求是网 [QS Theory], September 16, 2018. Available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/q ... 1.htm

73 宁波保税区人社局公众服务 [Public Services, Ningbo Free Trade Zone Human Resources and Social Security Bureau], “我区赴甘、宁两地做好回族务工人员关爱和劳务对接工作” [Ningbo FTZ visits Gansu, Ningxia to advance Hui worker care and labor transfer project], 搜狐 [Sohu], October 19, 2020. Available at: https://www.sohu.com/a/425773701_100020442

74 王志章, 孙晗霖, 张国栋 [Wang Zhizhang, Sun Hanlin, Zhang Guodong], 生态移民的理论与实践创新:宁夏的经验 [A New Theory and Practice of Ecological Migration: The Ningxia Experience], Shandong University Journal, 2020 Issue 4, April 5, 2020, pp. 50-63, p. 56. Available at: https://www.journal.sdu.edu.cn ... 5.pdf  

75 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

76 周映 [Zhou Ying], “广西易地搬迁安置点经验做法获国家发改委表扬” [National Development and Reform Commission Praises Guangxi’s Experience and Handling of Relocation Settlements], 广西日报 [Guangxi Daily], November 23, 2022. Available at: http://gx.news.cn/newscenter/2 ... 6.htm

77 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html  

78 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

79 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

80 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

81 邝亮桢, 张浩哲 [Kuang Liangzhen, Zhang Haozhe], “庙庙湖村：生态移民的扶贫之路” [“Miaomiao Lake Village: Ecological Migrants on the Road to Escaping Poverty”], 中国甘肃网 [Gansu China Net], August 4, 2017. Available at: http://gansu.gscn.com.cn/syste ... shtml

82 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

83 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

84 王志章, 孙晗霖, 张国栋 [Wang Zhizhang, Sun Hanlin, Zhang Guodong], 生态移民的理论与实践创新:宁夏的经验 [A New Theory and Practice of Ecological Migration: The Ningxia Experience], Shandong University Journal, 2020 Issue 4, April Collapse Read »

The  wooden Quran in the world can be found in Palembang, the capital of Indonesia’s South Sumatra province. It is the largest wood-carved Quran in the world, and was made from wood of the tembesu tree. It measures 1.77 by 1.40 meters (5.8 by 4.6 feet).
 
 

 
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Disaster rescue teams from Malaysia and Japan arrived in Turkey on Tuesday morning to help with the earthquake relief efforts.
 

 
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German Turkish footballer Mesut Özil helping with the earthquake relief efforts in Turkiye.
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Uyghur Muslim brothers are travelling to southern Turkiye to help earthquake victims. A people who endured genocide aiding a people who embraced them into their country.
 
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The openai answered this question  "What the evil things that the Chinese Communist Party did in muslim community"
 
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the victims of the 2017 Quebec City mosque attack where six Muslim Quebecers were killed in cold blood in their place of worship. This was the largest mass murder of a religious community in Canada in modern history.
 
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The Chinese Communist Party forcibly makes Kazakh and Uyghur people celebrate the Spring Festival like Han people. Xi Jinping repeats everything Mao Zedong did. Mao carried out reeducation through labor, Xi carries out forced labor, demolished mosques, forced Muslims to drink alcohol and eat pork, arrested Kazakhs with foreign relatives on the charge of being "foreign spies," compulsorily arranged Han officials to live in Kazakh and Uyghur families, prohibited communication with foreign relatives, and so on
 
video sources?:
 
https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw ... %3D12
 
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The population increasing rate in the video shows what the China population policy going on. East Turkestan(Xin Jiang) dramatically decline from about 13% to 0.56 % since 2017.
 
 

 
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CCP tried their best to deny the tragic fact that Zhanargul Zhumatai, a Kazakh woman from Urumqi, Xinjiang, was imprisoned in a Xinjiang concentration camp for two years. The following is her ID card and her work certificate when she was an editor in Kazakhstan National TV.
 

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Kurshat Sirajidin, a brilliant young Uyghur man, educated in USA, High school to University, went back to East Turkistan in 2016 to see family. Arrested in July 2021 while working as English teacher in Shanghai. Whereabouts unknown.
 
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Former world heavyweight boxing champion, Mike Tyson, and American Palestinian musician, DJ Khaled, recently completed their Umrah pilgrimage.
 
