Li Yunfei: Bangladesh is Just Beginning
February 21, 2026

Muhammad Yunus, the leader of Bangladesh's interim government, officially stepped down on February 16. He didn’t cling to power; he simply walked back to his study. While this makes sense, it stands out as a rare act of true character in a noisy world. It shows the whole world that a leader in a Muslim society can retire with dignity. This kind of political maturity is something the Muslim world has often lacked. In the humid, tense air of Dhaka, he said: "This is the day of liberation! What a joyful day! The people of Bangladesh are crying tears of joy.
 
 The youth of our country have freed the nation from the grip of a monster." You could see a sense of relief in his face, mixed with exhaustion. The Nationalist Party won a landslide victory in the recent elections, and their leader, Tarique Rahman, was sworn in as Prime Minister on February 17. This election was incredibly diverse, with over 50 parties and 2,000 candidates; nearly 130 million people voted. The fact that it happened without violence is a massive success for Yunus. Additionally, the "July Charter" he pushed for—which limits a Prime Minister to two terms and ensures the courts are totally independent—was passed by a public vote alongside the election on February 12. This charter was his way of making sure all political parties follow the rules of democracy.

For a long time, this land was stuck in the mud of dictatorship, and people's rights were fading away. Then came the July Revolution, where young students broke through years of darkness. 
 
Gen Z, the most modern-minded generation, created a new political reality. These young people have a simple, sincere Islamic faith, but they also know everything about modern tech and human rights. They have zero patience for corruption and dictators, which is how they changed a country with over a hundred million Muslims. This shows that if we want to change the politics of the Muslim world, the youth are the edge of the blade, and universities are the spark. Change starts with students who haven't been broken by the system, and that power comes from universities being truly independent. The early glory of the Islamic world also came from thinkers and scholars being independent. A country that truly follows Islamic values must admit that Truth doesn't belong to those in power; instead, it must protect the independence of universities, the courts, and the community. We should realize that the rise of the Muslim world doesn't start with building bigger mosques or fancy cities, but in a truly free university classroom.

Back then, Yunus took the job in a crisis. He was like a wise, elderly watchman carrying a lamp through the dark gaps of a power shift, making sure nobody stepped on the new sprouts of freedom. Looking at his whole life, his heart was never in the palace, but with the common people. He started "Grameen Bank" to help the poor escape poverty through non-profit small loans. This earned him worldwide respect, a Nobel Peace Prize, and top honors from ten countries, including the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom. Today in Bangladesh, while political freedom is finally dawning, the daily life of the people is still very hard to look at. In this land of many rivers, resources are low, the environment is messy, and poverty eats away at the dignity of millions like a disease. This isn't how a Muslim country should look! The true meaning of politics, the state, and even Islam, is ultimately to bring benefit to the people—success in this life and the Next. 
 
If people can’t even survive, it doesn’t matter how loud we say the name of Islam or how beautiful the laws are on paper; it lacks meaning. Yunus knows that if the land isn't clean and the people don't have a decent living, then democracy is just a dream. He once said: "I promote a 'Three Zeros' world: zero poverty, zero unemployment, and zero net carbon emissions. I focus on these three, but it doesn't mean other problems don't exist. Poverty is the root of all problems. My goal is to put poverty in a museum so it no longer exists in society." This "Three Zeros" vision is basically taking what Allah expects from us as His stewards on earth and turning it into a real-life yardstick for the people's welfare.
Yunus stepping down is the most dignified closing act of Bangladesh's "Gen Z Revolution."
 
 Over the last 18 months, he used his global perspective to build a new system on the ruins of the old one. Now, Bangladesh has an awake public and a set of brand-new rules to keep power in check. Whether the "July Charter" can stay strong against the Nationalist Party's huge victory remains to be seen. It's often easy to start a revolution but hard to run a country; easy to destroy but hard to build. Tarique Rahman and his family have a complicated history with power. But the game has totally changed now. 
 
The fall of Hasina proved that even the best spy network can't save you from a wave of Gen Z protesters in the streets. Independent courts will be the main thing keeping him in check. If he can handle the courts challenging his orders, then Bangladesh is truly on the right path. But today, the awakening of the youth in Bangladesh cannot be undone. May their light never go out. If Bangladesh can prove that a large Muslim country can work well with a parliament, a democracy, and an open economy, it will provide a model for the whole Muslim world. 
 
A country with deep Islamic traditions can be a successful nation in global politics. Regardless, the young generation of Bangladesh has brought honor to Muslims everywhere. You could even say they have upheld the dignity of Allah and His Messenger in today's world.
Yunus is gone, but Bangladesh is just beginning.
February 20, 2026 view all

We were little kids back then.

When the holidays came, our parents would herd us into the mosque like they were carrying out some solemn duty. It was a time of mischief and trouble — a time when faith hadn’t yet been disciplined into a “problem.”

In the mosque classroom, I lit a firecracker the moment the imam turned his back. It went off loud, smoke everywhere. The older kids pinned me down on the desk, and the imam came over furious, ruler raised, and gave me a beating. My backside really hurt — but there was no fear in that pain. I wiped my tears, grinned, and kept right on reciting with the imam from that blue-covered traditional-script book, Zaxue Zhujie — “Niyya takan ratam…” In the afternoon, the potatoes in the mosque kitchen’s big pot were done, and the kids scrambled for them with pure joy. Laughter, shouting, and the sound of Qur’anic recitation all mixed together into one rough but warm river.

Back then, the mosque was more than just a place for salah. It was the school, the canteen, the daycare for the Muslim community — the most humble and real form of belonging a people could have.

When college breaks ended, friends came back and talked about volunteering at the mosque: helping students with homework across all grade levels, teaching pinyin, working through math problems. It was their way of giving back to their hometown — of repaying the debt of that pot of potatoes from childhood. The mosque was still there, like patient ground, receiving one generation of children after another.

After graduation, I became a township official in the Chinese government.

The township where I worked had several immigrant villages. People had moved out from the deep mountains of Linxia and Dingxi in Gansu — relocated from places unfit for human habitation to the flat land of Qinwang Plain. On the open wasteland, unbroken wind bent the signal towers sideways. When night fell, you could only shut the doors and windows tight and listen to the wind howl across the open land. No television. No entertainment. Life was monotonous and hard. Young people had nothing to do — so they had children. Five years, eight births — in that era when family planning carried a “one-strike” veto, this was almost an absurd miracle. Affairs at the resettlement sites were handled by two or three people from the county relocation office, whose minds were on skimming money and other things elsewhere. Family planning became the kind of thing nobody wanted to touch — whoever did was asking for trouble. The township government took over public security, agriculture, and roads — but always sidestepped family planning. Who would dare? That was a career-ending matter.

And yet the children grew up, for real.
There were several mosques at the resettlement sites — a few simple tile-roofed structures. The slightly larger building served as the prayer hall; the smaller room housed the imam. No walls around them, no signs — just standing alone at the edge of the village. The same month I reported for duty at the township, a young student who had just completed his religious training and received his credentials at Lanzhou’s Xiguan Grand Mosque arrived as well. He was draped in bright red fabric, fair-skinned and young, still looking every bit like a student.
Three years later, I rode past that mosque on the motorbike the township had issued me. The courtyard was packed with preschool-aged children with no household registration. The young imam was leading them in a game of “hawk and chick,” and laughter tumbled through the wind. The handsome young man had been darkened by the wind of Qinwang Plain, a few wisps of goatee hanging from his chin — the seal of his identity.
The immigrant village’s primary school had been built based on a plan of three children per couple — and by now it was long over capacity. The burden of watching over the children had fallen to the mosque.

The mosque became a daycare, a school — the last buffer zone.

In 2015, I went back to my hometown of Lintan and prayed Dhuhr at the West Grand Mosque. Before the prayer had even finished, the courtyard was already alive with children’s noise. The neighboring Lintan No. 1 Primary School was building a new teaching block, so the mosque gave all the classrooms of its madrasa to the school — free of charge. When that wasn’t enough, a row of portable prefab rooms was set up around the courtyard as classrooms. That arrangement lasted three years.
Then something remarkable appeared: students in matching school uniforms lined up in the mosque courtyard to do morning exercises and dance. From the loudspeakers — the outdoor adhaan speakers that had since been banned — upbeat music and songs now played. Teachers stood on the high steps of the traditional Chinese-style prayer hall, leading the exercises. The elderly men who had come for salah sat quietly on the benches by the hall entrance, waiting.

That scene was warm, harmonious — and almost unbelievable.

It was like a crack in the age: the sacred and the secular standing side by side, drawing on each other, completing each other. In that moment, Islam’s capacity for tolerance — toward children, toward all forms of seeking knowledge — was on full display in a way that was almost hard to imagine.

In 2018, during Hajj in Saudi Arabia, an imam traveling with our group showed me a surveillance video someone back home had sent him. In the courtyard of a mosque in Guanghe County, children from a holiday class were playing. A figure crept in furtively, looked around, and left. I recognized him immediately — a colleague of mine, a Hui official who in normal times would walk behind me calling me “Leader” and “Brother.”

The next day, that mosque was shut down for “rectification.” The officials in charge of religious affairs received disciplinary action.

The children’s laughter had suddenly become a liability.
Later — during Ramadan 2019 — I broke my fast at Xiaoxihu and went to the mosque next door for Tarawih. At the entrance I ran into the head imam, who warmly invited me to his office to share the iftar meal. I declined politely; I just wanted to pray in peace.

That evening’s prayer seemed to have been deliberately delayed. The head of the mosque management committee took the microphone, gathered the committee members, and moved through the mosque driving the children out — demanding that parents take every child and leave immediately. “Minors are not permitted to enter” — printed in large characters on the door of the prayer hall.

The courtyard went suddenly silent.

The imam was slow to enter the hall. Before leading the prayer, he repeatedly stressed that the rule barring minors from the mosque had to be strictly enforced. They were saying it for my benefit — I was the director from the United Front Work Department.

In that moment, I suddenly understood: the mosque was no longer the big pot of my childhood. It had become a space watched by something evil. Every footstep of a child could become grounds for a written reprimand.
Today, every mosque, every church, every Taoist temple, every Buddhist temple displays the flag, posts slogans, hangs banners — Core Socialist Values, ethnic unity, religious harmony, anti-crime campaigns… Layer upon layer of colorful rhetoric. And the most prominent of all is that cold, hard prohibition:

Minors are not permitted to enter.
The mosques in the cities are as quiet as a forgotten mountain shrine.
No children running.
No firecrackers.
No chaos of kids scrambling for potatoes.
Only echoes remain.

History does not often turn in grand narratives. It turns quietly — in the moment a child is ushered out of the gate.

When the children of a people are forbidden from entering their own sacred space, that is not merely a regulation. It is a severing of memory. It is a hollowing out of inheritance. It is a predetermined verdict on the future.

I remember that ruler.
I remember that pot of potatoes.
I remember the wind of Qinwang Plain.
I remember the expression on the old man’s face as he sat by the prayer hall door, waiting for the children to finish their exercises.

This is not nostalgia.
This is testimony.
The mosque was once the children’s courtyard.
Now, all that remains are surveillance cameras and facial recognition at the gate.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ view all

My Halal Trip to Bangkok — Food and Stay

I headed to Thailand for the May Day holiday this year—my first trip abroad in three years, Alhamdulillah. Even though it’s the peak of summer and the heat is intense, everyone’s spirits were high. You could hear Chinese voices all over the streets of Bangkok. On this trip, I visited 9 Yunnanese Muslim mosques and 7 Indian mosques in Northern Thailand, as well as 9 different Muslim communities in Bangkok. I’ll be sharing more about those soon, Insha'Allah. In this post, I want to start by sharing the street food I found at Halal stalls in Bangkok and the Muslim hotel where I stayed.

The Foundation of the Islamic Centre of Thailand

We started our morning with breakfast at the Foundation of the Islamic Centre of Thailand. It’s a beautiful modernist building designed by a young Bengali Muslim architect, Paichit Pongpunluk. Construction began in 1970 and took 11 years to finish because of funding—but once it was done, it became a true landmark and hub for the community.

We picked up some Basil Chicken Rice (Pad Krapow), grilled chicken skewers, and Thai red tea. "Pad Krapow" uses Holy Basil, which grows all over Southeast Asia; stir-frying it with meat makes for a perfect meal. The Thai tea is made with Ceylon tea, condensed milk, sugar, and milk. You can have it hot for breakfast, but usually, people drink it iced. There are plenty of Halal stalls downstairs, though not all were open since we arrived early. Besides the food, they have books, clothing, and community events—it’s definitely worth a visit.

Street Food Stalls at Haroon Mosque

After praying Asr, we went for lunch at the stalls right outside Haroon Mosque by the Chao Phraya River. The mosque is named after Toh Haroon Bafaden, an Indonesian merchant who came to Bangkok with his father in the 1820s or 30s. He settled down, got married, and built the mosque, and a Muslim neighborhood grew around it.

First, we had the beef and chicken ball glass noodles. The beef was so incredibly flavorful—Zainab and I both agreed it was the best meal we had in Bangkok! Then we had the Basil Chicken with meatballs and chicken liver over rice. After that, we tried a bowl of braised chicken feet. They were so tender and soaked up all the flavor, though the soup was super spicy, haha!

In the Bangkok summer heat, there are two things you absolutely need for street food: a powerful electric fan and an ice-cold drink! Otherwise, you’d have no appetite at all.

We also had the classic Pad Thai. It’s made with rice noodles, stir-fried eggs, bean sprouts, crushed peanuts, and fresh shrimp, served with lime and chives. While Chinese immigrants brought the concept of stir-fried noodles here centuries ago, it only became the "national dish" in the mid-20th century. During WWII, when rice was scarce, the government promoted these noodles to help the country get through the shortage.

If Pad Thai is what people first think of when they think of Thai food, then "Roti" is definitely the first thing people think of for Thai Halal food. You’ll find a Muslim brother or sister with a Roti cart at almost every night market, and they’re always popular.

ICONSIAM Food Court

For any brothers and sisters (Dosty) visiting Bangkok in the summer, I highly recommend SOOKSIAM on the ground floor of the ICONSIAM mall. It brings together snacks from all over Thailand and has many Muslim stalls, many run by Malay Muslims from the South. Best of all, the AC is great—you won't want to leave!

We started with the steamed egg crab. It was full of roe and tasted amazing with the spicy and sour "Nam Chim" dipping sauce. They also have shrimp, squid, and all kinds of seafood. Our Malay Muslim brothers from the South are experts at cooking seafood.

Next, we had the classic Thai Muslim street snack: Roti with Thai milk tea. "Roti" actually comes from the Sanskrit word for bread, brought here by South Asian and Malay Muslims. Unlike in South Asia, Thai Roti is sweet—you can add bananas, eggs, and chocolate, and it’s topped with sweetened condensed milk.

We also tried the Thai chicken sausage with lotus root salad and the green mango oyster salad (Tam Mamuang). They use raw long beans in their salads here, unlike back home where we usually blanch them. These salads are all about that spicy and sour kick from lime and bird’s eye chilies. If you can’t handle heat, you definitely need to ask for "no spice" or "little spice."

The green mango salad belongs to the "Tam" category, which means "pounded." The most famous version is green papaya salad. They pound the mango with garlic, chilies, dried shrimp, and fish sauce to bring out the aroma, then add palm sugar and lime juice.

Finally, for the main course, we chose Chicken Rice (Khao Man Gai). This dish came from Hainanese immigrants in the late 19th century. The rice is cooked in chicken broth and is so fragrant. Unlike the version in Singapore or Malaysia, the Thai style uses a paste made of ginger, garlic, cilantro, and oil to braise the chicken, and it's served with "Nam Phrik," a sweet and spicy sauce.

Mango Sticky Rice at Suvarnabhumi Airport

Right before we left, I grabbed some traditional Mango Sticky Rice (Khao Niao Mamuang) from a Halal fast-food spot at the airport. It’s the perfect snack for the plane. During mango season in April and May, everyone loves this. The sticky rice is mixed with coconut milk and palm sugar, usually served with the sweet Nam Dok Mai or Ok Rong mango varieties. This dessert goes back centuries to the Ayutthaya period and is now famous all over Southeast Asia.

Al Meroz Muslim Hotel

This time in Bangkok, we stayed at the best Muslim hotel in town, the Al Meroz. It’s near the Ramkhamhaeng station on the Airport Rail Link—only 20 minutes from Suvarnabhumi Airport. There’s a canal boat nearby that takes you straight to the Old City so you can skip the traffic. The Foundation of the Islamic Centre of Thailand is right across the street, so you can really feel the local Muslim atmosphere.

The hotel has three high-end Halal restaurants and a bakery. The buffet breakfast is amazing—you can try Malay, South Asian, and local Thai Halal flavors all in one place.

The Ramadan buffet ad, the prayer hall (Musalla), the wudu area, and the rooftop pool at the Al Meroz Hotel. view all

A look back at my Halal trip to Seoul, South Korea.

The Early Muslims of Korea Persian and Arab merchants traveled to Korea to do business as early as the 9th century during the Silla period. This grew during the Goryeo dynasty (918-1392), where some Muslim traders married local women and started the very first Muslim communities in Korea.

During the Yuan dynasty, many Semu people (Central Asians) settled in Goryeo for trade and built a mosque called Ye-Kung in the capital, Kaesong. There’s even a famous old poem from back then called Sanghwajeom (The Central Asian Bakery) that tells the story of a Korean woman buying dumplings from a Muslim shop.

Once the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910) took over, King Sejong banned the faith in 1427. He forbid the wearing of kufis (prayer hats), closed the Kaesong mosque, and the Muslim community eventually faded away.

The Rise of Modern Korean Muslims It wasn't until the Korean War that Islam returned, when a Turkish brigade arrived with their own military Imam. They did a lot of humanitarian work, helping war orphans in makeshift schools. After the war, the Turkish troops stayed as UN peacekeepers, and Koreans began to embrace Islam. In 1955, the Korea Muslim Society was started, setting up the first prayer space in downtown Seoul. By 1967, this grew into the Korea Muslim Federation (KMF), which looks after the student association and the Islamic Culture Institute.

The Halal logo certified by the KMF.
 


A booklet printed by the KMF with info on mosques all over Korea.


A 1999 magazine from the KMF, featuring a list of new brothers and sisters who converted that year and the Halal butcher shops at the time.
 

 


The Itaewon Muslim Community In 1952, the U.S. military moved its headquarters to Yongsan. To serve the many American troops nearby, the Itaewon area—just a short distance east of the base—started filling up with foreign restaurants and bars. Eventually, Muslims started opening Halal spots there too.
 

In 1976, President Park Chung-hee provided the land to the KMF, and the Seoul Central Masjid was built in Itaewon. That year, the number of Muslims in Korea jumped from under 3,000 to over 15,000, and a Halal business district formed in Itaewon. Since the 90s, with brothers coming from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia for work, the population reached 150,000. Today, there are an estimated 100,000 Muslims in Korea, with about 40,000 being local Korean converts.

A map at the Itaewon subway station showing the Middle Eastern street and the Masjid.
 


Seoul Central Masjid 
 

 
There is a school inside the complex that offers Arabic classes.
 

 
The area around the Masjid is full of Halal restaurants with flavors from Iran, India, and Turkey, along with Halal supermarkets, Islamic bookstores, and Muslim-run travel agencies.

Street views of Itaewon.
 


You can pick up a "Halal Guide to Itaewon" at Incheon Airport, published by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. It shows exactly where all the Halal restaurants are.
 


The Korean government actually categorizes these restaurants into four types:

Halal Certified: Certified by the food safety department; must have at least one Muslim staff member.

Self-Certified: Muslim-owned restaurants that don't serve alcohol.

Muslim Friendly: These serve alcohol but have some or all Halal items on the menu.

Pork-Free: They don't have a specific Halal menu, but they don't use any pork.
 


Breakfast I stayed at the ITW Hotel in Itaewon. Every morning from 7 to 9 AM, they have a Halal breakfast buffet provided by a nearby Indian restaurant called ZAFFRAN. Other than a 24-hour Turkish spot called MR. KEBAB, most Halal places in Itaewon don't open until later in the morning.
 



Halal Supermarket ZAFFRAN MART, the biggest Halal grocery store in Itaewon.
 


Islamic Bookstore 
The bookstore in Itaewon is run by a brother from Indian-controlled Kashmir. We really hit it off, and he gave me a very warm greeting when he saw me the next day. They carry kufis from Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, East Africa, and Malaysia. I bought one made in Pakistan and one from India.
 


A kufi made in India. 

 
A kufi made in Pakistan.
 


Makan Restaurant Even though there are tons of Middle Eastern and Indian spots, the real highlight is Halal Korean food. Makan is the most famous one.
 



This sister is the head chef. 

They serve six different side dishes. 
 

Grilled fish. 

Korean rice is delicious! 

 
Doenjang-jjigae (Soybean paste stew). 

 
Rice mixed into the soup.

 Korean Beef Bibimbap—the meat was covered by the egg, so I missed the shot. 
 

Spicy stir-fried squid and rice cakes. 

 
The brother on the right is also a chef. 

The menu.


Makan Chicken & Noodle Besides the main spot south of the Masjid, Makan has another place to the west that specializes in Korean Fried Chicken and Jajangmyeon (black bean noodles). It’s run by the same people, and the chef is a very nice uncle.


Korean Jajangmyeon—it tastes different from the Beijing version, and the noodles are a bit like Udon. 
 

 
 
The uncle on the right is the chef. 

 
The menu.
 


Eid 
 
Eid is right up there with Makan as one of the best Halal Korean spots in Seoul. The menu isn't as big as Makan’s, but the food is great.


The chef is this very efficient-looking sister. 

Samgyetang (Ginseng chicken soup). 

Three types of side dishes.
 

 
 Braised chicken—the rice cakes inside are amazing.



Hajj 
 
There’s another Halal Korean spot east of the Masjid run by a Korean auntie. She’s very welcoming but has a very thick accent in English. I originally wanted Bibimbap, but she ended up making me spicy dried fish fried rice, so I’m not quite sure how her traditional Korean dishes taste.
 



Itaewon at sunset.
 


Yanggood
 
 This is the only Halal Korean BBQ spot in Seoul, located in Gangnam. It’s always busy, mostly with Muslims who’ve heard great things about it. I ordered my favorite lamb chops. A sister there grills them for you so you don’t have to do a thing. They’re delicious dipped in the sweet and spicy sauce. Having a bowl of hot soybean stew with rice and some kimchi really warmed me up.
 



There are many other Middle Eastern Halal spots in Itaewon as well. 
 
 

 
Plus, there are a few other cool places in Seoul I didn't discover until later—I'll just have to save those for the next trip, Insha'Allah.
 
  view all

 In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

Given that many people still do not understand the relationship between the Huímín and the Huízú, I feel it is necessary to share some basic knowledge.

People who believe in Islam are called Muslims. So where do the terms Huímín and Huízú come from? Historically, Islam in China wasn't called Islam; it was called Huìjiào (the Hui Religion). Those who believed in Islam were called Huìjiàotú (followers of the Hui Religion) or Huímín (the Hui people). In modern times, these Huímín were then designated as a minority ethnic group—the Huízú (Hui ethnicity). This is why people often get them confused.

From Dàshí Fǎ to Huìjiào

For a very long time, Islam was known as Huìjiào, which is connected to the history of how it came to China. According to historical records, Islam entered China in the second year of the Yonghui reign of the Tang Dynasty (651 CE). It first came to the capital, Chang'an, via the Silk Road, and to Guangzhou via the Maritime Silk Road. The Muslims who came to China at that time were mainly Arabs and Persians, though the Persians were also under Arab rule for a time. The Arabs were called the "Dàshí," and so in the Tang Dynasty, people sometimes called Islam "Dàshí Fǎ" (the Law of the Dashi).

"Dàshí Fǎ" was simple and clear: the law that the Dashi people believed in. The Tang Dynasty also used place names for other religions. For example, when Christianity came to China, it was once called "Dàqín Jǐngjiào." Dàqín was their name for Rome, and "Jǐngjiào" referred to a particular branch of Christianity (the Church of the East). They left behind a stone tablet in Zhouzhi, Shaanxi, called the "Stele on the Propagation of Dàqín Jǐngjiào in China."

When the Mongols ruled China, they also ruled over Central Asia, West Asia, and parts of Europe. The Mongol Empire included many regions in Central Asia, West Asia, and Southeastern Europe, all of which became its territories. The people of this vast empire were no longer held back by borders and could travel much more freely. Some Muslims came to inland China as soldiers for the garrisons, while others came for politics or business. As a result, a large number of foreign Muslims flowed into inland China.

During the Yuan Dynasty, a large portion of the foreign population was made up of the "Huíhuí" people. The term Huíhuí referred to the people from the Khwarazmian Empire and Eastern Iran. "Khwarazm" was once translated as the Huíhuí Country. The Huíhuí Country did not refer to the Arabian Peninsula; at that time, the Arabian Peninsula was translated as "Tiānfāng Guó" (the country of the Heavenly House, i.e., the Ka'bah). In the Tang Dynasty, there were more Arab Muslims in China, so people called their religion "Dàshí Fǎ." By the Yuan Dynasty, more Muslims were coming from the Huíhuí Country, so people started calling their religion "Huíhuíjiào" or simply "Huìjiào."

This is a bit like today, when some Muslim women in the interior of China wear headscarves and long robes. Many people don't know where they're from and think their clothing looks like that of people from Xinjiang, so they just assume they are from Xinjiang. If this misunderstanding keeps going, they might start saying they follow the "Xinjiang religion." The situation back then was similar. A large number of Huíhuí people appeared in the interior, and the religion they followed became known as "Huíhuíjiào." Even if local Han Chinese people converted to this religion, others would mistakenly call them "Huíhuí" as well.

You see the same thing in Malaysia. Because the Malay people are Muslims, the Chinese there sometimes call Islam the "Malay Religion." This is exactly what happened in the Yuan Dynasty. Since the Huíhuí people from Khwarazm all followed this religion, people called it the Huíhuí religion. And when Han people in the interior converted, they were also called "Huíhuí people."

Because people had a hard time telling the different foreign groups apart, for a while they called everyone who came from the West "Huíhuí." Later, as they learned to distinguish better, they called the Gypsies Luōlǐ Huíhuí, the Ossetians Lǜjīng Huíhuí (Green-eyed Huíhuí), the Jews Lánmào Huíhuí (Blue-capped Huíhuí), and the Christians Shízì Huíhuí (Cross Huíhuí).

Eventually, people's understanding became clearer. They started to only call followers of Islam Huíhuí, since, after all, they were the most numerous. In time, they became the main group associated with the name and came to monopolize it. Huíhuí came to mean a person who believes in Islam, and Huìjiào came to mean only Islam, not Judaism or Christianity.

The Sinicization of the Huíhuí People

Although Islam was called Huìjiào in China for a time, Islam is a universal religion; it’s not just for the Huíhuí people. So after it spread to the Han areas, many Han Chinese people accepted the faith. Because the Huíhuí were the main group practicing this religion, people also started calling the Han converts Huíhuí. By the Ming Dynasty, the Han Chinese had regained control of the government. To speed up ethnic integration, Ming law forbade foreign populations from marrying only among themselves; it required the Huíhuí and Mongols to intermarry with the Han. Intermarriage with the Han people accelerated the Sinicization of these foreign groups, and all the ethnicities quickly blended together. The foreign populations merged into the Huaxia nation, and it became difficult to tell who was originally Chinese and who was not.

The Huaxia nation is called the Han people, named after the Han Dynasty founded by Liu Bang. And who are the Han people? They are the Chinese people, the Huaxia people. The term "Han" cannot refer to Mongols, nor to Turkic peoples, nor to Tibetans. Even if Inner Mongolia, the Turkic lands, and Tibet are ruled by China, it is wrong to call Tibetans "Han," and it is wrong to call Turkic peoples "Han." They are not Han, and so they are not part of the Huaxia nation.

The Huaxia nation is not a strictly racial concept. The ancient Huaxia people were the residents of the Central Plains. As the Huaxia civilization expanded, it absorbed the Yue people of the south and the Hu peoples of the north. The Han people have continuously absorbed foreign populations, turning other ethnic groups into new Han people. In the Han mindset, Huaxia is a land of culture and etiquette, while foreigners are barbarians. When barbarians entered the Central Plains, as long as they accepted Huaxia culture and teachings, they could become students of Confucius and Mencius, citizens of Huaxia, and they were no longer considered barbarians. In this way, anyone who moved into Han areas, spoke the Chinese language, and adopted a Han surname was gradually Sinicized and became Han, no longer a foreigner.

During the Tang Dynasty, some foreign Muslims who came to China were quickly Sinicized. They took part in the imperial examinations and became government officials, like Li Shunxuan, who was of Persian origin. By the Yuan Dynasty, even more foreign Muslims poured into China. They married Han women, took Han surnames, spoke Chinese, wrote Chinese characters, wore Han clothing, and ate Han food. They were quickly Sinicized into new Han people. Mr. Chen Yuan wrote a book called A Study of the Sinicization of People from the Western Regions in the Yuan Dynasty, which discusses this very process. Sinicization means becoming Han, definitely not becoming Mongol or Manchu. By the Ming Dynasty, the Sinicization of foreign populations happened even faster. Because they were required to intermarry with the Han, their foreign bloodlines were quickly diluted. Their descendants had a large amount of Han blood and eventually blended completely into the Han people. The Han people thus include both the native Han and the Sinicized Han. The native Han are the indigenous people who have always lived here. The Sinicized Han are the foreign groups who have continuously merged into the Han people. For example, throughout history, many peoples like the Xianbei, Tangut, Jie, Qiang, Di, Jurchen, and Khitan settled in China, intermarried with the Han, and gradually assimilated, becoming new Han people. Their surnames, like "Murong," "Dongfang," and "Ouyang," all became part of the collection of Han surnames. The same happened with Arabs, Persians, and the Huíhuí people. When they came to China, they also began to marry Han women, take Han surnames, wear Han clothing, and speak Chinese. They too were soon Sinicized and became new Han people.

To give you an example, the people of North Africa were not originally Arabs; they were Berbers, Copts, Sudanese, Somalis, and so on. After the Arabs conquered these regions, the local people were rapidly Arabized, and they all eventually became Arabs.

The Han people are the same. The Dashi and Persians who came to China in the Tang and Song dynasties, and the Turkic and Huíhuí people who came in the Yuan dynasty, were all Sinicized into new Han people, just like the Xianbei and Xiongnu before them. But even after becoming Han, they held on to their Islamic faith. Because Islam was called Huìjiào, and believers were called Huíhuí, their ethnic identity became Huaxia, became Han, but their religious identity was Huìjiàotú (followers of the Hui Religion), or Huímín (people of the Hui Religion).

Chán Huí and Hàn Huí

The Great Qing Empire occupied the Han lands, and the Chinese people became subjects in their own land. The Qing also occupied the Turkic lands, Mongolia, and Tibet. During the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, Xinjiang was brought into the Qing Empire's territory. Then, the believers of Huìjiào were not just Han people anymore; Turkic peoples were now among them. Since the Turkic peoples also followed Huìjiào, they were naturally also called Huíhuí. So how did they distinguish between the Turkic Huíhuí and the Huíhuí of the Han lands? The government and historical texts called the Huíhuí of the Han lands "Shú Huí" (Assimilated Hui) or "Hàn Huí" (Han Hui), while the Huíhuí from the Turkic regions were called "Shēng Huí" (Unassimilated Hui) or "Chán Huí" (Turban-wearing Hui).

The people of Xinjiang also followed Huìjiào and had a custom of wrapping their heads in turbans, so they were called Chán Huí. This is why Xinjiang was also called Huíjiāng (the Hui Frontier) or Huíbù (the Hui Region). The followers of Huìjiào in the Han lands, on the other hand, were no different from ordinary Han people except for their religion. They didn't wear turbans but wore the queue hairstyle, they didn't speak Uyghur but spoke Chinese, and so they were called Hàn Huí.

Huíhuí refers to a follower of Huìjiào. Anyone who believes in Huìjiào can be called a Huíhuí. Besides the Hàn Huí, Dai people who became Muslim were called "Dǎi Huí," Tibetans who became Muslim were called "Zàng Huí," Mongols who became Muslim were called "Méng Huí," and Bai people who became Muslim were called "Bái Huí."

When Buddhism came to China, it influenced three main areas, forming what we know as Han Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Southern (Theravada) Buddhism. When Islam came to China, it influenced at least two main areas: the Turkic lands and the Han lands. The believers in the Turkic lands were Turkic Muslims, and the believers in the Han lands were Han Muslims. Using the historical terms, one group was the Chán Huí, and the other was the Hàn Huí. The Chán Huí are the Turkic Muslims, and the Hàn Huí are the Han Muslims.

The term Huíhuí at first meant people from Khwarazm, but later it came to refer to all followers of Huìjiào. Whether they were Turkic followers or Han followers, Chán Huí or Hàn Huí, they were all Huíhuí (followers of the Hui Religion), or Huímín (people of the Hui Religion).

A Huíhuí is a follower of Huìjiào, and these followers come from many ethnic backgrounds. Anyone who embraces Huìjiào (Islam) is a Huíhuí (Muslim). But embracing Huìjiào and becoming a Huímín doesn't mean your ethnicity changes. You can't say that believing in Huìjiào makes you a Khwarazmian, or an Iranian, or a Dashi person; that’s impossible. Just as believing in Christianity doesn't make you an Italian or a Roman, and believing in Buddhism doesn't make you an Indian or a Nepalese. As a Han person, if you embrace Huìjiào, you are still a Han person. But because Islam was called Huìjiào, if you believe in it, you are called a Huímín. But even as a Huímín, you are a Han Huímín. The term Huímín shows they are people of the Huìjiào faith; it doesn't mean they've changed their ethnicity and become foreigners. They are still Han people, just the Huímín among the Han. So even if they are Huíhuí, they are Hàn Huíhuí.

