2.0 Key Documents: Xinjiang Papers Document 10 and China Islamic Association Five-Year Plan for the Sinicization of Islam (2018-2022)
2.1 Xinjiang Papers - Document 10

The “Notice of the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing ‘Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation’” (better known as Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers), issued on April 19, 2018, provides a detailed series of instructions for ‘Islamic work’ to be enacted over the coming years. The “Suggestions” were distributed to all levels of government and relevant departments, with instructions to relevant departments to ‘adhere to the spirit of the suggestions’ in developing concrete measures to achieve their aims. Although the “Suggestions” postdate the beginning of the Sinicization campaigns, they represent a codification of the scope and logic of the campaign.

The “Suggestions” begin with, in effect, a state of the field: “Correctly Recognizing the Current Situation and Foundational Tasks of Our Country’s Islamic Work.” The document explains that “Islam in China has, on the whole, preserved a harmonious and stable situation, but it has been influenced by global Islam and international circumstances, which have also given rise to a few prominent challenges that require a high level of close attention.” Based on this pronouncement, the document identifies its recommendations as necessary for reasons of “national political and ideological security, interethnic unity, religious harmony, societal stability, and national unity.”

Citing various “outstanding problems” with Islam in China, the document also attributes blame to negligent local officials who have allowed ‘extremism’ to fester. Ominously, the report proclaims that there are “problems in Islamic work at the grassroots level that are not managed, are not desired to be managed, or are not dared to be managed” by the party-state. Among the many dangers associated with the “external use of Islam to infiltrate China,” the document cites the “Three Transformations” as latent signs of danger. Further, the document specifies that “increased mobility of religious believers” poses challenges to the party-state’s ability to regulate Islam. The document also warns, “a few feudalistic religious privileges have arisen from the ashes,” and that “contradictions and disputes between Islamic sects and orders are unceasing.” Each of these troubles, the report reasons, leaves China vulnerable to extremism or attacks by terrorists.

The “Suggestions” provide at least seven broad categories of proposed reforms and at least twenty-five specific mandates for the management of religious faith. Overall, the document emphasizes the need to build a “System of Islamic Ideology with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色伊斯兰教经学思想体系).” To facilitate these suggestions, the document prescribes a leading role for the China Islamic Association (CIA), recommending that the association serve as a facilitator of these measures and a link between the party and the state on both national and local levels, as well as local religious communities.

These propositions stress the importance of adapting Islam to a specifically Chinese context, using the history of localized adaptation of Islam as a baseline for all Islamic practice. Further, they promote a limited reading of the history of Islam in China that draws heavily on a “correct” understanding of Islamic tradition (i.e., theological work in the Chinese language).

Among the foundational actions taken to secure the Sinicization of Islam is outlined in Proposal Five, which suggests constructing a “system of study of the classics of Islamic theology with Chinese characteristics.” To build this system of party-state-approved theology, Proposal Five calls upon officials involved in Islamic religious work to “firmly grasp the leading authority and influence of classical interpretation and firmly oppose extremists attempting to advance misinterpretations.” The document also mandates that “each region must programmatically train a core group that is highly trained in scriptural exegesis, and generally improve the scriptural exegesis and preaching abilities of those in religious circles.” In so doing, the document not only emphasizes that clergy must maintain “correct” interpretation, but also must undergo a more universal and systematic training in interpretation, supervised by the party-state.

Moving from matters of ideology, the document begins to outline a series of recommendations for “Improving the Level of Legalization of Islamic Work.” Proposal Six, which stresses the need to establish the “mindset of rule of law” in regulating Islam, declares that to “manage Islamic affairs according to the rule of law,” local religious and governmental officials must “follow the law in stopping illegal religious activities, and resolutely follow the law to crack down against illegal criminal acts committed under the pretense of advancing Islam.”

Proposal Seven builds on these specifications about establishing “a mindset of rule of law” by making extensive and specific parameters for the construction, funding, and oversight of community religious spaces—specifically, mosques. In effect, the proposal makes a commitment to reducing the overall number of mosques and places strict limitations on where and when new mosques may be constructed. Specifically, in the “western regions,” the suggestions recommend a total prohibition on new mosque construction, except in the case of relocation of migrants or in renovations taking place in urban spaces. In these exceptional cases of relocation projects or renovations to city districts, the document stresses that local governments are to uphold the principle of “demolish many and build few” (拆多建少).

Further limitations regarding expansion and construction are specified. The report dictates that mosques serving a single sect, theological tradition, or ethnic group are not to be permitted. Furthermore, any expansion of existing mosques is to be strictly monitored. Citing specific challenges related to the internal migration of Muslim populations, the document urges that central and eastern regions must “research and resolve the issue of migrant Muslims living a religious lifestyle.” Relatedly, the document warns against mosque construction in communities that lack a historic mosque or in those communities where in-migration of Muslims has made existing mosques unable to serve the community’s needs. The suggestions declare, “In principle, no new mosques are to be built.”

The document also places strict limitations on where funds for mosque construction may be raised, sanctioning only donations from local voluntary contributions from religious leaders and lay congregation. External sources of funding, specifically contributions from abroad, are expressly prohibited. Any funding for the expansion or alteration of mosque spaces must be approved and limited where possible. Expansive oversight powers regarding both construction and fundraising are recommended to be given to municipal or county departments for religious work, including the ability to enact punitive measures against unapproved or unregistered construction activities.52

Effectively, proposal seven gives broad power to the party-state to establish aesthetic control over Islamic spaces. It establishes Chinese architectural styles as the standard and opens deviations from this standard to be considered extravagant misuses of public funding or potential signs of extremism. The proposal also effectively prevents any expansion of religious communities. The restrictions on new buildings—especially those prohibiting new construction to account for shifts in populations—discourage mosque attendance or the proliferation of mosques throughout China. These interventions effectively stem the movement of Islamic migrant populations.

Proposal eight extends such management to the internal affairs of mosques—especially the supervision of mosque finances and training and management of mosque leadership—to the UFWD and Religious Work Departments. The proposal prohibits the use of borrowing to build or expand religious venues.53 In cases with “chaotic, weak or lax management or where contradictions are prominent,” proposal eight empowers local government intervention to fully replace leadership.54 Compounding these suggestions, proposal nine suggests stricter enforcement of regulations on religious personnel and advocates stripping credentials away from those clergy found to have violated the law, spread religious extremist ideas, or otherwise “undermined religious and ethnic unity and religious harmony.”55 Moreover, the document pushes the government to create an “information query system” for religious personnel to strengthen centralized supervision of mosque clergy.56

By embedding party-state authority in processes of training, management, and oversight of mosque personnel, including religious clergy, the party-state gains power to specifically dictate who is licensed to lead religious rituals and how Islam is preached. Moreover, the central placement of the UFWD and Religious Work Departments in these processes of training, certification, and management broadly gives the party-state the power to observe and monitor religious communities.

The document also urges local authorities to place limitations on the observation of religious activities. This includes enforcing a reduction in the size and scale of religious observations and implementing a general reduction in the number of religious events being held. The document further recommends a prohibition on adding religious events that “do not have historical inheritance,” preventing the introduction of new religious rituals, particularly those from foreign Islamic communities.57

Like the preceding sets of proposals, the eleventh provides a number of interventions in the conduct of religious affairs, particularly those concerned with “sectarian problems.” Specifically, it expands the role of the party-state in overseeing the management of Islamic sects, especially the Sufi menhuan (门宦, religious orders), to prevent “the revival of feudal religious privileges.” It also calls for party-state prevention of passing on spiritual authority within menhuan and empowers the party-state to manage issues with the memorialization of previous religious leaders—specifically the practice of building shrines to honor Sufi religious saints. Prohibitions against the creation of new religious sects or the splitting of existing religious communities are also established.58

As a set of final restrictions on religious practice, the document places a number of limitations on the Hajj pilgrimage, claiming these to be a necessary measure to tame the “Hajj fever” that has sprung up in certain communities. Among the steps prescribed are limitations on annual visits allowed, prohibitions on individuals taking multiple pilgrimages, and also implementing mandatory ideological training for those who would go on the Hajj—both before and after undertaking the journey.59 These measures intend to place party-state figures in charge of defining “correct” religious practices.

Next, the document moves toward measures directly aimed at securitizing Islam and preventing the spread of “extremism.” These dictates place heavy scrutiny on any practice that might be linked to “foreign” Islam and highlight the degree to which non-approved formats for religious observation have been scrutinized as threatening to ideological and national security.