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Hundreds of Indian-American Christians and Muslims have gathered at the Frisco City Council in Texas to protest against Hindutva group Global Hindu Heritage Foundation for raising funds to demolish churches in India.
 

 
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England and Wales now less than half Christian. Those with ‘no religion’ form the second biggest group and are growing strongly. Muslim is 6.5%, just above ‘not answered’ at 6%, then Hindu at 1.7%, Sikh 0.9%. Buddhist, Jewish, and ‘other’ all around 0.5%. Figures from Census 2021
 
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What happened Nov 24 in Urumqi, two Uyghur girls telling from the beginning of the lockdown, what difficulties they were in and how that fire burned lives in Urumqi.
 
Click and watch their voice:
 
https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw ... %3D12
 
 
They couldn’t escape because their door is locked as required by the zero Covid policy of China.
 
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Protests erupted in front of the Urumqi city government building, which has been in lockdown for 100 days, after a fire killed 10 Uyghurs. Voices can be heard chanting, "open up" (end lockdown)
 
Click and watch the video:
 
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The Han-Chinese citizens are protesting the CCP regime, while over 5 Uyghurs died in this fire disaster. When people talking, Uyghurs are disappearing, when people protest on the streets, Uyghurs are still being locked in concentration camps.
 
click and watch the video.
 
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How can the authorities and CCP regime kill innocent Muslims and Han Chinese?
 

A whole life of a 3 years old kid in EastTurkistan(The occupied Xin Jiang).
 

 
 

Reports published throughout the year documented authorities’ continued use of torture and other forms of mistreatment against prisoners and camp detainees. As in the past reporting year, reports emerged documenting the deaths of individuals in mass internment camps and prisons or after they were held in camps or prisons. Examples include the following:

• Yaqup Haji, a 45-year-old Uyghur businessman and philan- thropist from Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autono- mous Prefecture, who died in or around September 2021 after being tortured in a mass internment camp or prison, where he had been held since 2018. A friend of Yaqup Haji told RFA that authorities had detained him for making contributions to religious causes, and that authorities had tortured him, includ- ing by holding him in solitary confinement.

• Zeynephan Memtimin, a 40-year-old Uyghur woman who died in 2020 in a prison in Keriye (Yutian) county, Hotan pre- fecture, where she was serving a 10-year sentence for violating family planning policies.62 Authorities previously held Zeynephan Memtimin in a mass internment camp beginning in 2017, for having fled a hospital where she was due to undergo a forced abortion in 2014.63 Officials did not disclose the cause of her death to relatives.

• Yaqup Hesen, a 43-year-old goldsmith who died on May 1, 2022, 20 days after being released from a prison in Ghulja (Yining) city, Ili (Yili) Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, where he had been held for three years. A neighborhood committee official told RFA that authorities had detained him for pray- ing. Family members sought medical treatment for Yaqup Hesen for an unspecified illness at multiple hospitals following his release. Yaqup Hesen’s 20-year-old son died, reportedly of grief, at his father’s funeral. Collapse Read »

 
Full pdf link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
 
AUTHORITIES CONTINUED TO PLACE INDIVIDUALS INTO FORCED LABOR

According to subsequent research published by Zenz in June 2022, XUAR authorities intensified and institutionalized the place- ment of Turkic Muslims into forced labor situations, likely forcing hundreds of thousands of mass internment camp detainees to work within the XUAR and transferring millions of ‘‘rural surplus labor- ers’’ within and outside of the XUAR. Zenz’s research indicates that authorities increased ‘‘the scope and scale’’ of forced labor transfers in 2021 and published plans to move increasing numbers of rural laborers into industrial work, as well as to train workers in coercive labor programs in higher skilled labor.

GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED FORCED LABOR CONTRAVENES CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

PRC government-sponsored forced labor contravenes inter- national human rights standards and China’s international obliga- tions. Government-sponsored forced labor programs in the XUAR constitute human trafficking under the Palermo Protocol and a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute. In February 2022, the International Labour Organization (ILO) released the an- nual report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Con- ventions and Recommendations. The Committee expressed its ‘‘. . . deep concern in respect of the policy directions expressed in numerous national and regional policy and regulatory documents . . .’’ with regard to the government’s detention and labor policies among ethnic minorities from the XUAR. The Committee re- quested that the Chinese government review, repeal, and revise its policies in order to serve ethnic minority individuals in the XUAR rather than discriminate against them. According to the report, as a signatory to the ILO’s Discrimination (Employment and Occu- pation) Convention (C111), China is obligated to create a ‘‘. . . na- tional policy to promote equality of opportunity and treatment and eliminate discrimination in respect of employment and occupation,’’ and ‘‘. . . to repeal any statutory provisions and modify any admin- istrative instructions or practices which are inconsistent with such policy.’’ In April 2022, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee ratified the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention of 1930 (C029) and Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 1957 (C105). C029 requires countries to prohibit the use of forced labor and make the use of forced labor ‘‘punishable as a penal offence.’’