So what is a Hàn Huíhuí? To put it simply, it's a Han person who believes in Huìjiào. Who are the Hàn Huíhuí? The Muslims in the Han lands are basically all Hàn Huíhuí. As Han people migrated to Xinjiang, a large number of Hàn Huí went there too, and their customs are completely different from those of the local Muslims.

Even if someone's research shows that a certain family's ancestors were Persian, or Jewish, or Uyghur, we don't deny that. But what I want to say is this: ancestors are ancestors, and they are who they are today. Their ancestors may have been Arabs or Persians, but they are Han people now. Their ancestors were Sinicized and became Han within a few generations, so of course they are Han people too.

So why do people usually just say they are Huíhuí and not put "Hàn" in front of it? It's because in the past, China was a Han country. Everyone was Han, so was there really a need to specifically point out your Han identity? Take Christians, for example. Do they need to call themselves "Han Christians"? Do Buddhists need to emphasize that they are "Han Buddhists"? Even during the Qing Dynasty, after Xinjiang became part of the country, the interior was still a Han region, filled with Han people. When everyone is in the Han lands, do you need to go out of your way to stress your Han identity? It’s like if your surname is Li and my surname is also Li. When the Li brothers are together, do they need to spell out which member of the Li family each one is?

A Han Christian only needs to specify that they are a Han Christian when they meet a Naxi Christian, a Dai Christian, or a Jingpo Christian. A Buddhist only needs to specify they follow Han Buddhism when they meet a Tibetan Buddhist or a Southern Buddhist. The term Hàn Huí is really only useful when you put it next to Chán Huí, to show the difference between the two.

Huíhuí means a follower of the Huìjiào religion. A Hàn Huí is a Han follower of Huìjiào, or to put it plainly, a Han person who believes in Islam. Apart from their religious practices, they are no different from ordinary Han people. But some people think Huíhuí is a separate ethnicity, the Hui ethnicity. This is as absurd as saying Buddhists are an ethnicity—the "Buddhist ethnicity." The Hàn Huí of the Han lands and ordinary Han people only have a religious difference, not an ethnic one. And having a different religion doesn't mean you belong to a different ethnicity. For example, a Lebanese Arab doesn't stop being an Arab just because he converts to Christianity. In the same way, a Han person doesn't stop being Han just because he believes in Huìjiào.

The Four Common Characteristics

The standard for defining ethnicities in China is often based on the four commonalities proposed by Stalin: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up. If you measure the Huímín of the Han lands by these four points, you’ll find they share the exact same four characteristics as ordinary Han people, which is enough to prove that they are, in fact, the same people.

First, let's look at common language. The inland Huíhuí have spoken Chinese since ancient times; they share a common mother tongue with ordinary Han people. Some people claim their mother tongue is Arabic, but that's nonsense. Which group of Huíhuí has Arabic as their mother tongue? The Huíhuí of Hainan? The Huíhuí of the Northwest? None of them. Even the first Muslims who came to China—be they Arabs, Persians, or Jews—all started speaking Chinese after they arrived. They had no single, unified language other than Chinese. Their descendants all speak Chinese. Chinese is the common language they share with ordinary Han people.

Some might say that while they speak Chinese, it's mixed with a lot of foreign words, a dialect called "Jingtangyu" (scripture hall language). But Jingtangyu isn't a separate language. It's just Chinese with some religious vocabulary mixed in; it's still Chinese. It's like Buddhists, who might use some Sanskrit loanwords in their daily speech, like "Fótuó" (Buddha), "Pútí" (Bodhi), "Fútú" (Stupa), "Chànà" (instant), or "Jiénàn" (calamity). You wouldn't say they aren't speaking Chinese because of that.

Others claim that "Xiao'erjing" is the common language of the Chinese Huímín. That’s also nonsense. Xiao'erjing is just a way of writing Chinese sounds using the Arabic script, used by some Muslims in the Northwest. They are still writing Chinese. At most, Xiao'erjing is a phonetic system for Chinese, not a language in itself.

The Huíhuí and ordinary Han people share a common territory: the Han lands, the areas of the Han people. All Hàn Huíhuí live in the Han lands and wherever Han migrants have settled. Take Xinjiang, for instance. When Han migrants moved there, Huíhuí appeared there too, because the Huíhuí among the Han people also moved there. Or the Northeast; during the great migration period, Han people went to the Northeast, and the Huíhuí among them went as well. In minority regions, where there are fewer Han people, there are fewer Huíhuí among them. Tibet is a Tibetan region, so very few Huíhuí went there. Why? Because there were few Han migrants, and so the number of Huíhuí among them was also small. Where there are Han people, there are Huíhuí; where there are no Han people, there are no Huíhuí. Therefore, the Huíhuí and ordinary Han people share a common territory: the Han lands and the places where Han migrants have gone.

The inland Hàn Huíhuí and ordinary Han people share a common economic life. For example, in an agrarian society, everyone farms. In the cities, they do business. In pastoral areas, they herd livestock. In Xinjiang, they are part of the production and construction corps.

They also share a common psychological make-up with ordinary Han people. They have the same sense of national identity and belonging as ordinary Han people. They are unwavering in their support for one China, which is different from their Uyghur compatriots. The Huímín who moved to Xinjiang deeply despise separatists. They are of one heart with the Han people and staunchly support the Han government, seeing the Han rulers as their own people. This is enough to prove that their psychological make-up is the same as that of the Han. Because they share a common ethnic foundation with the Han, the Uyghur people call this group of Huíhuí people "Dungan."

In the eyes of the Uyghurs, a Dungan is a Han person who believes in Islam. Some say the word means "East Bank," because the Huímín came from the east. Others say it means "Eastern Han," and still others say "Tong Han" (connected with the Han). The term "Tong Han" is very fitting. "Huí rén tōng Hàn" (Hui people connected with the Han) seems to capture both the sound and the meaning well. Their hearts are truly connected with the ordinary Han people, which is why they hope the Han will govern Xinjiang and do not want to see it split away.

More Than Just Four Common Points

They share common surnames with the Han people: "Zhao, Qian, Sun, Li, Zhou, Wu, Zheng, Wang..." Their surnames are Zhang, Liu, Han, Wei, Huang, Sun, Kong, and so on. These are all Han surnames; they rarely have other kinds of surnames. For example, the late scholar Jian Bozan had the surname "Jian," which is a Uyghur surname and has been identified as such. The surnames of the Huíhuí are no different from those of the Han. Although a few of these surnames came from Arabic or Persian, they have been Sinicized to fit the pattern of Han surnames. The given names of the Huíhuí are even more filled with Han character. For instance, women often have names like "Fengxian," "Shuxian," "Xiulan," and "Yulan," while men have names like "Ma Hualong," "Ma Rulong," "Du Wenxiu," "Ma Wanfu," "Ma Fuxiang," "Ma Qi," and "Ma Lin," all of which are typically Han in style.

They share a common architectural style with the Han people. Their mosques have decorative roof ridges (wǔjǐ liùshòu), coiling dragons and phoenixes, inscribed plaques, couplets, and stone tortoise pedestals (bìxì)—all of these are the same. Many mosques have a treasure vase ornament instead of a crescent moon. The only difference is that there are no idols inside the main prayer hall. Han people like to place an idol in the center of an alcove. Han people who believe in Islam often feel that something should be placed there, so they put winding Arabic calligraphy in the center, feeling that praying towards that spot gives them more peace of mind. Strictly speaking, this is not appropriate.

They share common eating habits with ordinary Han people. The Huíhuí in the north love noodles, while those in the south prefer rice. In the Central Plains, the Huíhuí enjoy "zhēngwǎn" (steamed bowls of meat), where meat is first fried and then steamed. The steamed bowl is a classic Han dish; Arabs, Persians, and Central Asians don't have this custom. This is all part of the culture of Islam in the Han lands. Just as there is an Arab Islamic culture, a Persian Islamic culture, a Turkic Islamic culture, and a Malay Islamic culture, there is also a Han Islamic culture. When Islam came to the Han lands, the great Han nation embraced it and created a great Han Islamic culture with its own unique Han characteristics.

In matters of marriage and funerals, the Huíhuí are also similar to other Han people. They place great importance on continuing the family line and still keep family genealogies. At funerals, the eldest son leads the mourning rituals. At weddings, they have the custom of teasing the newlyweds (nàodòngfáng). In Xi'an, the custom of testing a bride's virginity still exists; they spread a white handkerchief on the bed on the wedding night. When a baby is born, they cook red-dyed eggs. In the past, their women also practiced foot-binding. After a person passes away, they observe anniversaries, the day of death, the fortieth day, and the one-hundredth day. After a death, scriptures are recited for dozens of days. Han people hire Buddhist monks to recite scriptures; the Hàn Huí hire an Ahong (Imam) to recite scriptures. In both cases, money is given after the recitation is done. Christians, not having been Sinicized in this way, do not have this custom. When there is a death, the Huímín of Xi'an perform a ritual of balancing the Qur'an on their head (dǐng jīng), which is almost identical to the Han custom of balancing a basin on the head (dǐng pén), except that other Han people have to smash the basin afterwards, while the Huímín balance a plate and circle with the scripture, pretending to give charity. Historically, the bodies of the Huíhuí were carried in a sedan chair. On the sedan chair, there was a dragon. If the deceased was a man, the dragon had a beard; if it was a woman, it was a beardless female dragon. Their folk beliefs include a belief in dragons, in possession by spirits, and in the idea that those who commit suicide cannot report to Allah but instead wander with the stars and moon. These are all Han folk beliefs.

They have a common cultural and recreational life. The Huíhuí in the eastern regions enjoy traditional operas like Henan opera, Qinqiang, and Peking opera. Those in the western regions enjoy "Hua'er" folk songs. Whether it's Peking opera, Qinqiang, or Hua'er, these are all forms of Han entertainment. The Huíhuí also practice martial arts, or gongfu, which is a traditional Han way of strengthening the body. The founder of Tai Chi came from Chenjiagou village, and Muslims with the surname Chen consider themselves part of that lineage. The techniques of Xinyi Liuhe Quan were also created and passed down by the Han. Some martial arts styles were modified by Muslims, such as Chaquan and Tangping Qishi, but the forms are still Han-style. All of these characteristics are no different from those of ordinary Han people. The only difference is that they believe in Huìjiào. After converting, they were influenced by the religion, and some of their customs changed. In their diet, although they no longer eat forbidden foods, their cooking methods are still Chinese. The inland Huímín do not make pilaf or roasted baozi.

From Huíhuí to the Huí Ethnicity

The religion of Islam was called Huìjiào, and its followers were the Huíhuí. So, what should we call the Han Chinese who convert to Islam today (new Muslims)? Can they still be called Huíhuí? If Huíhuí means Muslim, then anyone who believes in Islam is a Huíhuí. The Han Chinese who are converting to Islam now are, of course, also Huíhuí. They are new Huíhuí, new Hàn Huí. After some Han people accept Islam, their mindset becomes even more "Huíhuí" than the old Huíhuí.

Now that we've talked about the Huímín, let's discuss the Huí ethnicity (Huízú). The idea of a "Hui ethnicity" is linked to the Japanese. The Japanese wanted to divide China. First, they split off Manchuria. Manchuria was the homeland of the Manchu people, and the Japanese manipulated Puyi to establish the state of Manchukuo. They also supported Mongolian independence. The Mongols were never Han people, and they had been occupied by the Qing state. Since the Qing had fallen, they sought their independence. Beyond this, the Japanese came up with a new idea: to establish a Huíhuí state. The theory behind this was that the Huíhuí people were not Chinese and should separate from China. This Huíhuí state they imagined was not Xinjiang, because the plan for Xinjiang at the time was to establish a Turkic state. They were referring to the Huímín of the Han lands. These people had always called themselves Huíhuí, so the Japanese seized on this, saying that the Huíhuí were not Han but a foreign people who should therefore form their own independent country. The Japanese promoted this idea of a Huíhuí state and spread a lot of propaganda, but it didn't work. Later, this viewpoint was adopted by the authorities in Yan'an. They said that the followers of Huìjiào in inland China were not Han people, but the Huíhuí ethnicity, and that the Huíhuí ethnicity did not belong to the Chinese nation, so they shouldn't be part of the Republic of China but should establish a Huíhuí Republic instead. The Party at one point encouraged all Huíhuí to break away from China and form another country. But the Huíhuí themselves didn't think this way; they had always considered themselves Chinese. But the Party didn't see them as Han. It stripped them of their Han identity and treated them as a separate ethnicity, the Huíhuí ethnicity, or Huízú for short.

It's worth noting that the term Huízú had appeared before. In Qing Dynasty historical books, the term Huízú shows up occasionally, but it didn't mean an ethnicity in the modern sense. It basically referred to the community of Huìjiào followers, similar to how we might say the "car-owning crowd" today; they were the "Huìjiào crowd." Dr. Sun Yat-sen once proposed the concept of a "Republic of Five Races," which included the Han, Hui, Manchu, Tibetan, and Mongol peoples. But the "Hui" he was talking about did not refer to the followers of Huìjiào in the interior; it referred to the Turkic people of Xinjiang. Since the Turkic people of Xinjiang followed Huìjiào, Xinjiang was also called Huíjiāng, and the Turkic people were also called the Huízú. The Huízú Dr. Sun mentioned were them. So, to be precise, the five races were the Han, Turkic, Manchu, Tibetan, and Mongol, while the followers of Huìjiào in the interior were considered Han people at that time.

Later, the government classified the Turkic and Tajik peoples into six separate ethnic groups, and the Hui ethnicity had nothing to do with them. The government designated the Hàn Huíhuí of the interior as the Hui ethnicity. This required two conditions: first, you had to be a follower of Huìjiào, and second, you had to be a Chinese-speaking Han person. Those who believed in Huìjiào but didn't speak Chinese, like the Dongxiang people who speak the Dongxiang language, or the Salar people of Xunhua who speak the Salar language, were classified as the Dongxiang and Salar ethnicities, not as Hui. And you couldn't be Hui if you spoke Chinese but didn't believe in Islam. For example, the descendants of Muslims in Chendai (in Jinjiang) and Baiqi (in Hui'an) were not classified as Hui because, although their ancestors were Muslims, they themselves were not. It wasn't until after 1979 that their classification was changed to Hui. That happened much later. Even today, that part of the Hui ethnicity does not practice Islam and is no different from ordinary Han people.

The Hui ethnicity was created by separating the Han followers of Huìjiào from the rest of the Han people. When this was done, the Hui ethnicity was made up of followers of Huìjiào; they all believed in Islam. But after seventy years of atheistic education, many no longer believe in Islam. As a result, there is now a portion of non-Muslims within the Hui ethnicity. Adding to that the descendants of non-practicing Muslims on the southeast coast who were later classified as Hui, you have a situation like in Quanzhou, where there are two hundred thousand ethnic Hui, almost none of whom practice Islam. So, to be precise, the Hui is not an ethnicity that universally believes in Islam.

The original Hui ethnicity came from Han people who believed in Islam. As for the Hui ethnicity today, you can only say that a part of them believes in Islam, a part believes in Christianity, a part believes in Buddhism, and another part believes in atheism. The Hui are descendants of Muslims, but they are not all Muslims. If you want an accurate definition, the Hui ethnicity is composed of the descendants of Chinese-speaking Muslims.

The Hui people are, in fact, Han people. They speak Chinese, write Chinese characters, have Han surnames, and are no different from ordinary Han people. Their ancestors were either originally Han, or they were Sinicized Han. A portion of the Hui people's ancestors were foreigners, but after coming to China, they were quickly Sinicized and became Han. It’s just like how after the Arabs conquered North Africa, the original Berber, Sudanese, and Somali peoples were quickly assimilated by the Arabs and became new Arabs.

Let's review the difference between these three terms: Huìjiào, Huímín, and Huízú. Huìjiào is the old Chinese name for Islam; it refers to the religion of Islam. In China, there are two large groups of people who follow Huìjiào. There are twenty million followers of Huìjiào (Muslims) in China. Of these, ten million are Han people, and the other ten million are Turkic peoples. The Turkic peoples are divided into six ethnic groups. The Han Muslims were designated as the Huíhuí ethnicity. In addition, there is a very small number from the Mongol, Tibetan, Manchu, Dai, and Bai ethnic groups.

Huímín means the people of the Huìjiào faith; it refers to people who believe in Islam. Who are the Huímín? If Huímín means Muslim, then all Muslims are Huímín. By that logic, Saudi Muslims are Huímín, Malay Muslims are Huímín, Indian Muslims are Huímín, and Turkish Muslims are Huímín. All these countries would be Huímín countries.

And the Huízú is a group of people that the Chinese government separated from the Han population. The difference between them and ordinary Han people is their belief in Islam. But since a portion of the Hui people no longer believe in Islam, it is more accurate to say that the Hui ethnicity consists of the descendants of Han Muslims, rather than Han Muslims themselves.

Islam is a religion for all people, not just for the Hui people. Even if all Hui people were practicing Muslims, they would only be one part of the global Muslim community. This is not to mention that a significant number of people in the Hui ethnicity do not practice Islam. Therefore, we should not equate the Hui ethnicity with Muslims.

The Hui ethnicity comes from the Han people, but these ten million Han people are not considered Han; their Han identity has been taken from them, even though they speak Chinese, write Chinese characters, and have Han surnames. They are no different from ordinary Han people. The only difference is their belief in Islam. If they were to leave Islam, there would be no difference at all between them and ordinary Han people. Of course, once an ordinary Han person accepts Islam, they become no different from a Han follower of Huìjiào. This is because they are originally the same people. The tragedy is that after this group of people was stripped of their Han identity, they started to believe they really weren't Han. They forgot their own compatriots, stopped interacting with their relatives, and stopped spreading the message of Islam to ordinary Han people. The authorities' policy of catering to them was warmly embraced by this group. They legitimately took on the identity of a foreign population, contentedly became second-class citizens, and stopped seeing themselves as descendants of the Chinese people, as children of the legendary ancestors Yan and Huang. They really began to think of themselves as sojourners, as Arabs or Persians.

In the beginning, a few Italian missionaries came to China to spread Catholicism. If Catholics today naively believed they were Italian, that would be absurd. In the beginning, some Arabs and Persians did come to China, but they were quickly Sinicized and became Han, and their descendants were all Han. Yet now, the descendants of this group are shouting that they are Arabs or Persians and denying that they are Han. This is just as absurd and laughable as Catholics claiming they are Italian.

This group displays strong nationalistic tendencies. At every turn, they emphasize how different they are from others, that they are a separate category, not ordinary Chinese, not ordinary Han. They oppose the Han in every respect and deliberately avoid anything that seems similar to Han culture. Things that have already become habit, they don't mention. For example, terms like "sì" (temple), "wúcháng" (impermanence), "jiàomén" (religious community), and "qīngjìng" (pure and clean) were originally Buddhist terms. Terms like "Tiānjīng" (heavenly scripture), "Tiānfáng" (house of heaven/Ka'bah), "Tiānkè" (heavenly tax/zakat), "Tiānmìng" (mandate of heaven), and "Tiānqǐ" (heavenly revelation) also have a Han cultural flavor. They use these words without a second thought, assuming they were always Huíhuí terms. But if a word wasn't used in the past and hasn't become a habit, they will fiercely oppose it. For example, if a Muslim refers to Allah as "Tiān" (Heaven) or "Shàngdì" (Lord on High), they will say it is a great heresy, an act of apostasy, and an imitation of the Han. Yet they turn a blind eye to the fact that their own speech is entirely in the Han language. We are originally Han people, so how can we be "imitating"? We are simply carrying on the customs of our own nation.

Nearly all the mosques in the Han lands are built in a temple-like style, no different from the religious architecture of ordinary Han people. But now, mosques must be built in a Byzantine style to distinguish them from ordinary Han architecture. Also, it’s fine for a mosque to hang couplets—even though this is a Han custom, they have come to see it as their own. But if a family hangs couplets at home, that's not acceptable; that's imitating the Han. Then there are those who nitpick over words. For instance, you can't say "féi" (fat), you must say "zhuàng" (stout); you can't say "tián" (sweet), you must say "xián" (savory); you can't say "sǐ" (die), you must say "mò" (pass away); you can't say "shā" (kill), you must say "zǎi" (slaughter for consumption). The truth is, even if you say "mò," it's still a Chinese word. But even so, they must be different from the habits of ordinary Han people. Deliberately drawing lines and creating differences—this is a classic feature of nationalism.

Our non-Muslim compatriots are part of the same nation; we are all Han people. If you must divide the Han people into two types, you could divide them by region into southern Han and northern Han, because there are indeed significant differences between southerners and northerners. If you divide them by faith, you can also split them into two types: ordinary Han and Muslim Han. Ordinary Han people do not follow a single religion, while Muslim Han people believe in Islam. Other than that, there is no difference between us.

Common Slips of the Tongue

Ordinary Han people are our compatriots, and we are Han people too. That being the case, we should correct some mistakes we often make in our speech. Many people say that the development of Islam depends on the Hui ethnicity, that the Hui ethnicity is the vehicle for the development of Islam in China. This is nonsense. The history of the Hui ethnicity is only sixty or seventy years long. Before that, Islam had been spreading in the Han lands of China for over a thousand years. Who was responsible for spreading Islam then? It was the Huímín, not the Huízú. And the Huímín were the Han people who had embraced Islam, the Hàn Huímín, the Hàn Huíhuí. In other words, it was the Han people who carried Islam in China.

Others say that to develop Islam, we must first improve the character of the Hui ethnicity, because, after all, developing Islam in China relies on the Hui. This is also nonsense. To develop Islam, you just need Muslims. In the Han lands, you need Han Muslims. Rely on the Hui ethnicity? Are all Hui people Muslims? The two hundred thousand Hui in Quanzhou no longer practice Islam—can you rely on them? A Han person who has embraced Islam is just as reliable. So, who do we rely on to develop Islam? On Muslims, that's enough. And if you must ask which ethnicity's Muslims, then of course it must be Han Muslims. You might say we rely on the Hui ethnicity, but the Hui ethnicity is, in fact, Han people who believe in Islam.

Someone once introduced a seeker to me and said, "You should teach him more about Islam; he is Han." I replied, "Does being Han mean he must learn about Islam? Who here isn't Han? I am also Han. We speak the Chinese language, have Han surnames, have Han faces, wear Han clothes, and write Chinese characters. In what way am I not Han? You tell me." Am I not of the Hui ethnicity? Yes! But that is because others have stripped you of your ethnic identity, so you became "Hui," and you are no longer seen as Han. But in reality, you are still Han.

I've never seen a Christian introduce a friend by saying, "Here, this person is Han, tell him about Christianity!" Never. Everyone is Han, so why the need to emphasize it?

When we approach religion with a preconceived ethnic bias, we fall into a trap. When you deliberately emphasize a non-Muslim's Han identity, it shows that you have already accepted the stripping of your own identity and agreed with the way others have classified you. The implication is that you are not Han, which means you consent to this classification—and this classification is wrong. We have been Han people since ancient times, for generations, descendants of Yan and Huang. When others take away your Han identity, do you really start to believe you are not Han? If you're not Han, then what are you? An Arab? A Persian? Do you believe that yourself? A member of the Hui ethnicity? By that logic, if you believe in Buddhism, are you of the "Buddhist ethnicity"? If you believe in Taoism, do you become of the "Taoist ethnicity"?

Someone once asked me, "Teacher, our school doesn't have halal meals. Can we eat 'Hàn cān' (Han food)?" We are all Han people. Isn't all the food we eat 'Hàn cān'? What does he mean by 'Hàn cān'? He means non-halal food. But isn't a meal cooked by a Han Muslim a halal meal? It is wrong to use an ethnic concept to define what is halal and what is not. A meal cooked by a Han person is Hàn cān. If he believes in Islam, the meal he cooks is naturally a halal meal—a halal Hàn cān. If a member of the Hui ethnicity eats pork, then even if he cooks a "Huí cān" (Hui meal), you cannot eat it, because it is a non-halal Huí cān.

We cannot let the term "Hui ethnicity" be used to bind Muslims, to bind Islam, because Islam is not just for the Hui; Islam is for all of humanity. To whom should we spread the message of Islam? Not to "the Han people." I have never emphasized preaching to the Han people. I emphasize preaching to those outside the faith, meaning to non-Muslims. There are many non-Muslims, and quite a few of them are within the Hui ethnicity. Are all Han people non-Muslims? No, there are Muslims among the Han. How many? Ten million. And those who are now called the Hui ethnicity—are they not all Han Muslims? To whom do we preach? To all non-Muslims, to the sons and daughters of Huaxia, to the one-point-three billion Chinese people—not just to "the Han ethnicity." The Han people already include many Muslims; they cannot be seen as a group of non-Muslims. These are the common mistakes we must be mindful of.

We must be especially careful with our words. Some people are quick to say, "we Hui people do this," and "you Han people do that," or "we can't intermarry with you Han people," and so on. When they talk like this, they have already put a label on Islam, unconsciously treating it as the exclusive property of a certain ethnicity. For example, someone might say, "Muslims cannot intermarry with other ethnicities." This statement is completely wrong. What is an "other ethnicity"? Is the Han ethnicity an "other ethnicity" and the Hui an "inner ethnicity"? Ten million Han people in China have embraced Islam; are they still an "other ethnicity"? Islam makes no distinction between inner and outer ethnicities; anyone can believe in Islam. Islam is a world religion; you will find it among all peoples. Therefore, statements like "we must preach to the Han ethnicity," "we need to develop Han Muslims," "we cannot marry Han people," or "we must not imitate the Han"—all of these are driven by a nationalistic mindset, and these are the things we must be careful about. view all

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.


When a person spends a long time in a place without freedom, like a mental institution or a prison, they lose their independence and develop deficiencies in their ability to survive in society.

This is the sickness of institutionalization.

People who are institutionalized for a long time develop mental health problems and become dependent on the very system that harms them.

They think they are trying to survive, but in reality, they are on a path to extinction.

The reason the Huimin have been able to survive in the saline-alkali land (mainland China) until today is mainly due to a kind of cultural independence, not the sort of localized adaptation that academics often discuss.

In fertile soil, adaptation might be a good thing.

But in the saline-alkali land (mainland China), where the flower of civilization cannot blossom, adaptation will lead to one's own demise.

Therefore, the great scholar Hu Dengzhou established the Jingtang (madrasah) education, rejecting the socialization of the saline-alkali land, setting up his own schools, and using the bestowing of robes and certificates as the standard for recognizing an ahong's qualifications.

And the Huimin mosque communities would only hire ahongs who were certified according to this standard.

Regarding the authority to certify an ahong, it comes from the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) authorizing his disciples to carry on his sacred mission. In the context of the Huimin's Jingtang education, this was ritualized when a senior teacher would wrap a turban and bestow robes on his student to grant him the qualification of an ahong and the authority to begin teaching.

This authority to certify ahongs is both a matter of religious freedom and a right of a minority group.

The United Nations human rights covenants state: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."

The governments of all signatory countries have a human rights obligation in this regard.

The Huimin should rightfully defend this right of theirs.

For the Huimin to maintain their cultural independence, the most important thing is freedom.

In education, they need the autonomy to run their own schools; for an ahong's qualification, they need certification by a senior teacher according to the master-disciple tradition; and for an ahong's appointment, they need the democratic choice of the mosque community.

—All of these must exclude the interference of secular authority.

If the Huimin could have freedom in these areas, even if they cannot realize the grand vision of spreading Islam in China, they would not perish.

But now, the authorities are systematically squeezing this space for freedom.

The most vivid aspect of this squeezing of freedom is none other than the architectural imprints expressing official ideology that are forcibly added to destroyed mosques.

It tells the Huimin that they have penetrated the most central areas of their community life.

The Huimin see it every day and deeply feel its expression of power.

The Huimin have lost the freedom to express their architectural culture in this land.

And the freedom of publication and freedom of speech have also long been lost.

The state-run Islamic institutes and ahong certificates further strip freedom from Huimin society.

When the Huimin completely lose the freedom of cultural education and ahong certification, that will be the moment their spirit withers and dies, both as an ethnic group and as a religious community.

The Huimin must understand that the official ideology is incompatible with religion.

Leaving aside the few so-called "left-leaning" special periods, let's look at Document 19, which represents the era of reform and opening up; it also states—"In the history of humanity, religion is ultimately bound to disappear; however, it will only disappear naturally after the long-term development of socialism and communism, when all the objective conditions are in place."

"The figures from religious colleges are to create a corps of young religious professionals who politically love the motherland, support the Party's leadership and the socialist system, and also have considerable religious knowledge."

"The only correct and fundamental way to solve the religious problem can only be, under the premise of guaranteeing freedom of religious belief, to gradually eliminate the social and cognitive roots of religion's existence through the gradual development of socialist material and spiritual civilization."

In other words, under normal circumstances, they wait for it to disappear naturally; in special periods, they help accelerate its disappearance.

There is not much to say about this official ideology; this is just the ecosystem of the saline-alkali land (mainland China).

Everything depends on the Huimin themselves.

If they can struggle with all their might to survive, I think no one could refuse to accept the objective fact of their existence; but if they cannot survive, then for others, their disappearance is for the best.

If the Huimin do not wish to disappear, they must avoid creating the conditions for their own disappearance.

But now, we see that on the two most important rights—cultural education and the certification of ahongs—the Huimin are rushing one after another towards institutionalization.

There's a line in The Shawshank Redemption that says: "These walls are funny. First you hate 'em, then you get used to 'em. Enough time passes, you get so you depend on 'em."

As everyone lines up to march towards institutionalization, to avoid extinction, there must be a counter-institutional force.

At this moment, the spirit of the Huimin ancestors from the Cultural Revolution era must be carried on by this counter-institutional force.

They should, in every possible way, preserve the freedom of cultural education and ahong certification, so that in the saline-alkali land (mainland China), they can rely on this bit of independence in their social existence to make a flower bloom that connects the past to the future.

Mosque schools, Arabic language schools, study groups, and da'wah groups, as long as they are de-institutionalized and independent, have taken on an extraordinary significance.

They are the reality within the illusion, the embers of the revival of our Deen after a period of madness.

Allah says: "Allah will bring forth a people He will love and who will love Him, [who are] humble toward the believers, powerful against the disbelievers; they strive in the cause of Allah and do not fear the blame of a critic." (Al-Ma'idah 5:54) view all

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

I have heard that Ma Zhixiong has been imprisoned once again for printing religious books for the Huí People.

The charge against him is merely for undertaking the printing of religious books meant for circulation within the Huímín community; his actions were neither intended for profit nor did they harm public order.

However, the Ningxia police and courts have framed a case against him under the name of "illegal publications"—they found the books he printed in the local area and sentenced him to ten months in prison, which is infuriating.

The last time he was imprisoned, under the same charge, he was sentenced to five years (from April 19, 2016, to January 10, 2021). His mother passed away on a public bus while seeking justice for her son.

Looking back at history, the printing of religious literature by the Muslim community has been a vital aspect of its cultural heritage, something that was not interfered with even during the dark times of the Manchu Qing rule.

The Qur'an, books on Islam, and commentaries not only provide guidance for the faith but also construct the collective memory of the community.

Yet, today's Chinese government uses administrative measures to suppress and prohibit this kind of printing activity, treating a cultural act as "illegal," which has gone beyond the proper scope of the law.

The case of Ma Zhixiong reflects a worrying trend in national governance: using administrative controls and judicial intervention to suppress religious and cultural expression, attempting to erase the foundations of diverse cultures with a monolithic mindset, and making the fifty-six vibrant and colorful ethnic groups into uniform, bright red pomegranate seeds.

What is particularly infuriating about this case is how it demonstrates a naked challenge of rule by man against the rule of law.

The Chinese constitution explicitly guarantees citizens' freedom of speech, publication, and belief (Articles 35 and 36), and further stipulates that all ethnic groups have the right to use and develop their own spoken and written languages (Article 4).

In practice, however, these fundamental rights and principles of the rule of law, granted by the constitution, are often rendered meaningless by the arbitrary interpretations of the CCP's administrative bodies.

The printing Ma Zhixiong was involved in neither violated the spirit of the constitution, nor is there any evidence to show that his publications caused any substantial harm to society. The CCP government's actions of convicting and confiscating based on prejudice have neither justification nor legitimacy, and only reveal an abuse of power.

What is even more thought-provoking is how the "Sweep Away Pornography and Illegal Publications" campaign has been quietly extended into the realm of religion and culture.

How did a campaign that was supposed to target pornographic and illegal publications evolve into a tool for suppressing ethnic culture and eroding religious diversity?

The answer perhaps lies in an obsession with control—labeling any expression that does not conform to the official ideology of the Chinese Communist Party as "illegal" or "harmful" for the convenience of governance.

However, this logic of governance is akin to drinking poison to quench a thirst.

Culture and faith are the very foundation of a society's stability; suppressing their diversity will only lead to long-term division and conflict.

Ma Zhixiong's case is not an isolated incident, but an epitome of the oppression that the entire Muslim community has endured in recent years.

The arrest of Imam Ma Yuwei in Yuxi, Yunnan, still echoes in our minds.

Over these years, the religious and cultural activities of the Muslim communities living in mainland China have been repeatedly attacked.

The shutting down of religious printing houses and the confiscation of religious books all indicate that a systematic campaign to purge the cultural heritage of minority ethnic groups is underway.

If this trend is not stopped in time, it will ultimately lead to a repeat of the tragic history of the Cultural Revolution for the Huímín of today.

In recent years, international accusations of "cultural genocide" against China's Muslim communities have been constant, and this case undoubtedly shines a harsh light on the matter.

The ordeal of Ma Zhixiong makes one feel deeply the utter absence of the rule of law in a modern state. When power overrides the law, when individual freedom and the right to ethnic self-governance are stripped away by administrative orders, the so-called "rule of law" becomes nothing but empty talk, forcing us to live once again in the evils of the old society under the guise of its glossy, modern terminology.