Proposal thirteen provides a comprehensive discussion of why the party-state’s efforts should be focused on curbing “religious extremism.” In particular, it advises that religious extremism “creates divisions between different sects, faiths, and ethnic groups, and advocates violence.”60 As a counter, it outlines several aspects of “de-extremification work,” including curbing the “transmissions of illegal religious texts online.”61

The document continues to make a strong connection between “foreign” Islam and extremist behavior, identifying the “infiltration of foreign forces” as “not purely a religious issue, but a serious political issue.”62 It empowers the Ministry of Public Security (公安局), the Ministry of State Security (安全局), the UFWD, and the Department of Religious Work to conduct interventions against foreign Islam—especially the “Dawa Missionary Group” (the Tablighi Jamaat). Likewise, the document suggests extending increased authority to the CIA to police interactions with religious communities from overseas—in particular with regard to receiving foreign donations, which the proposal prohibits.

The proposal also advocates a crackdown on studying abroad. Those who “study religion abroad without permission” are specified as needing special intervention. Alongside these, the document stresses that those returning from studying abroad who “plan to engage in religious professions” must be strictly scrutinized.

A number of prohibitions on economic engagement are identified in proposal 14. The proposal broadly dictates that the government must prevent “religious factors” from influencing trade and finance. Here, the document is emphatic that local authorities should prevent the practice of “Islamic finance.” Further, the document states that specific enterprises or commercial associations should not be focused on a single ethnic or religious group. These measures target growing economic linkages between Muslim ethnic minority groups and business ventures from the Islamic world and reassert state control over economic engagement with foreign entities. These curtailments come in the midst of the Chinese party-state’s efforts to build economic ties with (largely majority-Muslim) countries in South and Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East via the Belt and Road Initiative.

Proposal fifteen engages with cultural and linguistic practices as matters of security, effectively establishing Arabic language use as threatening to China’s cultural security. The document implores measures to be taken to prevent the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) of Islam, citing “Arabization” and “Saudification” as threats. Harking back to the introduction, proposal 15 notes growing foreign influence in a number of daily practices for Muslims.63


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Following this period of policy formulation, the party-state began the process of localized implementation of Sinicisation policies. This implementation period allowed party-state actors on subnational (and in many cases subprovincial) levels to refine tactics related to policy implementation and messaging surrounding the campaign. The localized rollout of these policies resulted in a few locations—namely, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and southern Gansu province—serving as early test cases for working out best practices related to policy implementation. Lessons learned from the implementation of policies in these initial locations were quickly applied to Islamic communities throughout the rest of China. By late 2019, Sinicisation policies were underway in provinces in East China. In the summer of 2021, processes of Sinicisation were being undertaken in Qinghai province. By mid-2023, these measures were being implemented in holdouts in conservative Hui communities like Najiaying and Shadian in southeastern Yunnan.

The processes of standardization and ideological management undertaken in this initial phase of Sinicisation served as a precursor for the implementation of the next stage of the campaign, where the party-state turned its focus to reducing the density of mosques and gaining control over personnel management. These policies intended to deepen Sinicisation, achieve consolidation of party-state control, and compel the transformation of religious communities.

To enforce and implement these policies, the party-state has utilized a number of legal instruments. The party-state often cites statutes concerning building registration and planning. Concerns for proper maintenance of registration have also been used to justify the party-state’s involvement in the policing of religious clergy and mosque personnel. In some instances, the party-state has justified interventions on economic or financial grounds. Preservation of cultural heritage stands as yet another justification for alterations to mosque architecture. Most of these justifications align with broad goals of national security and counterterrorism. At each stage of the project, the party-state’s interventions have been accompanied by targeted surveillance to monitor implementation. The surveillance undertaken as part of the Sinicisation campaign has employed both high-tech digital infrastructure as well as on-the-ground human intelligence.

Better understanding the various parameters and directives that the campaign of Sinicisation encompasses requires an overview of the two key documents—the CIA’s Five-Year Plan and Document 10 of the Xinjiang Papers—which provide instruction on how the campaign ought to be implemented and detailed discussions of the broad objectives and basic functions of the campaign. In the following section, we provide an outline of these key documents and their implications for how Sinicisation has been pursued.

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1.2 Policy Development

The current system of Sinicization policies has roots in a cohort of scholars and policymakers within the party-state bureaucracy and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ advocacy for a so-called ‘second-generation’ of minzu policies.27 These proposed policies called for the abandonment of minzu identification altogether and pressed for the adoption of a system that prioritized “contact, communication and fusion.”28
Often, these calls for reform were justified as necessary for the preservation of societal stability under the party-state’s rule. The 2009 unrest in Xinjiang especially galvanized policymakers who framed control over ethnic identity as a central concern of the party-state.29 In response, calls for greater assimilation became louder and more influential within the central administration. By the time Xi ascended into leadership, a shift towards a homogenizing, assimilative nation-state building process was in evidence. Changes in the staffing and structure of the administration of ethnic politics illustrated such shifts.30
These measures were swiftly implemented in Turkic and Muslim communities in Xinjiang. Though the party-state’s efforts to link unrest in Xinjiang to the larger politics of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) began in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, securitization around Islamic identity intensified following July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.31 After a number of attacks occurred between 2009 and 2014, Xi leaned into more aggressive strategies of assimilation to counter “extremist” religious ideologies. In a speech given in Urumqi on April 30, 2014, following an inspection tour of Xinjiang in the wake of the Kunming attacks earlier in the month, Xi outlined the dangers of the so-called “three forces” (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Highlighting the unique dangers posed by infiltrators from abroad, Xi warned, “There are ‘seeds’ outside the country, ‘soil’ inside the country, and ‘markets’ online, which are the main reasons for the active violent and terrorist activities in Xinjiang.”32
Following two further attacks in Urumqi (on April 28 and May 22) Xi declared the opening of the “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism Campaign (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动).” Speaking privately to the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum on May 28, Xi characterized “extremist” (read “foreign”) Islamic ideology as a virus. His remarks stressed that this “disease” of religious extremism must be treated with Sinicisation, declaring, “Heart disease needs heart medicine. For Xinjiang, this ‘heart medicine’ is the correct view of the motherland and nation, Chinese culture, the socialist core value system and socialist core values.”33
Publicly, Xi emphasized the centrality of “traditional Chinese values” in informing the party-state’s policies on ethnic and religious affairs. In an April 2016 address to the National Conference of Work Related to Religious Affairs, Xi pronounced that religious communities in China should “interpret religious doctrines in a way that is conducive to modern China’s progress and in line with our excellent traditional culture” and warned that China must “resolutely guard against overseas infiltrations via religious means and prevent ideological infringement by extremists.”34 During his 2017 address to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi reprised this rhetoric by promising “We will remain committed to the principle that religions in China must be Chinese in orientation and provide active guidance to religions so that they can adapt to socialist society.”35
Practically, the party-state has devised a comprehensive and iterative set of policy measures intended to implement the call to Sinicisation made in Xi’s remarks. The most visible enactment of these measures by the party-state–undertaken as part of the so-called “People’s War on Terror” (人民反恐战争)–has occurred in Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic and Muslim communities.36 However, Muslim minority communities throughout China have seen the implementation of measures aimed at de-Islamification and officials from areas with significant Muslim minority populations have coordinated with their counterparts in Xinjiang on “counter-terrorism” measures.37
The policies of Sinicisation enacted in Islamic communities encompass a wide array of interventions and measures enacted primarily by local governments in communication with the UFWD and the Chinese Islamic Association (CIA). After a series of workshops and white papers released between 2014 and 2017 which defined the threats related to the so-called “Three Transformations” (三化) of ”Saudification” (沙化), Arabization (阿化), and pan-halalification (清真概念泛化), policymakers in the central bureaucracy developed a comprehensive and multifaceted program of Sinicisation in response. The party-state adopted a gradualist approach to implementing Sinicisation strategies, first experimenting with processes and tactics at local levels, then expanding to implementing them nationwide. Further, the party-state has implemented policy in phases, building off of earlier foundations to entrench and extend Sinicisation processes. As a result, the process of implementing policy has been piecemeal and iterative.
In initial stages, beginning in early 2018, key speeches and strategic policy documents articulated overarching goals and best practices for Sinicisation nationwide. In particular, two documents—“The Five Year Workplan for Adhering to the Sinicisation of Islam in China, 2018-2022” (坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向五年工作规划纲, 2018-2022) and “Suggestions on Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work in the New Situation (关于加强和改进新形势下伊斯兰教工作的意见)”—provide guiding principles for the campaign, and set strategic priorities.38
These imperatives were developed at a central level in close cooperation with the CIA, and outline broad objectives of the campaign—namely, entrenching patriotic education, eliminating “foreign” religious influence in aesthetics, scriptural interpretation and practice of worship, re-centering religious practice on “traditional” Chinese culture, and establishing channels for party-state surveillance. For example, the Five Year Plan emphasized the necessity of promoting the “Four Enters Program to Bring Chinese Exceptional Traditional Culture into Mosques” (中华优秀传统文化四进清真寺活动, hereafter referred to as “The Four Enters”), an initiative to ‘exceptional traditional Chinese culture’ in mosques begun in 2014.39
These guiding documents also established the ideological justification for party-state intervention in religious affairs—largely, countering “religious extremism” and protection of a historically-rooted, “uniquely Chinese Islam.” Further, these documents established benchmarks for progress toward Sinicisation and standards for the “correct” practice of faith in Islamic communities. Through such specifications the documents created a template for Sinicisation to be enacted by authorities on the ground at the local level.
 