Human Trafficking

Countries that ratify C105 are prohibited from using forced labor ‘‘as a means of political coercion or education’’ or ‘‘as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination.’’According to a human rights advocate, the PRC’s multiple violations of inter- national human rights standards on forced labor diminished mean- ingful expectations that the government will work in good faith to meet the ILO forced labor conventions. Collapse Read »

https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
Full pdf link:
 
Islam

This past year, the PRC continued to impose the policy of ‘‘sinicization’’ on ethnic minority Muslims throughout the country, promoting the eradication of distinct ethnic and religious character- istics and increasing assimilation with Han Chinese culture. The PRC continued its campaign to remove characteristically Muslim elements from mosques throughout the country. Authorities also continued to target girls wearing headscarves to school, ‘‘quietly’’ rooting out the practice ‘‘at the majority of schools, at all levels, by various means’’ since 2019, according to Radio Free Asia. Along with large-scale surveillance operations targeting Muslim communities, the central government has also continued to target Muslim worship by undertaking surveillance and interfering with religious activities at mosques and has imposed quotas on the number of Muslims permitted to gather to observe Ramadan. Examples of widespread violations of freedom of religion include:

• In July 2021, authorities in Xining municipality, Qinghai province, announced the removal of domes and a minaret from the front gate of Dongguan Mosque. Scholar David R. Stroup has described Dongguan Mosque as China’s ‘‘most prominent and culturally important mosque’’ and one of its largest.51 One report claimed that authorities had implemented similar re- movals from at least 10 other mosques throughout Xining.

• On November 3, 2021, seven Muslim girls were locked out of their elementary school in Changge city, Xuchang munici- pality, Henan province, for wearing headscarves.
• Beginning on October 15, government and Party officials launched their latest round of ‘‘wo’erzi’’ (a Chinese trans- literation of the Arabic word for ‘‘admonition,’’ or sermon) preaching tours, sending preaching groups to mosques throughout Qinghai to promote Party and government policies, loyalty to the Party, and Party-approved interpretations of the Quran.


• In 2022, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection had launched a corruption investigation into Chinese People’s Political Con- sultative Conference Vice Chair and member of the Hui ethnic minority Wang Zhengwei. Wang, formerly head of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and former Governor of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, was known for encouraging the build- ing of mosques ‘‘on a relatively grand scale’’ and supporting mechanisms for the certification of halal foods. According to the WSJ, the investigation into Wang Zhengwei was ‘‘prompted by concerns that Mr. Wang had promoted ‘unrestrained Mus- lim culture’ and encouraged religious extremism.’’  Collapse Read »

The infos from CECC Annual Report 2022 
 

 XINJIANG

• Key findings from a cache of tens of thousands of files ob- tained from public security bureaus in two counties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) included: the key role of senior Communist Party and central government offi- cials in carrying out the mass detention and other persecution of Turkic Muslims in the XUAR; the highly securitized nature of detention in the region’s camps and prisons; the high rate of imprisonment in Konasheher (Shufu) county in Kashgar pre- fecture, XUAR, as authorities increasingly sentenced Turkic Muslims to formal imprisonment; and arbitrary deprivation of liberty in camps and prisons.

• Reports published during the Commission’s 2022 reporting year indicated that XUAR officials increasingly sentenced many Turkic and Muslim individuals to long prison terms, sometimes following their detention in mass internment camps. According to international reporting and analysts’ re- view of satellite imagery, officials have converted many former mass internment camps into prisons or other types of formal detention facilities.

• International researchers and journalists found evidence that authorities continued to expand detention facilities, in- cluding mass internment camps. Based on research and anal- ysis of leaked official documents and satellite imagery, BuzzFeed News journalists estimated in July 2021 that au- thorities in the XUAR had enough space in detention facilities in the region, including prisons and mass internment camps, to detain more than one million people at the same time.