Written after the second imprisonment of Ma Zhixiong. view all

In March of 2025, the heavens over Boston remained veiled in a persistent drizzle, with the sun gracing the sky only on occasion; the low temperatures, coupled with a damp chill, could not help but bring to mind the clime of Shanghai. By Allah's grace, as my wife attended her conference, Providence afforded me the opportunity to journey through Boston, and thus the disposition of the weather became a matter of little consequence. Indeed, in the days preceding my departure, a fervent anticipation led me to repeatedly consult the map, searching time and again for the keywords “masjid,” “mosque,” “muslim,” or “islam,” seeking out the Houses of Allah that I might be blessed to visit. The dense constellation of red markers that appeared upon the map bore witness to the vast and deeply vibrant Muslim ummah of Boston. As my time was decreed to be short, within the span of a two-day weekend sojourn, I was only able to make a humble visitation to seven of Boston's masjids.
 


I. The Commuter Rail

The transportation network of Boston is indeed well-developed. Depending upon one's region of origin, the journey to Boston may be undertaken by airplane, the American railway (Amtrak), motorcoach, or by one's own conveyance. Within the city itself, one finds transport by bus, subway, and the commuter rail. A single fare for the subway and bus begins at a modest $2.40, with a round trip costing $4.80; one may also procure a rechargeable Charlie Card, which is akin to the transport card of Shanghai and covers various modes of travel. The fare is determined according to the distance of the journey. A fare of $2.40 suffices for travel to the city proper and its immediate suburbs, yet for a distance comparable to that from Ren Guang to Lin Gang, the price would ascend to upwards of ten dollars. The commuter rail is a rather unique form of train, for it not only connects the northern and southern regions of the Boston area but also extends its reach to the surrounding cities, much like the intercity trains of the Pearl River Delta.

As my own city lies but forty miles distant from Boston, the Boston rail company has extended its commuter rail line to our local station, with a one-way passage requiring only $12.50. And upon every weekend, a pass for unlimited travel is made available for a mere ten dollars. When measured against the tickets of Amtrak, which can command prices from thirty to eighty dollars, the commuter rail is remarkably inexpensive. The method of verifying fares on the commuter rail is also quite elementary; travelers may board and purchase their passage, and after the train commences its journey, a conductor proceeds through the carriage to inspect each ticket individually. For those travelers whose fares are confirmed, a small slip of paper is inserted into the back of the seat ahead, signifying that the occupant seated behind it has settled their passage. I found myself harboring great doubt as to the efficiency of this method of inspection.
 


I remained deeply skeptical of the efficiency of this inspection. Perhaps it was ordained that our travel coincided with the festival of Saint Patrick; on this return journey from Boston, the carriage was filled to overflowing, yet the conductor tasked with inspecting fares never manifested. It may be that he, too, deemed inspecting an entire carriage before the next station an impossible charge. It is worthy of note that the purchase of tickets is not bound to one's name, nor is there any security screening before boarding, and upon disembarking, one finds no ticket barriers or similar apparatus. Consequently, on this particular sojourn, those who had not procured their tickets in advance were, in effect, granted free passage upon the intercity train. Does it then follow that if the conductor is negligent in his duty or turns a blind eye, the traveler is absolved of the need to purchase a fare? This conjecture was soon put to the test and affirmed during two of my other journeys. On one occasion, after boarding, I proceeded directly to the heart of the carriage to take my seat; before me, a few other travelers were sparsely seated. After the train began to move, the conductor approached the first traveler to verify his passage. As for myself, I sat in quiet repose by the window, my credit card in hand, waiting in customary fashion to purchase my ticket. Yet, after inspecting that one individual, the conductor returned to his own seat, as if he had chosen a single representative for the entire carriage's right of passage—one soul pays the fare, and the whole company benefits from the blessing. In a state of bewilderment, I approached the conductor's station and informed him that I had not yet purchased my passage. The conductor offered a verbal apology, yet the expression upon his face was one of profound lethargy, and he appeared altogether unconcerned. Another instance was more bewildering still; just before my stop, the conductor came to my seat and inquired as to my destination. I informed him of my stopping place and clarified that I had yet to secure my ticket. The conductor replied, “I am aware,” and then vanished, never to be seen again. And so it was that until the moment I stepped off the train, I found no one from whom I could purchase my fare.
 
 
 

II. An Overview of the Muslim Community in the Boston Area:

In the Greater Boston area, the Muslim Ummah is a diverse tapestry, encompassing more than 50 different masjids, schools, and community organizations, with a population exceeding 50,000 souls (in the broad sense of the Muslim community). The Muslim population of Greater Boston, which in its nascence was composed principally of African Americans, has now grown to encompass immigrants from the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, as well as converts of European and American heritage and self-identifying secular Muslims. Located in Ruxbury, the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center stands as an iconic testament to Islam in Boston.

The voluntary immigration of Muslims to the United States commenced in the late 19th century, with the majority of them hailing from Lebanon and Syria; some of these immigrants, including both Christians and Muslims, settled in the Boston area in the early 20th century. Quincy served as the first port of call for these immigrant families. In the year 1934, these families, alongside other Arabic-speaking Muslims of the region, joined together to form a cultural, social, and charitable organization known as the "Arab American Banner Society." From 1937 to 1952, they would gather in an old house at 470 South Street in Quincy. Perceiving that the second generation was growing up with a weakened sense of their Islamic identity, the society began to organize informal religious classes and initiated activities such as the Friday Jummah and the prayers for the two great festivals of 'Eid. In 1962, the organization resolved to construct a masjid in Quincy. The masjid was completed in 1964, with the first-generation immigrant Muhammad Omar Awad serving as its Imam. As the oldest existing mainstream Sunni masjid in the Greater Boston area, its present name is the Islamic Center of New England in Quincy.
 


The decades of the 1970s and 80s ushered in a period of tremendous growth throughout the entire New England region. During this era, a multitude of vibrant Islamic organizations were established across New England, which gathered Muslims together to plan community events; the majority of the masjids were affiliated with these already-established various Muslim organizations. The foundational path of development was to first establish an organization and then to build a masjid; for example, the organization Dar Islam, which serves the Muslims of downtown Boston, does not yet have a permanent masjid of its own and must borrow the St. Paul Cathedral to hold the Jummah prayer.

The Islamic Council of New England (ICNE), established in 1984, administers over thirty masjids in Massachusetts and sponsors an annual conference on Islamic life in America. The New England Imams' Shura Council, an affiliate of the Islamic Council of New England, makes decisions on certain matters of Islamic law, such as determining the times of prayer, with the participation of the Imams and other leaders from each local Islamic center. The Council also provides materials for Islamic training and children's education, and it runs youth programs, summer camps, and athletic activities. The first nationwide Islamic organization in America, the Muslim Students' Association (MSA), is also active within universities such as Harvard, MIT, Boston University, Northeastern University, and Tufts University, helping Muslim students to coordinate their religious affairs on campus. In addition to this, the Islamic Society of Boston (ISB), established in 1982 and formerly an independent student Islamic association, administers two masjids, and the largest masjid in Boston is affiliated with this organization.

For a portion of the indigenous African American community, Islam is regarded as part of the spiritual inheritance from their African forebears, who were forcibly brought to the Americas through the transatlantic slave trade. They hold that the faith identity of the enslaved was, to a great extent, suppressed, and that the Islamic tradition should, by right, be "rediscovered." Based on this conviction, they founded certain pseudo-Islamic religions. In this wave, the first was Noble Drew Ali, who founded the Moorish Science Temple in 1913, followed by the more influential Nation of Islam, established by W.D. Fard in the 1930s, an organization later brought to greater prominence by Elijah Muhammad. The renowned leader of the Black civil rights movement, Malcolm X (later renamed el-Hajj Malik el-Shabazz), was affiliated with this organization. Under the influence of Malcolm X, the boxing champion Ali became a member of this organization and was granted a new name by Elijah Muhammad: Muhammad Ali (Ali, too, would later return to orthodox Islam). The doctrines and teachings of this organization more fully embodied Black separatism, being the product of a re-imagining built upon Islamic nomenclature. In the late 1970s, the organization made deliberate moves toward the orthodox mainstream, and its leader went so far as to send his son, Wallace Deen Mohammed, to Egypt's Al-Azhar University to study orthodox doctrine, which laid the groundwork for the organization's future doctrinal shift. After the passing of Elijah Muhammad in 1975, his son, Wallace Deen Mohammed, led the majority of Black Muslims to forsake separatism and instead merge into the fold of the Sunni mainstream. The organization's masjids, Muhammad Mosque, subsequently became Sunni masjids or Islamic centers.
 

 


III. The Masjids:

When searching on a map with keywords such as masjid, mosque, islam, and muslim, the results may vary slightly. Compiling the map's information, there are more than ten masjids in the city of Boston and its surrounding areas, though most are distributed in the Ruxbury district; the largest masjid in Boston, and indeed in all of New England, the ISBCC (Islamic society of Boston culture center), is located in this very area. The most bustling downtown district has no independent masjid; as mentioned previously, Dar islam of Boston (DIB) borrows the downtown St. Paul Cathedral as a venue for the Friday Jummah, for the use of several hundred Muslims. In addition to the permanent masjids and the borrowed Jummah locations, there are also the Muslim Students' Associations (MSA) in the various schools. On the map, the distance from the northernmost masjid to the southernmost masjid is less than 20 kilometers; this distance is equivalent to that between Hongqiao Airport and Lujiazui.
 
 

 
Islamic Culture Center of Medford

Address: 43 High St, Medford, MA 02155
 
 


The Islamic Culture Center of Medford is situated in the city of Medford, not far from Tufts University. In the early days, the local brethren held their Jummah prayers in an Episcopal cathedral for four years, after which they purchased this house to serve as a masjid. I arrived at this masjid at nine in the morning, at which time the place was empty of people; the front door was locked, but by Allah's grace, a side door to the building was still open. My visit coincided with the week just before Ramadan, and the masjid had already posted a schedule for the community Iftars, calling for those who would make a niyyah to sponsor the meal for each day.
 


Many of Boston's masjids are established by purchasing existing single-family homes and converting them, and as a result, the internal renovations possess a rather unique character. The original layout and fixtures might not be altered, but are instead adapted for other uses as circumstances require. Back when I was in Pu-cun, I visited a masjid that had been converted from a bank; upon entering the main prayer hall, the massive iron door of the vault stood out right before you, having become a part of the wall itself. This masjid was no exception. The basement had been converted into a place for wudu, while the living room had become the prayer hall, and a fireplace in a small room happened to serve perfectly as the marker for the Qiblah. Every masjid in Boston has deep ties with the local community, and the masjid is never just a place for prayer: gatherings, education, consultation on affairs, and more all fall within the scope of the masjid's services.
 


The location of this masjid also has some connection to the first battle of the American Revolutionary War, the Battle of Lexington and Concord; in April of 1775, the local revolutionary leader Paul Revere once stopped his horse here to report news of the British forces to the local militia.
 


Islamic of Society of boston (ISB Cambridge)

Address：204 Prospect St, Cambridge, MA 02139
 


This masjid is located near the renowned academic institutions of Harvard and MIT. It is the first masjid established by the ISB, founded in the 1980s, and its presence enriched the religious architecture of the Cambridge area. I arrived precisely at the Shamu hour on a Saturday, and walking into the main hall, I found it filled with children, all gathered around their female teacher. The teacher seemed to be telling a story, and after she finished, each child was given a “crown.” The children who received them began to shout and run about wildly, yet the adults, for their part, paid them no mind; there was not a single word of rebuke. The adults, resting or praying in other parts of the hall, were not the least bit disturbed by the children. This state of affairs continued until the sound of the Bangk rang out, at which point the children knew to fall silent. After the Shamu prayer, the masjid's "Director of the Management Committee" warmly invited everyone to come for Iftar at the masjid and thanked them for their support. I knew who this person was because upon entering, I had seen a poster announcing his appointment. In the top left corner was his personal bio and photograph, while the rest of the poster was filled with commendations for him from the police, the city government, and various other agencies. From this, one can see that the masjid is tied in real tight with its surrounding district, and that selecting a masjid administrator requires someone who can not only handle the internal affairs of the house of worship but also coordinate a whole host of external matters. That's a tough gig.
 


Boston Islamic Center (BIC)

Address：2870 Washington St, Roxbury, MA 02119
 


Drawn by the grand name "Boston Islamic Center" on the map, I went to this masjid, all fired up for Jummah. From a good ways off, I saw the familiar crescent and dome, and though the dome was so small it looked like a little mosquito bite, it didn't diminish the majestic image of the masjid in my heart one bit. It's a rare thing, really, to see a masjid that actually looks like a masjid. By the time I had made my ablutions and settled in, the Imam's khutbah was not yet concluded. The Imam first spoke in Arabic, followed immediately by English, and finally by a language I had never heard before, with the duration of his sermon in each of the three languages being about the same. I later learned at another masjid that this one wasn't really much of a "Center," and that most of the people who come are Somali; the language I couldn't understand was Somali. After the prayer concluded, two volunteers stood at the door of the masjid, calling out to the people passing by with cries of “salam sange nietie!”. A dollar from you, twenty cents from me—it was through everyone's "mustard seed" of good deeds that the masjid's operations were sustained. I learned from a financial statement posted on the wall that to maintain a small-to-medium-sized masjid like this one requires about $9,000 a month—no small expense.
 


Islamic of Society of Boston Culture Center（ISBCC Ruxbury）

Address：100 Malcolm X Blvd, Roxbury, MA 02120
 


Coming out of BIC, I met a fellow from Rhode Island who had also come for Jummah. Turns out his hometown is Boston, and his parents live in this very area. He told me that there was a massive masjid nearby that was well worth checking out. Taking his advice, I headed straight for the masjid he spoke of—the ISBCC.
 


The Islamic Society of Boston Culture Center (ISBCC) has, over the past two decades, stood as a potent symbol of the development of Islam in Boston, and also as a microcosm of intergroup relations and the image of Islam in the city. Throughout the entire process of its planning and construction, the center was continually embroiled in legal and cultural conflicts, and its inauguration was, for many Muslims, a significant milestone. The road to the ISBCC's completion was incredibly winding: besides the issue of cost—a brother told me this masjid cost 12 million dollars to build—negative press also constantly battered the image of the masjid and the Muslim community. The Boston Herald once openly accused several leaders of the ISB of having ties to extremist organizations.

Among these, a rather significant controversy arose when a Jewish organization, “The David Project,” found a local resident to file a lawsuit against the ISBCC, arguing that the city had sold the land at a price below its market value, an act which violated the separation of church and state. The ISBCC filed its own countersuit, accusing the media groups of defamation. After the case brought by the opponents of the masjid's construction was dismissed in early 2007, the lawsuit was ultimately withdrawn. On June 26, 2009, the ISBCC held its public inauguration ceremony.

Today, the ISBCC has developed into an active participant in the public sphere of Boston, providing a wide range of social services to the region's Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The ISBCC is also the host for many other community groups and activities, such as the summer Quran academy for Muslim children and the Friday night gatherings for young Muslims. As the largest Islamic center in the New England region, the ISBCC is without a doubt the most prominent Islamic landmark in the Greater Boston area.

This interaction with society is, in my view, a form of silent testimony against the slander, as it seems wickedness must always be linked with the Muslim community. A masjid that can accommodate three thousand people for prayer means that within its walls you will meet professors from the surrounding universities, and you will also meet recent immigrants from Asia and Africa who have just moved to Boston. The masjid is a public space, and it can create a connection with anyone; you cannot say a bookstore gave a murderer his motive and ideological source just because he often frequented it. In '13, the police shot and killed a suspect right next to the masjid. The police came into the masjid to investigate because the suspect had once worked there as a security guard. And even though the Imam explained to the police that the suspect did not come to the masjid regularly, he still received hundreds of phone calls from the media after the incident. The believers in Boston directly face all kinds of islamophobia in the form of propaganda and slander, yet they still continually explain to the public, “We are not terrorists.”

The exterior of the masjid is of a classic Islamic architectural style, with a towering minaret, a dome, and a crescent moon upon the dome. Upon entering, the prayer hall is to the left, and directly opposite the prayer hall is a café, where one can have a meal or drink a cup of coffee. By the time I wandered in here, my legs were aching from all the walking. After praying the tahiyyatul-masjid in the main hall, I went over to the café across the way, ordered a coffee, and started scrolling through my phone. And what do you know, a brother walked straight up to me and said he saw me earlier at BIC during the Jummah prayer. We got to talking, and by sheer coincidence, we both knew the same old buddy who had recommended this masjid to me. He told me that he was born in Somalia, has been in Boston for over 20 years, and now works as an accountant. I watched as he greeted people coming and going and saw he was on very familiar terms with the café staff; I figured he was probably a volunteer here. It was from him that I learned that BIC, where we had just prayed our Jummah, is a masjid comprised mainly of Somalis.
 

 
 

 
Masjid al Quran (Muhammad Temple 11)
Address: 35 Intervale St, Boston, MA 02121
 
 


As early as 1957, the Nation of Islam (NOI) purchased this building, originally a synagogue, and named it Temple No. 11. The mosque’s name evolved from Temple No. 11 to Mosque No. 11 and finally to Masjid al Quran, marking its shift from fringe separatism to Sunni doctrine. The mosque’s founding leader and founder was the renowned Malcolm X, with his successor being the later NOI leader Farrakhan. As early as 1965, the mosque’s first orthodox imam, Shakir Mahmoud, had already reached out to Boston’s orthodox Muslims to study mainstream Islamic teachings. In 1977, Shakir became the imam of 多切斯特 Mosque. Under his leadership, the community gradually embraced the mainstream Islam advocated by W.D. Muhammad. In 1981, Louis Farrakhan led a group of followers away from the orthodox Islamic path, revived the spiritual legacy of Elijah Muhammad, re-established the NOI, and built another Mosque No. 11 next to the original one. To distinguish it from the NOI-affiliated mosque, the original Mosque No. 11 was renamed Masjid al-Qur’an. My friend chuckled and told me that Farrakhan’s new “mosque” used to be a funeral home—members jokingly called it the “cold body room.”
 


This mosque’s interior layout differs from others: a row of seats curves in a semicircle around the pulpit, reflecting their previous preaching style. Taking a close look at the pamphlets on the wall and the books on the shelves is a quick way to get the mosque’s basic info. The mosque sells various Islamic books, with many works by W.D. Muhammad. The “Haji board” on the wall caught my eye instantly, listing every pilgrim from this mosque. My friend proudly said that his parents’ names were on it. Nowadays this mosque is no longer just for African American Muslims; it welcomes Muslims of all ethnic backgrounds for prayer.




Another mosque stands just across the street, but even on a Friday its doors were closed, and I’m not sure why. When I asked around, people said it likely belongs to an immigrant community.
 


Mosque for Prasing Allah
Address: 724 Shawmut Ave, Boston, MA 02119
 


This mosque, without even a proper street number, offers services like marriage, funeral rites, education, and employment assistance. It’s run by the Society for Islamic Brotherhood (S.I.B.). In 1970, the S.I.B. leased 724 Shawmut Ave and later purchased the building, making it one of Boston’s oldest surviving mosques. From 1980 to 1983, the mosque also supported a full‑time Islamic elementary school. On the ground floor of the mosque is a small shop selling Islamic books and prayer robes. If you enter through the shop’s left door, you’ll find a wudu area on the first floor; up the stairs on the second floor are the women’s prayer room and offices. The third floor is the men’s prayer hall. The space is modest, fitting at most a hundred or two men.
 



Muhammad Mosque 11 (New)
Do not go there, you cannot pray there. It’s an NOI event venue.
 



Other Sects

Besides the large Sunni communities in Greater Boston, various Shia Muslims—such as the Jafarite school (Twelver Imams), the Ismailis (Dawoodi Bohra and Nizari)—as well as the Qadianis (the so‑called Ahmadiyya) have also established their own prayer centers. Below are the names of some mosques set up by these groups; it’s advised that the general Sunni populace steer clear:

Dawoodi Bohra Anjuman‑e‑Ezzi
 


Islamic Masumeen Center of New England
 


Ismaili Center & Jamatkhana

Masjid Baitul Zikr
  view all

Bismillah ar-Rahman ar-Rahim (In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful).

They say Chicago has the most beautiful skyline in all of America, and you’d better believe it. Gaze at the city from the north or south along the shore of Lake Michigan—which feels more like an ocean, Subhan'Allah—and you'll be captivated by a stunning tapestry of skyscrapers. The crown jewel of that skyline, the one that really catches your eye, is the 442-meter tall, black Sears Tower. When it was built, it was the tallest kid on the block. But what most people don't know is that the tower's chief architect was a brother in Islam, a devout Muslim.
 


Fazlur Rahman Khan, a Bengali-American structural engineer, was the genius behind the structural systems for both the Sears Tower and the John Hancock Center. For his work, he’s hailed as the "father of the tubular design" for high-rises and was a pioneer in Computer-Aided Design (CAD). And Fazlur Khan is hardly the only Chicago Muslim to earn worldly acclaim. Just ask about Dr. Hussein Abd Al-Sattar, a professor of pathology at the University of Chicago Medical School, often called the father of American pathology. To the local Muslim community, he is even better known for his deep taqwa (God-consciousness). Dr. Sattar, now in his 50s, came to Chicago with his parents from Pakistan back in the '80s. Alhamdulillah (all praise is due to God), the city of Chicago alone is a powerful answer to those who ask what Islam or Muslims have done for the modern world.
 


The success of these two men from South Asia is no fluke; it reflects how the city has been a magnet for immigrants seeking to build a new life. The pioneers of Chicago’s ummah (Muslim community) were the Bosnians and Arabs, who had already established their own Muslim associations in the early 20th century. The history of Palestinians in Chicago is especially prominent; in fact, Cook County is affectionately known as “America’s Palestinian hometown.” Palestinian Muslims began their hijra (migration) to Chicago in the early 1900s, and the political turmoil following the establishment of Israel in 1948 brought even more. By the late 1940s, Palestinians began to put down roots and build a community in Bridgeview, on the edge of the South Side's African-American neighborhoods. If you ask any local where to find “Little Palestine,” they’ll point you straight to Bridgeview. Other Arab Muslims who were not Palestinian started arriving in the mid-1950s.

Head over to the north side, to Devon Avenue, and you'll find a place locals have nicknamed “Little India.” Walking down Devon, surrounded by all kinds of halal South Asian restaurants, supermarkets, and Islamic bookstores, you know right away you’re in a South Asian Muslim enclave. It is here that Dr. Sattar, seeking to spread 'ilm (sacred knowledge), established his own masjid (mosque) and learning center: the Sacred Learning Center.

Today, Chicago is home to the second-largest Muslim community in the United States, a true testament to the barakah (blessings) of this city. Since the 1965 immigration reforms, the diversity of the local Muslim community has blossomed. In just forty years, from the 1960s onward, the number of masjids in the Greater Chicago area skyrocketed from a mere five to over one hundred. South Asian Muslims, in particular, have had a profound impact on community institutions in recent years. More than half of the region's mosques primarily serve a South Asian congregation, with several of these located in suburbs where the income is well above the regional average.

Beyond that, Masha'Allah (as God has willed), Chicago has built a complete ecosystem of Muslim educational institutions, from kindergarten all the way up to university. This deep commitment to tarbiyah (Islamic education and upbringing) is on full display every year when Chicago hosts the national forum for Muslim school educators.
 
 

 
 
The Story of the First Minaret in Chicago

Islamic Cultural Center of Greater Chicago (ICCGC)

1800 Pfingsten Rd, Northbrook, IL 60062

The story of this community began way back in 1906, when our Bosnian brothers and sisters founded the "Muslim Mutual Aid and Benevolent Society of Illinois" (Muslimansko Potpomagajuce Drustvo Dzemijetul Hajrije) in the city's Near North Side. Masha'Allah, it stands today as the oldest Muslim organization in the entire history of the United States. Fast forward to the 1970s, the original Bosnian masjid (mosque) on North Halsted Street packed up and moved to the northern suburb of Northbrook. The new center was given a name reflecting its broader mission: the "Islamic Cultural Center of Greater Chicago."
 


On Saturday, September 8, 1974, a groundbreaking ceremony was held on a little over two acres of land, a blessed day attended by representatives from both the Muslim and non-Muslim communities. By the grace of Allah, Phase I of the center—which included administrative offices, a library, classrooms for weekend school, a nursery, and a social hall—officially opened its doors on March 21, 1976.

The call to build a proper house of worship grew stronger, and on June 29, 1984, the community broke ground for Phase II: the masjid and its minaret. This second phase, completed in 1988, added a beautiful musalla (prayer hall) that could hold 500 worshipers, a lecture hall for 200, and a towering minaret—the first and, at that time, the only one in the entire state of Illinois. Allahu Akbar (God is the Greatest).
 


The first Imam (spiritual leader) of the center was a Bosnian, Kamil Avdich, who served the ummah (community) faithfully until his passing in December 1979. May Allah grant him Jannah (paradise). The center's most famous Imam, however, has to be Dr. Mustafa Cerić, a real heavy-hitter in Bosnia and Herzegovina with massive influence in both religious and political circles. From 1993 to 2012, Dr. Cerić served as the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina and even ran for a seat on the Bosnian presidency in 2014.

Today, the center’s members come from many different backgrounds, though the majority are still from Bosnia, Montenegro, and other parts of the Balkans. It's a sad reality, though, that most of the time you’ll find the doors to this beautiful masjid locked outside of the prescribed prayer times.

“Little Palestine” of Bridgeview

Take a drive southwest from downtown Chicago into Bridgeview, and before you know it, you’re in Little Palestine. It's a dead giveaway. Just drive down Harlem Avenue in the heart of the Bridgeview community, and you'll see Arabic script everywhere—on signs for shops, law offices, barbers, and restaurants.

The Palestinian presence in this city goes way back to the 1890s. The first arrivals were willing to get their hands dirty, taking any job they could find and selling goods in the city's undeveloped areas. Their early success laid the groundwork for the waves of Palestinians to come. It’s no surprise, then, that in the wake of the 1948 Nakba (The Catastrophe), when over 700,000 Palestinians were tragically displaced from their homeland, a good number of them came here to settle. Today, Cook County is home to more than 22,000 Palestinians—more than anywhere else in the United States.

The shopping plazas in Little Palestine have a flavor all their own. The signs are proudly written in both Arabic and English. You can easily find authentic Arab sweet shops, sizzling shawarma joints, and stores selling traditional clothing and everyday goods. But it’s more than just commerce; it's a community that wears its heart on its sleeve. The walls outside shops are often adorned with posters of the Shahada (the declaration of faith) and beautiful du'as (prayers). Inside, you’ll find information on how to give sadaqa (charity) to support those in Palestine and messages of unwavering solidarity.

Sometimes, even the food carries a deeper meaning. One fried chicken joint in the neighborhood, in an act of defiant creativity, named its chicken tenders the “Gaza Strips.” They are not afraid to make their stance known, doing what they can to give you a gut-punch of a reminder of the ethnic cleansing happening in Gaza as we speak.
 

 


The first local masjid in this area, now known as the Mosque Foundation, got its start in 1954. In 1982, it set up a new home in the southwest suburb of Bridgeview and later added two state-accredited Muslim schools. Subhan'Allah (glory be to God), the Mosque Foundation is a magnificent sight. It’s the anchor of the neighborhood, and it seems like most of the villas surrounding it are owned by Muslims—it's a common sight to spot a beautiful piece of calligraphy with an ayah (verse) from the Qur'an posted on the front doors.

Even though it’s a good ways from downtown, come Dhuhr (noon prayer) time, the main prayer hall is packed to the gills with brothers standing shoulder-to-shoulder. Right next to the mosque's courtyard, you’ll find its affiliated Islamic elementary school, the Aqsa School, and a Muslim high school, the Universal School. Together, they provide a private K-12 education where students dive deep into Islamic studies, the Arabic language, and the Holy Qur'an. The school's motto says it all: "Where Islam and Education Come Together."
 
 
 
Muslim Foundation 
 


Villa Park and Lombard

Out in the western suburbs of Chicago, Villa Park and Lombard are home to a booming Muslim population. The two crown jewels of the community out here are the Islamic Foundation and Masjid DarusSalam.

Islamic Foundation of Villa Park

300 W Highridge Rd, Villa Park, IL 60181
 
 


The Islamic Foundation (IF) was established in 1974 to serve the ummah in Chicago's western suburbs. The Islamic Foundation Masjid is considered one of the largest in North America, a massive project that was completed in 1998 after three years of construction. Today, the campus is the whole nine yards: it includes a bookstore, a library, a community center, a hall for banquets and lectures, a modern kitchen, conference rooms, and offices for the foundation's staff.
 
 


Their commitment to tarbiyah (Islamic upbringing) is serious business. Back in 1975, the community started a weekend Islamic school in a rented space with just 36 students. From those humble beginnings, the foundation purchased a former public school building in 1983 to create the campus they have today. The Islamic Foundation School (IFS) is now a fully accredited K-12 institution with about 650 full-time students from over 400 families, making it one of the largest Islamic schools in North America, Alhamdulillah.
 



Masjid DarusSalam

21W525 North Ave, Lombard, IL 60148
 
 


Completed in 2013, Masjid DarusSalam in Lombard serves Muslims from about 20 surrounding communities. The campus is a behemoth, with 87,000 square feet of building space. It not only provides beautiful prayer spaces for brothers and sisters but also includes over 20 classrooms, a library, funeral facilities for handling the Janazah (funeral prayer), an NCAA-standard gymnasium, a banquet hall, a fitness center, a kitchen, and plenty of parking.

This masjid is also home to the DarusSalam Seminary, a national institution dedicated to teaching traditional Islamic sciences. This is where they are forging the next generation of 'ulama (scholars) and community leaders, insha'Allah (if God wills).
 
 


Irving Park Avenue

Hop off the Blue Line train at the Irving Park station, and after a short walk, you'll find the Muslim Community Center (MCC). You're in the heart of a Muslim hub here; within a stone's throw of the MCC, there are as many as seven masjids.

Muslim Community Center (MCC Chicago)

4380 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60641
 


On a cold Sunday in February 1969, after much heartfelt discussion, members of the Yugoslavian-Bosnian Muslim Religious and Cultural Home decided to form the Muslim Community Center (MCC). It was officially registered as a non-profit that same year and is considered the mother organization for many other centers and masjids that came later. It’s one of the oldest and largest Muslim organizations in Chicagoland.

The MCC is a membership-based masjid where all decisions are made based on the Qur'anic principle of Shoora (consultation). They currently have over 1,600 paying members (and they post every single name!). But between its two affiliated mosques, the weekly Jumu'ah (Friday sermon) attendance tops 3,000 souls.
 


The MCC headquarters on Elston Avenue is a real head-turner because the building used to be the Rivoli Theater, built back in 1923. Inside, the main musalla (prayer hall) still keeps the original theater structure. You pray where the main audience used to sit, with a raised stage area and even the second-floor balcony converted into a prayer space for the sisters. It’s a sight to see.
 
 

 
MASOM （Midwest Association of Shia Organized Muslim）

4353 W Lawrence Ave, Chicago, IL 60630

A few other spots in the neighborhood:

MASOM (Midwest Association of Shia Organized Muslim): Established in 1994, this is the center for South Asian Twelver Shia Muslims. You can't miss the distinctive Shia flags and the Hand of Fatima (Hamsa) flying outside, marking their unique identity.
 

 
 
Masjid Dar Al-Hadeeth

4809 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60630
 

 
 
 
MASJID AL RAHMAN

4846 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60630
 


Masjid Dar Al-Hadeeth & MASJID AL RAHMAN: Two more local masjids on the same street. When I stopped by Masjid Al Rahman, it was time for the Asr (afternoon) prayer, but wouldn't you know it, the doors were locked.
 


Chicago's South Side

Al-Sadiq Masjid

4448 S Wabash Ave, Chicago, IL 60653
 


In 1920, the first missionary from the Ahmadiyya movement in Islam, Mufti Muhammad Sadiq, made his way to Chicago. By 1922, he had established America's first Ahmadiyya mosque right here on South Wabash Avenue, and it served as the movement's national headquarters until 1950. The mosque has a claim to fame as being the very first masjid in Chicago, and some say in all of America. The original 1922 building is long gone, but the current one was rebuilt on the very same spot in 1994.
 
 


Mosque Maryam

7351 S Stony Island Ave, Chicago, IL 60649

Mosque Maryam (also known as Muhammad Mosque No. 2) is the national headquarters for the Nation of Islam (NOI). The building itself has a wild history; it was originally the Saints Constantine and Helen Greek Orthodox Church. In 1972, the Honorable Elijah Muhammad bought the building, securing a $3 million loan from Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to convert the church into a temple. After Elijah Muhammad passed away in 1975, his son, Imam Warith Deen Mohammed, undertook a momentous task. He dissolved the Nation of Islam, steered the entire community towards the path of orthodox Sunni Islam, and re-established the organization as the American Muslim Mission. A powerful chapter in the story of Islam in America.
 
 

 
 
In 1981, former Nation of Islam (NOI) member Louis Farrakhan and his followers held the traditional Saviours’ Day gathering in Chicago and officially brought back the “Islamic Nation of North America” name. In his keynote address, Farrakhan pledged to work toward restoring the organization based on the teachings of Elijah Muhammad. By 1988, Farrakhan had repurchased and reopened the old mosque, naming it “Masjid Maryam” in honor of Maryam (Mary), the mother of ‘Isa (Jesus). Right next door sits Muhammad University of Islam, an educational institution founded by the NOI that offers classes from pre-K through 12th grade for both boys and girls—think of it as a full-fledged Islamic madrasah right in the heart of Chicago.
 