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36 Klimeš 2018, Byler 2021, Clarke 2022.

37 Ji Yuqiao, ‘Ningxia Learns from Xinjiang How to Fight

Terrorism - Global Times’, Global Times, 27 Novem-

ber 2018, sec. Society, https://www.globaltimes.cn/con-

tent/1129272.shtml; Stroup 2022, p.157–65.

38 Better known as “Document No. 10” in the “Xinjiang

Papers.” We will hereafter refer to it as such.

39 https://news.ifeng.com/a/20141212/42699377_0.shtml Collapse Read »

Islam under the early PRC (1949-1978)

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the system of ethnic classification put in place by the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the first time distinguished Muslims on the basis of nationality rather than grouping them together as a single category of citizens—as had been the case during both the late Qing and Republican eras. With the establishment of the “nationality” (minzu) categorization system in 1957, the former category of “Hui” now comprised only Sinophone Muslims.15

In the early years of the PRC, the new system of ethnic categorization effectively began to decouple religious and ethnic identity. Such differentiation aroused suspicion and disapproval from some in the Hui clergy and religious elite.16 Despite this, many Muslims bought into the CCP’s efforts to reshape China. Many hoped the designation of autonomous regions for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Hui in Ningxia were indications that the CCP would deliver the kind of cultural autonomy they hoped for.17

However, even in the early stages of the Mao era, limitations on Islamic expression began to create tensions between Muslims and the party-state. The China Islamic Association (中国伊斯兰教协会, CIA), founded in 1953 through actions of the United Front Department and the state Religious Affairs Bureau to serve as a bridge between Muslims and the state, aligned quickly with the party-state’s agenda.18 As a “patriotic” organization, the CIA became a conduit through which party-state policy could be transmitted, and CCP oversight of religious practice could be facilitated.19

By 1957-58, the growing hostility of the party-state toward religiously observant Muslims made open practice of the faith difficult. The party-state moved to promote “democratic reforms” that had the effect of suppressing religious activity, closing or demolishing mosques, and rendering the open practice of ordinary religious activity difficult.20 Suppression of religion deepened during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21 In most communities, the closure of religious spaces and the danger posed by open religious observance rendered the practice of faith impossible.

Revival in the era of Reform and Opening (1978-2014)

The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 saw a rehabilitation of ethnic and religious identification.22 In particular, official registration of people as “Hui” increased as otherwise secularized people rediscovered distant Muslim ancestors.23 Communities, often with funding or assistance from national or local governments, rebuilt community mosques, expanded community education about Islam, and began to seek commercial and cultural ties with the global Islamic community.24

In many respects, the period lasting from the start of the Reform Era and continuing up until Xi’s declaration of a People’s War on Terror in 2014 marked a period of relative openness and autonomy for Muslims living outside of the Turkic communities of Xinjiang—especially for ethnic Hui Muslims. In some Islamic minority autonomous communities, clergy worked closely with local government, serving as mediators working to encourage civic values in the community on Islamic terms.25 With the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as the centerpiece of China’s diplomatic outreach in the Xi era, China’s Muslims (and Hui, in particular) were touted as critically important cultural ambassadors to the larger Islamic world.26
 
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15 Mullaney 2011.

16 Cieciura 2014, p. 15

17 Cieciura 2014, p.14-15

18 Cieciura 2014, p. 16-17; Yang, 2012, p. 70.

19 Yang 2012, p. 70.

20 Ciecura 2014, p. 17-18.

21 Yang 2012, p. 72-76

22 Gladney 2004.

23 Gladney 1991, p. 261-293.

24 Gillette 2002, McCarthy 2009, Stroup 2019.

25 Erie 2016.

26 Chen 2020, Brown and O’Brien 2020. Collapse Read »

Historical Background

Though China is typically not considered part of the “Islamic World,” Muslim communities have long lived within the territorial boundaries of Chinese-administered states. At present, China’s estimated Muslim population totals just over 1.8% of China’s 1.4 billion people–approximately 25 million people in all.2
Of China’s 56 recognized nationalities (referred to as 民族, “minzu”), ten are predominantly Muslim, with Hui and Uyghurs being the largest and second largest Muslim groups respectively.3

While China’s Islamic community is overwhelmingly Sunni, Muslims in China belong to a wide array of sectarian and jurisprudence traditions. In addition to the non-Sufi, primarily Hanafi schools of the Gedimu and Yihewani sects, many of China’s Muslims belong to Sufi orders, including several in the Naqshbandiyya tradition.4 Likewise, a small percentage of China’s Muslims belong to Salafi congregations.5
Geographically, China’s Islamic heartland predominantly rests in the northwestern “Qur’an Belt” (comprising Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Gansu, eastern Qinghai and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region).6
However, significant Islamic communities also reside in Yunnan, Henan, Hebei, Hainan, Shandong, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia, and Hui enclave communities exist in most of China’s major cities.7

Short history of Islam in China prior to the PRC (approximately 700-1949)

The history of Islam in China stretches back almost as far as the beginning of the faith itself. Muslim traders first arrived in China via sea routes through the Indian Ocean as early as the 7th century.8 In addition, other Muslims arrived via overland travel along trade routes that made up the Silk Road. Yet another wave of Muslim settlement occurred with the arrival of Muslim (usually Turkic) armies of the Yuan Dynasty who conquered China in the 12th and 13th centuries.9
As a result, by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), Chinese-speaking Muslim communities existed alongside Mongolic and Turkic Muslim groups throughout China, especially in Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu and eastern Qinghai.10 Islam in China thus bore the influence of the Arab, Persian and Turkic Muslims, as well as the local Chinese whom they converted or with whom they intermarried. Though at the outset these communities were regarded as temporary residents in China, intermarriage and integration gave these communities a sense of rootedness in China.11
Through this long history, the process of integrating Muslims into various Sino-centered administrative states has been uneven. Internecine sectarian conflicts between rival Sufi orders led to the outbreak of violence in Qinghai, Gansu, and Ningxia as well as Yunnan in the 18th and 19th centuries. These so-called “Muslim Rebellions,” which the Qing armies brutally suppressed, resulted in devastation and massive loss of human life.12
These conflicts also sowed seeds of mistrust between Muslims and non-Muslims that still influence interethnic relations in the northwest and elsewhere today.13
In the aftermath of these conflicts, the Qing attempted several “civilizing” missions in Muslim regions.
 
 
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2 Estimates taken from the CIA World Factbook (accessed

September 14, 2023): https://www.cia.gov/the-world-fact-

book/countries/china/#people-and-society

3 The other groups are (from largest population to smallest):

Kazakh, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik (Pamiri), Bao’an,

Uzbek, and Tatar. See, Guo 2020, p. 3-5.

4 Ha 2022.

5Al Sudairi 2016.