• Authorities in the XUAR maintained a system of forced labor that involved former mass internment camp detainees and other Turkic and Muslim individuals. In its annual report re- leased in February 2022, the International Labour Organiza- tion expressed ‘‘deep concern’’ over forced labor in the XUAR and asserted that the ‘‘extensive use of forced labor’’ involving Turkic and/or Muslim minorities in the region violated the Em- ployment Policy Convention of 1964.

• In September 2021, official media in the XUAR announced a new plan pairing Uyghur children with children from across the country, a move that observers believe is designed to con- trol Uyghurs’ lives and eliminate Uyghurs’ cultural identity.



Executive Summary

Called the ‘‘Pomegranate Flower Plan,’’ the initiative matched Uyghur toddlers and elementary school students from a village in Kashgar prefecture with predominantly Han Chinese chil- dren from other parts of China, in order to establish ‘‘kinship’’ ties between the children.

• During the 2022 Ramadan period, which lasted from April 1 to May 1, authorities in parts of Urumqi municipality and Kashgar and Hotan prefectures reportedly enforced quotas for local Muslims allowed to fast during the holiday, and required them to register with officials. Reports published this past year showed that authorities have sentenced Turkic Muslims in the XUAR, including members of the clergy, to lengthy prison terms.

• Turkic women who had been detained in mass internment camps in the XUAR provided evidence to the Uyghur Tribunal that many female detainees were raped in the camps. One former camp detainee testified that unmarried, divorced, and widowed women were raped in a camp where she was detained and that men paid to come to camps to rape female detainees. Collapse Read »

The infos from CECC Annual Report 2022 
 
link: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
 ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS

Findings

• During the Commission’s 2022 reporting year, People’s Re- public of China (PRC) authorities implemented policies that limited the freedom of ethnic minority groups to express their cultural and religious identities, in contravention of the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law and international law such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

• During this reporting year, PRC officials introduced lan- guage and education policies that prioritized the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and the reduction of ethnic minority lan- guage instruction. Australian scholar James Leibold said, ‘‘[T]he education system is now the front lines in President Xi Jinping’s assault on ethnic minority cultures in China.’’

• Authorities implemented programs and activities in Hui reli- gious communities this past year which were aimed at ‘‘sinicizing’’ Islamic practices, a trend observers say limits Hui Muslims’ ability to practice their religion and culture.

• Following protests in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re- gion in fall 2020 over a new policy to reduce Mongolian lan- guage instruction in schools, authorities worked to eliminate dissent among Mongol parents, students, teachers, and others in the region. Officials launched mass ‘‘rectification’’ and ‘‘re- education’’ campaigns, including through ‘‘patriotism courses,’’ to shore up support throughout all segments of Mongol society for the PRC’s sinicization policies. Collapse Read »

MASS INTERNMENT CAMPS

Authorities continued to operate a system of extrajudicial mass internment camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in which they have arbitrarily detained over a million indi- viduals from predominantly Muslim ethnic minority groups, includ- ing Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others.46 In April 2022, the U.S. Government reiterated its determination that the Chinese government is committing genocide against Muslim minorities in China.47 [For more information on arbitrary detention in China’s mass internment camps, see Section X—Xinjiang.]
 
The infos from CECC Annual Report 2022 
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf Collapse Read »

The data from CECC Annual Report 2022 
link:https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... 0.pdf
 Meryem Emet

2022-00124

Date of Detention: Unknown date in 2017
Place of Detention: A prison in Kucha (Kuche) county, Aksu prefecture, XUAR
Charge(s): Unknown
Status: Sentenced to 20 years
Context: In 2017, authorities in Urumqi municipality, XUAR, detained Meryem Emet and later sentenced her to 20 years in prison. Her sentence was reportedly con- nected with her marriage to a Turkish national, and with her having met and spoken with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdog ̆an during his 2012 visit to Urumqi. Additional Information: After her detention, XUAR au- thorities forced her two children, then ages four and six, into boarding schools in Urumqi, where teachers sub- jected them to traumatizing disciplinary measures includ- ing beatings and being forced to hold stress positions. After nearly 20 months at the schools, the two children were left unable to communicate in Uyghur. Collapse Read »