Masjid Al-Faatir
1200 E 47th St, Chicago, IL 60653
 

 


Masjid al-Faatir opened its doors in 1987 in the Kenwood neighborhood of Chicago. It was established by Jabir Herbert Muhammad—the late boxing legend Muhammad Ali’s manager and son of Elijah Muhammad—who donated the land, while Ali himself kicked in significant funds for construction. The masjid’s striking design features two interlocking octagonal halls, two standalone minarets, and a grand central dome. On Jummah days, it can accommodate up to 3,000 worshippers praying Salah side by side, shoulder to shoulder, in a powerful testament to ummah unity.
 


When his father set up the NOI headquarters in Chicago, Jabir Herbert Muhammad took on the role of Chief Business Manager, running restaurants, bakeries, laundromats, and more under the organization’s umbrella. He also oversaw the publication of Muhammad Speaks, the group’s newspaper. From 1966 to 1991, he served as Muhammad Ali’s manager—talk about wearing multiple kufi caps! Fun fact: Elijah Muhammad’s home and Muhammad Ali’s residence were just two streets away from Masjid al-Faatir, making that stretch of Chicago a real hub of Islamic heritage.

In “The Loop”

Downtown Islamic Center
231 S State St #4, Chicago, IL 60604

Easily the most accessible masjid in Chicago’s Loop, the Downtown Islamic Center hides behind a tiny door in a street-side office building. Head up to the fourth floor and you’ll find a cozy prayer hall where the call to prayer echoes off glass and steel—a real urban oasis for your daily salah.
 
 


Little India District

Tucked between Ridge Avenue and Kedzie Avenue along West Devon Avenue, this “Little India” corridor boasts more than ten masajid, plus Islamic bookstores, halal eateries, and markets. One standout is:

Masjid E-Noor
6151 N Greenview Ave, Chicago, IL 60660
 
 


This unique masjid, seemingly repurposed from an old church, draws a diverse crowd—especially faces from Central Asia. On Jummah, you’ll hear the mix of Farsi, Urdu, and Arabic, echoing beneath its vaulted ceilings.

Evanston

Home to the prestigious Northwestern University, Evanston also hosts two notable masajid:

Baitul Huda (House of Guidance)
A converted church that now serves as a vibrant community center for Jummah prayers and youth programs.

Dar-us-Sunnah Masjid
A brand-new standalone building with a spacious musalla, echoing with the recitation of Quran during Taraweeh in Ramadan.
 

 


Des Plaines

Des Plaines Downtown Masjid (DDM)
733 Lee St, Des Plaines, IL 60016
A large complex housing both a masjid and an Islamic seminary. I tried popping in for Zuhr, but the doors were locked—turns out they run on strict school hours.

Islamic Community Center of Des Plaines (ICCD)
Just a ten-minute drive from O’Hare Airport, making it a handy stop for travelers looking to freshen up for Dhuhr and Asr prayers en route.
 

 


Tasting Kyrgyz Delights

Chicago’s melting-pot vibe means you can snag authentic eats from all over the ummah. From budget-friendly Arabic feasts (think lamb platter with salad and flatbread for just $16) to an upscale, alcohol-free Italian spot run by Kyrgyz chefs—yes, you read that right, Kyrgyzstan-style spaghetti! There’s even a Central Asian joint dishing out manti (dumplings) and rice bowls, just like back in the day in Xinjiang.
 
 



Arzan Café

Funny enough, two of my three sit-down meals (tip expected, of course) were at Kyrgyz spots. At the Italian place, all the chefs and waitstaff were unmistakably Central Asian. Curious, I asked one server why so many Kyrgyz folk call Chicago home. She shrugged, “Hard to say exactly—no reliable stats—but we’re over 13,000 strong here now. Ten years ago, that number was way smaller.” She herself came from Russia five years ago, echoing a trend of Kyrgyz leaving the Motherland to avoid conscription into the Moscow–Kyiv conflict.

This year, the U.S. Census Bureau even added “Kyrgyz” as its own category in community surveys. As a sanctuary city, Chicago has long been a beacon for immigrants and asylum seekers. During our meal, the server asked, “Where are you from?” I replied, “China.” She probed, “Uyghurs?” I explained, “No, we’re Hui—Mandarin-speaking Chinese Muslims.” She lit up: “Alhamdulillah! I know of the Dungan people too!” I beamed back, “Exactly—we’re from eastern China, my wife from central China.” It was such a heartwarming exchange we bumped our tip by an extra 5%—hey, a little sadaqah for good conversation never hurts!
  view all

Ramadan in the Big Apple: My 2025 islamic Journey to Manhattan, NYC

As the southbound train gently rolled into Brooklyn on the East Coast, looking out the window, you suddenly see those towering skyscrapers of Manhattan. At that moment, you can't help but exclaim, "We've made it to New York!" I quickly pulled out my phone and snapped a couple of shots. It's that feeling you get looking at the Lujiazui skyline from the Bund in Shanghai – it's like a calling card, as if it is the entire city. Of course, to truly appreciate the beauty of such urban grandeur, it's always better to keep your distance, to remain an observer.

Eventually, our train pulled into Penn Station, right in Midtown Manhattan. This, my friends, is the busiest train station in all of America, sitting near Times Square, with its entire concourse and waiting areas completely underground. Unlike back home, here there isn't just one rail company. The waiting areas are split into three sections – Amtrak, Long Island Rail Road, and NJ Transit – each managed by their own company. Amtrak and NJ Transit are on the first basement level, while Long Island Rail Road is on the second basement level. We got off the train and made our way through the Moynihan Train Hall to street level. As an old-school NBA fan, I was absolutely stunned to realize that the building right above the station was Madison Square Garden, the home of the New York Knicks! There I was, wearing my Brooklyn Nets jacket, feeling just a tad out of place. Subhanallah, what a welcome!
 


Navigating the NYC Subway: A Leap of Faith

Our first day in New York happened to be a Monday, and we'd already planned to hit the Metropolitan Museum of Art, which was open. I stared at the complex subway map, finally picking a line that didn't require any transfers – we'd get off and just walk through Central Park to the Met. I'd heard stories before coming here: the New York subway runs 24/7, and there are no barriers between the platforms and the tracks, just like the old Shanghai Metro Line 3/4. Word on the street was that people waiting on the platforms always choose to stand against the wall because some crazy person might just push you onto the tracks. Others warned that the NYC subway reeked, rats scurried everywhere, and you'd see all sorts of eccentrically dressed characters, plus rumors of anti-Asian violence. It sounded like a no-go zone, a place to avoid at all costs, as if this bizarre underworld gathered all the evil of the city.
 


But honestly, the thing that chapped my hide the most was buying a subway ticket. You can't buy tickets from a human; you're stuck using these ancient-looking, grandpa-era ticket machines on the wall. Since we didn't have enough cash, my wife and I tried our credit cards a gazillion times, but it was a bust every time. We finally had to scrounge up some coins from a passerby to buy our tickets. Later, when I was venting about this to Wasim (the young brother I met in Flushing), he just chuckled and told me you could actually just tap your credit card directly on the turnstile. My actual experience riding the subway, however, felt perfectly normal: the same crowds, the same bumps and jostles. Every now and then, you'd see someone leaning against the door, their eyes closed, swaying precariously, looking like they were about to keel over onto you at any moment. May Allah protect us all.

Central Park: A Spiritual Oasis

After getting off the subway, we crossed the street to the west entrance of Central Park. Our plan was to cut through the park to reach the Met on the east side. This route turned out to be an absolute winner. Central Park is simply breathtaking; the city's usual hustle and bustle just stops cold here. It's crawling with people walking their dogs, jogging, and just strolling along. Central Park is massive, like a sharp sword plunged right into the heart of the city.
 


The park feels like a sanctuary for the soul, pulling you away from the heavy burden of work, if only for a short while, and healing the wounds within. The park is surrounded by a dense forest of skyscrapers, and behind them are the crowded streets. The roads separate the park from the buildings that rise abruptly from the ground, almost like a dividing line between reality and an ideal. Central Park has been around for over a hundred years, and it hasn't been developed into housing projects as the city grew. In fact, it's even gotten bigger. The city's planners clearly see it as a balance between work and leisure, a true ni'mah (blessing) for the residents.

Islamic Cultural Center of New York: A Thriving Ummah

Lately, my social media has been flooded with posts from my brothers and sisters in New York. They're back to performing Tarawih (Ramadan night prayers) in Times Square. They cordon off a rectangular area amidst the crowds, standing with their backs to that iconic, gigantic screen. Even with a light rain, the Imam leading the prayer recited the beautiful Quran into a microphone, his melodious voice cutting through the surrounding clamor. The dhul-jism (Muslims) behind him, their lips moving, quietly recited along with the Imam, completely undisturbed by the environment. By now, most New Yorkers probably don't even bat an eye at this sight. When you look at the number of mosques and the Muslim population, New York might just be considered the halal capital of America. Data from 2018 showed that over 750,000 Muslims lived in New York City, making it the city with the largest Muslim population in the U.S. Roughly 9% of New York City residents are Muslims, accounting for 22.3% of America's total Muslim population. And New York City boasts over 200 mosques, scattered in every corner of the metropolis. Masha'Allah, the Ummah is truly thriving here.
 
 
Okay, here's the translation of your article, incorporating the requested style, tone, and vocabulary:

The Islamic Cultural Center of New York: A Beacon of Faith

Perhaps it all began with the completion of the Islamic Cultural Center. In Manhattan, no other mosque stands out quite like the Islamic Cultural Center of New York, located between East 96th and 97th Streets in the Upper East Side. Due to the need to face the Kaaba for prayer, the entire building is angled about thirty degrees to the street. This Islamic Cultural Center is New York's first purpose-built mosque and one of the largest in the city. When this mosque, with its dome soaring 27 meters high and minaret reaching 40 meters, was completed, Islam seemed to suddenly burst onto the scene for New Yorkers. The dedication of this masjid felt like New York granting a new identity card to its Muslims, acknowledging and embracing their presence in the city. After its opening, Muslim culture, by the grace of Allah, truly became an integral part of this vibrant metropolis.
 


The ambitious plan to establish a large Islamic center in New York was first conceived in the late 1960s. The initial Islamic center operated on a small scale in a modest townhouse. Later, the board of directors envisioned a grander center to elevate the prestige of Islam and to become one of New York City's iconic landmarks. Eventually, a comprehensive project including a mosque, a school, a library, a museum, and an auditorium was planned. After years of delays, including fundraising from Muslim countries, lengthy tenant relocations, and the eventual demolition of existing structures on the site, construction of the Islamic Cultural Center finally began in October 1984. The mosque itself started construction on May 28, 1987, a day that perfectly coincided with the end of Ramadan. Construction was even further delayed during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War. Finally, the mosque officially opened its doors on April 15, 1991, which was the blessed day of Eid al-Fitr. Throughout this monumental process, over 46 Muslim nations contributed to the center's $17 million construction cost, with Kuwait alone donating a staggering two-thirds of the total. Truly, this center embodies the hopes of Muslims from nearly every country in the world; even in this place, famously known as the "center of the universe," Islam continues to flourish. Allahu Akbar!

This mosque just so happened to be near the museum we were visiting. We arrived after the Asr prayer time had passed, so we performed our salah individually. The constant stream of people coming and going was incredible; new prayer congregations were forming one after another. I even witnessed a truly fascinating sight: a New York Police Department (NYPD) officer, in full uniform, became a temporary Imam, leading a few Muslim brothers behind him in prayer. In that moment, there was no law enforcement and no civilians, only ikhwah (brothers) bowing together towards the Kaaba. Near the entrance of the mosque, there was also a small shop selling books and various Muslim essentials. Before leaving, I bought a black prayer cap, and my wife picked up a box of dates. After settling the bill, we were about to head out when the shop owner suddenly called us back. She must have gathered from our brief chat that we were tourists. She then gave us some extra dates, explaining they were from Madinah, and also handed us two bottles of water. Mind you, we had only spent twelve bucks in total, and the items the kind sister gave us were easily worth at least five dollars. May Allah bless her for her generosity!
 


It was a bit of a bummer, though, that only the first floor of this mosque was open during our visit. The doors to the second and third floors were firmly locked, so we couldn't explore them fully.

Manhattan's "Rest Stops" for the Faithful

Aside from a handful of mosques whose unique architecture immediately gives them away, most mosques in Manhattan are incognito from the outside, blending seamlessly with office buildings and townhouses. You often have to get close and rely on the name of the mosque on the doorplate and the Muslims going in and out to confirm its identity.

More often than not, a mosque in Manhattan is like a mini "Central Park" for Muslims. The peaceful prayer hall inside is a world apart from the bustling environment outside the door. Muslims come and go, entering through an inconspicuous little door, quickly heading to the wudu facilities in the basement to perform their ablution. After that, they quietly perform their salah, and if they're tired, they lean against a wall for a quick rest. When it's time for work or if they have an urgent matter, they quickly leave. Traveling during Ramadan can be a bit tiring, so I gave up on my specific plans to visit every mosque. Instead, I just started treating them as places to rest. If I felt weary, I'd find a mosque, step inside for a breather, and then continue my journey. Alhamdulillah for these havens.

The Islamic Society of Mid Manhattan on 55th Street (154 E 55th St, New York) is a prime example of such a mosque. It doesn't have a grand entrance or stand alone; it looks just like the surrounding apartment buildings, accessed through a small door. Braving the rainy weather, we followed the directions from a fellow Muslim brother outside and easily entered the mosque. After walking in, you go down a long corridor, almost like a wormhole, and suddenly you've transported from the chaos of Manhattan to the quiet peace of home.
 


The wudu area wasn't as clean as it could be, probably due to the high foot traffic and the rainy weather, making the floor and restrooms a bit dirty. This might indicate a lack of regular upkeep, but it definitely highlighted the significant number of people using this mosque. After performing wudu, I headed straight to the men's prayer hall. As I entered, a Black brother was standing by the door, and I greeted him with a salam. His response was quite animated: his arm went halfway up, then swung down in a semicircle, firmly grasping my hand. With a rhythmic cadence, he repeatedly said, "Welcome, brother," "How are you doing?" and "You're doing great!" (likely approving of my enthusiastic response to him). After prayer, I leaned against the wall, and people kept greeting me. Compared to other places, New Yorkers are pretty well-informed. Folks elsewhere had no clue where I was from, but New York Muslims asked me more than once, "Are you Indonesian?"
 


NYC's Halal Food Carts: A Culinary Blessing

Speaking of halal food in New York, you simply can't skip the halal food carts – they're a huge part of New York's halal culinary scene. If you instinctively search "halal" on your map, most of the results you'll get are these food carts. These carts usually have fixed locations, and the map will show their spot along with customer reviews. The types of food they sell are pretty similar across the board: meat platters, rice bowls, hot dogs, and falafel. Some even have fried chicken if they're feeling a bit more adventurous.
 


On my first evening in Flushing, I broke my fast (iftar) with food from a cart. I ordered chicken over rice. The turmeric-colored long-grain rice was piled high with tender chicken, topped with a generous squeeze of white sauce and hot sauce. Even before I took a bite, my mouth was watering! And for a heaping container of that deliciousness, it only cost me $7. I immediately ordered another one to take for my suhoor (pre-dawn meal), grabbed a drink, and the total was $15. No exaggeration, this might just be the cheapest meal you can get in New York that's worth its salt. Of course, carts in Manhattan might charge a little more, but still usually under $10. Alhamdulillah for these blessings!
 
A Test of Faith in Manhattan: Halal Carts and Humble Mosques

Fasting while walking through the bustling streets of Manhattan is a massive test of sabr (patience). Despite my rumbling stomach, the tempting aroma from those halal food carts would waft into my nostrils every now and then. You know for sure that scent is halal, and sometimes you can't help but take an extra sniff or two, but there's nothing to do but sigh and hurry past. This temptation and the urge to buy don't just vanish. When you think you've missed out on a delicious meal, you turn the next corner and lo and behold, you find another cart. Look further down, and there's yet another halal food cart at the next intersection. By the time Iftar (breaking of fast) rolls around, you've probably passed a good dozen or so carts, and at that point, you're so famished you don't even want to explore which one has the most variety or the best taste.

Masjid Awliya of Allah: A Hidden Gem

As Iftar time drew near, my wife and I were walking around Times Square, passing one food cart after another, our eyes glued to the prize. I suggested we find a masjid to settle down and rest for a bit, then grab our food once it was time to break our fast, and head to the train station to go home. So, I searched and found this mosque: Masjid Awliya of Allah (Friends of Allah Mosque, located at 327 W 36th St., New York, NY 10018). It's probably the closest mosque to Times Square. We made a beeline for it, and as soon as we got to the entrance, my wife stared in disbelief and asked, "Are you sure this is a mosque?"

And honestly, at first glance, you'd think you'd stumbled into the Halal Food Cart Association. The entrance, as marked on the map, led into a huge warehouse chock-full of food carts waiting to be stocked up for their day's business. We asked someone inside, and he confirmed it was indeed the masjid. Then, he led us on a winding path, weaving through rows of food carts until we finally reached a staircase. Lo and behold! The actual masjid entrance was hidden behind this dense array of food trucks! We ascended to the second floor, where we found a small prayer room. Even with such limited space, they had a dedicated area for the sisters, masha'Allah. I quickly scanned the people resting; by their attire, most seemed to be delivery drivers or food cart vendors. This place had clearly become their perfect refuge from the elements, a spot to enjoy a moment of tranquility amidst their busy lives. The only downside was that the wudu (ablution) area in this mosque had no partitions, just a large communal water basin. It wasn't very convenient for the sisters to perform wudu, so we decided to head out.

The Ever-Present Mercy (of Allah)

Back on the street, my wife and I were beat, our feet killing us. I pointed to the map and said, "There's another masjid not too far. Let's make a dash for it." At this point, I was pinning all my hopes on that one, praying it would be a more "conventional" masjid, a place where I could charge my phone and my body could get a quick recharge too. Our train home was less than two hours away, so time was of the essence. We decided to grab some food from the "Tianshan" restaurant we'd just passed, saving it for tomorrow's suhoor (pre-dawn meal).

Walking up to the restaurant, we saw the menu taped to the window, filled with familiar dishes: "wontons," "roasted samosa-like buns," "stir-fried noodles with meat." We walked in, our hearts singing, thinking this must be authentic Chinese cuisine. At the ordering counter, my wife looked at a familiar-looking young man and started, "Hey, so, can I have a—" I cut in, blurting out, "Wontons!" The young man replied in Chinese, "Sorry, no wontons." We both looked at each other and shared a laugh. He asked about our situation, and we, in turn, asked about his. This young man, who had been in the U.S. for six years, told us his parents had also moved to New York. Hearing that, the slight tension in my brow eased a bit, as if a worry had lifted off my shoulders. I said, "That's the real deal." The young man, seeing we weren't planning to sit down, asked, "Are you also fasting?" Fearing he might misunderstand, I quickly said, "Yes, that's right! I'm taking it to go for suhoor." The young man wasn't questioning us; he just wanted to give us some dates, and with that, he started to head to the kitchen. We quickly stopped him, explaining that we already had plenty of dates, both ones we'd bought and some given to us for free at the masjid. But he insisted on giving us more. When we finally got our takeout bag, we saw a box of dates placed right next to our roasted buns. We thanked him profusely, saying, "Jazak Allah Khayr!" The young man waved us goodbye, calling out, "Come back anytime!"
 



Masjid al-Rahman: A True Sanctuary

With our suhoor taken care of, we made a beeline for our next masjid: Masjid al-Rahman (The Mosque of The Most Merciful). As we hurried along, I could already see men in kufis and women in hijabs gathered at the entrance from a distance. I told my wife, "Do you see that group of Muslim brothers and sisters up ahead? This time, we definitely haven't come to the wrong place!" The mosque had two roll-up doors, one covering the prayer hall and the other serving as the entrance. After confirming there was a designated women's prayer area and a women's wudu station, we couldn't wait to go inside and recharge.

After praying, I took a moment to truly examine this masjid. It wasn't small at all. As Iftar time drew near, the number of people was substantial. There were small groups chatting by the walls, and others reciting Quran to a teacher. Through their official website, I learned that the jama'ah (congregation) in this area had been gathering and renting places for Jumu'ah since the 1990s, enduring three relocations before finally settling here. The first floor was the main prayer hall, and the basement held another surprise. The masjid had covered the entire basement with tablecloths, waiting for those breaking their fast to arrive.
 


I leaned against a pillar, charging my phone and resting. A study circle behind me caught my interest. Some young men were sitting around an elder, who was clearly imparting ilm (knowledge). About twenty minutes passed, and I figured my phone was charged enough. I quickly unplugged it and discreetly slipped into a spot next to a brother, not wanting to miss anything. I whispered to him, "Is this a halaqah (study circle) for new Muslims?" The brother whispered back, explaining that it covered basic Islamic knowledge, Quranic studies, and more. Our whispering must have disturbed the elder, as he paused his talk and reminded us to be quiet. We awkwardly sat upright in our places.

The Wisdom of Obligation Versus Tradition

When I joined, it was exactly during the Q&A session. A brother across from me, with the trendiest dreadlocks, was casually leaning against the wall, legs stretched out. Suddenly, the elder turned to him and asked gravely, "What are the seven external conditions for Salat (prayer)?" The young man immediately straightened up, knelt with his thighs upright, placed his hands on his thighs, closed his eyes tightly, and answered the Shaykh's question precisely: "Purity of body, purity of clothes, purity of place of prayer, covering the awrah (modesty), praying on time, facing the qibla, and having the correct niyyah (intention)!" At that moment, he sat rigidly, looking just like a student called to task. The Shaykh then asked about the essential elements of prayer and wudu. Finally, he asked him to recite Surah Al-Ikhlas ("The Chapter of Sincerity"). After answering all this, the young man slumped back into his original relaxed posture, like a balloon that had lost its air.

This teaching method was quite insightful. If we reflect on our own learning process for things like wudu, we often don't explicitly differentiate between its fardh (obligatory) and Sunnah (Prophetic tradition) elements. Instead, the focus is on formal instruction, teaching the entire wudu procedure as a whole. The same goes for salat. Every movement, every recitation is ingrained in our bones, but if you're pressed to explain what's fardh and what's Sunnah, you might not remember it with such clarity. This somewhat pragmatic approach, not emphasizing the distinction, can lead us to treat fardh and Sunnah as equally essential in practice. In special circumstances, our memory gets blurry, and it feels like everything is fardh and shouldn't be omitted. However, if we clearly understand that fardh are absolute obligations, and Sunnah are not strictly mandatory (referring only to special circumstances, as emphasized Sunnah implies you shouldn't casually abandon it!), then the issue becomes clear as daylight. I recall a brother recently asking in our group chat about the validity of wudu if one cannot rinse their mouth due to illness. How did the Imam answer? He said rinsing the mouth is Sunnah, so the wudu is still valid without it. Indeed, our Deen is one of ease.

 
 

 
 
 
The Abundance of Allah's Provision

Seeing the time was almost up, I told my wife to wait for me by the door while I quickly performed my wudu (ablution). When I emerged, my wife had a takeout container in her hand. She explained that one of the uncles at the masjid had seen us leaving and insisted she take a meal for iftar (breaking fast), a true blessing from Allah. We didn't have time to dwell on it; our minds were still set on the food carts we'd been eyeing, eager to get our actual iftar there.

After walking for less than five minutes, we finally settled on a large food cart. The young man working the cart seemed a bit green; he was out of pretty much everything we wanted, only having rice bowls and meat wraps left. We had no choice but to settle for what we could get. Just then, a Black uncle came bustling over. Without a word to the vendor, he grabbed some water from the cart, paid, and was about to leave. He seemed to notice my wife and I by our attire, and he extended a warm salam (peace greeting) to us. Masha'Allah.

After he left, I told my wife, "Subhanallah, there are so many Muslims here!" No sooner had the words left my mouth than the uncle reappeared. This time, he was carrying a bag overflowing with fruits and dates. He pulled out some bananas and oranges and insisted we take them, shoving them into our hands. The other people waiting for food around us looked on, perplexed, wondering what in the world was going on. After the uncle left, I smiled at an auntie nearby and tried to explain, "We're Muslims, fasting, and he gave us food." The auntie just smiled back. It was clear she didn't speak English and didn't understand my explanation, but the gesture of brotherhood transcended language.

A Sister in Need, A Prophet's Wisdom

Just that morning, we were wondering what we'd eat, and now we had a whole bag full of food. It felt as though Allah's grace was continuously flowing into our lives. Alhamdulillah (all praise is due to Allah)! As we waited, a young woman wearing a white hijab (headscarf) came over to buy food. I pointed to the dates in our bag and gestured for my wife to offer her some. The girl took the dates, and her previously serious expression instantly lit up with a smile. My wife chatted with her, while I pointed her in the direction of the masjid. It turned out this sister had no idea where there was a mosque nearby where she could break her fast. Subhanallah! It was a perfect moment for a small act of kindness.

This experience brought to mind the beautiful Hadith (Prophetic tradition) where the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was asked, "Which act in Islam is the most excellent?" He replied, "To feed others and to greet with salam (peace) those whom you know and those whom you do not know." (Recorded in Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim).

As we walked through the bustling streets of New York, my wife turned to me and said, "I feel so content with this trip." And how could I not feel the same? Indeed, Subhanallah, what a blessed journey!
 

 
 
  view all

Ramadan in the Big Apple: A Muslim's Journey

The last two days of the first week of Ramadan, my wife and I finally embarked on our long-awaited trip to New York. We were at the train station by the crack of dawn, before 7 AM, with the sky still dark. Even for a Monday, the station was buzzing with people; I figured a lot of folks, like us, were taking advantage of spring break. We'd planned this trip over a month ago. My wife's main goal was to see a special exhibition at the Asian Society Museum. I threw in, "Let's check out the Metropolitan Museum of Art while we're at it!" But as for what to do with the rest of our time, we were drawing a blank. My wife basically just threw up her hands, saying aside from wanting some good eats (most trips for us Muslims eventually boil down to that one line: "Let's get some good food"), she had no other demands.

When I think of New York these days, my mind doesn't immediately go to iconic landmarks like the Statue of Liberty or the World Trade Center. It feels like "freedom" and the concept of "global trade" are showing signs of continuous decline, perhaps on the brink of being swallowed by the tides of history once again. Instead, what pops into my head are the rumors floating around: daily shootings, rats scurrying through the subways, and all that jazz. The reports and the spread of these stories aren't really about genuinely caring whether New Yorkers are doing well; it's more about proving that folks in New York are worse off than we are. Faced with that kind of information environment, I just decided to go with the flow and document whatever I saw and heard, getting a firsthand feel for everything.

Flushing, Queens: The New Chinese Capital in America

We booked our hotel in Flushing, Queens. When we made the reservation, there was only one reason for choosing that spot: it was cheap. After a full day of hitting the museums, we got back to Flushing around 8 PM. New York, which had been bright and sunny all day, was now buffeted by strong winds, with icy raindrops occasionally hitting us. As my wife and I shivered our way out of the subway station, the streets were still packed with people. Suddenly, my wife shouted, "Sugar-roasted chestnuts!" I gazed at the sign, which looked just like the ones back home in China, and felt a bit disoriented. I said, "We've really come home this time." When I spotted a "Zhang Liang Malatang" (a popular Chinese hotpot chain), I was even more convinced. Most of the people walking around were Chinese faces, the sidewalks teeming with pedestrians, just like Shanghai's People's Square during rush hour. Mandarin was understood everywhere, and most of the signs on both sides of the street were written in Chinese. If you stepped away from the bustling commercial strips into the residential areas, you'd hear passersby talking on the phone with family in a Northeastern Chinese dialect, while a mother behind you might be reminding her school-aged daughter in Mandarin to study hard. If an American were knocked out cold and thrown into a sack, then dropped onto a street in Flushing, they'd wake up in a panic, convinced they'd been sold to China.

Of course, if you're looking for a quiet and safe place in New York, Flushing and its surrounding areas can probably fit the bill. Otherwise, Chinese people wouldn't choose to settle here. Compared to the old Chinatown downtown, a brother I met at the mosque who lives in Flushing put it this way: "It's safer here. Old Chinatown is Manhattan, after all, and you've got all sorts of characters there." I readily agreed. Following the Chinese is the way to go. Chinese people are known for "voting with their feet"—if more and more Chinese are flocking to a place, it pretty much tells you it's at least safe to live there. My wife and I chose a Malaysian restaurant there for our iftar (breaking the fast) that night. The restaurant had a halal certification, but the staff told us the Hainanese chicken rice wasn't halal. In the States, you see this kind of restaurant quite a bit. It’s a good reminder to always ask, even with a halal sign, because when it comes to halal, you can never be too careful.
 

 
 
 
 
Masjid Syed Jamaluddin Afghani: A Dawn Prayer Revelation

This mosque, Masjid Syed Jamaluddin Afghani, is one of four in the Flushing area, named after the renowned modern scholar, Afghani. You can tell from the name that it was founded by the Afghan community. Naming mosques after people is nothing out of the ordinary and pretty common. Not far from here, there's Masjid Hazrati Abu Bakr Siddique, and the Islamic Center in Midtown Manhattan is Masjid Usman Bin Affan. There are countless mosques named after Ali, too. So, a mosque named after a person doesn't really tell you much. This mosque is about two blocks from me, so I decided to go there for Fajr (dawn prayer).

I left home a little before 5:45 AM, and folks in Flushing were still fast asleep. The only people out on the streets were those like me, responding to the call that "prayer is better than sleep," and Koreans heading to church activities. It was my first time seeing churches hold events so early. As I walked, I kept looking at the churches along the road; people were constantly going in, and the music was already blaring inside.

It took about fifteen minutes to get to the mosque. It was too dark to see the whole building, but luckily, a few people wearing hats went in ahead of me, showing me where the door was. Once inside, Fajr hadn't started yet, but there were already about twenty people gathered, mostly South Asian faces, all silently waiting for the Imam to arrive. About five minutes later, there was still no sign of the Imam, and at this point, some folks started to get a little antsy. Someone quickly pushed an elder from the community forward to lead the prayer. An older gentleman in front of me seemed to have a different opinion, suggesting we wait another five minutes, and if the Imam still didn't show, then start. But nobody paid him any mind; they stuck to the schedule and prayed on time.
 



Post-Prayer Greetings: A Lingering Connection

After the prayer, I, as usual, shook hands with the people passing by who were also praying. The others in the mosque weren't in a rush to leave after the prayer; instead, they greeted each other and chatted. Greeting everyone after prayer can actually take a fair bit of time; when there are a lot of people, you feel like you're saying salam a hundred times. Have you ever experienced the "hand-shaking" (shaking hands and exchanging salams) after Eid prayers? I go through this almost every morning after Fajr in our "P-town" (Princeton). After the Imam finishes saying salam to the left and right, the crowd slowly starts to stir. Two strangers who meet will shake hands, smile, and say salam. If you've met a few times, you'll also ask, "How are you doing?" And if you're really familiar, it's like old friends who haven't seen each other in eight hundred years; their eyes meet, a look of surprise and delight crosses their faces simultaneously, then comes the handshake, the salam, and that's not even enough for the ritual. They'll also give each other a hug and exchange a few pleasantries. As other familiar faces pass by, the cycle begins anew.

About ten minutes later, most of the people in the mosque had pretty much left. At this point, the main prayer hall was filled with the sound of an old man and a younger man arguing. They seemed to disagree on the time for imsak (the start of fasting before Fajr). The old man spoke with great conviction, saying that most of the Ulama (scholars) believe that the Fajr time and imsak are the same, and you can pray after imsak. As for ending 15 minutes earlier, that's just for caution. His powerful voice seemed a bit out of place with his frail, trembling body. The younger brother, who was likely the mosque's spokesperson, spoke much softer and more politely. He was probably explaining to the old man what the mosque's regulations were, and so on. The old man cut him off, sticking to his point, and told him, "I don't want to hear what the mosque says. What the mosque decides has nothing to do with me. I just want to tell you what the scholars explain." With that, he limped off, leaning on his cane.

Honestly, it took me years to figure out this issue myself. Imsak is simply the beginning of Fajr time, and iftar (breaking fast) is the beginning of Maghrib time. Ending imsak 15 minutes early and delaying iftar by two or three minutes is purely a precautionary measure. Once you understand that, it becomes much easier to grasp the timing of imsak and iftar. Of course, this was a prime example of the confusion I experienced in my earlier years due to not knowing any better. Understanding the Deen greatly helps in practicing it; a muddled account simply means a muddled life.
 



A Sudanese Brother and a Tire Thief's Den

While they were arguing, I sat against the wall, reciting Quran and eavesdropping (as they say in Northeast China) on their "chit-chat." A young man sitting across from me seemed undisturbed by their discussion; every time I looked his way, he was quietly reading the Quran. When only the two of us were left in the mosque, I got up and walked over to him, pretending to look at the bulletin board above his head, all while trying to figure out how to strike up a conversation. To my surprise, as soon as I got in front of him, he greeted me: "Brother, where are you from?" My heart leapt with joy, and the floodgates of conversation immediately opened. We briefly introduced ourselves. He was Sudanese, named Wasim, and a medical student.

Soon after, another older uncle joined us. They seemed to know each other. The uncle asked Wasim if he was busy, and the young man said, "You know how it is in the hospital; I can only bounce between the mosque and the hospital." I asked, "So you don't go shopping then? How do you get your groceries and stuff?" He just said, "Amazon." The uncle, listening in, chuckled and said, "I still prefer to buy things myself, especially fruits and vegetables. I have to see them with my own eyes." We chatted casually about various topics. They asked me about the situation in China, and I shared my thoughts on Flushing. I told them that what surprised me most about Flushing was how Chinese people online always complained about people here stealing tires. I asked if it was true. Wasim thought for a moment and said that theft is pretty common. "There's a well-known shop around here," he explained, "if you lose something, you go to that shop, and nine times out of ten, you'll be able to buy your stolen item back."