6 Gladney 1991, p. 27

7 See population figures in Stroup 2022.
 
8 Gladney 1987, p. 498.

9 Lipman 1997, p. 31-35.

10 Gladney 1991, Lipman 1997, Israeli 2002.

11 Benite 2005.

12 Kim 2004, Atwill 2005.

13 Stroup 2024.

14 Schluessel 2020. Collapse Read »

Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened level of awareness arose in international news media about the Chinese party-state’s programme of coercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic community spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the phenomenon of sinicization of Islam became a concern among human rights and policy activists, journalists and policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this widespread campaign focused on its impact on architecture in specific cases. Thus, the campaign for sinicization became synonymous with a particular repertoire of actions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing minarets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in public spaces. However, a closer examination of the sinicization campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Beyond architecture, the campaign touches on matters connected to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque employment, among others. Understanding sinicization, then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it has been implemented nationwide. This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicisation of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Following a brief historical overview of the origins of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview of the campaign itself. In part one, we focus on the documents which establish the campaign. In part two, we take a detailed look at its enforcement. The rhetoric of the sinicisation campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicisation policy. Through this analysis, we reveal the framework, ambitions, and proposed measures which this sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on two key documents that elucidate these standards of appropriateness and empower the state’s capacity to enforce them: the General Office of the State Council’s “Opinions on Suggestions for Strengthening and Improving Islamic Work under the New Situation”, more commonly known as Document No. 10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year Plan for Maintaining Progress toward the Sinicization of Islam in Our Nation (2018-2022).” Together, these documents provide a blueprint for radical transformation of Islamic communities and social organisation, and lay the groundwork for further measures, including those which reduce the numbers of mosques in China, and implement additional means of surveillance of Muslim migrants within China.
 
 
In practice, the guidelines established by the documents we overview produced a vast system of policies whose implementation and enforcement depends upon a complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tactics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organization, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each domain we illustrate how party-state interventions seek to securitize religious identity and restrict Islamic expression to only those party-state approved practices. In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from international Islam as inherently threatening to China’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly, through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in Muslim communities and marginalizes—and in some cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic practice.

The effects of this campaign are wide-ranging. Because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identified in this report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically underestimated by observers.

Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is iterative and progressive in implementation. To date, we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures represent only the first stages of the campaign and that further measures to affect party-state control will continue to be implemented in the future. In our conclusion, we make a number of suggestions about where future research can continue to expand our understanding of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim communities.
 
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This report lays out a comprehensive survey of the impacts of the sinicization of islam programme on hui communities from 2017 to the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct observation of religion and allows it to exert near total authority on matters of religious belief, practice and expression. Further, because of the broad powers they give to the party-state to suppress religious activity falling outside its own narrowly construed parameters, the measures identifi ed in this report present a profound threat to muslim identity and practice within the people’s republic of china (prc). Th e concealed nature of much of the policies in question means that, to date, the impacts of these policies have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
 
This report provides detailed analysis of key policy documents undergirding sinicization policy to reveal the framework, ambitions and proposed measures of sinicization policy. The general office of the state council’s “opinions on suggestions for strengthening and improving islamic work under the new situation”, more commonly known as document no. 10 of the xinjiang papers, and the china islamic association’s (2018) “five year plan for maintaining progress toward the sinicization of islam in our nation (2018-2022)” together provide a blueprint for radical transformation of islamic communities and social organisation, alongside further measures for reducing the numbers of mosques and additional surveillance of muslim migrants within china. Th e rhetoric of this campaign established clear norms of appropriateness for islamic religious belief and practice in accordance with standards set by the party-state. Analysis of policy implementation demonstrates that policy toward the sinicization of islam is taking place across china. The campaigns have targeted behaviours seen as precursors to extremism, ensured tighter state control of mosques and religious organisations, and have promoted ‘chinese culture’ to islamic communities. Policy implementation has been iterative and progres- sive, with progress toward campaign objectives proceed- ing at diff erent paces and to diff erent timelines in dif- ferent regions of the prc. Whilst it is likely that this is simply due to structures of implementation at the provincial level, this has also served to dilute the possibility of open community protest against sinicisation and to obscure the true impact of sinicisation measures.
 
 
The party-state applies signifi cant pressure to Islamic communities to ensure compliance with sinicization policy. These measures have included targeted arrests of key individuals, including imams, dissidents and mosque management committee members, interventions into mosque management committees and imam selection processes, ‘study visits’ for key local religious professionals and offi cials, and Public Security Bureau (PSB) deployment around forced mosque renovations considered to be of high sensitivity. Other coercive tac- tics have included leverage of health and safety regula- tions and other bureaucratic processes to enforce clo- sures, and outright threats of demolition made against targeted mosques and religious institutions. Such pro- cesses of quiet coercion have similarly served to dilute public opposition and obscure the true impact of Sini- cisation measures. In general, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) has served as a testing ground for policy implementa- tion, with key measures piloted in the region prior to the formal launch of the Five-Year Plan in late 2018. Policy development in Ningxia shows links between Si- nicisation policy and counter-terror initiatives, many of them drawn from or influenced by the securitisation of identity and religion that has occurred in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2014. We estimate that all mosques with ‘Arabic’ features have either been subject to architectural sinicization or will be targeted in further policy cycles. Schools, nurseries and informal religious infrastructure, including unregistered mosques, have been shuttered en masse since 2017, many of them under campaigns intended to target criminal gangs and so-called “black society.” Our analysis shows that in addition to architectural renovations made to mosques and closures of informal religious establishments, from 2020 onwards, the par- ty-state has moved to close mosques in Ningxia under ‘mosque consolidation’ programmes. We suggest that over a thousand mosques in Ningxia may have been targeted, with further evidence indicating that similar programmes are now underway in Gansu and Ningxia. In addition to enforcing architectural norms, the par- ty-state’s Sincisation measures stridently police lan- guage usage within Islamic religious communities to establish the linguistic hegemony of Chinese over more the traditional Arabic and Persian. Party-state interven- tions into language and scripture mandate that Chinese should be preferred as a language of worship, and that content preached in mosques should be in line with socialism with Chinese characteristics. Additionally, the state has moved to take much tighter control of scrip- tural interpretation and Islamic education, with impacts on freedom of belief and freedom of association. The priority placed on sinicization measures both re- flects the core place of the campaign to Xi Jinping’s vi- sion of ethnic and religious policy, as well as the general advance of authoritarianism under Xi’s leadership. The sinicization of Islam reflects an increasingly authoritar- ian crackdown on both expression and practice of iden- tity across the PRC. The party-state’s policing of Islamic communities further highlights how the pursuit of such campaigns tightens central party-state administrative control over local governance structures. Measures for the sinicization of Islam have been accompanied by discipline inspections of local officials and, in some in- stances, measures to replace village-level committees. Reform of mosque management committees and bodies of the China Islamic Association has been core to en- suring implementation of measures nationwide. Enact- ment of the campaign’s wide-ranging and multifaceted mission has required institutional restructuring within the party-state bureaucracy. New inter-bureaucratic ties between party and state institutions—particularly the China Islamic Association and the United Front Work Development—have been forged to ensure coordina- tion in devising and implementing sinicization policy. Islamophobic activisms and the outsourcing of surveillance to the public has dramatically sharpened the impact of the campaign, as activists push for evermore draconian policing of Muslim communities, Islamic expression and observance. There remains a need for further research into sinicization policy and its impacts on the lives of targeted communities. sinicization is not just taking place in Islamic communities; there are parallel sinicization initiatives targeting other religious and ethnoreligious communities across the PRC. Given the grave human rights concerns posed by sinicization in Islamic communities, urgent investigation into parallel campaigns is needed. Collapse Read »

The word "ٱلْأَمْرِ" in the Holy Quran carries multiple layers of meaning, broadly encompassing:

Command or Order: This is the most frequent and direct meaning, referring to a directive, injunction, or decree. It can be a command from God, a ruler, or someone in authority.
Affair, Matter, or Event: In a broader sense, "ٱلْأَمْرِ" can denote a situation, circumstance, business, concern, or happening. It refers to "things" in a general context.
Divine Decree or Will: In theological contexts, particularly when attributed to God, "ٱلْأَمْرِ" signifies the divine command that brings things into existence instantaneously. It represents God's will and power to create and control the universe.
Authority or Governance: Related to the concept of "Ulu'l-Amr" (those in authority), the word connects to leadership, responsibility, and the execution of decisions.

To understand the full scope, let's explore its occurrences and etymology.

ٱلۡأَمۡرِ in the Holy Quran

 the triliteral root "أ م ر" (hamza-mim-ra) appears 248 times in the Quran in various derived forms. Specifically, the noun form "أَمْر" (amr), which includes "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" (Al-Amr) appears 166 times.

Here are some of the verses where the noun "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" (amr) appears, as listed by the Quranic Arabic Corpus:

Verses Related to "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" in the Quran:

Quran 2:109: "... فَاعْفُوا وَاصْفَحُوا حَتَّىٰ يَأْتِيَ اللَّهُ بِأَمْرِهِ..." (...forgive and overlook until Allah delivers His command.)
Quran 2:117: "...وَإِذَا قَضَىٰ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ" (...and when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, "Be," and it is.)
Quran 2:210: "...وَقُضِيَ الْأَمْرُ وَإِلَى اللَّهِ تُرْجَعُ الْأُمُورُ" (...and the matter will be concluded, and to Allah will [all] matters be returned.)
Quran 2:275: "...فَلَهُ مَا سَلَفَ وَأَمْرُهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ..." (...what is past is his, and his affair is with Allah...)
Quran 3:47: "...إِذَا قَضَىٰ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُنْ فَيَكُونُ" (...when He decrees a matter, He only says to it, "Be," and it is.)
Quran 3:109: "...وَإِلَى اللَّهِ تُرْجَعُ الْأُمُورُ" (...and to Allah will be returned [all] matters.)
Quran 3:128: "...لَيْسَ لَكَ مِنَ الْأَمْرِ شَيْءٌ..." (Not for you, [O Muhammad, but for Allah ], is the decision in the matter...)
Quran 3:147: "...وَإِسْرَافَنَا فِي أَمْرِنَا..." (...and our excesses in our affairs...)
Quran 3:152: "...وَتَنَازَعْتُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ..." (...and disputed about the order [given by the Prophet]...)
Quran 3:154: "...هَلْ لَنَا مِنَ الْأَمْرِ مِنْ شَيْءٍ..." (..."Is there anything for us [to have a say] in the matter?"...)
Quran 3:154: "...قُلْ إِنَّ الْأَمْرَ كُلَّهُ لِلَّهِ..." (Say, "Indeed, the matter [of victory] is all with Allah."...)
Quran 3:154: "...لَوْ كَانَ لَنَا مِنَ الْأَمْرِ شَيْءٌ مَا قُتِلْنَا هَاهُنَا..." (..."If we had anything to do with the matter, we would not have been killed right here."...)
Quran 3:159: "...وَشَاوِرْهُمْ فِي الْأَمْرِ..." (...and consult them in the matter.)
Quran 3:186: "...فَإِنَّ ذَٰلِكَ مِنْ عَزْمِ الْأُمُورِ" (...then that is of the matters requiring determination.)
Quran 4:47: "...وَكَانَ أَمْرُ اللَّهِ مَفْعُولًا" (...and ever is the command of Allah accomplished.)
Quran 4:59: "...وَأُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْكُمْ..." (...and those of authority among you...)
Quran 4:83: "...وَإِذَا جَاءَهُمْ أَمْرٌ مِنَ الْأَمْنِ أَوِ الْخَوْفِ أَذَاعُوا بِهِ..." (When there comes to them a matter [regarding] security or fear, they publicize it.)
Quran 4:83: "...وَإِلَىٰ أُولِي الْأَمْرِ مِنْهُمْ..." (...and to those of authority among them...)
Quran 5:52: "...أَوْ أَمْرٍ مِنْ عِنْدِهِ..." ( ...or a decision from Him.)
Quran 5:95: "...لِيَذُوقَ وَبَالَ أَمْرِهِ..." (...that he may taste the penalty of his deed.)
Quran 6:8: "...لَقُضِيَ الْأَمْرُ ثُمَّ لَا يُنْظَرُونَ" (...the matter would have been decided; then they would not be reprieved.)
Quran 6:58: "...لَقُضِيَ الْأَمْرُ بَيْنِي وَبَيْنَكُمْ..." (...the matter would have been decided between me and you...)

This list is not exhaustive but provides a representative sample of verses where "ٱلۡأَمۡرِ" appears, illustrating its varied meanings within the Quranic context. For a complete list, a specialized Quranic concordance would be required.



Etymology of ٱلۡأَمۡرِ

The word "ٱلۡأَمْرِ" (Al-Amr) originates from the triliteral Arabic root أ-م-ر (ʔ-m-r). This root is fundamental and prolific in Arabic, giving rise to a wide array of words with interconnected meanings.

Core Meanings of the Root (أ-م-ر):

To command, order, direct: This is the primary verbal meaning. The verb أَمَرَ (ʔamara) means "he commanded," "he ordered."
To enjoin, instruct, bid: Related to the act of giving a command or instruction.
To manage, conduct, govern: Implies taking charge and directing affairs.
To become abundant, prosperous: In some derived forms, the root also takes on meanings related to growth and abundance.
To be firm, strong, bitter, severe: Another branch of meanings, possibly related to the decisiveness and forcefulness associated with command.

Evolution and Historical Reasons:

The etymology of "ٱلۡأَمْرِ" and its related forms reveals a historical and semantic development centered around the concept of direction and control. From the basic act of commanding, the meaning expanded to encompass:

The Command itself (ٱلۡأَمْرِ): The verbal noun أَمْر (ʔamr) directly translates to "command," "order," "decree," or "injunction."
The Thing Commanded or Managed (ٱلۡأَمْرِ): The meaning broadened to include "affair," "matter," "business," "concern," "state," "condition," "event," referring to the subject or object of the command or management.
Authority and Leadership (أَمِير - Amir): Words like أَمِير (ʔamīr), meaning "commander," "prince," or "leader," are derived from the same root, highlighting the association of "ٱلۡأَمْرِ" with governance and authority.
Urgency and Decisiveness: The connection to "bitter" or "severe" might stem from the idea that commands are often delivered with firmness and carry weight, requiring decisive action.

Cognates in other Semitic Languages:

The Wiktionary entry suggests a cognate in Hebrew - אמר (amar), meaning "to say." This connection points to a deeper Semitic root associating the concept of "command" with the spoken word and authoritative utterance. It also mentions comparison to Ugaritic Collapse Read »

1.0 Introduction

Beginning as early as 2018, a heightened lev-
el of awareness arose in international news media
about the Chinese party-state’s programme of co-
ercive renovation of mosques and other Islamic commu-
nity spaces throughout China.1 In the following years the
phenomenon of Sinicisation of Islam became a concern
among human rights and policy activists, journalists and
policymakers. Much of the international coverage of this
widespread campaign focused on its impact on architec-
ture in specifi c cases. Thus, the campaign for Sinicisation
became synonymous with a particular repertoire of ac-
tions: stripping domes off of mosques, demolishing min-
arets, erecting ‘Chinese-style’ ornamentation on mosque
buildings, and minimizing the use of Arabic script in pub-
lic spaces. However, a closer examination of the
 
 
 
See https://ig.ft.com/china-mosques/; https://www.
hrw.org/news/2023/11/22/china-mosques-shut-
tered-razed-altered-muslim-areas; https://www.npr.
org/2021/10/24/1047054983/china-muslims-sinicization
 
Sinicisation campaign reveals a much wider scope for intervention
and a broader array of tactics employed by the party-state
to curb religious expression in Muslim communities. Be-
yond architecture, the campaign touches matters connect-
ed to theology, ritual, diet, dress, education, and mosque
employment among others. Understanding Sinicisation,
then, requires a broad and detailed examination of the
campaign’s many aspects, as well as the scale at which it
has been implemented nationwide. Th is report lays out a
comprehensive survey of the impacts of the Sinicisation
of Islam programme on Hui communities from 2017 to
the present. As detailed in the report, this slate of policies
makes the ruling party-state the sole arbiter for correct
observation of religion and allows it to exert near total au-
thority on matters of religious belief, practice and expres-
sion. Following a brief historical overview of the origins
of this campaign, our report provides a two-part overview
of the campaign itself. In Part One, we focus on the docu-
ments which establish the campaign. In Part Two, we take
a detailed look at its enforcement.
 