Chinese Muslims in Flushing: A Scattered Community

Compared to Wasim, the uncle was an old hand, very familiar with Flushing. I asked these two brothers living in Flushing if they had ever seen any Chinese Muslims here. The young man thought for a bit and said he knew a young man named Omar, whom he often saw on Fridays and at some hadith (Prophetic tradition) study classes. Besides him, he hadn't seen anyone else. The uncle seemed to know Omar too. He said that the first time he saw that Chinese man, he had long hair. The uncle gestured with his hand to show the approximate length. He told Omar, "Hair this long isn't very good." The second time the uncle saw Omar, he was surprised to find that Omar's hair was cut very, very short. I asked, "Besides Omar?" They tried hard to remember. "Yes, there was one more, but not Hui Muslim like you." I pressed a bit further, "Was Omar a convert or born Muslim?" They said he was a convert.

I then voiced my confusion. I told them it seemed difficult to find Chinese people in the mosque, and it wasn't like the Indo-Pakistani or other ethnic groups who have their own mosques. The uncle immediately corrected my second point. He said, "Mosques are the same everywhere, so there's no need for Chinese people to have their own mosque. That's Islam." The uncle told me to observe the churches in Flushing; there are so many of them, almost every denomination has its own church, and people from different denominations usually don't go to each other's churches. "But here, all the mosques are the same. Chinese people can go to any mosque. Every mosque has the same prayer, the same Jumu'ah. People from different backgrounds can enter confidently. Maybe Chinese Muslims are just spread out among all the mosques." The uncle's words were confirmed later during my stroll; there was one main road where almost every intersection had a Korean church.

The Mosque's True Form: A Hidden Gem

After about an hour of chatting, the uncle got up and motioned for us, inviting us to see the mosque's true "form." The place where we had just prayed was probably less than 100 square meters, and I was thinking, in such a large city, how much room could there possibly be for imagination? Following the uncle's lead, we walked out of the main prayer hall and turned towards a basement entrance. I followed him skeptically. When he opened the door, Wasim and I were both blown away, exclaiming that it was a whole other world! It turned out the place where we had just prayed was just a temporary side hall; the real mosque hadn't been used in winter because the heating hadn't been fixed. Including the basement, this mosque had three floors. The basement was a common area, with even a room for washing the deceased (ghusl). The second and third floors were the men's and women's prayer halls, respectively.

I asked the uncle, "Are there many women?" The uncle said that on Eid, the third floor was packed. I estimated that would be a few hundred people. I asked the uncle how much such a mosque cost and if it was funded by Muslim donations. The uncle said, "About $3 million. Donations from ordinary Muslims definitely aren't enough. There are always some wealthy individuals who cover the vast majority of the costs." Next, we followed the uncle to the first floor. The uncle pointed to a small room by the entrance of the main prayer hall, explaining that it was a restroom for those who didn't have time to go downstairs for wudu. I remarked, "New York is different; everyone's always on the go." The uncle then pointed to an uninstalled iron gate leaning against the wall and mysteriously said, "This iron gate was bought from China." My eyes bulged out as I confirmed with him, "Are you saying this iron gate with the crescent moon decoration on it?" It's quite ironic, I thought. Back home, we might not even be allowed to use such decorations, yet you bought them from China. The uncle chuckled and said, "Chinese people can sell anything!" And he cracked up.
 

 


A Mosque's Distinct Identity & Community Pushback

Stepping outside, the day had also brightened up considerably. The uncle pointed to the entrance. "That spot used to be the original main door," he explained. "We moved the door inward a bit so we could squeeze in two more parked cars." Space is at a premium here, so making smart use of every square foot is absolutely crucial.

I looked back at the mosque again, and it was then that I truly saw its distinct identity as a mosque. The not-so-tall minarets on either side stood in clear contrast to the surrounding buildings. Mosques like this are actually a rare find in urban areas. When you factor in the cost, having a dome and minarets means you need a completely undeveloped plot of land, which is practically a pipe dream in Manhattan.

Of course, they also run into some bumps in the road here. For instance, neighboring residents complain that during Jumu'ah (Friday congregational prayer), there are too many people, the loudspeakers are too loud, and they demand the mosque keep its windows closed, and so on. The uncle, with a slight hint of disdain, scoffed, "The prayer itself is only half an hour, and it's not like it's every single day. They clearly just don't want a mosque here and are looking for trouble."

However, there are exceptions. Wasim mentioned that his landlord, who is Chinese, has actually been eager to visit the mosque with him. I encouraged him, saying, "You've absolutely got to bring him. Don't forget about our Chinese brothers and sisters!"

Dar Al Taqwa Islamic Center: Another Welcoming Spot

After wrapping up my chat with them, I made my way to another mosque, and this one was much more polished by comparison. Wasim had told me about this mosque, saying that scholars often give lectures there, and he really enjoys going. The people at this mosque were also very courteous. When they saw me come in, they warmly asked where I was from and then inquired about where I was planning to break my fast that evening, insisting that I come back because they had iftar (breaking fast) meals ready. Before I left, one of them pointed to the door and said, "The mosque door is always open. You're welcome to come any time." Alhamdulillah!
 

 


Streets Lined with Diverse Houses of Worship
 
 

As I walked along the main thoroughfares, it was striking to see church after church, often right next to each other, especially Korean churches at almost every intersection. It truly made me ponder the diverse religious landscape of this city.
  view all

From Steeple to Minaret: A Growing Trend

Last year, I heard from the news that a Muslim group in Buffalo, New York, was planning to convert St. Ann Catholic Church, a local landmark, into a mosque. This Gothic-style building had been closed for five years before the Muslims bought it. The group plans to invest at least $22.5 million in renovations. News like this often spreads like wildfire within the Muslim community, seen as a kind of spiritual conquest in the West: Christianity is supposedly declining, while Islam is flourishing. But this change in building use isn't just about some psychological intent by Muslims (though, yes, there might be a preference for churches). From an economic standpoint, it simply makes perfect sense: there are too many abandoned Christian churches, and with a constant increase in Muslim immigrants and converts, a slight modification to a church – removing the idols from the sanctuary – makes it a natural prayer hall.

If you can't change their faith, change their architecture. While in the East, this might be seen as an affront or a test of obedience from an authority figure to a group, in the West, it's more about going with the flow. Nowadays, I hardly bat an eye at this kind of news anymore. "Church-to-mosque" conversions have clearly become a trend, a growing reality. Even though I haven't specifically sought out these converted mosques, I've come across enough of them to dedicate an entire article to the ones I've encountered. It's not just churches; mosques have even been theaters, or get this, even nightclubs!
 


Mosques Across the States: From Churches to Nightclubs

Let me share some of the fascinating transformations I've witnessed, from coast to coast.

Massachusetts Mosques

Dar al-Islam of Boston

138 Tremont St, Boston, MA 02111

Located right in downtown Boston, Dar al-Islam is the only publicly accessible place where you can find Jumu'ah (Friday congregational prayer). Dar al-Islam is probably the weirdest example on this list because it genuinely is a church: St. Paul Catholic Church, and it still has all its church facilities intact. But it's not just a church; Muslims aren't simply borrowing the church for Jumu'ah prayers (which is actually pretty common in North America, as churches often lend their space to Muslims for Jumu'ah before a proper mosque is established in an area). No, this is a legitimate usage because the Muslim community actually helped sponsor its construction. So, you get this bizarre sight: this church has special sinks for Muslims to perform wudu (ablution). Of course, this particular church only functions as a prayer space on Fridays.

 
 
 


Islamic Society of Greater Worcester

57 Laurel St, Worcester, MA 01605

The Islamic Society of Greater Worcester's building was originally bought and built as a church by Finnish Evangelicals in 1906. In 1957, it converted to a Lutheran church. By 1977, the church faced problems like a dwindling active membership, insufficient funds, and a deteriorating surrounding neighborhood. Finally, in 1979, it was sold for $27,000 to the Islamic Foundation of North America, and by 1980, the building officially became a mosque.

During the conversion, the pews were removed, and the church's second floor was transformed into the main prayer hall. There was even a debate for a while about the qibla (direction of prayer), leading to prayers being conducted in two different directions for some time! Ultimately, the community agreed on the qibla direction based on publications from the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA).
 

 
 


Rhode Island Mosques

Masjid Ali

575 Charles St, Providence, RI 02904

This mosque has a really odd layout. To perform wudu, you have to walk through the main prayer hall, then enter a door next to the qibla. While heading to the basement for wudu, I bumped into the mosque's manager. When he heard I was from China, he immediately started speaking Chinese! Turns out, the uncle had worked in Guangzhou about a decade ago. As we chatted, I learned that this mosque was only established a year and a half ago, and he seemed to be the one who founded it. The reason for the strange layout? It used to be a bank, so it still has the old vault doors! I asked the uncle if he leads prayers, and he said several people do. I then asked why they don't invite an Imam, and he simply replied they couldn't afford one. Despite not having a full-time Imam, this small mosque, with less than a hundred people on Friday, still offers Quran classes for kids. It's a true case of being small but mighty, having everything you need.
 
 


Chicago Mosques

Muslim Community Center (MCC Chicago)

4380 N Elston Ave, Chicago, IL 60641

The MCC headquarters on Elston Avenue in Chicago really catches your eye because this building was once the Rivoli Theater, built in 1923. The interior of the mosque still retains the original architectural structure of the theater. The main prayer hall is the former performance hall, complete with a raised stage and a sunken audience area, and the second-floor balcony has also been repurposed into a prayer area.
 

 


Chicago Merkez Camii

3617 W Belle Plaine Ave, Chicago, IL 0618

Founded in 2011, Chicago Merkez Camii, or Chicago Central Mosque, was previously St. Andrew’s Church. It was later converted into a Muslim community center and mosque, primarily serving the Turkish community.
 
 


Islamic Oasis Center and Mosque

4201 N Monticello Ave, Chicago, IL 60618

Established in 2008, the Islamic Oasis Center and Mosque is just two blocks away from Merkez Camii and quite similar to it. This mosque was also converted from a church; its predecessor was the United Methodist Church, built in 1898. This mosque not only provides local Islamic learning, social services, and after-school tutoring but also engages in humanitarian work overseas, supporting charity efforts in places like Bangladesh and Syria.
 

 


Masjid E Noor

6151 N Greenview Ave, Chicago, IL 60660

This mosque has a very distinctive exterior, and it also appears to be a church conversion. When I prayed Jumu'ah there, I saw many Central Asian faces.

Dar-us-Sunnah Masjid (House of Guidance Mosque) also underwent a church conversion.
 
 
 


Baitul Huda (House of Guidance)

1136 Wesley Ave, Evanston, IL 60202
 



Portland

Al Furqan Islamic Center

7410 NE Martin Luther King Jr Blvd, Portland, OR 97211

As I looked at the exterior of this mosque, I thought the building's theme was a bit strange. There was a prominent sign-like protrusion on the roof that read "Moon Star." Once inside, I asked a young man who was leading prayers, and he explained that before its conversion, this place was a nightclub! Allahu Akbar! From the dance floor to the prayer mat – only Allah could orchestrate such a transformation.
 
  view all

A Little Bit of Rhode Island, A Whole Lot of Faith

Now, Rhode Island, in New England, is the smallest state in the U.S. – it's even tinier than Shanghai if you lop off its Pudong New Area. But here's the kicker: Rhode Island isn't even an island; it's a coastal state defined by its ocean vibes. Before I landed in the States, I didn't know a thing about this place. And honestly, that's no surprise – even Americans often mistake it for Long Island, New York, when I tell them where I'm from. Its biggest claims to fame are probably Newport, where The Great Gatsby was filmed, and that sweet old Judge Caprio from Caught in Providence, who's let countless folks off the hook for their traffic tickets.

So, when I found out there's an Islamic School in this little state with just over a million people, I was more than a little surprised. After all, compared to Massachusetts next door, Rhode Island's education system has always had its share of critics. Public schools are often underfunded, good teachers can be hard to come by, and top-notch schools are as rare as hens' teeth. What's more, in a state like Rhode Island, which is considered a liberal stronghold, the education scene is a hotbed of ideological clashes. Just last year, a local parent who questioned her daughter's kindergarten curriculum filed a public records request and ended up getting sued by the teachers' union. This case really shines a light on some conservative parents' worries about issues like Critical Race Theory (CRT) and radical gender education. In this kind of environment, it makes perfect sense that some more conservative Muslim families would choose to send their kids to an Islamic school.

My First Visit to the Muslim School

For a long time, I'd been itching to see how this school actually ran. As luck would have it, one of the Shaykhs who leads prayers at the mosque – he's a Quran teacher at this very school. He'd actually invited me a year ago to share my Quran recitation experiences with his students. He chuckled and said:

"Shanghai (that's his nickname for me, subhanallah!), I tell my students, 'You know what? I know a Chinese guy whose Quran recitation is fantastic. He doesn't even know Arabic, but he can learn to recite. What's your excuse, you Arabs, for not learning properly?'"

Hearing that, I felt a sense of contentment on one hand, but also a touch of irony. In this small, provincial corner of the world, "a Chinese person who can recite the Quran" had become a big deal, a rare sight. Nevertheless, I accepted Shaykh's invitation. Yet, in the days that followed, our conversations always seemed to get stuck on "What day are you free?" and "Definitely next week." It wasn't until late 2024 that the visit finally came to fruition.

The school's location is pretty out of the way, which was one reason I'd dragged my feet for so long. The school itself isn't huge, just two buildings: one for classrooms and a gym. As the only Muslim institution in the area, the gym doubles as a prayer space during Ramadan, and it's also open every Friday for teachers, students, and the local community to perform Jumu'ah (Friday congregational prayer). Even with limited facilities, the school offers a broad education, covering everything from kindergarten all the way to eighth grade (in the U.S., high school is grades nine through twelve). The school boasts computer labs, meeting rooms, and other multi-purpose classrooms – it's truly a case of being small but mighty, with everything you need.
 

 

 

 

 

 
 
 
 
School Operations and Curriculum: A Balancing Act

This school, by the way, has got its teaching license directly from the state government. The principal, proud as punch, told me:

"Our school is just like any other. Our students participate in state activities, and some of our graduates have even gotten into Brown University."

Even though it's called an Islamic School, the main learning during the day revolves around regular subjects like science, math, English, and history. The religion-related classes – things like Arabic and Quran studies – are saved for after school. This setup means students hit all their regular academic targets, but it also stretches the school day a bit longer. Public schools usually let out around 3:30 PM, but the Muslim school's classes don't wrap up until 5:30 PM, which is a real convenience for a lot of parents picking up their kids.

Shaykh gathered all the students from different grades together. I took a seat in the front, recited a couple of pages from the Quran, and chatted with the kids. After I shared my own learning journey, the students and teachers were chock-full of questions about China. Some asked, "Is it easy to find halal restaurants in China? Which cities should we go to for a Muslim experience?" or "Do you get picked on for your faith in China?" Still, a few of the older boys were dozing off the whole time. In that moment, I felt like I was back in my teaching shoes again.
 



 

 



Campus Life and Community Support: A Family Affair

After the event, I took a stroll around the campus with Shaykh. Peeking into the classrooms from the back door, each one was decorated brightly and colorfully, showing off that typical American school vibe. The desks and chairs were set up just like a traditional classroom, but with so few students in each class, the rooms felt pretty spacious. Even the kindergarteners were sitting in neat rows, good as gold. The teachers led the kids in learning Arabic letters through nursery rhymes, showing how deeply Arabic education is woven into their daily lives from a young age.

The Muslim school in Rhode Island has been going strong for twenty years through thick and thin. And none of it would be possible without the community's support. Every Ramadan, the school throws a fundraising gala because, let's be real, running on just $6,000 in annual tuition fees is a non-starter. But the school offers a trustworthy option for local Muslim families. Just last week, I happened to run into a graduate from this school at the mosque. He was part of the school's second graduating class, and now he's a father, successful in his career, and on his way to becoming a qualified doctor. His Quran memorization is top-notch, and he often leads the recitation during prayers. Shaykh remembered him clearly and brought up quite a few old stories.

Another Option: Sunday School

Besides the full-time school, the mosque's Sunday school is another popular choice for parents. The Sunday school divides students into classes based on their knowledge level, focusing on Arabic letters, recitation rules, Arabic grammar, and the Prophet's (PBUH) life story. The curriculum is set up much like a regular school, with quizzes and final exams throughout the semester. Students who graduate from the highest level of Sunday school generally have a solid grasp of Arabic grammar, are familiar with recitation rules, and can recite the last two Juz' (parts) of the Quran from memory.
 


Freedom to Thrive: Why This Land Still Beckons

The relaxed environment for free speech and the freedom to run schools are big reasons why this land still attracts immigrants. At least here, the requirements for running a religious school are pretty straightforward. You can grow a long beard without anyone giving you grief, and nobody bats an eye if you pray in public. Before I came here, I could hardly imagine Islam appearing so "uninhibitedly" in any corner of the West. Even at top universities, schools actually budget to hire Imams to serve Muslim students on campus and specifically set aside a room for Muslim student activities. Honestly, just over a decade ago, during those wild, anything-goes years, our universities were just as open. The seeds sown in those years easily took root in our hearts. Who knows when the season of rampant sowing will come again, insha'Allah (God willing).
  view all

Unveiling Islam in Taiwan: A Muslim Traveler's Perspective

For the longest time, the idea of "Taiwan" and "Islam" in the American mind felt like two completely unrelated concepts. It's tough for folks to naturally picture a place there where Muslims could truly put down roots and thrive. If it even crossed their minds, it was usually imagined much like other Northeast Asian countries: a need for foreign laborers due to an aging population. These workers, often from Muslim nations, toiled in low-wage jobs within an unfamiliar culture, all while clinging to religious beliefs that locals might find "odd and out of place."

Thanks to the rapid growth of the internet over the past decade, the Hui Muslim community in mainland China has definitely gained a deeper understanding of their Taiwanese counterparts. In Shanghai, especially, there are more chances to connect with Muslim friends, relatives, or workers from the island. These interactions give us a peek behind the curtain, offering a glimpse into their lives. Taiwan's relatively open publishing industry has also allowed a wealth of Islam-related Chinese books to flow back to the mainland, building crucial bridges between East and West, and between different faiths and cultures.
 
 

 


Truth be told, Taiwan's modern Muslim history is far richer than most people imagine. It's a story that globalizes local Hui history, tracing their journey from the mainland, heading south into Myanmar and Thailand, and eventually finding their home in Taiwan. Their individual experiences paint a hidden yet grand picture of East Asian Islam. My trip this time was only ten days – not enough time to tell the whole enchilada, but I hope to leave a few clues for others to chew on later.

Taipei: Muslim-Friendly Amenities Galore

The Taipei Grand Mosque is certainly no longer an "isolated island" of faith, and Islamic beliefs are no longer confined within mosque walls. The Taiwanese authorities have been pushing a "Muslim-Friendly Policy" in recent years, setting up convenient facilities for Muslims in transportation hubs, universities, and major tourist spots. We're talking prayer rooms, dedicated facilities for wudu (ablution), and the like. The very first day I arrived in Taipei, I spotted clear signs for Muslim facilities in the downtown Taipei Main Station. Following the directions, it was a piece of cake to find both the restrooms and the prayer room.



Even though I didn't actually need to pray at that moment, I specifically asked a kind cleaning lady to open the wudu room door, just to see if it was the real deal or just for show. To my surprise, she was super enthusiastic, opened the door right away, and even proactively told me where the prayer room was and how to use it. In that moment, my tired body and soul immediately felt a boost – Taiwan really made a fantastic first impression. When someone extends a hand of kindness, we shouldn't just gladly accept it; we should also respond positively. If every Muslim doesn't overlook these readily available conveniences, then those who set up these facilities will also truly feel the meaning and necessity of their efforts.
 
 
 
 
Descendants of the "Lonely Army" on Myanmar Street

The very first day I landed in Taipei, even before checking into my hotel, I was in a hurry-scurry to get to the Taipei Grand Mosque, right next to Daan Forest Park. I rolled up just in time for a funeral, and honestly, seeing the family all dressed in black, lined up in two rows on the way to the wudu room, really caught me off guard. The deceased was there, waiting to be washed. I, with my luggage in tow, walked into the wudu room under their somewhat puzzled gazes. I naturally figured most of these family members weren't Muslim and probably wondered why a rushed traveler like me was heading into a washroom meant for the departed. Without a second to spare, I quickly performed wudu and headed to the main prayer hall, waiting for Dhuhr (midday prayer).

Glancing around at the people waiting for prayer, my eyes immediately landed on the "legendary" newly appointed young Imam. I went over and gave him a salam, and we agreed to chat after prayers. After we finished, we all stood for the Janazah (funeral prayer) for the deceased. Afterward, we started talking, and when the young Imam mentioned the deceased, he told me the person might be a descendant of Yunnan Hui Muslims from Myanmar, a young man from Myanmar Street, not even 30 years old. He also mentioned he was heading to "Myanmar Street" that evening to grab some food. I was all ears, quickly asking what the connection was between Myanmar Street and Muslims. To my surprise, the Imam explained that a significant part of Taiwan's Muslim community is made up of these Yunnanese Muslims, and Myanmar Street is one of their main hangouts. My aimless Taiwan trip suddenly had a bullseye: Myanmar Street.
 
 
 
 
 

Myanmar Street: Home to the "Lonely Army's" Descendants

Hua Xin Street, nestled in Taipei's Zhonghe District, is widely known as "Myanmar Street." It's a vibrant hub for Burmese Chinese and, crucially, a stopping point for Hui Muslims from Yunnan. These folks are descendants of what's often called the "Burma-Thailand Lonely Army," gradually settling here after the 1980s. The "Lonely Army," also known as the "Yunnan-Burma Lonely Army" or "Remnants of the KMT Army," refers to Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) troops who retreated to Myanmar after the People's Republic of China was established in 1949. A significant number of Yunnanese Muslim soldiers and their families moved with them, forming a distinct Muslim community within the ranks of this "Lonely Army." Early on, a large number of these Muslim families found a base in the border regions of Myanmar's Shan and Kachin states. Another segment later migrated to northern Thailand, making their lives along the Mekong River.
 


For most Taiwanese, these folks are cultural and geographical "outsiders." The Imam, with a touch of melancholy, recently told me that young people aren't really into Islam anymore, and many religious practices have simply become "customs." You could see this plain as day among the young folks at the funeral. While the older aunties wore their headscarves, the younger generation opted for general funeral attire – black to show respect – looking no different from any other non-Muslim from the outside. The Initium (a Chinese digital media outlet) even published an article titled "The Outsiders" that delves into the identity struggles of a young person from Myanmar Street. These Muslim descendants grapple with a unique "Yunnan-Myanmar-Taiwan" triple cultural identity, a blend of Chinese culture, Islamic faith, and Southeast Asian influences. But they don't quite belong to Myanmar, and it seems they don't fully belong to Taiwan either. Even their Yunnan accent has become a source of discrimination. Myanmar Street is their Huifang – their Muslim quarter. For the younger generation "from the block," stepping outside this Huifang might feel like a more "fitting" integration, while holding onto your turf makes you a stubborn outsider. It’s the bitter taste of growing up in the Huicamps. Perhaps it’s not until they can truly think for themselves that they can appreciate the preciousness of what they already possess.
 

 


Despite all this, Myanmar Street remains their Huifang. Burmese signs are everywhere you look, and the names of street snacks like "Ersi" (rice noodles) and "Ganba" (dried beef) betray their Yunnan roots. Here, you can still confidently enjoy halal food that’s both Burmese and Yunnanese. The older sister running the "Yongli" snack shop told me she only arrived in Taiwan a few years ago and isn't quite used to living here. If her husband hadn't been here for decades, she never would have considered moving. Everything is just so different. Speaking in a somewhat broken Yunnan-inflected Mandarin, she warned me, "Young folks gotta be careful and protect yourselves, okay? Yesterday, a young guy died in a motorcycle accident, only in his twenties." I quickly chimed in, "I stood for the Janazah at the mosque today for the deceased. You must be talking about that very same person!"
 
 
Longgang: Another Haven for Yunnan Muslims in Taiwan

These days, Longgang, over in Taoyuan's Zhongli District, is another super important spot where Yunnan Muslims have really set down roots. Back in the 1950s, the Taiwanese government brought over the Dian-Myanmar "Lonely Army" and their families from Thailand and Myanmar, settling them all right here. To keep their faith alive and kicking, the Muslim community pooled their resources and built the Longgang Mosque. It's not just a place for salat (prayers); it's a vibrant hub where their culture and spirit come together. The fact that every single mosque in Taiwan has a Yunnanese Imam really shows just how big a deal these Yunnan descendants are within the Taiwanese Muslim community.
 
 

 

 

 

 
Lukang: Where History and Faith Whisper (Quietly)

My first footprint on the mainland Hui Muslim journey in Taiwan was in Lukang, a town absolutely bursting with incense smoke. As I made my way south from Taipei to Taichung, my Aunt Ma, who I'd been in touch with, kept bringing up taking me to Lukang. I was a bit in the dark, honestly, wondering what this little town had to do with Hui Muslims. Once I hit Taichung, Sister Shi, who picked me up with my aunt, was a local from Lukang herself. She told me she was a descendant of the famous General Shi Lang, and that Lukang was one of the very first places mainlanders settled in Taiwan. Lukang’s temples are crammed with worshipers; Sister Shi mentioned they get tens of millions of visitors every year. Walking near the old street, temples and ancestral halls are everywhere, and as Aunt Ma put it, "The idols have taken over this place."
 


Sister Shi, with her headscarf, definitely sticks out like a sore thumb here. But even before she embraced Islam, she wasn't part of the mainstream. She used to be a devout Christian, knew her Bible inside and out, and could debate scripture with anyone.

But the Lukang I want to talk about is a different side of it – this is where Taiwan first intersected with Hui Muslims. As early as the late Ming Dynasty, some descendants of Hui Muslims living in the Quanzhou region followed the migration waves to Taiwan, settling in what is now Lukang and Taisi. This marked the earliest recorded presence of Muslims in Taiwan. Today, Lukang is primarily home to the Chen-dai Ding and Guo families. The earliest observations of them date back to the 1920s, when scholars noted there wasn't a single trace of Islamic practice left in their lives. Their descendants even revealed that their ancestors had a strict rule: "Hide the fact that you are Muslim at all costs." Despite fully adopting Han customs, their family genealogies still record their connections to the mainland and their Muslim ancestors. The Ding clan in Lukang still knows they are descendants of the 18th generation. Some of their unique ancestral worship rituals might also hint at their special identity. For instance, the Ding family has a peculiar custom during funerals called "Guan Mao" (pouring water from the roof into a well) where the family patriarch or eldest grandson pours three cups of wine into a bowl. The Ding family's main house is a siheyuan (quadrangle courtyard), which from above forms the Chinese character "回" (Hui/return), unlike the local sanheyuan (three-sided courtyard). Plus, there are no ancestral tablets in their ancestral hall. For the Guo clan, not using pork in their ancestral worship is perhaps more direct evidence of their Muslim lineage. The Guo family also doesn't invite Taoist priests to chant scriptures; instead, they specifically invite someone familiar with Guo family customs to perform the rituals. There's even a rumor that a local temple called Bao'an Temple was originally a mosque, later converted into an ancestral hall.

Unlike the Yunnanese descendants who came to Taiwan in the 1980s, Lukang presents a much more localized form of Muslim history, and you won't find many visible signs of Islam here. There's only one small prayer spot for Indonesian migrant workers, maintained and managed by two Taiwanese converts to Islam. The converts and the deeply assimilated Hui descendants form a stark contrast. Modern Lukang is booming with traditional worship, but it's also stubbornly resistant to change. Grandpa Xue, a convert from Kaohsiung, picked up his Iman (faith) after converting and started Da'wah (religious outreach) in a park not far from the Lukang Mosque. In over ten years, he only managed to guide one person to Islam – and that person was my guide, Sister Shi.
 
 

 

 

 

 
 


 
Kaohsiung: Tracing the Footsteps of Our Elders


Kaohsiung holds a special place, as it was one of the first cities in Taiwan to establish a mosque. The early Kaohsiung Mosque was originally located at 117 Wufu 4th Road in Yancheng District – that spot is actually a Hong Kong-style tea restaurant now. Back then, the second floor had tatami mats laid out for prayer, a small space, until they eventually moved to Linsen 1st Road. Not far from this old prayer hall, there was a Beijing Halal Restaurant that was a regular hangout spot for the "people of the faith."

The owner of that halal restaurant was a man named Zhao Mingyuan from Qingzhou, Shandong. During the Republic of China era, he actually recommended Imam Wang Jingzhai to serve at the Qingzhou Mosque. Even after coming to Taiwan with the Kuomintang in '48, his heart remained devoted to the Deen (faith). He was one of the original founders, along with twelve others, who established the Kaohsiung Mosque. When I mentioned Zhao Mingyuan, a teacher named Y from Taipei told me that the Zhao clan of Qingzhou was a prominent family, a big deal in the Muslim community, and they contributed a ton to the Deen. Nowadays, the Zhao family gatherings are practically international events, with their descendants found from mainland China all the way to North America. There’s even a Chinese-American Imam named Zhao in the States who's part of that very family. But perhaps even more well-known in Taiwan is the grandson of elder Zhao Mingyuan, the famous former Imam of the Taipei Grand Mosque, Dr. Zhao Xilin. Today, the Kaohsiung Mosque has been at its current location on Jianjun Road in Lingya District since 1992. The first Imam of the new Kaohsiung Mosque, Chen Yongwu, hails from Myanmar and is still serving there today, carrying on the rich tradition of the Dian-Myanmar Muslims.

Of course, there are also some less visible Hui Muslims who quietly live in Kaohsiung, like my own grand-uncle. After being forced to retreat to Taiwan with the larger army as a wounded soldier, my grand-uncle lived alone on this land. He didn't seem to interact with these active "people of the faith." I often wondered, as a Hui Muslim from Northeast China, how he managed to make a life for himself all alone here. Following the address my dad sent me, which had been mailed from Taiwan, I went to his old place. Now, it's just a parking lot – nothing left of what it used to be.
 

 

 

 


 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 

 
 
A Mix of Sacred and Secular: Indonesian Prayer Spots

Given Taiwan's geography and terrain, the island's east coast has always been pretty off the beaten path, with very few people living there. So, finding a sizable Muslim community there is practically a pipe dream. Even so, you can still scout out some places to pray in a few cities. The thing is, these prayer spots aren't necessarily what you'd call serene or super peaceful. When I followed my map to two Indonesian prayer spots in Hualien City, the noisy surroundings honestly made me cringe a little bit.

At one of them, the first floor was a bustling restaurant, and the third floor was the prayer hall. But get this: sandwiched right in between, on the second floor, was a hidden dance hall! So, there I was, praying on the third floor, prostrating to Allah (SWT), and feeling the vibrations of the speakers and hearing the faint sounds of singing wafting up from the floor below. Subhanallah! It was a truly unique experience, a test of focus, no doubt.

At the other prayer spot in Hualien, the secular world had seeped in even more thoroughly. The prayer room was still upstairs, but the first floor was like a reception area, or maybe a community hangout. As soon as you walked in, there was a living room setup, complete with a kitchen. Indonesian folks were busy preparing meals right there for others sitting downstairs. I gave a friendly nod to the "hosts" on the first floor and headed upstairs to pray. Just when I thought this might be a quieter spot, a wave of smoke from downstairs started drifting up, making the second floor feel all hazy and ethereal – and not in a good way, if you catch my drift.

Ultimately, though, much like the laborers themselves, the Deen (faith) here is something that's been brought in from elsewhere. Beyond these two prayer spots, even finding a single halal restaurant was a tall order, almost a luxury. It truly put into perspective the challenges faced by our brothers and sisters in places where Islam isn't the dominant culture. May Allah make it easy for them.
 

 

 

 

 
 

 
 
 
Taichung Mosque: A Hub of Faith

Taichung is home to a pretty active Muslim community, and my main reason for coming to Taiwan this time around was to visit my Uncle and Aunt Ma, who live there. Now, Uncle Ma, bless his heart, is an engineer by trade, not some academic from an Islamic studies program. But in his free time, he dedicates himself to a word-by-word morphological and grammatical analysis of the Quran, then pays out of his own pocket to print and publish his findings online for others to learn from. Aunt Ma, for her part, is the quiet force behind the scenes, a true pillar of strength for the Taichung Mosque. They've been my gateway to understanding Taiwan's Muslim community, and getting to know them has really opened my eyes.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Culture Mosque: A Community-Driven Space

As one of only two real mosques in Taipei, the Culture Mosque doesn't have a permanent Imam. So, it's usually run by amateur Imams. There's one particular Pakistani uncle who prays there regularly; he's gotten Taiwanese citizenship through marriage and is now a bona fide Taiwanese citizen. Masha'Allah!

Food Chronicles: Beef and Its Vegetarian Buddies

Long story short, if you're on the west side of Taiwan, you won't have any trouble finding halal food. But head east, and you're pretty much out of luck. There are no more than two halal spots in Taitung, and maybe three at most in Hualien... it's a tough nut to crack if you're trying to keep things strictly halal.
 


 


Halal Bites Across the Island

Halal cuisine at Taipei Airport (A true blessing when you're traveling!)
 
 


Taiwan's chain fried chicken shops (Always a crowd-pleaser!)
 

 

 

 


Halal beef noodle soup joint in Kaohsiung (A warm bowl of goodness!)
 



Halal beef noodle shop in Taipei (Classic comfort food, Muslim-style!)
 


 


A halal Roujiamo (Chinese meat burger) spot (A little taste of home for many!)
 