The rhetoric of Sinicisation campaign established clear
norms of appropriateness for Islamic religious belief
and practice in accordance with standards set by the
party-state. Thus, Part I of this report provides detailed
analysis of key policy documents undergirding Sinicisa-
tion policy. Through this analysis we reveal the frame-
work, ambitions and proposed measures which this
sprawling campaign comprises. Our report focuses on
two key documents that elucidate these standards of ap-
propriateness and empower the state’s ca-
pacity to enforce them: The General Office
of the State Council’s “Opinions on Sug-
gestions for Strengthening and Improving
Islamic Work Under the New Situation”,
more commonly known as Document No.
10 of the Xinjiang Papers, and the China
Islamic Association’s (2018) “Five Year
Plan for Maintaining Progress Toward
the Sinicisation of Islam in Our Nation
(2018-2022).” Together, these documents
provide a blueprint for radical transfor-
mation of Islamic communities and social
organisation, and lay the groundwork for
further measures, including those which
reduce the numbers of mosques in China,
and implement additional means of sur-
veillance of Muslim migrants within Chi-
na.
Muslim communities, and marginalizes—and in some
cases totally silences—non-standard or non-hegemonic
practice.
The effects of this campaign are wide ranging. Because
of the broad powers they give to the party-state to sup-
press religious activity falling outside its own narrowly
construed parameters, the measures identified in this
report present a profound threat to Muslim identity and
Beyond architecture,
the campaign touches
matters connected to
theology, ritual, diet,
dress, education, and
mosque employment,
In practice, the guidelines established by
the documents we overview produced a
vast system of policies whose implemen-
among others.tation and enforcement depends upon a
complicated network of actors, infrastructure, and tac-
tics. In Part 2 of this report, we provide a preliminary
overview of this wide-ranging campaign, assessing its
implementation in five key areas: 1) Mosque Organisa-
tion, 2) Aesthetics, 3) Cultural Control, 4) Surveillance
and Monitoring, and 5) Mosque Closures. In each do-
main we illustrate how party-state interventions seek
to securitize religious identity, and restrict Islamic ex-
pression to only those party-state approved practices.
In so doing, the party-state depicts any practices from
international Islam as inherently threatening to Chi-
na’s national security and cultural existence. Similarly,
through these measures, the Sinicisation empowers
the party-state as the arbiter of cultural correctness in
practice within the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The concealed nature of much of the policies in ques-
tion means that, to date, the impacts of these policies
have been systematically under-estimated by observers.
Among our top-line findings is that the campaign is
iterative and progressive in implementation. To date,
we estimate that the campaign enforced the closure of
approximately one third of all mosques in Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. We suggest that these closures
represent only the first stages of the campaign, and that
further measures to affect party-state control will con-
tinue to be implemented in the future. In our conclu-
sion, we make a number of suggestions about where fu-
ture research can continue to expand our understanding
of this campaign and its influence on China’s Muslim
communities. Collapse Read »

The Communist Party of China often emphasizes the freedom of ethnic and religious affairs, but strictly controls Muslims and their beliefs in Linxia Hui Autonomous…
 




  Collapse Read »

They survived re-education camps in China’s western Xinjiang region. They were released from detention centers and psychiatric hospitals. They watched their loved ones disappear one by one and feared when it would be their turn.

Then they managed to get out of China and reached the soil of the United States, many by trekking through the brutal jungle in Panama known as the Darién Gap on their way to the U.S. southern border.
 




They are Hui Muslims, a state-recognized ethnic minority group in China, where the government is determined to crack down on Islam. As President-elect Donald J. Trump promises to build detention camps and enlist the military to carry out mass deportations, the future of this group of immigrants is precarious. Deportation could mean years in jail or labor camps.

“My mother told me to stay here,” said Yan, a single mother who came to the United States in July with her 10-year-old son, Masoud, through the Darién Gap. “‘If you come back,’” she quoted her own mother as saying, “‘there’ll be no good outcome for you. Who knows — they might even sentence you to life imprisonment.’”

In China, Yan was detained by the police for 15 days, then sent to a psychiatric hospital for more than 20 days because her phone showed that she had made small donations to two online Quran prayer groups. The police said she supported religious terrorists and called her a “radical religious fanatic.” She considers herself not very religious and doesn’t even wear a head scarf.

A growing number of Chinese are migrating to escape bleak economic prospects and political oppression. Many have joined Venezuelans, Ecuadoreans and Haitians trying to reach the United States through the Darién Gap. More than 38,000 Chinese migrants were temporarily detained on the southern border of the United States in the 2024 fiscal year, up from 24,000 the previous year, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It’s not clear how many of them are Muslims.
 


 
Many Hui Muslims are making the crossing with their families.

On a recent Friday afternoon, Yan and Masoud were among the 15 adults and six children who had gathered at a three-story house in Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Most of them had stayed there, a shelter for Muslim immigrants from China, just after arriving in the United States. They get together on Fridays with newcomers to chat, pray and discuss their lives, faith and current affairs. Then they cook a big meal with the flavors of northwestern China’s cuisine: beef noodles, spicy chicken and steamed buns.

The shelter offers the immigrants free boarding for the first two weeks before they can find places to settle down. Known as Home of Muslim, it also serves as a community center where they can seek solace and support one another.

They exchange personal stories, often full of trauma, sorrow and anger, said Ma Ju, the founder and a financial backer of the shelter. Once, he walked into the living room, he said, and saw a group of women in one another’s arms, weeping.



Mr. Ma, a businessman and a critic of the government’s policies to make Islam in China more Chinese, started the shelter in February 2023 as more Chinese came from the southern border. Over 350 people have stayed at the refuge. Most of them are Hui Muslims, though some are Uyghurs, Tibetans or Han Chinese.

“They are all traumatized,” Mr. Ma said. “But sometimes, they didn’t even know what they experienced was oppression and discrimination.”
 
 
Of the roughly 25 million Muslims in China, 11 million are Hui, who have a big presence in the northwest but also live in enclaves around the nation. The Hui are better integrated into Chinese society than Uyghurs, the biggest Muslim group, who live primarily in Xinjiang. Unlike Uyghurs, who are ethnically Turkic, the Hui look similar to the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Han. The Hui haven’t faced the same degree of persecution as the Uyghurs, but the crackdown on Islam has shaken the group.

The Chinese Communist Party fears ideological competition from any religion. Across the country, the government has demolished minarets and domes of mosques, banned the public use of Arabic script, forbidden children to attend Quran schools and sent the most religious Muslims to re-education camps.



That Friday afternoon at the shelter, Yong, a Hui Muslim from Xinjiang, was one of the cooks. For years, he operated a successful halal restaurant in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capital city. Nearly 90 percent of his customers were Uyghurs, he said. When the government expanded re-education camps in 2017, his customers started to dwindle in number. A year later, nearly 80 percent of them had disappeared, he said.

Then Yong’s three uncles and his brother-in-law, all Hui Muslims, were sent to re-education centers for going to mosques “too often” or for having studied at religious schools when they were young. His mother was taken to the local police station for questioning after she was spotted wearing a scarf at home. She was released after making a written promise that she would not wear a scarf again.
 
“At that time, my wife and I were living in constant fear,” Yong said, “feeling like even the slightest misstep could get us into serious trouble.” He and his wife arrived in America in May 2023, having transited the Darién Gap. He now drives an ambulance in Queens, and his wife works at a halal restaurant in New York City.

Most people I interviewed for this column asked that I use only their given names for fear that their family members in China could face harassment or worse punishment from the authorities.



Another cook at the shelter was Ye Chengxiang, a Hui Muslim from northwestern Qinghai Province. In 2017, the authorities destroyed the minaret on the mosque of his hometown. Then in 2022, Mr. Ye, also a restaurant owner, was forced to take down its halal sign amid a campaign to ban Arabic script.

Mr. Ye, 43, grew up listening to horror stories about his older family members’ experiences. He was determined to leave the country. It took him a decade to get Chinese passports for his family of four. On Dec. 11, 2023, he arrived in San Diego with his wife and two teenage daughters by way of the Darién Gap.

“There were moments on the road when it felt like I was going to die, completely unable to keep going,” he said. “But after I got to this land of freedom, the hardship was nothing. Totally worth it.”

In November, his wife, Sophie, gave birth to their third child. He recently opened a halal restaurant in Rego Park, Queens, with other Muslim immigrants. Another group who stayed at the shelter opened a halal noodle restaurant in Manhattan.
 
But Mr. Ma, the founder of the shelter, said Muslim migrants faced obstacles in making lives in America. Pork dishes, which many Muslims don’t eat, feature heavily in most Chinese restaurants. One former resident of the shelter, with Mr. Ma’s help, found a job at a warehouse — and was called “a terrorist” by co-workers, Han Chinese immigrants, on his first day.

After Mr. Trump won the election, Mr. Ma said, his phone rang almost nonstop for a week. The callers were anxious. They spoke little English, so they had limited access to official information.

Mr. Ma said he had invited a lawyer to the shelter to explain the importance of applying for political asylum. Most Chinese migrants entering the United States from the southern border are released on parole by immigration authorities. Then they can apply for asylum. Under the current protocols, the lawyer told them, once they had a pending case, they should be protected from deportation.

“It would be lying if anyone says they are not scared,” said Yan, the single mother. “Everyone is on edge.” She said she would accept being deported but would make the painful decision to have someone adopt her son, who has problems learning, if it meant he could stay in the United States.

“My son has to stay here,” she said. “Going back would mean no chance of survival for him.” Collapse Read »

The Catholic priest stood at the altar in the hilltop church for the mass baptism, dunking dozens of heads in water and tracing a cross with his finger on each forehead.

Then he rejoiced at Christianity’s recovery of souls in a land where the vast majority of people are Muslim — as the men, women and children standing before him had been.

The ceremony was one of many in recent months in Kosovo, a formerly Serbian territory inhabited largely by ethnic Albanians that declared itself an independent state in 2008. In a census last spring, 93 percent of the population professed itself Muslim and only 1.75 percent Roman Catholic.


A small number of ethnic Albanian Christian activists, all converts from Islam, are urging their ethnic kin to look to the church as an expression of their identity. They call it the “return movement,” a push to revive a pre-Islamic past they see as an anchor of Kosovo’s place in Europe and a barrier to religious extremism spilling over from the Middle East.

Until the Ottoman Empire conquered what is today Kosovo and other areas of the Balkans in the 14th century, bringing with it Islam, ethnic Albanians were primarily Catholics. Under Ottoman rule, which lasted until 1912, most of Kosovo’s people switched faiths.
 
By reversing that process, said Father Fran Kolaj, the priest who carried out the baptisms outside the village of Llapushnik, ethnic Albanians can recover their original identity.

Ethnic Albanians, who trace their roots to an ancient people called the Illyrians, live mainly in Albania, a country on the Adriatic Sea. But they also make up a large majority of the population in neighboring Kosovo and more than a quarter of the population in North Macedonia.

At the church where the baptisms took place, nationalist emblems jostle with religious iconography. The double-headed eagle symbol of Albania decorates the steeple and also a screen behind the altar.

“It is time for us to return to the place where we belong — with Christ,” Father Kolaj said in an interview.

In many Muslim lands, renouncing Islam can bring severe punishment, sometimes even death. So far, the baptism ceremonies taking place in Kosovo have stirred no violent opposition, though there have been some angry denunciations online. (It is not known how many conversions have so far taken place.)

But historians, who agree that Christianity was present in Kosovo long before the Ottoman Empire brought Islam, question the thinking behind the movement.
 
“From a historical perspective what they say is true,” said Durim Abdullahu, a historian at the University of Pristina. But, he added, “their logic means that we should all become pagans” because the people living on the territory of today’s Kosovo before the arrival of Christianity and later Islam were nonbelievers.

Like many other Kosovars, Mr. Abdullahu said he believed that Serbia, which has a mostly Orthodox Christian population, had helped stoke the return movement as a way of sowing discord in Kosovo. While Serbia has long been accused of undermining Kosovo’s stability, there is no evidence it has been promoting the conversions.

Archaeologists in 2022 uncovered the remains of a sixth-century Roman church near Pristina, and in 2023 found a mosaic with an inscription indicating that early Albanians, or at least a people perhaps related to them, were Christians.

Still, Christophe Goddard, a French archaeologist working at the site, said it was wrong to impose modern concepts of nation and ethnicity on ancient peoples. “This is not history but modern politics,” he said.
 
 
Traces of Kosovo’s distant pre-Islamic past also survived in a small number of families that clung to Roman Catholicism despite the risk of being ostracized by their Muslim neighbors.

Marin Sopi, 67, a retired Albanian language teacher who was baptized 16 years ago, said his family had been “closet Catholics” for generations. In childhood, he recalled, he and his family observed Ramadan with Muslim friends but secretly celebrated Christmas at home.

“We were Muslims during the day and Christians at night,” he said. Since coming out as a Christian, he said, 36 members of his extended family have formally abandoned Islam.

Islam and Christianity in Kosovo mostly coexisted in peace — until Orthodox Christian soldiers and nationalist paramilitary gangs from Serbia began torching mosques and expelling Muslims from the homes in the 1990s.

Foreign Christian missionaries have kept their distance from Kosovo’s conversion campaign. But some ethnic Albanians living in Western Europe have offered support, seeing a return to Catholicism as Kosovo’s best hope of one day entering the European Union, a largely Christian club.

Arber Gashi, an ethnic Albanian living in Switzerland, traveled to Kosovo to attend the baptism ceremony at the church in Llapushnik, which overlooks the scene of a major battle in 1998 between Serb forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army.

He and other activists worry that funding for mosque-building and other activities from Turkey and countries in the Middle East like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with their more conservative approaches, threatens Kosovo’s traditionally laid-back form of Islam. Most of this money has gone into economic development projects unrelated to religion.

The center of Pristina has a statue honoring Mother Teresa, the Catholic nun and Nobel Peace Prize laureate of Albanian descent, and is dominated by a large Roman Catholic cathedral built after the war with Serbia. But Turkey is currently funding the construction nearby of a giant new mosque that will be even bigger.
 
Mr. Gashi also said that he feared a return of the Islamic extremism that emerged in Kosovo’s first, chaotic decade of independence. By some counts, Kosovo provided more recruits to the Islamic State in Syria than any other European country.

Christianity, on the other hand, would open a path to Europe, he said.

A crackdown by the authorities in recent years has silenced extremism and reinforced Kosovo’s traditionally relaxed take on Islam. The streets of Pristina are lined with bars serving a wide range of alcohol. Veiled women are extremely rare.

Gezim Gjin Hajrullahu, 57, a teacher who was among those baptized recently in Llapushnik, said he had joined the Catholic church “not for the sake of religion itself” but for the “sake of our national identity” as ethnic Albanians. His wife also converted.

Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian prime minister, Albin Kurti, in an interview in Pristina, played down the importance of religion to Albanian identity. “For us, religions came and went but we are still here,” he said. “For Albanians, in terms of identity, religion was never of first importance.”
 
That sets them apart from other peoples in the now vanished, multiethnic federal state of Yugoslavia, which disintegrated during the Balkan wars of the early 1990s. The main warring parties in the early phases of the conflict spoke much the same language and looked similar but were clearly distinguished from one another by religion — Serbs by Orthodox Christianity, Croats by Roman Catholicism and Bosnians by Islam.

Activists in the return movement believe that ethnic Albanians also need to cement their national loyalties with religion in the form of Roman Catholicism.

Boik Breca, a former Muslim active in the movement, insisted that the Catholic church is not an alien intrusion but the true expression of Albanian identity and evidence that Kosovo belongs in Europe.

He said his interest in Christianity began when Kosovo, along with Serbia, was still part of Yugoslavia. He was sent to jail off the coast of Croatia as a political prisoner. Many of his fellow inmates were Catholics, he recalled, and helped stir what he now sees as his true faith and a belief that “our ancestors were all Catholics.”

“To be a true Albanian,” he said, “you have to be Christian.”

This view is widely disputed, including by Mr. Kurti, the prime minister.

“I don’t buy that,” he said.

The current push against Islam began with a meeting in October 2023 in Decani, a bastion of nationalist sentiment near Kosovo’s border with Albania. The gathering, attended by nationalist intellectuals and former Kosovo Liberation Army fighters, discussed ways to promote “Albanian-ness” and decided that Christianity would help.

“We are no longer Muslims as of today,” attendees said, adopting the slogan: “To be only Albanians.”

The meeting led to the formation of what was initially called the Movement for the Abandonment of the Islamic Faith, a provocative name since largely dropped in favor of the “Movement of Return.”

From his office in Pristina, decorated with a model of Mecca, Kosovo’s grand mufti, Naim Ternava, has watched the return movement with anxiety and dismay. The push for Muslims to switch to Christianity, he said, risked disrupting religious harmony and was being used by “foreign agents to spread hatred of Islam.”