 




Postscript: The Unfolding Journey

Taiwan really brought to mind a topic we often discuss: migration. For an individual, migration can be quite a conscious choice, a proactive step. But for an entire community, it feels like there's no escaping the gears of destiny and the call of Qadar (Divine decree), no matter where you go. The reality that descends upon a community can't be faced by constantly running away. Some might ask if Taiwan is suitable for Muslims to live in. If you consider food, clothing, and education, simply existing as a Muslim here is a huge test. Yet, you can't really tell those who've already put down roots here to find a more "Muslim-friendly" country. Looking back at them, they've constantly been on the move, and while Taiwan might not be the ideal Jannah (paradise), it has given them a chance to catch their breath. We, as humans, merely pass through this life fleetingly. It's only by accepting hardships that we can truly overcome them and face the Hereafter with peace. Finding glimmers of light – good people and good deeds – amidst the chaos was truly enough to uplift my ruh (spirit) and strengthen my iman. Alhamdulillah for all His blessings.
 
 
 
  view all

1.0 Introduction

Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
 
 
 
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
 
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
 
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities. view all

3:98 Say, ‘People of the Book, why do you reject Allah’s Signs when Allah is witness of everything you do?’ 3:99 Say, ‘People of the Book, why do you bar those who believe from the Way of Allah, desiring to make it crooked, when you yourselves are witnesses to it? Allah is not unaware of what you do. ‘Why do you bar from the Way of Allah?’
 
 
It means to turn people away from the dīn of Allah. Al-Ḥasan recited ‘tuṣiddūna’ [instead of ‘taṣuddūna’]. They are two dialectical forms from ṣadda, aṣadda. ‘Crookedness’ denotes bias and deviation in the dīn, words and actions, and what will divert someone from the straight path or what is upright, as Abū ‘Ubaydah and others said. We see the same meaning in His words: ‘they will follow the Summoner who has no crookedness in him at all.’ (20:108) It means that they will not deviate if they respond to his summons. The verb ‘āja means to stop in a place and stand. ‘Ā’ij is someone standing. [POEM] A man who is a‘raj has bad character and ‘awaj is clear bad character. In respect of a horse, ‘ūj refers to the curving of the sinews in the back leg. It is praised. The term a‘awjīyah was used of certain horses in the Jāhilyyah whose legs were far apart. you yourselves are witnesses to it.
It means: you understand it. It is said: ‘You witness that it is written in the Torah that the dīn of Allah that is accepted is Islam alone by reason of the fact that it contains the description of Muḥammad .’ view all

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of what it contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

translated by

Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Downloaded via sunniconnect.com.

The Publisher have books from both Authentic and Deviant scholars. The Readers are requested to be careful and differentiate such scholars to make sure about the Authenticity of the knowledge. The sufsim mentioned here refers to early stage sufism which is entirely different from what it is today. We recommend the reader to read the book “Devil’s Deception” by Ibn Jawzi for further clarification on this issue.

© Aisha Bewley

Published by: Diwan Press Ltd.

Website: www.diwanpress.com

E-mail: [email protected]

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publishers.

By: Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qurtubi

Translated by: Aisha Abdarrahman Bewley

Edited by: Abdalhaqq Bewley

A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN13: 978-1-908892-96-6 (Paperback)

978-1-908892-97-3 (Casebound)

978-1-908892-98-0 (ePub & Kindle)

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

Table of Transliterations

| Arabic | Latin | Arabic | Latin |

|--------|-------|----------|-------|

| ض | d | ط | t |

| ظ | z | ع | gh |

| ث | t | غ | gh |

| ذ | dh | ف | f |

| ر | r | ق | q |

| ز | z | ك | k |

| س | s | ل | l |

| ش | sh | م | m |

| ح | h | ن | n |

| ت | th | هـ | h |

| خ | kh | و | w |

| د | d | ي | y |

| ص | s | | |

Long vowel | Short vowel

| Arabic | Latin | Examples |

|--------|--------|-------------|

| ا | ā | a [fātih] |

| و | ū | u [damm] |

| ي | i | i [kasrah] |

| ءا | aw | |

| ءي | ay | |

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

Sūrah ĀL ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200

إِنَّ أَوَّلَ بَيْتٍ وُضِعَ لِلنَّاسِ لَلَّذِي بِبَكَّةَ مُبَارَكًا وَهُدًى لِّلْعَالَمِينَ ﴿96﴾ فِيهِ آيَاتٌ بَيِّنَاتٌ مَكَانُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ ۖ وَمَن دَخَلَهُ كَانَ آمِنًا ۚ وَأَذَّنْ فِي النَّاسِ بِالْحَجِّ يَأْتُواكَ رِجَالًا وَعَلَى كُلِّ ضَامِرٍ يَأْتِينَ مِنْ كُلِّ فَجٍّ عَمِيقٍ ﴿97﴾ لّيَشْهَدُوا مَنَافِعَ لَهُمْ وَيَذْكُرُوا اسْمَ اللَّهِ فِي أَيَّامٍ مَعْلُومَاتٍ عَلَى مَا رَزَقَهُمْ مِّنْ بَهِيمَةِ الْأَنعَامِ ۚ فَكُلُوا مِنهَا وَأَطْعِمُوا الْبَائِسَ الْفَقِيرَ ﴿98﴾ ثُمَّ لْيَقْضُوا تَفَثَهُمْ وَلْيُوفُوا نُذُورَهُمْ ۖ وَلْيَطَّوَّفُوا بِالْبَيْتِ الْعَتِيقِ ﴿99﴾ ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يُعَظِّمْ حُرُمَاتِ اللَّهِ فَهُوَ خَيْرٌ لَهُ عِندَ رَبِّهِ ۖ وَأُحِلَّتْ لَكُمُ الْأَنْعَامُ إِلَّا مَا يُتْلَى عَلَيْكُمْ فَاجْتَنِبُوا رِجْسَ الْأَوْثَانِ وَاجْتَنِبُوا قَوْلَ الزُّورِ ﴿100﴾

The first House established for mankind was that at Bakkah, a place of blessing and a guidance for all beings. In it are Clear Signs – the Maqām of Ibrāhīm. All who enter it are safe. Hajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind – those who can find a way to do it. But if anyone disbelieves, Allah is Rich Beyond Need of any being.

It is confirmed in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim that Abū Dharr said, ‘I asked the Messenger of Allah ﷺ about the first mosque established on the earth and he answered, “The Masjid al-Ḥarām.” I asked, “And then?” He said, “Al-Aqṣā.” I asked, “How long was there between them?” “Forty years,” he replied, “and then the whole earth became a mosque for you, so pray wherever you are when the time for prayer comes.”’

Mujāhid and Qaṭādah said, ‘There was no house before it.’ ʿAlī said, ‘There were many houses before it. What is meant is that it is the first house established for worship.’ Mujāhid said, ‘The Muslims and Jews boasted and the Jews said, “The temple of Jerusalem is better and greater than the Kaʿbah because it was the place of the emigration of Prophets and is in the Holy Land.” The Muslims said, “The Kaʿbah is better.” Allah then revealed this āyah. How the House was built has already been dealt with in al-Baqarah. Mujāhid said, ‘Allah created the site of this house two thousand years before the House was built.’

He created any of the earth, and its foundations are in the seventh and lowest earth. As for Al-Aqṣā, Sulaymān built it.’ An-Nasāʾī transmitted this with a sound isnāḍ from ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Amr. The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘When Sulaymān ibn Dāwūd built the temple in Jerusalem, he asked Allah for three things. He asked Allah for judgment corresponding to His judgment and he was given it. He asked Allah for a kingdom which no one after him would have and he was given that. He asked Allah, when he finished building the temple, that anyone who approached it for the sole reason of praying in it would have his errors fall from him so that he would be like he was on the day he was born, and this was granted.’ There is some equivocation between the two hadiths because there was a long period of time between Ibrāhīm and Sulaymān. Historians say that there was more than a thousand years between them. It is said that Ibrāhīm and Sulaymān were the predecessors for what others built after them.

It is related that Ādam was the first to build the House, as was already mentioned. Then it is possible that one of his sons built al-Aqṣā forty years later. It is also possible that the angels built it with Allah’s permission. All of this is possible, and Allah knows best. ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib said, ‘Allah commanded the angels to build a house on the earth and to do tawāf of it before Ādam was created. Then Ādam built what he built of it and did tawāf of it and then the Prophets after him, and then Ibrāhīm completed its construction.’

…that at Bakkah,

Bakkah is the actual site of the House and Makkah is the rest of the town according to Mālik ibn Anas. Muḥammad ibn Shihāb said that Bakkah is the mosque and Makkah is all the Ḥaram, including the houses. Mujāhid said that Bakkah is Makkah. The bāʾ is replaced by the mīm as done in the word for ‘sticking’: lāzim for lāzib. Aḍ-Ḥaḥḥāk and al-Mu’arrij said that.

Then it is also said that Bakkah is derived from the word bakk,

which means crowding and Bakkah takes its name from the fact that the people crowd together in it during tawāf. Bakka means ‘to throttle’ and it is said that it is called that because it crushes the necks of any tyrants if they act unjustly towards it. ‘Abdullāh ibn az-Zubayr said, ‘No tyrant has ever directed evil at it without Allah breaking his neck.’

It is said that the name Makkah comes from its lack of water, and it is said that it is because it sucks (makka) the marrow from the bones through the hardship involved in reaching it. The verb makka is used for a foal suckling from its mother. A poet said:

It suckled (makkat) and no milk remained inside her.

It is said that it is called that because it sucks the one who does injustice in it, in other words destroys him. It is said that it is called that because people used to whistle (makkā) and laugh in it as in Allah’s words: ‘Their prayer at the House is nothing but whistling and clapping.’ (8:35)

a place of blessing and a guidance for all beings.

Allah made it blessed by multiplying the reward of action in it. Barakah is abundant good. It is in the accusative for the ḥāl modifying what is implied by ‘established’, or an adverb of Bakkah. It is a guidance for all.

In it are Clear Signs – the Maqām of Ibrāhīm

The people of Makkah, Ibn ‘Abbās, Mujāhid and Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr read this as ‘a Clear Sign’ in the singular, meaning a Sign of tawḥīd, referring to the Maqām of Ibrāhīm alone. They said, ‘The mark of his feet in the Maqām is a Clear Sign.’ Mujāhid explained it as referring to the entire Haram and believed that its Signs include Şafā and Marwah, the Corner and the Maqām. The others read it in the plural, meaning the Maqām of Ibrāhīm, the Black Stone, the Ḥaṭīm, Zamzam and all the sacred hallmarks. Abū Ja‘far an-Nahḥās said the reading with the plural is clearer because the Signs certainly

include Ṣafā and Marwah.

Another sign is that the birds do not fly over it when they are healthy and another sign is that when someone is hunting and the game enters the Ḥaram, he leaves it be. Another sign is that when there is abundant rain at the Yemeni Corner, there is plenty in Yemen, and when it is at the Syrian corner, there is plenty in Syria. When rain covers all of the House, there is plenty in all lands. Another aspect of it is that the jamrahs, in spite of what is added to them, remain the same size.

The word Maqām comes from the verb qāma, to stand, and so it is the place where one stands. The Maqām was dealt with in al-Baqarah along with the disagreement about it. It implies: ‘one of them is the Maqām of Ibrāhīm’, as al-Akhfash said. It is related that Muḥammad ibn Yazīd said that ‘Maqām’ is an appositive for ‘Signs’. A third view is that it means: ‘They are the Maqām of Ibrāhīm’ based on a known Arabic usage. [POEM] Abu-l-‘Abbās said that the word ‘maqām’ actually indicates the plural ‘maqāmāt’ because it is a verbal noun. We see in the Qur’an: ‘Allah has sealed up their hearts and hearing’ (92:8) where ‘hearing’ is in the singular. This is strengthened by the hadith which states: ‘Ḥajj is all the Maqām of Ibrāhīm.’

All who enter it are safe.

Qatādah said, ‘That is also one of the signs of the Ḥaram.’ An-Nahhās says that is a good opinion because people are swept away all around it and no tyrant reaches it. They reached Jerusalem and destroyed it but never reached the Ḥaram.’ Allah says: ‘Do you not see what your Lord did with the Companions of the Elephant?’ (105:1) One of the people of meanings said, ‘The form of the āyah is a report while its meaning is a command. It means: “Give security to whoever enters it.”’ The same usage is seen in 2:197. Along these lines, an-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit said, ‘Anyone who commits a wrong action and merits a ḥadd punishment and then takes refuge in the Ḥaram is safe,’ based on this āyah. Allah made security mandatory for those who

enter it. That is related from a group of the early generations, including Ibn Abbās and others.

Ibn al-‘Arabī said, ‘There is weakness in the statements of all who say this for two reasons. One is that they do not understand that the āyah is about the past and does not involve the establishment of a future ruling. The second is that they do not acknowledge that its security has been violated and killing and fighting occurred after that. What Allah states cannot occur differently to that statement. So that indicates that this must have been referring to the past.’ Abū Ḥanīfah disagreed and said, ‘Anyone who seeks refuge in the Ḥaram is not given food or water nor is any business done with him nor is he spoken to until he leaves.’ His being forced to leave is not consonant with security. It is related that he said, ‘Retaliation for limbs takes place in the Haram. There is also no security in this case.’ The majority of scholars say that ḥudūd punishments may be carried out in the Ḥaram. It is reported that the Prophet ﷺ ordered the killing of Ibn Khaṭāl while he was clinging to the drapes of the Ka’bah.

Ath-Thawrī related that Ibn ‘Abbās said, ‘If someone commits a crime that merits a ḥadd punishment in the Haram, it is carried out on him. If he commits it outside of the Ḥaram and then seeks refuge in it, he is not spoken to nor is business carried out with him until he leaves the Ḥaram and then the ḥadd is carried out on him.’ This is the position of ash-Sha‘bī. This is also the argument of Kufans. Ibn ‘Abbās understands that this is what the āyah means. He was the scholar of the Community.

What is sound is that by saying that Allah is referring to the many blessings granted to anyone who is there, whoever they are, as Allah also says: ‘Do they not see that We have established a safe haven while people all round them are violently dispossessed?’ (29:67) In the Jāhiliyya, those who entered it and sought sanctuary were safe from attack and killing as will be explained in al-Mā’idah. Qatādah said, ‘In the

Jāhilīyyah, whoever entered it was safe.’

This is good. It is related that an atheist said to one of the scholars, ‘Does the Qur’an not say: “All who enter it are safe”? We have entered it and we have done such-and-such. Is not the one who enters it safe?’ He said to him, ‘Are you not one of the Arabs? What does someone mean when he says that whoever enters his house is safe? Does he not say to those who obey him, “Leave him be”? “Yes, of course,” he replied. He said, ‘That is how it is with His words: “All who enter it are safe”’ Yahyā ibn Ja‘dah said that it means he is safe from the Fire.

This is not universal because we find in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim in the hadith of intercession reported by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī: ‘By the One Who has my soul in his hand, none of you can be more insistent in asking Allah for his rights than the believers on the Day of Rising who will ask Allah for their brothers who are in the Fire. They will say, “Our Lord, they used to fast with us, pray and perform ḥajj!” They will be told, “Bring out those you recognise.”’ The one who enters it is safe from the Fire by performing the practices connected with it, respecting it, acknowledging its right, and seeking to draw near to Allah Almighty.

Ja‘far as-Ṣādiq said, ‘Whoever enters it with purity, as the Prophets and awliyā’ entered it, is safe from Allah’s punishment.’ This is what is meant by his words ﷺ, ‘Anyone who makes ḥajj to this House and does not engage in sexual activity or wrongdoing emerges from his errors like the day his mother bore him. An accepted ḥajj has no reward but the Garden.’ Al-Ḥasan said, ‘An accepted ḥajj is that he returns abstinent in this world, desiring the Next World.’ He recited:

O Ka‘bah of Allah! The supplication of the one who seeks refuge is the supplication of one calling, in need.

He has bade farewell to those he loves and his home and come hovering between fear and hope.

If Allah generously accepts his striving,

he is saved. Otherwise he is not saved.

You are one of those whose intercession is hoped for.

Be kind to Wāfīd ibn Ḥajjāj!

It is also said that it means whoever entered it in the year of the Fulfilled ʿUmrah with Muhammad ﷺ is safe. The evidence is found in the words of the Almighty: ‘You will enter the Maşjid al-Ḥarām in safety, Allah willing.’ (48:27) It is said that the word ‘man’ (tr. as ‘all’) here refers to the non-sentient and the āyah is about the safety of game. This is odd. We see in the Revelation: ‘Some of them (minhum) go on their bellies.’ (24:45)

Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind

In the phrase ‘owed to Allah’ Allah uses the lām of the obligation and then reinforces it with “ʿalā” which is the strongest preposition in Arabic for making something obligatory. Allah uses the most comprehensive of the expressions of obligation to stress the right it has over us and the esteem owed to it. There is no disagreement about its obligatory nature. It is one of the pillars of Islam and is only obliged once in a lifetime. Some people said that it is obliged once every five years and relate about that a hadith which they trace back to the Prophet ﷺ. The hadith is false and not sound. The consensus invalidates their position.

‘Abd ar-Razzāq related from Sufyān ath-Thawrī from al-‘Alā’ ibn al-Musayyab from his father from Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘The Lord says, “I have expanded my slave’s provision and yet he does not visit me in iḥrām every four years.”’ It is famous from al-‘Alā’ ibn al-Musayyab ibn Rāfīʿ al-Kāhilī al-Kūfī from the children of hadith scholars. More than one related it from him. They include those who said ‘every five years’. Some said: from al-‘Alā’ from Yūnus ibn Khabbāb from Abū Saʿīd. There is disagreement about all of that.

13

The atheists deny the ḥajj and say that it involves removing garments, which is contrary to modesty, running, which is contrary to gravity, and stoning the jamarahs for no purpose, which is contrary to logic. They say that all these actions are baseless because they do not recognise their wisdom or cause. They are ignorant of the fact that it is not necessary for the Lord to make His slave understand all that He commands him to do nor to acquaint him with the point of the actions He requires of him. It is incumbent on him to obey, and he must obey without seeking benefit nor asking about the goal. This is the meaning of what the Prophet ﷺ used to say in his talbīyah: ‘At Your service, truly, truly in worship and slavehood. At Your service, God of the Truth.’

The imāms related that Abū Hurayrah said, ‘The Messenger of Allah ﷺ addressed us and said, “People! The Ḥajj has been made obligatory for you, so perform it!” A man asked, “Every year, Messenger of Allah?” He was silent until the man had asked that three times. Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, “If I had said yes, it would have become obligatory and you would not be able to do it.” Then he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Those before you were destroyed for asking too many questions and differing from their Prophets. If I command you to do something, do what you can of it. If I forbid you from doing something, then leave it.”’ (Muslim)

This hadith makes it clear that when an obligation is directed to those responsible for doing it, it is enough that they do it once and it does need to be repeated. This differs from the position of Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī. It is confirmed that his Companions said to the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, is this ḥajj of ours for just this year or for all time?’ He answered, ‘It is for all time.’ This is a text refuting those who say that it is obligatory once every five years. The ḥajj was well known among the Arabs. It was part of what they desired because of its markets, social acceptability and being part of the Ḥanīfiyyah. When Islam came, they were told to do what they

The atheists deny the ḥajj and say that it involves removing garments, which is contrary to modesty, running, which is contrary to gravity, and stoning the jamarahs for no purpose, which is contrary to logic. They say that all these actions are baseless because they do not recognise their wisdom or cause. They are ignorant of the fact that it is not necessary for the Lord to make His slave understand all that He commands him to do nor to acquaint him with the point of the actions He requires of him. It is incumbent on him to obey, and he must obey without seeking benefit nor asking about the goal. This is the meaning of what the Prophet ﷺ used to say in his talbīyah: ‘At Your service, truly, truly in worship and slavehood. At Your service, God of the Truth.’

The imāms related that Abū Hurayrah said, ‘The Messenger of Allah ﷺ addressed us and said, “People! The Ḥajj has been made obligatory for you, so perform it!” A man asked, “Every year, Messenger of Allah?” He was silent until the man had asked that three times. Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, “If I had said yes, it would have become obligatory and you would not be able to do it.” Then he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Those before you were destroyed for asking too many questions and differing from their Prophets. If I command you to do something, do what you can of it. If I forbid you from doing something, then leave it.”’ (Muslim)

This hadith makes it clear that when an obligation is directed to those responsible for doing it, it is enough that they do it once and it does need to be repeated. This differs from the position of Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī. It is confirmed that his Companions said to the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, is this ḥajj of ours for just this year or for all time?’ He answered, ‘It is for all time.’ This is a text refuting those who say that it is obligatory once every five years. The ḥajj was well known among the Arabs. It was part of what they desired because of its markets, social acceptability and being part of the Ḥanīfiyyah. When Islam came, they were told to do what they

The atheists deny the ḥajj and say that it involves removing garments, which is contrary to modesty, running, which is contrary to gravity, and stoning the jamarahs for no purpose, which is contrary to logic. They say that all these actions are baseless because they do not recognise their wisdom or cause. They are ignorant of the fact that it is not necessary for the Lord to make His slave understand all that He commands him to do nor to acquaint him with the point of the actions He requires of him. It is incumbent on him to obey, and he must obey without seeking benefit nor asking about the goal. This is the meaning of what the Prophet ﷺ used to say in his talbīyah: ‘At Your service, truly, truly in worship and slavehood. At Your service, God of the Truth.’

The imāms related that Abū Hurayrah said, ‘The Messenger of Allah ﷺ addressed us and said, “People! The Ḥajj has been made obligatory for you, so perform it!” A man asked, “Every year, Messenger of Allah?” He was silent until the man had asked that three times. Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, “If I had said yes, it would have become obligatory and you would not be able to do it.” Then he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Those before you were destroyed for asking too many questions and differing from their Prophets. If I command you to do something, do what you can of it. If I forbid you from doing something, then leave it.”’ (Muslim)

This hadith makes it clear that when an obligation is directed to those responsible for doing it, it is enough that they do it once and it does need to be repeated. This differs from the position of Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī. It is confirmed that his Companions said to the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, is this ḥajj of ours for just this year or for all time?’ He answered, ‘It is for all time.’ This is a text refuting those who say that it is obligatory once every five years. The ḥajj was well known among the Arabs. It was part of what they desired because of its markets, social acceptability and being part of the Ḥanīfiyyah. When Islam came, they were told to do what they

knew and to hold to what they recognised. The Prophet ﷺ performed ḥajj before the obligatory ḥajj. He had stood at ʿArafah and did not change the Law of Ibrāhīm that had been changed by Quraysh when they stood at the Mashʿar al-Harām, saying, ‘We are the people of the Ḥaram and do not leave it. We are the Ḥums.’ This was already explained in al-Baqarah.

One of the oddest claims that I have seen made is that the Prophet ﷺ performed ḥajj twice before the Hijrah and by that the obligation was cancelled for him because he had responded to the summons of Ibrāhīm when it was said: ‘Announce the Ḥajj to mankind.’ (22:27) Aṭ-Ṭabarī said, ‘This is unlikely. When it was announced as part of his Sharīʿah: “Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind,” then it must also have been a duty for him according to that injunction. If it is said that it is only addressed to those who have not yet performed ḥajj, that is arbitrary and specific and there is no evidence for it. If someone claims that those who performed ḥajj in the religion of Ibrāhīm are not addressed by this, it is extremely unlikely.’

The Book and the Sunnah indicate that the ḥajj should be performed in a person’s own good time, not immediately. That is the final position in the school of Mālik as Ibn Khuwayzimandād mentioned, and it is the position of ash-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn al-Hasan ash-Shaybānī, and Abū Yūsuf in one transmission. Some later Baghdadi Mālikīs believed that the obligation is immediate and it is not permitted to delay it when the ability to perform it exists. That is the position of Dāwūd. The sound view is the first one because Allah says in Sūrat al-Ḥajj: ‘Announce the Ḥajj to mankind’ (22:27) and al-Ḥajj is Makkan. He says: ‘Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by people.’ This sūrah was revealed in the year of Uḥud in Mādīnah in 3 AH and the Prophet ﷺ did not perform ḥajj until 10 AH.

As for the Sunnah, there is the hadith of Dīmām ibn Thaʿlaba as-Saʿdī of the Banū Saʿd ibn Bakr who came to the Prophet ﷺ and

asked him about Islam and he mentioned the shahādah, prayer, zakāt, fasting and ḥajj. Ibn ‘Abbās, Abū Hurayrah and Anas related it. There is a lot of mention of the ḥajj in the Sunnah. It is clearly obligatory. The hadith of Anas is better and more complete. There is disagreement about the date of this hadith. It is said that is 5 AH, 7 AH and 9 AH. Ibn Hishām mentioned from Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Wāqidī that it was in the year of the Ditch after the Confederates left.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr said, ‘Part of the evidence that the ḥajj can be delayed is the consensus of scholars that if someone able to go on ḥajj delays it for a year or two, and then performs the ḥajj some years after his ability to perform it exists, then he has performed the obligatory ḥajj in its time. All agree that he is not like someone who misses the prayer until its time has passed and makes it up after its time, or someone who misses fasting Ramadān due to illness or travel and then makes it up, or like someone who invalidates his ḥajj and then makes it up. It is agreed that if someone performs the ḥajj years after he is able to do so, he is not said to be “making it up”. From this we know that there is wide scope for the time of ḥajj and that it is not immediate.’

Abū ‘Umar said, ‘All who say that ḥajj can be delayed put no time limit on that except what is related from Ṣaḥnūn who was asked about a man who had the wherewithal to make ḥajj and delayed it for some years while he was able to do it and whether that meant that he became fāsiq by delaying the ḥajj, causing his testimony to be rejected. He said it did not, even if that delay was up to sixty years. If it was more than sixty years, he was considered fāsiq and his testimony rejected.’ So he made sixty years the limit. Limits are only stipulated in the Sharī‘ah by someone who can legislate.

Ibn al-Khuwayzimandād related this from Ibn al-Qāsim. Ibn al-Qāsim and others said, ‘If he delays it for sixty years, his character is not impaired. If he delays it beyond sixty years, his character is

impaired because the Prophet ﷺ said, “The lifespan of my community is between sixty and seventy. Few exceed it.” It is as if the requirement is made urgent for him in these ten years.

Abu ‘Umar said, ‘Some people, like Saḥnūn, cite as evidence the words of the Prophet ﷺ: “The lifespan of my community is between sixty and seventy. Few exceed that.” There is no proof in that because the words deal with the majority of the ages of the community, if the hadith is sound. It contains evidence for scope for this up to the age of seventy because that is still within the lifespan of the majority. It is not proper to call someone of good character and trustworthiness impious through such a weak interpretation.’ Success is by Allah.

Scholars agree that all are addressed in general. Ibn al-‘Arabī said, ‘Even if people disagree about the application of general terms, they agree that this āyah applies to all people, male and female, except children, who are excluded by the consensus that they are excluded from the obligations of responsibility. The same applies to slaves who are also not included. They are excluded from it by the words: “those who can find a way to do it.”’ A slave lacks the ability because his master can prevent him from doing it by his right of ownership and Allah put the right of the master before His right out of kindness to His slaves. There is no disagreement about this either in the community as a whole or between the imams. We do not hasten to affirm what we do not actually know. The only evidence regarding it is the accepted consensus.’ Ibn al-Mundhir said that most of the people of knowledge agree, with the exception of the odd person whose disagreement is not considered, that if a child or slave has made ḥajj and then the child becomes an adult or the slave is freed, they still owe the ḥajj if they can find a way to do it.

Abū ‘Umar said, ‘Dāwūd disagreed with most of the fuqahā’ of the cities and leaders of tradition about slaves and said that they are required to perform ḥajj. According to the majority of scholars,

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

Sharīʿah are also directed at unbelievers, and there is no disagreement that that is the view of Mālik. The second is that all acts of worship are obliged for him with respect to the prayer and fasting while he is a slave. If he had done them while an unbeliever, they would not be counted. The third is that unbelief is removed by Islam, so its ruling must also be removed. Success is by Allah.

those who can find a way to do it.

Ad-Dāraquṭnī reported that Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It was asked, “Messenger of Allah, should ḥajj be done every year?” “Rather it is one ḥajj,” he replied. He was asked, “What is ‘a way?’” He said, “Provision and a mount.”’ That is related from Anas, Ibn Masʿūd, Ibn ʿUmar, Jābir, ʿĀ’ishah, and ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb from his father from his grandfather. ʿAli ibn Abī Ṭālib related that the Prophet said: ‘Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind—those who can find a way to do it.’ He said that he was asked about that and the Prophet said that it meant, ‘That you have the use of a camel.’

Ibn Mājāh also transmitted the hadith of Ibn ʿUmar in the Sunan as did Abū ʿĪsā at-Tirmidhī in the jāmīʿ. He said that it is a good hadith. According to the people of knowledge, the practice is that when a man has provision and transport, he must perform ḥajj. Things are said by the people of hadith about the memory of Ibrāhīm ibn Yazīd al-Khūzī al-Makkī. They transmitted from Wakīʿ and ad-Dāraquṭnī from Sufyān ibn Saʿīd from Ibrāhīm ibn Yazīd from Muḥammad ibn ʿAbbād that Ibn ʿUmar said, ‘A man went to the Prophet and asked, “Messenger of Allah, what makes ḥajj mandatory?” He answered, “Provision and a mount.” He asked, “Messenger of Allah, what is the state of the hājj?” He replied, “Dishevelled, ill-smelling.” Another rose and asked, “What is ḥajj?” He answered, “Clamour and shedding blood.”’ Wakīʿ said that ‘clamour’ is raising the voice with the talbiyah and ‘shedding blood’ is making the sacrifices.

Among those who said that provision and a mount are

preconditions for the hajj were ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, his son ‘Abdullāh, ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr, ‘Aṭā’ and Mujāhid. That is the position of ash-Shāfī‘, ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Aḥmad, Ishāq, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Abī Salamah, and Ibn Ḥabīb. ‘Abdūs mentioned something similar from Sahnūn.

Ash-Shāfī‘ says, ‘Ability has two aspects. One is that a person is physically able to do it and has enough money to achieve the hajj. The second is that someone is disabled in his body and unable to ride, but is able to have someone perform hajj on his behalf for a wage or without a wage. This will be explained. The one who is physically able is obliged by Allah’s Book to perform hajj by Allah’s words: “those who can find a way to do it.” The one who is financially able to do it is obliged to perform the hajj by the Sunnah on the basis of the hadith related about the Khath‘amī woman. As for the one who is able to do it himself, he is the strong person who incurs, in riding a mount, no hardship beyond his ability to bear it. If this is the case at a time when he possesses provision and a mount, he is obliged to make hajj himself. If he lacks provision and transport, or either one of them, then the obligation of hajj is cancelled for him. If someone is able to walk and has provision or the ability to earn provision on the way through their skill, such as leather work, cupping or a similar trade, it is recommended that they make hajj on foot, whether man or woman. Ash-Shāfī‘ added, ‘The man has less of an excuse than a woman because he is stronger.’ They consider this to be recommended, not mandatory. If the only way he is able to get provision is by begging from people on the way, it is disliked for him to perform hajj because he becomes a burden on people.

Mālik ibn Anas said, ‘If he is both able to walk and also has provision, he must perform hajj. If he has no mount but is able to walk, there is some question. If he possesses the necessary provision, he is obliged to perform hajj. If he does not possess it, but is able to

preconditions for the hajj were ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, his son ‘Abdullāh, ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr, ‘Aṭā’ and Mujāhid. That is the position of ash-Shāfī‘, ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Aḥmad, Ishāq, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Abī Salamah, and Ibn Ḥabīb. ‘Abdūs mentioned something similar from Sahnūn.

Ash-Shāfī‘ says, ‘Ability has two aspects. One is that a person is physically able to do it and has enough money to achieve the hajj. The second is that someone is disabled in his body and unable to ride, but is able to have someone perform hajj on his behalf for a wage or without a wage. This will be explained. The one who is physically able is obliged by Allah’s Book to perform hajj by Allah’s words: “those who can find a way to do it.” The one who is financially able to do it is obliged to perform the hajj by the Sunnah on the basis of the hadith related about the Khath‘amī woman. As for the one who is able to do it himself, he is the strong person who incurs, in riding a mount, no hardship beyond his ability to bear it. If this is the case at a time when he possesses provision and a mount, he is obliged to make hajj himself. If he lacks provision and transport, or either one of them, then the obligation of hajj is cancelled for him. If someone is able to walk and has provision or the ability to earn provision on the way through their skill, such as leather work, cupping or a similar trade, it is recommended that they make hajj on foot, whether man or woman. Ash-Shāfī‘ added, ‘The man has less of an excuse than a woman because he is stronger.’ They consider this to be recommended, not mandatory. If the only way he is able to get provision is by begging from people on the way, it is disliked for him to perform hajj because he becomes a burden on people.

Mālik ibn Anas said, ‘If he is both able to walk and also has provision, he must perform hajj. If he has no mount but is able to walk, there is some question. If he possesses the necessary provision, he is obliged to perform hajj. If he does not possess it, but is able to

āyah and to Allah’s words: ‘Hajj to the house is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind…’ This person lacked the ability because the hajj is enjoined on those responsible for reaching the House themselves and because it is an act of worship which cannot be delegated when the ability is lacking, just as is the case with the prayer.

Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir related from Jābir that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘By means of one hajj, Allah will admit three to the Garden: the deceased, the one who takes on hajj for him and the one who carries that out.’ Abu-l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad ad-Dārāquqnī transmitted this from ‘Amr ibn Ḥuṣayn as-Sadūsī from Abū Ma‘shar from Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir. The name of Abū Ma‘shar was Najīḥ. They considered him to be weak.

Ash-Shāfi‘ī said, ‘Regarding someone who is chronically ill, very sickly or very old, who finds someone able to perform the hajj on his behalf, he possesses a certain type of ability. There are two forms of it. One is that he is able to pay someone to perform hajj on his behalf. That person performs his obligatory hajj. This is the view of ‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib. It is related that he told a very old man who had not performed hajj, ‘Equip a man to perform hajj on your behalf.’ This position was taken by ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Ibn al-Mubārak, Aḥmad and Isḥāq. The second is that he is able to find someone to pay on his behalf and represent him in performing hajj on his behalf. According to ash-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad and Ibn Rāhawah, hajj is also an obligation for such a person. Abū Ḥanīfah said that the hajj is not obligatory for them. Ash-Shāfi‘ī cited as evidence what Ibn ‘Abbās related about the woman of Khath‘am who asked the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, Allah has obliged His slaves to perform hajj. My father is a very old man who cannot remain firm on a mount. Can I perform hajj on his behalf?’ ‘Yes,’ he answered. That was during the Farewell Hajj. One variant has: ‘He cannot remain upright on a camel.’ The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘Perform hajj for him. Do you think that if your father owed a debt,

āyah and to Allah’s words: ‘Hajj to the house is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind…’ This person lacked the ability because the hajj is enjoined on those responsible for reaching the House themselves and because it is an act of worship which cannot be delegated when the ability is lacking, just as is the case with the prayer.

Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir related from Jābir that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘By means of one hajj, Allah will admit three to the Garden: the deceased, the one who takes on hajj for him and the one who carries that out.’ Abu-l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad ad-Dārāquqnī transmitted this from ‘Amr ibn Ḥuṣayn as-Sadūsī from Abū Ma‘shar from Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir. The name of Abū Ma‘shar was Najīḥ. They considered him to be weak.

Ash-Shāfi‘ī said, ‘Regarding someone who is chronically ill, very sickly or very old, who finds someone able to perform the hajj on his behalf, he possesses a certain type of ability. There are two forms of it. One is that he is able to pay someone to perform hajj on his behalf. That person performs his obligatory hajj. This is the view of ‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib. It is related that he told a very old man who had not performed hajj, ‘Equip a man to perform hajj on your behalf.’ This position was taken by ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Ibn al-Mubārak, Aḥmad and Isḥāq. The second is that he is able to find someone to pay on his behalf and represent him in performing hajj on his behalf. According to ash-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad and Ibn Rāhawah, hajj is also an obligation for such a person. Abū Ḥanīfah said that the hajj is not obligatory for them. Ash-Shāfi‘ī cited as evidence what Ibn ‘Abbās related about the woman of Khath‘am who asked the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, Allah has obliged His slaves to perform hajj. My father is a very old man who cannot remain firm on a mount. Can I perform hajj on his behalf?’ ‘Yes,’ he answered. That was during the Farewell Hajj. One variant has: ‘He cannot remain upright on a camel.’ The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘Perform hajj for him. Do you think that if your father owed a debt,

āyah and to Allah’s words: ‘Hajj to the house is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind…’ This person lacked the ability because the hajj is enjoined on those responsible for reaching the House themselves and because it is an act of worship which cannot be delegated when the ability is lacking, just as is the case with the prayer.

Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir related from Jābir that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘By means of one hajj, Allah will admit three to the Garden: the deceased, the one who takes on hajj for him and the one who carries that out.’ Abu-l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad ad-Dārāquqnī transmitted this from ‘Amr ibn Ḥuṣayn as-Sadūsī from Abū Ma‘shar from Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir. The name of Abū Ma‘shar was Najīḥ. They considered him to be weak.

Ash-Shāfi‘ī said, ‘Regarding someone who is chronically ill, very sickly or very old, who finds someone able to perform the hajj on his behalf, he possesses a certain type of ability. There are two forms of it. One is that he is able to pay someone to perform hajj on his behalf. That person performs his obligatory hajj. This is the view of ‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib. It is related that he told a very old man who had not performed hajj, ‘Equip a man to perform hajj on your behalf.’ This position was taken by ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Ibn al-Mubārak, Aḥmad and Isḥāq. The second is that he is able to find someone to pay on his behalf and represent him in performing hajj on his behalf. According to ash-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad and Ibn Rāhawah, hajj is also an obligation for such a person. Abū Ḥanīfah said that the hajj is not obligatory for them. Ash-Shāfi‘ī cited as evidence what Ibn ‘Abbās related about the woman of Khath‘am who asked the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, Allah has obliged His slaves to perform hajj. My father is a very old man who cannot remain firm on a mount. Can I perform hajj on his behalf?’ ‘Yes,’ he answered. That was during the Farewell Hajj. One variant has: ‘He cannot remain upright on a camel.’ The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘Perform hajj for him. Do you think that if your father owed a debt,

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Allah ﷺ was among them and they saw him. It is also possible that this is addressed to the entire Community because His traces and signs and the Qur’an which he was given are among us in the place of the Messenger ﷺ, even if we did not see him.

Qatādah said, ‘There are two clear signs in this āyah: the Book of Allah and the Prophet of Allah. The Prophet of Allah has passed, and the Book of Allah remains among them as a mercy and a blessing. It contains its lawful and unlawful, and obedience and disobedience.’

The phrase ‘Whoever holds fast’ means someone who is patient and holds to Allah’s dīn and obeys Him. Then he is given success and rightly guided. Ibn Jurayj says that it means he believes in Him. It is said that it means, ‘Whoever holds to the rope of Allah,’ which is the Qur’an. The verbs aʿṣama and iʿtasama mean to hold to something to the exclusion of anything else. Anyone who clings to something is called ‘muʿṣim’ and ‘muʿtasim’. Someone who defends something is called ‘ʿāsim’. Al-Farazdaq said:

I am the son of the defenders (ʿāsimīn) of the Banū Tamīm.

[POEMS] Food is described as defending (ʿasama) someone from being hungry. The Arabs say, ‘the food kept him (ʿasama) from being hungry. That is why they call pottage (sawīq) Abū ʿĀsim.’ Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā said, ‘The Arabs called bread ʿāsim and jābir, and they also called it ʿāmir. [POEMS]

ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَلَا يَضُرَّ اللَّهَ شَيْئًا ۗ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَأُولَـٰئكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

102 You who believe! have taqwā of Allah with the taqwā due to Him and do not die except as Muslims.

An-Nahhās related from Murrah ibn ‘Abdullāh that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘The taqwā due to Him is that He be obeyed and not disobeyed, remembered and not forgotten, thanked and not shown ingratitude.’ Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It means not disobeying Him

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Allah ﷺ was among them and they saw him. It is also possible that this is addressed to the entire Community because His traces and signs and the Qur’an which he was given are among us in the place of the Messenger ﷺ, even if we did not see him.

Qatādah said, ‘There are two clear signs in this āyah: the Book of Allah and the Prophet of Allah. The Prophet of Allah has passed, and the Book of Allah remains among them as a mercy and a blessing. It contains its lawful and unlawful, and obedience and disobedience.’

The phrase ‘Whoever holds fast’ means someone who is patient and holds to Allah’s dīn and obeys Him. Then he is given success and rightly guided. Ibn Jurayj says that it means he believes in Him. It is said that it means, ‘Whoever holds to the rope of Allah,’ which is the Qur’an. The verbs aʿṣama and iʿtasama mean to hold to something to the exclusion of anything else. Anyone who clings to something is called ‘muʿṣim’ and ‘muʿtasim’. Someone who defends something is called ‘ʿāsim’. Al-Farazdaq said:

I am the son of the defenders (ʿāsimīn) of the Banū Tamīm.

[POEMS] Food is described as defending (ʿasama) someone from being hungry. The Arabs say, ‘the food kept him (ʿasama) from being hungry. That is why they call pottage (sawīq) Abū ʿĀsim.’ Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā said, ‘The Arabs called bread ʿāsim and jābir, and they also called it ʿāmir. [POEMS]

ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَلَا يَضُرَّ اللَّهَ شَيْئًا ۗ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَأُولَـٰئكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

102 You who believe! have taqwā of Allah with the taqwā due to Him and do not die except as Muslims.

An-Nahhās related from Murrah ibn ‘Abdullāh that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘The taqwā due to Him is that He be obeyed and not disobeyed, remembered and not forgotten, thanked and not shown ingratitude.’ Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It means not disobeying Him

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Allah ﷺ was among them and they saw him. It is also possible that this is addressed to the entire Community because His traces and signs and the Qur’an which he was given are among us in the place of the Messenger ﷺ, even if we did not see him.

Qatādah said, ‘There are two clear signs in this āyah: the Book of Allah and the Prophet of Allah. The Prophet of Allah has passed, and the Book of Allah remains among them as a mercy and a blessing. It contains its lawful and unlawful, and obedience and disobedience.’

The phrase ‘Whoever holds fast’ means someone who is patient and holds to Allah’s dīn and obeys Him. Then he is given success and rightly guided. Ibn Jurayj says that it means he believes in Him. It is said that it means, ‘Whoever holds to the rope of Allah,’ which is the Qur’an. The verbs aʿṣama and iʿtasama mean to hold to something to the exclusion of anything else. Anyone who clings to something is called ‘muʿṣim’ and ‘muʿtasim’. Someone who defends something is called ‘ʿāsim’. Al-Farazdaq said:

I am the son of the defenders (ʿāsimīn) of the Banū Tamīm.

[POEMS] Food is described as defending (ʿasama) someone from being hungry. The Arabs say, ‘the food kept him (ʿasama) from being hungry. That is why they call pottage (sawīq) Abū ʿĀsim.’ Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā said, ‘The Arabs called bread ʿāsim and jābir, and they also called it ʿāmir. [POEMS]

ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَلَا يَضُرَّ اللَّهَ شَيْئًا ۗ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَأُولَـٰئكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

102 You who believe! have taqwā of Allah with the taqwā due to Him and do not die except as Muslims.

An-Nahhās related from Murrah ibn ‘Abdullāh that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘The taqwā due to Him is that He be obeyed and not disobeyed, remembered and not forgotten, thanked and not shown ingratitude.’ Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It means not disobeying Him view all

I will not be attending Netanyahu’s address and will instead join families of the hostages taken in the October 7 attack. I vehemently object to giving the Prime Minister a platform when his failed leadership has brought so much death and destruction to Palestinians and Israelis.
 

  view all

“Netanyahu is a war criminal. It’s a shame he is addressing our Congress. Our tax dollars should not be spent on killing children.” —Congressman Jamaal Bowman
 
 
 

 
  view all

سْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ

1.
قُلْ أَعُوذُ بِرَبِّ ٱلنَّاسِ
Say, ˹O Prophet,˺ “I seek refuge in the Lord of humankind,
2.
مَلِكِ ٱلنَّاسِ
the Master of humankind,
3.
إِلَـٰهِ ٱلنَّاسِ
the God of humankind,
4.
مِن شَرِّ ٱلْوَسْوَاسِ ٱلْخَنَّاسِ
from the evil of the lurking whisperer—
5.
ٱلَّذِى يُوَسْوِسُ فِى صُدُورِ ٱلنَّاسِ
who whispers into the hearts of humankind—
6.
مِنَ ٱلْجِنَّةِ وَٱلنَّاسِ
from among jinn and humankind.”
  view all

​肥沃的土壤，植物奉它的主的旨意茁壯成長；貧瘠的土壤，植物只能長出劣等的產品。我如此為感恩的民眾闡明許多跡象。（古兰经第7章58节）

Watch: A Palestinian boy shares his modest breakfast with a cat in front of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque.
  view all

 
40,000 Palestinians performed Al-Juma'a prayer at Al-Aqsa Mosque
 

 

 

 
 

  view all

David Fishman

Renovation of Two Chinese Hui Mosques in Yunnan and Sichuan: On-the-Ground Observations Background: The last time I visited Dali was 2015. I rented an e-bike and went up Erhai Lake, taking pics and checking out small villages. One of those was Meiba Village 美坝村
I had stopped there because Ctrip informed me there was a minor tourist attraction in the village - the Meiba Mosque. I was curious, because as far as I knew, Dali is a region of the Bai ethnicity, (白族) and the Bai people aren't Muslims. But this was clearly a Muslim village.
 

 
Turns out it was not Bai, but a Hui village, so there you go. The mosque was small. The front building was white, matching the local Bai architecture, with gold and green highlights, some Islamic window styling, a green dome & symmetrical green-accented minarets. (2015 pic)
 

 
 
 
Unfortunately I had no idea in 2015 I'd write about it in 2023. I didn't even use Twitter then... Over the years, I have cleaned my camera roll for space, so I only have these few pics of Meiba village left, including this last shot of one of the minarets. (2015 pic)
 
 
On Sohu, I found a travel blog of someone who had also visited the village in 2015, and had some additional pictures of Meiba, its mosque, and the prayer room - and interviewed people too. Mosque in background of first picture.
 

 


 

 

Anyway. Over last few years, with so much discussion about how Chinese gov't was targeting foreign-styled mosques for renovations, I've thought about the Meiba Mosque, with its dome and minarets... I saw in 2020 it was removed from Ctrip, and was also no longer on Baidu Maps.

And then in 2020, the travel site Yunnan Explorer posted a pic of the Meiba Mosque seemingly amidst renovations...the dome was already gone and the minarets were being taken down too. (This pic of the front building was taken from the courtyard with back against prayer hall)
 

 
Fast-forward to 2023. Last week while in Dali, I noticed the Meiba Village Mosque was now back on Baidu Maps! So we decided to visit and see what it's like now. As expected, the dome & minarets have now been replaced by pagoda-like structures and the Islamic styling is GONE.
 
 

 
 
Passing through the entrance into the courtyard, the back prayer hall has been completely leveled and rebuilt as a much larger, two-story structure based on Chinese temple elements. This looked very new - completed in the last six months perhaps.
 

 
when we went, there were children running around the village and playing in the mosque courtyard. The boys all wore little taquiyah. Some of the nicer houses had fancy entrance archways with Arabic (?) over the doorways. Otherwise it looked like the other Bai villages.
 

 
In the courtyard entrance was a list of villagers and how much they had donated for zakat (it was Ramadan at the time). 200-300 CNY seemed the norm. Notice nearly everyone is surnamed Ma 马, the dominant Hui surname.
 

 
Besides the renovated exteriors, and the new, large prayer room, there were several HUGE new houses and the roads were all paved vs. last time. And very clean. It was late afternoon and there were only a few children around, no one to ask questions, so we just got pics and left.
 

 
 
Next: Weizhou Town, Wenchuan County, Sichuan I found myself in Weizhou by accident...because I missed an exit on the highway. Believe me, you do NOT want to miss an exit in Western Sichuan...the next exit was 30+ km! Since I had come all this way, I decide to explore a bit...
 
 

There's not much in Weizhou Town - I visited a museum and a few parks and in 30 mins I'd just about seen the whole place. On my way out, I saw the local mosque on Baidu. The street view pic was from 2016, and it had green domes, so I expected it would have some changes too.
 

 
Sure enough, when I arrived, I found the entire roof had been changed, with the domes replaced with pagodas and the green + gold aesthetic swapped for a modern Chinese color palette. I had to check the old pics several times to ensure I was aligning correctly. 
 
 
2016 | 2023
 

 
 
 
I stopped to grab a bite at the halal restaurant on the street in front of the building and ask the ladies there some questions. "Hey is this a mosque? Baidu says it's a mosque, but it doesn't look like one" "Yes, this is the Weizhou Mosque" "Oh good, I couldn't tell at first"
 

 
"What happened to the building? It looks very different from the pictures on Baidu" "Oh, the government renovated the mosque" "When?" "Last few years" "Why?" "I don't know. They said it needs to look more Chinese. They spent a lot of money on the renovation...2-3 million RMB"
 

 
"Oh...are there many Hui in Wenchuan? I suppose not many?" "No, not many. Very few. Less than a thousand I guess" (Wenchuan County is part of Aba Prefecture, a Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Region in Western Sichuan; Weizhou is the county seat. Most people here are Qiang 羌族)
 
"After renovations, it's still used as a mosque?" "Yes. Hui people pray here, and have activities. It's Ramadan now." "When the government did the renovations, did they change anything inside?" "Oh, no, it's all the same as before." (I saw a Ramadan fast schedule):
 
 
 

 
 
She gestures to a passage on the side of the kitchen. "That leads into the mosque. You can go look inside if you're interested". I venture tentatively down the hallway, emerging in a tidy courtyard in front of a large building. There's a bucket of potatoes and some grain drying.
 

 
 
On a blackboard on the side of the building, I find a tally of the 2023 Ramadan contributions for zakat, just like in Meiba. It's a much smaller congregation here though. There's also a signup sheet for who will lead to break the fast each week (I think?) (请开斋名单)
 
 

 
The prayer room is on the second floor. A small sign outside indicates the salah times for the 5 daily prayers. The interior decoration is old and perhaps a bit worn, but very clean and dust-free. No one else is around.
 

 

 
I go back outside to eat and find the ladies preparing their own lunch. "Hey" I say, "Isn't it Ramadan? Can you eat now?" "Oh, we're not Hui" she says. "We just work here. We don't fast". "Oh...Is the owner Hui?" "Yeah" "Where is he? "He's busy. He has a lot of businesses."
 
On my 30+ km highway drive back to my original destination, I reflected on the two mosques. I really regretted in both cases that I didn't get to speak directly to any Hui people in those communities to find our how they feel. But anyway, here's how I sum up my thoughts now:
 
1. The Chinese rationale for the removal of domes and minarets of mosques in China has been public for a few years now; the stated objective of making the visual of the mosques conform to Chinese (and not foreign) architectural styles is clearly met by these renovations.
 
It's been noted that mosques with more Sinitic or styling seem less likely to be affected. For example, here's the Dujiangyan city mosque, constructed in 1934, with its green tiered pagodas, crescent moon and star, unchanged. My photo + file photo from http://chinaislam.net.cn
 

 
2. At least in the two sites I visited, I couldn't see any evidence that the usage of the mosque had been impacted (or that anything besides the outward appearance had been changed). They are clearly still places of prayer, congregation, and community for practicing Hui.
 
3. From a PERSONAL TASTE perspective, I think the Meiba renovation looks poorly proportioned and kinda ugly. The Weizhou renovation doesn't look bad, but also you can't even tell it's a mosque anymore. IMO, the Dujiangyan mosque's fusion aesthetic is a good blend of styles:
 
4. I don't fool myself thinking that I discovered anything with my little field trip that will change anyone's mind. Those that think it's a Bad Thing will keep thinking it, and those that think it's Totally Fine will do the same. They'll both see confirmation here I'd expect.
 
 
  view all

Many people often ask me, 'Your Chinese is so good, how did you learn it? Do you know Uyghur?' On the internet, there are also people who frequently ask me, 'Since you are so against China, why do you still study and use Chinese? Why not write in Uyghur?' Although I always smile and brush off these questions, especially the latter one keeps coming up. After a while, I feel that maybe I should give an answer.

Today, I will talk about how I chose to learn Chinese and how I learned it. Also, what was my purpose for learning Chinese. This can be considered as a summary of my experience in learning the language and my motivation and goals for doing so.

To be honest, learning Chinese was not my choice but rather my parents' decision. They forced me to learn it!

I have mentioned this briefly in some of my previous articles; originally born in Quruqhay Township in Yili (Xinjiang), where I grew up with my grandparents. Around 1970 when I started third grade at a Uyghur elementary school there suddenly came a time when my parents visited from Hami to see us on vacation. They wanted me to go back with them to Hami city for schooling.

Going to school in the city had great appeal for me as a child growing up in rural areas even though leaving behind grandparents who raised me made it difficult for me emotionally; however curiosity led me follow along with them away from beautiful mountain village Quruqhay Township filled with clear waters and fragrant fruits through several days of horse-drawn carriage rides followed by long-distance bus trips before finally arriving at Hami Railway Area.

Completely unexpected were rows upon rows of pale dilapidated railway flats highlighting poverty-stricken self-built small courtyard walls high or low unevenly distributed throughout area's dusty narrow roads pitted year-round emitting odors every crossroads having at least one or two open-air toilets which made lose interest completely towards cities - accurately speaking - disgust arose within myself.

Furthermore almost no Uyghurs lived around Hami Railway Area where we resided only two or three families were present; since unable speak Mandarin (Chinese) thus confined inside home feeling deceived by parents' actions wrote secretly letter asking grandparents come rescue immediately after approximately one or two months later they appeared unexpectedly taking week-long visit bringing freedom returning back home Quruqhay.
 
However, the good times didn't last long. My parents came again, bringing with them more new clothes, candies and biscuits as material temptations. They repeatedly urged me to learn Chinese and described a bright future of growing up in the city. They told me that if I learned Chinese, I could work on the railway in the future with high salary and job security. Although I didn't quite understand what high salary and job security meant, under my grandparents' persuasion, I knew that working on the railway was much better than farming in rural areas.

Under my parents' sugar-coated bullets and promises of a better future, I followed them to Hami once again. But this time, I persisted.

In autumn when school started, I entered Hami Railway Elementary School No. 4 not far from my home to begin learning Chinese language from scratch since at that time I did not know any Chinese words.

At first it was very difficult for me; besides arithmetic problems which were easy for me because they are universal across languages ,I couldn't understand anything else teachers said or communicate effectively with classmates except through gestures or body language . However,I persevered knowing that hard work pays off eventually . After several months of hard work ,I began to understand spoken Mandarin ; by second semester ,I had already made it into top ten students in class .

While studying Uyghur script at Quruhay Primary School back then there were no other books available except Mao's quotations but at Hami where we studied Mandarin there were many different kinds of books available . With mastery over Mandarin language ,I read extensively all sorts of books which further piqued my interest towards learning Mandarin; a language opens up a window into another world -Mandarin opened up a new window for me.
 
The railway, like the military unit where I later worked, was a heavy area of ​​ethnic discrimination. As Uyghurs, whether it was my parents or my siblings and other Uyghurs working on the railway, we faced various forms of discrimination almost every day. This discrimination came from teachers, classmates, neighbors, leaders and colleagues in our parents’ units; these seemingly trivial discriminations had a profound impact on my growth.

The most disgusting and boring discriminatory issue that accompanied me for half of my life was when I first appeared in class with seemingly innocent but obviously provocative questions that made teachers and classmates remember for a long time: Why don’t Uyghurs eat pork? Why do Uyghur names are so long? Why are Uyghurs so barbaric? At first, I patiently explained them but found out they already had their own answers. After I finished explaining to them, they would still come up with insulting fabricated stories to argue.

What’s worse is that some classmates deliberately put food containing pork on my desk or in my backpack and drawers. When I reported this to the teacher, he always casually said it was just children playing jokes on you. Then the teacher also joked about how good pork tasted and asked why didn’t I try it? Helpless as I was left with no choice but to solve it myself - by fighting back; most of the time I won but there were also times when students called their friends over to gang up on me leaving me beaten black and blue.

The more discrimination we encountered made me want to master Chinese better than ever before becoming an outstanding student at school. However, this became another reason for promoting discrimination; every time teachers criticized poor-performing students using frequent statements such as “Look at Yilixiati (my name), an ethnic minority person who performs better than all of you in all subjects; aren’t you ashamed?”

During ten years studying at Hami Railway School ,I witnessed firsthand how difficult life could be for my parents despite earning slightly higher wages compared to other Uighur workers on railways which allowed us a slightly better standard of living . They did the hardest work yet earned lowest wages while facing daily humiliation due to racial prejudice.

I remember one day when mother returned home crying after being insulted by Han people at her workplace selling tickets at small stations along railways . Commuting railway staff can travel free with their commuting certificate while others have to buy tickets . That day she met an extremely vulgar non-commuting worker who not only refused buying ticket but also insulted her verbally . My mother retorted him back then he jumped up wanting hit her physically calling her old ignorant uyghur woman who doesn’t understand anything etc .

Every time something like this happened ,my parents would tell me seriously: “Son,I hope you study hard Chinese language well ,master knowledge well,hopefully one day you can sit down equally with them ; unlike us living our whole lives being bullied.” Seeing all this happening around me,I knew what they expected from me wasn’t just mastering Chinese language skills or getting a job working on railways,but rather achieving equality between Han people &Uighurs!

Although at that time,I didn’t fully understand what equality meant according to parent’s expectations,but through personal experiences&commonly faced prejudices among fellow uighurs around,it dawned upon me that mastering Chinese language&modern knowledge is essential.I naively thought,the various forms of prejudice against uighurs were caused partly because older generation uighur folks couldn’t speak chinese fluently,and partly because ordinary han people working along railways were too ignorant & uncivilized.So if i studied hard,mastered knowledge,i could prove uighur people weren’t inferior compared to han people,&change their views towards us thus achieving equality .

I worked hard,determined not fall behind,became top student in class,&with excellent grades ranked within top ten throughout school,enabling admission into prestigious HaMi No2 High School followed by Dalian Institute Of Technology.
 
 
After graduating from university, I returned to my hometown to look for work. My father asked me if I would be willing to work on the railway. He said he could talk to his leader about it and my younger siblings also encouraged me, saying that railway jobs had high salaries and good benefits, and everyone was in Hami. However, I firmly refused and told them about the various discriminations I encountered during my ten years of schooling as well as the dirty, chaotic, and poor environment of the railways which had already made me tired of working there. No, I never wanted to go back to the railway.

However, fate played a joke on me when I was unfortunately assigned to Shihezi after graduation where I became a teacher in China’s colonial pioneer corps - Bingtuan’s capital city.

As a recent college graduate with an arrogant sense of superiority due to being one of the best students at that time who thought they could point out flaws in everything and make sweeping statements with ease; coming here as a teacher in Shihezi gave me this feeling like because my Chinese language skills were fluent coupled with modern knowledge meant that equality should be achievable through ability alone. But what happened instead was that compared with discrimination against non-Han ethnic groups such as Uyghurs by railways (which is already bad enough), Bingtuan’s discrimination against these groups can only be described as equally severe but more insidious and blatant.

During decades spent teaching here while dealing with school leaders and colleagues alike; most Han intellectuals’ prejudice towards Uyghurs or other non-Han ethnicities runs deep rooted within them along with their own brand of ignorant arrogance.

This kind of ignorance makes them feel entitled towards enlightening us or civilizing us; our language culture traditions beliefs are all backward according to them so their mission is assimilating us into “Chinese civilization” making us become just like Han people who speak Mandarin rather than Uyghur speakers!

I remember after countless heated debates between myself & Han colleagues over time; one old teacher named Wang said: “Mr Yiliyasiti! In the past we used say ‘Heaven fears not nor does Earth fear anything except for an old Uyghur speaking Mandarin’. Today however? We know you guys learn Chinese just so you can deal with us.” This statement has been repeated many times since then sometimes vented out angrily sometimes sighed helplessly but sometimes even cursed at full throttle fueled by hatred!

With hopes held high wanting mastery over Mandarin learning knowledge realizing dreams for equal footing alongside Han people- 10 years studying hard behind closed doors mastering Chinese yet ultimately discovering how uncomfortable angry & indignant it made both my Han superiors & colleagues feel even going so far as thinking any dissenting opinions or resistance from myself constituted rebellion deserving punishment!

Nevertheless despite all this hardship endured throughout East Turkestan fluency in Mandarin did not change my status nor fulfill wishes for equality among Han people yet through learning Mandarin gained much knowledge understanding deeper historical context regarding imperial China grasping vastness profundity contained within its culture meeting genuine friends among enlightened open-minded individuals who truly understand freedom & equality concepts! Most importantly though- mastering Mandarin became most powerful tool enabling pursuit toward equal rights freedom standing toe-to-toe versus those advocating unity under imperialist rule actually achieving true parity long ago! view all

   ​China’s Ethnic Hui Community at Risk of Erasure

A joint submission to

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

for its

3rd Periodic Review of the Implementation by the People’s Republic of China

of the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Submitting organizations:

Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)

A coalition of Chinese and international human rights non-governmental organizations. The network is dedicated to the promotion of human rights through peaceful efforts to push for democratic and rule of law reforms and to strengthen grassroots activism in China.

[email protected]

https://www.nchrd.org/

Hope Umbrella International Foundation

An organization whose mission is to preserve the cultural, religious, and intellectual heritage of the Hui people. The organization also documents the effects of government policies that violate the human rights of Hui communities in China.

Date of Submission: January 15, 2023
 
 
Executive Summary

1. China’s Hui population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—numbering over a million—has been among the groups targeted by crimes against humanity in the government’s counter-terrorism campaign in the region. Beginning in 2014 and escalating in 2017, this is the same counter-terrorism campaign that has received widespread international coverage for targeting Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic-speaking groups. The campaign has resulted in the detentions of a plausible estimate of more than 100,000 Hui in re-education centers, in addition to pre-trial detentions and imprisonments. The Hui have also been subject to restrictions aimed at eliminating “signs of extremism” that include what the OHCHR has referred to as religious and cultural expression protected under the Covenant, and intrusive surveillance of public and private life.

2. The Hui are an ethno-religious group of primarily Chinese-speaking adherents of Islam who are descendants of Han Chinese and immigrants from Central Asia and the Middle East via the Silk Road trade. A few ethnically distinct Muslim groups in China are also classified as Hui by the Chinese government. There are 11.4 million Hui in China according to the most recent national census, making them the third most populous of the officially recognized ethnic groups in China.1 Hui communities are concentrated in various regions in China, with the largest number in the northwestern provinces.

3. This submission also covers violations of Hui cultural and religious rights throughout China. Through the government’s “Sinification” campaign, authorities have tried to forcibly integrate religious groups into the government and Party system and to eliminate aspects of cultural expression that are seen by authorities as being incompatible with Han Chinese culture. Authorities have intimidated and detained lawyers taking up cases of Hui persecuted for exercising their cultural rights and censored online content about Hui and Islam, while permitting officials to foment hate speech and campaigns attacking Hui communities on Chinese social media.

4. “Poverty alleviation” is another Chinese government policy with a significant impact on Hui social, cultural, and economic rights. Officials have implemented two major poverty alleviation programs among Hui communities that require relocation: “ecological migration” and domestic “labor transfers” to more economically developed regions within China. In designing these programs, authorities have failed to conduct consultations with the communities that would be seriously affected. Officials have stated that the goals of these policies include assimilation of minority groups. These policies have forced the integration of ethnic minority communities into Han Chinese-dominant cities, where Hui find their employment opportunities limited to unstable and low-paying wage work.

5. Finally, this report covers violations of Hui economic rights in the context of forced labor in Xinjiang and the threatened deprivation of social benefits in both the Xinjiang counter-terrorism campaign and the nationwide “Sinification” campaign. Hui throughout China have also faced discrimination in the job market and the workplace, and this discrimination has worsened because of the stigmatizing effect of the government campaigns marginalizing and criminalizing Hui religious and cultural practices.

Chapter 1. Counter-Terrorism Policies Targeting Hui in Xinjiang

1.1 Targeting Hui for Exhibiting “Signs of Extremism” (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues pars. 12, 29)

6. Beginning in 2014 and escalating in 2017, the Chinese government’s “strike hard” campaign to counter “terrorism” and “extremism” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang or XUAR) has resulted in egregious violations of the social, economic, and cultural rights of the over one million Hui persons in region.2 Though the resulting crimes against humanity directed at Uyghurs and Kazakhs have drawn more widespread attention, China’s Hui population has also been among the targeted groups.

7. As part of the “strike hard” campaign, authorities have implemented a series of laws3 and policies that have been used to impose severe sanctions on a wide range of activities that government officials have designated “signs of extremism.”4 Authorities have rounded up members of the Hui community and held them in detention centers and re-education camps and sentenced some of them to prison for engaging in Hui religious and cultural activities such as praying at home5 or in mosques,6 watching7 or discussing8 religious content online, traveling to Muslim-majority countries,9 having funded mosque construction,10 going on Hajj pilgrimages,>11 being an imam, both with12 and without13 state licenses, and keeping religious paraphernalia in the home.14Such government measures targeting Hui persons for the above-listed activities violate their rights under the ICESCR to non-discrimination (article 2.2) and to take part in cultural life (15.1.a).

8. In further violation of the Hui community’s cultural rights under article 15.1.a, authorities have prohibited Hui communities in Xinjiang from engaging in religious and cultural activities such as observing Ramadan and Eid-al-Adha and have required Hui individuals to renounce their religion under duress.15 Authorities have required Hui families of those who had been detained in re-education camps to attend weekly flag-raising ceremonies16 and evening classes with “anti-religious” curriculum and demanded that attendees report on the religious observance of friends and family, threatening to send those who failed to report to a re-education camp.17
 
 
1.2 Detention of Hui & Mistreatment in Detention (Articles 11 & 12)

9. As part of the counter-terrorism campaign beginning in 2014, Hui in Xinjiang have been detained in pre-trial detention centers and re-education camps and sentenced to prison. The Chinese government has made little information public about the number or ethnicity of those detained in the campaign. In the absence of official data, researcher Gene Bunin has found that many witness testimonies from former detainees who later fled to Kazakhstan mention that Hui were detained alongside them in Xinjiang; Bunin also found that a report of 43 persons detained in Xinjiang in one predominantly Hui village of 60 households was comparable to expert estimates of the proportion detained in Uyghur communities in Xinjiang.18 Using researchers’ conservative estimate of 10 percent for the proportion of those detained in Uyghur communities,19 it is plausible to estimate that perhaps more than 100,000 Hui may have been deprived of liberty in connection with the campaign in Xinjiang.

10. The conditions in which Hui persons have been held in custody have resulted in serious violations of their rights to an adequate standard of living (article 11) and to physical and mental health (article 12). Uyghur, Kazakh, and other majority Muslim groups have reported significant physical and psychological abuse in custody,20 and reports indicate that Hui in custody have been subject to similar treatment,21 such as being crowded in squalid conditions of around 40 detainees to a cell with space so limited they could only sleep in shifts, being deprived of sunlight, and malnutrition so severe that detainees suffered from life-threatening anemia and weight loss.22 Like other detainees, Hui have been handcuffed and shackled for long periods,23 with at least one account having emerged of a Hui man dying in detention after being restrained in a tiger chair for 78 hours.24

1.3 Surveillance in Public and Private Life (Articles 2, 10, 12, & 13)

11. The detentions described above underpin a broader system of surveillance and restrictions aimed at eliminating the aforementioned “signs” of religious “extremism” in public and private life in the XUAR. The implementation of such policies has violated the rights of Hui individuals to non-discrimination (Article 2.2) These measures include close scrutiny of the movements and activities of Hui and other non-Han persons residing in the XUAR through security checkpoints,25 forced inspection of social media history,26 random cellphone checks,27 home inspections,28 regular questioning by police in person and over social media,29 and assigning public employees to stay in homes to monitor for religious observance and other “signs of extremism.”30

12. To facilitate monitoring by local authorities, Hui persons have also been subjected to discriminatory travel, residence, and employment restrictions, with reports of local authorities selectively requiring Hui to return to their registered hometowns.31 Authorities have also prohibited Hui from relocating within Xinjiang by reportedly refusing to register them as new residents.32

13. Authorities have also subjected Hui persons to physically and psychologically intrusive surveillance of their private lives. As part of the “becoming family” homestay program, public employees have reportedly monitored people in their homes for long periods of time with highly intrusive methods—continuously taking pictures of their activities, asking children about their parents’ activities,33 and even sleeping with families in their beds.34 The program constitutes a serious, coercive disruption of family life (Article 10.1) and also violates the right to enjoyment of mental health (Article 12.1) and to ensure the religious and moral education of one’s children (Article 13.3).

1.4. Recommendations

14. We urge the Committee to recommend that the State party:

Indicate any concrete steps taken to adopt comprehensive legislation or to review the existing laws, including “counter-terrorism” legislation, for eliminating discrimination and violations of social, cultural, and economic rights against ethnic groups including the Hui.
Provide information on the measures taken, and their effectiveness, to combat widespread social stigma and discrimination against ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Hui, in the country’s counter-terror campaigns.
Provide statistical data on children of ethnic or religious minorities including the children of Hui persons, who have been separated from their families, without adequate care, when parents are taken to “vocational training” camps.

Indicate the measures taken to improve access to health-care services, particularly among persons living in rural ethnic minority regions, including the Hui regions, and detainees and prisoners.
Provide information on the measures taken to ensure the freedom of Hui parents to determine the religious and moral education of their children.

Chapter 2. Discriminatory Policies and Practices Violating Hui Cultural and Religious Rights

2.1 “Sinification” Policy Undermines Hui Religious Freedom and Identity (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues par. 30)

15. In CESCR’s List of Issues, paragraph 30, the Committee asks the state to “indicate the measures taken to ensure that the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of ethnic minority groups is not undermined by the assimilation policy of the State party, known as “Sinification.”

16. Much of the Sinification campaign has targeted the Hui people, which appears to be authorized and coordinated via secretive directives35 from the PRC State Council and the United Front Work Department. Implementation of the campaign has had the effect of expunging communities of their connections to Hui culture, religion, and each other so thoroughly that some leaders view the erasure of a meaningful Hui identity within another generation as being a likely possibility.36

17. A classified 2018 State Council directive called for eliminating signs of Arab cultural influence in Islamic venues, dress, and religious observance, prohibiting waqf charitable funds from being independently held and administered by local Islamic communities, and barring Islamic organizations from running programs involving minors—from kindergartens to Arabic language schools and study abroad programs.37

18. Among the forms of “Arab influence” being targeted for removal since 2016 are Arabic lettering and motifs on buildings, in public areas, and in people’s homes.38 Islamic dietary restrictions have also been targeted as an unacceptable expression of Hui identity: since 2016 across China, restaurants and groceries have been forced to remove halal signage,39 and by 2019 authorities in Ningxia, Beijing, and elsewhere were no longer allowing food, dairy, and wheat producers and restaurants to certify food as halal.40

19. The Sinification campaign also aims to prevent transmission of cultural and religious heritage across generations. Minors under 18 have been prohibited from entering mosques and other religious venues in many areas, and Arabic language and Islamic schools have been shut down by authorities. In Gansu, extremely limited quotas for Arab language and religious instruction have made it impossible for most children to access instruction.41

20. In 2018, the Chinese Islamic Association—the state-sanctioned leadership organization for Islamic religious leaders—released measures regarding the Sinification of mosques and Islamic doctrine.42 The policy was referred to as the “four entries,” and directed local officials to ensure that “four” things make their “entry” into Hui, Uyghur, and all other mosques: the national flag, the Chinese constitution and laws, core socialist values, and Chinese traditional culture.43 Mosques were reportedly required to raise national flags,44 which were often accompanied by slogans exhorting patriotism, ethnic unity, and social stability.45

21. The “four entries” also heralded the intrusion of official surveillance into the religious and private life of Hui. Surveillance cameras have been installed by local police to monitor activity inside mosques in Ningxia and Henan.46 Hui have also been expected by the government to report on the religious activities of friends and families, with monetary rewards offered to informants.47

22. Authorities have sought to introduce the last two “entries”—core socialist values and Chinese traditional culture—through Hui religious leaders. Imams are only able to openly preach contingent on whether they demonstrate loyalty to the government’s Sinification program.48 Mosques without licensed imams have been shut down entirely.49 Officials in Ningxia and Henan now require imams to attend monthly training sessions regarding Party ideology and official policies governing ethnic minorities; for renewal of their imam license they must pass yearly tests regarding Party ideology.50 Imams are closely policed to monitor their deviation from officially prescribed interpretations of Islam.51

23. Meanwhile, the Sinification policy seeks to change the very beliefs of Islam by inserting “core socialist values” into the religious doctrine itself. The state-led China Islamic Association began leading conferences in December 2020 for the purpose of generating official re-interpretations of Islamic theology from the perspective of Confucianism and “core socialist values” so that they can be in line with “Chinese traditional culture.”52 Officials have worked methodically to remove signs of Arabic influence from mosques: the call to prayer in Arabic was prohibited in at least Ningxia and Gansu and replaced with the sound of a siren; as with all other buildings, Arabic inscriptions and motifs were removed from mosque walls.53

24. The Sinification measure that has provoked the strongest reaction in Hui communities is the forced demolition of mosque domes and minarets and their replacement with traditional Chinese roof designs.54 Authorities have retaliated against those opposing the demolitions. Following mass protests in Tongxin, Ningxia over the attempted removal of a mosque dome in August 2018, authorities visited each Hui household in the community requiring each to give consent to the replacement of the dome, issuing threats such as job loss for family members who were public employees.55

2.2 Intimidation and Detention of Lawyers Taking up Cases of Hui Cultural Rights (Article 2, List of Issues par. 4)

25. In its List of Issues (paragraph 4), the Committee asks the government to provide information about the intimidation of lawyers taking up cases of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Chinese authorities have harassed, threatened, and detained lawyers for representing Hui clients charged in connection with their religious identity or activities. Instead, authorities forced Hui detainees to be represented by government-appointed attorneys.

26. One Hui interviewee told CHRD in 2022 that in 2017, a lawyer was disappeared by authorities in Xinjiang for several days after being engaged to represent Hui religious leader Jin Dehuai, who was convicted for separatism based on religious activities such as preaching in his home, encouraging proselytizing, and organizing religious conferences with participants from abroad.56 The lawyer canceled representation after being released by authorities.

27. The same interviewee informed CHRD that authorities in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 2019 warned lawyers against attempting to represent Hui defendants who had been detained for their refusal to consent to the government’s removal of a mosque minaret. The defendants were members of the leadership committee of the Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia’s Tongxin county,57 Consequently, the defendants were assigned government-appointed lawyers and later convicted for “criminal syndicate activity.”58 Charges involving “criminal syndicates” have allowed for expedited prosecution and lower levels of judicial scrutiny under a major national anti-corruption campaign initiated in 2018 known as “Sweep Away the Dark Forces and Eliminate the Evil” (saohei chu’e).59

2.3 Internet Censorship (Article 15; List of Issues par. 31)

28. Chinese internet regulations have led to the selective censorship of content from Hui internet users while allowing denigrating and hateful speech about Hui and Islam to proliferate on social media. This combined with the encouragement of hate speech by public figures in official positions has contributed to worsening discrimination against Hui persons in Chinese society more generally.

29. In March 2022, a state ban on independent publication of “religious information” online went into effect, allowing only officially registered organizations vetted by the government to publish information online about “religious doctrine, knowledge, culture, or activities.”60 Prior to this ban, websites and online platforms popular among users in the Hui community had already been shut down.

30. For example, the website Zhongmu (www.2muslim.com) was shut down when a user-posted an open letter to Xi Jinping calling for the release of political prisoners was reposted by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Xi Wuyi on Chinese social media platform Sina Weibo as evidence of Hui subversion.61 The website had been online for over 13 years and included forums for 77 local communities throughout China, and former users searching for “Zhongmu” on Chinese social media found that searches on these platforms produced no results, thus preventing them from reconnecting.62 In addition to Zhomgmu, the personal websites of leading Hui cultural figures such as imam Li Yunfei and writer Zhang Chengzhi were shut down in 2020 and 2021, respectively.63

31. Individual Hui Internet users have also encountered censorship online. Researchers reported in a 2018 study that Hui users frequently found that their online posts about Islam or official ethnic policies were deleted or their accounts blocked, while state-approved imams have been allowed to discuss Islam online.64 Such targeted censorship has effectively prevented Hui persons from freely exchanging ideas and information on the internet.

32. While websites and Hui Internet users have been censored, discriminatory and hateful speech about Islam and Muslims has flourished on Chinese-language social media platforms. Academic experts have observed that such anti-Muslim rhetoric online has been indirectly encouraged by state media, which almost always portrays Muslims as the grateful beneficiaries of state programs or as violent extremists.65 Studies also find that social media platforms selectively fail to remove Islamophobic content clearly in violation of platform policies,66 which experts note is itself a reflection of suspicion of Muslim groups among Chinese authorities67 because authorities have significant control over what content appears online.68 Islamophobic hate speech also comes in the form of vicious online attacks against social media users identified as Hui, which has caused many Hui internet users to avoid engaging on issues related to Islam online.69

33. Government officials are often both the source and propagators of some of the most vitriolic comments about Muslims and Islam on Chinese social media. Scholar of Marxism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Xi Wuyi (mentioned above) has led numerous online campaigns against accommodations for or acknowledgment of Muslim members of Chinese society.70 Another government figure who has mobilized online followers to target the Hui community is a government propaganda and cyberspace official named Cui Zijian, who said it was part of his “professional and patriotic duty” to lead a 2017 online campaign to shut down the construction of a mosque in Hefei, provincial capital of Anhui.71 The status of such officials as in government capacity further legitimates hate speech about Muslims in mainstream discourse.
 
2.4 Recommendations

34. The Committee should recommend that the State Party:
Provide information on the efforts undertaken to promote and protect the culture, religion and language of ethnic minority groups, including the Hui, and show how the measures taken to ensure that the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of ethnic minority groups including the Hui are not undermined by the assimilation policy of the State party, known as “Sinicization.” Please also comment on reports that the State party has attempted to eradicate the culture, religion, and language of Hui through the destruction of sacred cultural and religious sites and bans on engaging in religious activity.Provide information about avenues for accountability, redress, and compensation for lawyers and law firms subject to intimidation, detention, and retaliation for taking up cases of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Also provide information on the measures taken to provide an enabling environment for lawyers and human rights defenders to advocate and promote economic, social and cultural rights, particularly for Hui persons.Provide information on any measures taken to ensure the free exchange of ideas and information online without interference to the enjoyment of Hui persons to cultural rights and religious freedom.

Chapter 3. “Poverty Alleviation” Policies Disperse Hui Communities and Facilitate Cultural Assimilation

3.1 Political Goals and Effects of “Poverty Alleviation” Programs (Articles 2, 11 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

35. In its List of Issues (paragraph 24), the Committee asks the Chinese government to “specify the efforts made … to involve the affected individuals and communities in designing and implementing various poverty alleviation projects, especially those entailing relocation and resettlement of residents[.]” CHRD finds that few, if any, such efforts have been made with Hui communities.

36. Chinese officials have implemented two major poverty alleviation policies among Hui communities that require relocation: “ecological migration” and domestic “labor transfers” to more economically developed regions within China. “Ecological migration” has been touted by President and Party Chairman Xi Jinping as part of a series of the government’s ethnic minority policies that would create “mutually embedded social structures,” “intermingle ethnic groups,” and “guide people of different ethnic groups to correctly understand ethnic relations and issues.”72 Meanwhile, officials involved in a 2020 “labor transfer” recruitment effort targeting Hui workers cited the importance of “ensuring social stability and harmony” and “strengthening national unity.”73

37. In practice, such policies force the integration of ethnic minority communities into Han Chinese-dominant society, where they find employment opportunities limited to unstable and low-paying wage work. In designing these programs, authorities have failed to conduct consultations with the Hui communities that would be seriously affected by their implementation. The Chinese government’s implementation of “ecological migration” and “labor transfer” policies has violated the rights of Hui persons to an adequate standard of living (article 11) and/or to participate in cultural life (article 15). The design and execution of these programs have also negatively impacted the rights of the Hui persons to non-discrimination (article 2) by targeting Hui for dispersal to achieve political goals.
 
3.2 “Ecological migration” (Articles 2, 11 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

38. The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (Ningxia) hosts the world’s largest planned “ecological migration” project in terms of people affected. Begun in 1983, the government has relocated more than 1.1 million residents, out of a total of 7.2 million people in the region to achieve “environmental” and “poverty alleviation” goals.74 Scholars have contended that the policies are also a cover for dispersing and dislocating ethnic minority groups.75 Ecological migration projects have been used to disperse hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities in other areas: 710,000 people—72 percent ethnic minority—were resettled across 506 resettlement areas in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region between 2016 and 2020. The design of the resettlement plan emphasized relocating people from Zhuang, Miao, Yao, Maonan, and other ethnic minority groups and resettling them in mixed communities to promote “ethnic unity.”76 In Ningxia, although Hui make up 35% of the population, the majority of those resettled have been Hui.77

39. In one example, journalists found that Hui were forced to abandon independent farming for poorly remunerated jobs on industrial farms when 7,000 of them were relocated from Yejiahe Village in the Xihaigu region to the newly established Miaomiao Lake Village.78 Authorities denied farm subsidies and water pipelines to households that chose to remain.79 The relocated villagers were not compensated for the land they relinquished in their original village, and they were required to pay a “resettlement fee” of 14,000 RMB (USD $2,100) per household.80 Local officials told Chinese media that in exchange each household received 300 square meters for housing,81 but journalists found that relocated families of as many as eleven people were living in 50-square-meter, 2-bedroom apartments.82

40. Despite government promises that some families would be able to support themselves by farming allotted land in the new village, officials forced families to lease their plots to an agricultural company at low rates that the company allegedly stopped paying after the first year.83 A quarter of the 350,000 people84 relocated between 2011 and 2015 were not allotted any land for farming.85 Officials justified this by insisting that proximity to highways and urban areas amounted to an improvement in quality of life and encouraging residents to work in nearby cities.86 Officials boasted a high employment rate at 93 percent, but these figures were contested by local residents who reported that men were unable to find construction work and families relied on government loans to meet expenses.87 By 2021, Chinese media reported that garment work had been brought onsite to the village in a trailer.88

3.3 Domestic “labor transfers” (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

41. The other major “poverty alleviation” policy resulting in relocation and dispersal for Hui communities is the practice of domestic “labor transfers” coordinated by authorities in Ningxia89, Gansu,90 Qinghai,91 and Yunnan,92 where majority-Hui communities are concentrated. Government officials run these programs in conjunction with companies and other cities or regions seeking workers.

42. These “labor transfer” programs have displaced hundreds of thousands of people at any given time. In 2020, the Ningxia government had coordinated the “labor transfer” of 817,600 residents to work in the coastal province of Fujian and other parts of China as of August.93 In Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 550,000 out of 2 million total residents of the province was working as transferred labor outside of Gansu, according to numbers reported in 2020.94 Some of these local governments have been engaged in labor transfers of their residents for decades—Ningxia and Qinghai began enlisting residents to work for companies in coastal areas such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Shanghai as early as 2005.95

43. Although there is no available official data tracking the exact number and proportion of Hui people involved in “labor transfers,” there are indications that the Hui people in particular are significantly impacted. A free trade-zone official from Ningbo met with government leaders from both the Ningxia region and Linxia Prefecture in Gansu Province in 2020 to recruit Hui workers specifically, citing the importance of “ensuring social stability and harmony,” and “strengthening national unity.”96 Such “labor transfer” coordination is discriminatory as it targets Hui communities to achieve political goals.

44. We do not currently have evidence that these government-coordinated labor transfers are coercive in nature, in contrast to the labor transfer programs organized by local governments in Xinjiang (see Section 4.1).97 However, surveys suggest that the transfers are neither planned nor implemented in consultation with the affected communities, who have found that labor transfers disrupt social and cultural life in undesirable ways.

45. One 2014 study of the labor transfer programs in Zhangjiachuan Hui Autonomous County in Gansu province found that the 70 percent Hui population preferred to continue individual farming and to earn income without having to leave the region and work in other parts of the country.98 A survey of Muslim “labor transfer” participants from Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu province found that transferred laborers faced language barriers, difficulty finding Halal food, and lack of accommodation for religious observance, particularly for those traveling to eastern coastal cities where there was not a significant Muslim presence.99 Despite their preferences, such communities have become dependent on the labor transfer system for income—in 2021, remittances from labor transfers were more than half of local GDP in Zhangjiachuan county (1.77 billion RMB out of 3.39 billion RMB).100

3.3 Recommendations

46. The Committee should recommend that the State Party:

Specify the efforts made by the State party to involve the affected individuals and communities in designing and implementing various poverty alleviation projects in ethnic Hui regions, especially those entailing both temporary (as in the case of labor transfers) and permanent relocation of residents (as in the case of ecological migration), and to carry out those projects in accordance with its obligations under the Covenant. Please provide statistical data, disaggregated by region, on the number of land expropriations carried out and the number of persons relocated accordingly.
Provide information on the steps taken to address the reportedly persistent discrimination faced by ethnic minority persons with rural household registration in accessing employment, social security, housing, health care, education and other social services.

Chapter 4. Violations of Hui Economic Rights

4.1 Forced Labor in Xinjiang (Articles 6 & 11; List of Issues par. 16)

47. There is evidence suggesting that Hui detainees in Xinjiang (see Section 1.2) have been subjected to forced labor: Hui persons have served for periods in and around Ürümchi at Wujiaqu Prison and Badaowan Vocational Education and Training Center where forced labor has been documented;101 in one case, authorities have sent a Hui person to work in factories rather than allowing them to return home after being released from re-education camps.102

48. Xinjiang authorities have also promulgated official policies intended to forcibly displace residents for the purpose of performing forced labor as part of a political and cultural reform program. In 2018, the Yanqi Hui Autonomous County government in the XUAR issued Document No. 99 outlining a government-administered system of coercive relocation for labor, stating that “those who are transferred for work are not allowed to return without permission,” workers would be assessed based on “ideological education,” and administrative units would report on their progress in ideological training to the local Political Legal Committee and the Public Security Bureau.103

49. The scale of detentions of Hui and other Muslim-majority persons has also directly impoverished entire communities in the region. For example, a 2020 report describes 43 men in a village of around 60 households in Tacheng prefecture being sent to re-education camps. Without their labor, the main economic activity in the village, farming, was largely discontinued and the families remaining in the farming community no longer have sufficient income for necessities.104 Thus, the mass detentions have infringed on the right of the families of the detained to an adequate standard of living (Article 11).

4.2 Deprivation of Social Benefits, Rights to Work and Education (Articles 6, 9 & 13)

50. Chinese government officials have denied or threatened to deny public education, pensions, and other social benefits to compel Hui persons to comply with certain counter-extremism policies. This is in violation of their rights to work (article 6), social security (article 9), and education (article 13). For example, a Hui woman in Karamay prefecture in Xinjiang was threatened with the loss of her pension and her son’s minimal living allowance if she did not renounce her religion.105 In some cases, officials have coerced Hui migrants in Xinjiang to other parts of the regions to return to their registered residential locations by denying employment and public education for their children in the cities where they had been found work and lived for a long time.106

4.3 Employment Discrimination against Hui Muslims (Articles 2, 6; List of Issues par. 15)

51. Hui have historically faced discrimination in the job market and the workplace. In recent years this discrimination has worsened because of the stigmatizing effect of government campaigns marginalizing and criminalizing Hui religious and cultural practices described in preceding sections. A 2020 academic study found that Muslim job seekers in China are more than 50 percent less likely to advance beyond an initial interview than Han Chinese job seekers, discrimination that would primarily affect Hui, Uyghur, other predominantly Muslim groups. The study also found that despite government mandates to prioritize ethnic minority applicants, state-owned enterprises are as likely as private companies to engage in discriminatory hiring.107

52. More recently, such pervasive discrimination has been compounded by religious restrictions in the workplace imposed by local authorities as part of the government’s nationwide crackdown on religion in general. Since 2015, civil servants, teachers, and other public sector employees in Xinjiang have been banned from fasting during Ramadan;108 Hui make up approximately 9 percent of the population of Xinjiang of the population. As early as 2018, in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, public sector employees have been prohibited from appearing at work wearing the white caps Hui men customarily wear.109 Around 2016, the Chinese Communist Party warned its members of disciplinary measures if they believe in any religion, with state media publicized cases of CCP officials being subjected to disciplinary penalties for harboring religious beliefs.110

4.4 Recommendations

53. The Committee should recommend that the State party:

Provide information on any specific steps taken to ensure that no alternative or parallel system of forced labor is still in place, provide information on the steps taken to address reports about forced labour and physical and mental abuse of detainees allegedly involved in the so-called “vocational training programmes” operated by the State party, including through vocational training centres, for surplus rural workforce, particularly Uighurs, Tibetans, Huis and other ethnic minority groups; and indicate what support is provided to families whose primary breadwinner is sent to such centres.

Provide information on the trends in coverage of each social security scheme during the reporting period and the efforts made to expand the coverage of social security schemes, particularly among rural ethnic minority (including the Hui) migrant workers and workers in the informal economy or with non-standard forms of employment.

Endnotes:

1 According to the 2021 China Annual Statistical Yearbook. Cited in: https://baike.baidu.com/item/% ... ence-[4]-2699-wrap

2 China Internet Information Center, August 1, 2021.Available at: http://www.china.com.cn/opinio ... shtml

3 PRC Counterterrorism Law; XUAR Implementing Measures for the PRC Counterterrorism Law; PRC Criminal Law; XUAR Religious Affairs Regulation; 2017 XUAR Regulation on De-Extremification.

4 “新疆局地组织民众识别75种宗教极端活动” [“Local Xinjiang Authorities Organize Public to Identify 75 Signs of Religious Extremism”], Sina, December 14, 2014. Available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014 ... shtml

5 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

6 Chang Xin, “Xinjiang Woman Struggles to Care for Her Grandchildren,” Bitter Winter, February 11, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/woman ... n/%3B Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

7 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhengxiu,” May 14, 2022.

8 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhixue,” May 14, 2022.

9 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Xuexian,” December 27, 2019; Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Yuanlan,” December 27, 2019; Xinjiang Victims Database, “Wang Yali,” December 28, 2019.

10 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhongbao,” December 18, 2018.

11 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

12 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

13 Li Zaili, “Monetary Reward Offered for Muslim Man’s Recapture,” Bitter Winter, November 21, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/monet ... ture/

14 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

15 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

16 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

17 Xiang Yi, “With Husbands in Camps, Hui Women Struggle Taking Care of Families,” Bitter Winter, January 4, 2020. Available at:  https://bitterwinter.org/hui-w ... lies/

18 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

19 Jessica Batke, “Where Did the One Million Figure for Detentions in Xinjiang’s Camps Come From?” ChinaFile, January 8, 2019. Available at: https://www.chinafile.com/repo ... -come

20 Gene Bunin, “Because you had to do it very quickly, or you could be punished,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, November 1, 2019. Available at: https://livingotherwise.com/20 ... hed/. Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

21 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

22 Li Zaili, “Muslim Woman Reveals Details of Her Life in Detention,” Bitter Winter, October 30, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/musli ... tion/

23 Li Benbo, “Released from Xinjiang Camps but Forced to Lie About Them,” Bitter Winter, February 24, 2020. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/relea ... hem/. Li Zaili, “Imam Forced to Recite CCP Policies,” Bitter Winter, October 18, 2018. Available at:https://bitterwinter.org/imam- ... cies/

24 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

25 Darren Byler, “Do Coercive Reeducation Technologies Actually Work?,” Los Angeles Review of Books (Blog) , January 6, 2020. Available at: https://blog.lareviewofbooks.o ... work/

26 Gerry Shih, “China’s crackdown on Uighurs spreads to even mild critics,” Associated Press, December 28, 2017.

Available at: https://apnews.com/article/ap- ... 09ce8

27 Li Zaili, “CCP Monitors, Punishes Comments on Social Media,” Bitter Winter, December 28, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/ccp-m ... edia/

28 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

29 Darren Byler, “Do Coercive Reeducation Technologies Actually Work?,” Los Angeles Review of Books (Blog) , January 6, 2020. Available at: https://blog.lareviewofbooks.o ... work/  

30 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... ims/. For general information about the “Becoming Family” program, see UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, pars. 100-101. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/de ... t.pdf 

31 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... hur/. Li Zaili, “Imam Forced to Recite CCP Policies,” Bitter Winter, October 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/imam- ... s/%3B

32 Li Zaili, “Muslims Pushed to the Fringes of Housing Market,” Bitter Winter, November 25, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/musli ... rket/ 

33 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

34 Ivan Watson and Rebecca Wright, “The Chinese policy that makes Uyghurs feel like hostages in their own homes,” CNN, May 8, 2021. Available at: https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/08 ... html. For general information about the “Becoming Family” program, see UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, pars. 100-101. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/de ... .pdf. See also University of British Columbia Xinjiang Documentation Project, ““Hundred Questions and Hundred Examples”: Cadre Handbooks in the Fanghuiju Campaign,” accessed January 11, 2023. Available at: https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/ ... ooks/

35 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html. Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html  

36 Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

37 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... .html

38 Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... stics

39 David R. Stroup, “The de-Islamification of Public Space and Sinicization of Ethnic Politics in Xi’s China,” Middle East Institute, September 24, 2019. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publicatio ... ftn4. Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Huizhong Wu, “Sign of the times: China’s capital orders Arabic, Muslim symbols taken down,” Reuters, July 31, 2019. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/articl ... Q0JF. “China’s repression of Islam is spreading beyond Xinjiang,” The Economist, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.economist.com/chin ... iang. Keith Bradsher and Amy Qin, “China’s Crackdown on Muslims Extends to a Resort Island,” New York Times, February 14, 2021.Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/0 ... ml%3B Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

40 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... .html

41 Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

42 “中国伊斯兰教协会“四进”清真寺活动在京启动” [“China Islamic Association “Four Entries” Initiative Launches in Beijing”], Xinhua, May 18, 2018. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/polit ... 4.htm 

43 “中国伊斯兰教协会“四进”清真寺活动在京启动” [“China Islamic Association “Four Entries” Initiative Launches in Beijing”], Xinhua, May 18, 2018. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/polit ... 4.htm 

44 Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Matthew Chitwood, “China’s Crackdown on Islam Brings Back Memories of 1975 Massacre,” Foreign Policy, April 11, 2021. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021 ... obia/

45 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html. Alice Su, “China’s new campaign to make Muslims devoted to the state rather than Islam,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2020.Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world- ... gansu

46 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

47 “China’s repression of Islam is spreading beyond Xinjiang,” The Economist, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.economist.com/chin ... iang. Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

48 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

49 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

50 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2019 Annual Report, November 18, 2019, pg. 110. Available at: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... N.pdf

51 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

52 China Islamic Association, “Holding Fast to Our Country’s Direction of Islamic Sinification: 5-Year Plan of Work Outline (2018-2022)” [“坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向 五年工作规划纲要 (2018-2022)”]. Available at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/yqRJy1eNTNZdEqq8n12MKg.

53 Alice Su, “China’s new campaign to make Muslims devoted to the state rather than Islam,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2020.Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world- ... ansu.  Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html.

54 “被政府盯上的穹顶 宁夏韦州清真大寺对峙事件原委” [“Mosque in the Eye of the Government: the Story of the Ningxia Weizhou Grand Mosque Standoff”], BBC Chinese, August 10, 2018.Available at: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/s ... 6943. China Aid, “Ningxia Plots to Destroy Mosques,” February 20, 2018. Available at: https://chinaaid.org/ningxia-p ... ues/.

55 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... stics

56 CHRD interview; for more information about Jin Dehuai, see Xinjiang Victims Database, “Jin Dehuai,” September 15, 2019.

57 CHRD interview; for information about the demolition of the Weizhou Grand Mosque dome, see Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

58 PRC Criminal Law, Art. 294.

59 Supreme People’s Court Monitor, “The New Campaign to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil,” January 31, 2018. Available at: https://supremepeoplescourtmon ... evil/

60 互联网宗教信息服务管理办法 [Measures on the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/cont ... .htm. English translation: 

https://www.chinalawtranslate. ... tion/

61 “中穆网疑刊载海外留学生致习近平公开信遭封杀” [Zhongmu.com website taken down, suspected due to overseas student’s posting of public letter to Xi Jinping], Radio Free Asia,December 12, 2016. Available at: https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/ ... ified

62 CHRD interview with Hui scholar, July 2022.

63 CHRD interview with Hui scholar, July 2022.

64 Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang, “Anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise in China,” Washington Post, May 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... this/ 

65 Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang, “Anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise in China,” Washington Post, May 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... his/. Bailey Marscheck and Kangyu Mark Wang, “Islamophobia on Chinese Social Media,” China Data Lab, September 25, 2018. Available at: https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/ ... dia/. David R. Stroup, “Good Minzu and bad Muslims: Islamophobia in China’s State Media,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 27, Issue 4, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.co ... 12758

66 Wang Shuaishuai, “How Hate Speech Falls Through the Cracks of the Chinese Internet,” Sixth Tone, November 23, 2022. Available at: https://www.sixthtone.com/news ... rnet-

67 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... rget. “Islamophobia in China: A ChinaFile Conversation,” ChinaFile, May 14, 2019. Available at: https://www.chinafile.com/conv ... china

68 Mary Gallagher and Blake Miller, “Can the Chinese Government really control the internet? We found cracks in the Great Firewall,” Washington Post, February 21, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... wall/

69 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... arget

70 Phoebe Zhang, “No halal please: meet China’s pig vigilantes,” South China Morning Post, February 9, 2019.

71 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... rget. Gerry Shih, “Unfettered online hate speech fuels Islamophobia in China,” Associated Press, April 9, 2017. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/ap- ... 424fa

72 中共宁夏回族自治区委员会书记 [Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary], “全面贯彻落实党的民族政策 谱写新时代宁夏民族团结进步事业新篇章” [Fully implement the Party’s ethnic policy: write a new chapter advancing national unity in Ningxia in the new era], 求是网 [QS Theory], September 16, 2018. Available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/q ... 1.htm

73 宁波保税区人社局公众服务 [Public Services, Ningbo Free Trade Zone Human Resources and Social Security Bureau], “我区赴甘、宁两地做好回族务工人员关爱和劳务对接工作” [Ningbo FTZ visits Gansu, Ningxia to advance Hui worker care and labor transfer project], 搜狐 [Sohu], October 19, 2020. Available at: https://www.sohu.com/a/425773701_100020442

74 王志章, 孙晗霖, 张国栋 [Wang Zhizhang, Sun Hanlin, Zhang Guodong], 生态移民的理论与实践创新:宁夏的经验 [A New Theory and Practice of Ecological Migration: The Ningxia Experience], Shandong University Journal, 2020 Issue 4, April 5, 2020, pp. 50-63, p. 56. Available at: https://www.journal.sdu.edu.cn ... 5.pdf  

75 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

76 周映 [Zhou Ying], “广西易地搬迁安置点经验做法获国家发改委表扬” [National Development and Reform Commission Praises Guangxi’s Experience and Handling of Relocation Settlements], 广西日报 [Guangxi Daily], November 23, 2022. Available at: http://gx.news.cn/newscenter/2 ... 6.htm

77 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html  

78 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

79 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

80 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

81 邝亮桢, 张浩哲 [Kuang Liangzhen, Zhang Haozhe], “庙庙湖村：生态移民的扶贫之路” [“Miaomiao Lake Village: Ecological Migrants on the Road to Escaping Poverty”], 中国甘肃网 [Gansu China Net], August 4, 2017. Available at: http://gansu.gscn.com.cn/syste ... shtml

82 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

83 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

84 王志章, 孙晗霖, 张国栋 [Wang Zhizhang, Sun Hanlin, Zhang Guodong], 生态移民的理论与实践创新:宁夏的经验 [A New Theory and Practice of Ecological Migration: The Ningxia Experience], Shandong University Journal, 2020 Issue 4, April view all

The  wooden Quran in the world can be found in Palembang, the capital of Indonesia’s South Sumatra province. It is the largest wood-carved Quran in the world, and was made from wood of the tembesu tree. It measures 1.77 by 1.40 meters (5.8 by 4.6 feet).
 
 

 
video online：

Your browser does not support the video tag. view all

More than 3,000 Muslims in the German city of Hamburg protested against Quran burning in Sweden by a far-right Danish politician on February 4. The protest was organised by the youth organisation Muslim Interaktiv.
 
 
online video:
 

Your browser does not support the video tag. view all

Uyghur Muslim brothers are travelling to southern Turkiye to help earthquake victims. A people who endured genocide aiding a people who embraced them into their country.
  view all