“Our mission,” he added, “is to keep people in our religion. I tell people to remain in Islam.”
 
 
 
 
 
  Collapse Read »

3:98 Say, ‘People of the Book, why do you reject Allah’s Signs when Allah is witness of everything you do?’ 3:99 Say, ‘People of the Book, why do you bar those who believe from the Way of Allah, desiring to make it crooked, when you yourselves are witnesses to it? Allah is not unaware of what you do. ‘Why do you bar from the Way of Allah?’
 
 
It means to turn people away from the dīn of Allah. Al-Ḥasan recited ‘tuṣiddūna’ [instead of ‘taṣuddūna’]. They are two dialectical forms from ṣadda, aṣadda. ‘Crookedness’ denotes bias and deviation in the dīn, words and actions, and what will divert someone from the straight path or what is upright, as Abū ‘Ubaydah and others said. We see the same meaning in His words: ‘they will follow the Summoner who has no crookedness in him at all.’ (20:108) It means that they will not deviate if they respond to his summons. The verb ‘āja means to stop in a place and stand. ‘Ā’ij is someone standing. [POEM] A man who is a‘raj has bad character and ‘awaj is clear bad character. In respect of a horse, ‘ūj refers to the curving of the sinews in the back leg. It is praised. The term a‘awjīyah was used of certain horses in the Jāhilyyah whose legs were far apart. you yourselves are witnesses to it.
It means: you understand it. It is said: ‘You witness that it is written in the Torah that the dīn of Allah that is accepted is Islam alone by reason of the fact that it contains the description of Muḥammad .’ Collapse Read »

Hundreds of Hui Muslims Protest Arrest of Respected Imam in Yunnan Province, China Mainland

On December 15 and 16, hundreds of Hui Muslims gathered outside the city government office in Yuxi, Yunnan Province, to protest the arrest of a well-respected local imam by Chinese authorities. The incident highlights the Chinese Communist Party’s growing control over religious groups, extending beyond the predominantly Muslim regions of northwest China.

According to reports, Imam Ma Yuwei was forcibly detained by plainclothes police officers on the morning of December 15 while dining at a restaurant near Nie’er Square in Yuxi. That same day, his brother in Shadian narrowly avoided arrest thanks to strong opposition from local residents. These actions sparked outrage among the local Muslim community, who took to the streets demanding Ma Yuwei’s release. The protests continued into the morning of December 16.


Sources revealed that Ma Yuwei had been under surveillance and investigation by unidentified individuals for the past year. For safety reasons, he and his father had been living in a mosque for months and rarely ventured outside. On this rare occasion, while dining out, Ma was surrounded and taken away by armed officers. Protesters claim the police did not present an arrest warrant or official identification, and the only reason given for his detention was his preaching of the Quran.


This is not an isolated incident. In recent years, the Chinese government has increased pressure on various religious groups, including Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, through measures such as setting up so-called “re-education camps.” These actions have drawn widespread international condemnation.


The Yunnan protests suggest that these crackdowns may now be extending to Hui Muslim communities outside northwest China. Protesters pointed to repeated instances of oppression against Hui Muslims since 2017, including arrests, detentions, and suppressions, creating a cycle of conflict. They refuted government claims that no Hui Muslims have been detained in “camps,” arguing that substantial evidence indicates tens of thousands of Hui Muslims have been imprisoned.


Tensions remained high at the protest site. Police reportedly tried to disperse the crowd outside the city government office, leading to confrontations. Protesters began organizing efforts to identify undercover officers within the crowd to prepare for potential crackdowns. Witnesses reported seeing large numbers of military and police vehicles heading toward Yuxi overnight, raising concerns about further escalation.

Protesters have submitted a petition to the Yuxi city government demanding an explanation for Ma Yuwei’s arrest and guarantees of religious freedom for Hui Muslims. The petition also highlighted long-standing conflicts between the mosque and local authorities, including allegations regarding its religious activities and management.

This incident is another example of the worsening state of religious freedom in China. The government’s tightened control over religion has increasingly affected not only Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang but also Hui Muslims and other religious groups, including Christians, in other regions of the country. Collapse Read »

Dr. Shabir Ally explores the misunderstood Quranic verse 8:60, which discusses preparing strength to deter enemies. Dr. Shabir emphasizes that this verse, often misinterpreted to justify violence, actually advocates for building comprehensive strength, including economic and technological advancements, to maintain peace and deter aggression. He explains that the reference to "horses" symbolizes tools of mobility and modern warfare in today's context. Moreover, the term "frighten" in the verse is not a call for terrorizing civilians but a deterrence strategy to prevent conflict. Dr. Shabir also addresses the Arabic root words connected to this verse, highlighting their positive connotations in the Quran, such as fear of God and monasticism, contrasting these with their modern misuse. The discussion underscores the need to interpret the Quran dynamically, moving beyond classical commentaries to address contemporary contexts and challenges and reclaim the verse's intended message of peace and preparation rather than aggression or terrorism.
 
 
 

 
Understanding Chapter 8 Verse 60 of the Quran: A Misunderstood Message on Power

In this article, we dive into the widely misunderstood Chapter 8, Verse 60 of the Quran, emphasizing its themes of power and self-defense. With insights from Dr. Shabir Ally, we explore how the historical context and modern interpretations of this verse can shed light on its true meaning. By broadening our understanding of "power," we can better grasp the intention behind this verse, countering misinterpretations that align it with violence and terrorism.

The Context of Chapter 8 Verse 60

To begin our exploration, it's crucial to understand the context in which Chapter 8, Verse 60 of the Quran was revealed. This verse states: “And prepare for them what you can of strength of arms and horses tethered for battle, frightening thereby the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them whom you know not. God knows them.” At first glance, the verse may seem to advocate for a militaristic approach, but a deeper analysis reveals a more nuanced message about preparation and power.

Preparing Power: A Broader Perspective

Dr. Shabir Ally highlights a significant point often overlooked in traditional interpretations: the term "prepare whatever power you can muster." Historically, commentators have focused narrowly on military weaponry, such as arrows and horses. However, in our contemporary context, "power" encompasses much more than just military might. 

Expanding the Definition of Power

In today’s world, we must consider factors like economic strength, technological innovation, and social cohesion as forms of power. The message of the Quran is not limited to arms and combat; it advocates for a comprehensive approach to building strength to secure peace and protection for the community.

The Misinterpretation of “Frightening the Enemy”

Another phrase that has been warped in the narrative is the encouragement to "frighten the enemy." This has been taken out of context by extremist groups to justify acts of violence and terrorism. However, Dr. Shabir emphasizes that the Quran is not suggesting Muslims should instill fear through acts of aggression. Instead, the verse conveys that a strong, prepared community will naturally deter aggression from potential enemies.

The Role of Fear in Self-Defense

It’s essential to recognize that the fear discussed here is one of deterrence, not aggression. The intent is to prevent conflict through strength, ensuring that adversaries reconsider attacking a well-prepared community. Misinterpreting this as a directive for offensive actions compromises the verse’s true objective.

The Positive Connotation of Fear in the Quran

Dr. Shabir brings to light the distinction between the Arabic terms associated with fear in the Quran. The root of the word related to fear, as seen in the context of this verse, often has a positive connotation. For instance, it aligns with the fear of God, a foundational aspect of spiritual life in Islam, denoting reverence rather than terror.

Fear as a Protective Element

The fear that is described is akin to the fear experienced during conflicts, where God helps fortify believers' hearts, giving them confidence. This protective element is vital; it solidifies the believers in their faith during trying times. While some people may misuse the verses for personal agendas, the essence of this discourse points towards respect, self-defense, and the integrity of one’s values.

Conclusion: Reclaiming the Message

In recapping Verse 60 of Chapter 8, we are reminded of the misunderstandings that often cloud interpretations of the Quran. Dr. Shabir Ally urges us to look beyond historical contexts and embrace a more evolved understanding of such verses. Recognizing that power encompasses various forms encourages a holistic approach to community defense and unity.

As we navigate these thought-provoking interpretations, it becomes our collective responsibility to spread the message of peace and understanding anchored in the Quran. The call to prepare, while steeped in historical context, persists as a relevant reminder to both seek strength and foster environments of safety and security, predicated on respect for all. 

So, let us delve deeper into these teachings and work towards a genuine understanding, breaking barriers and misconceptions that have clouded the true message of Islam. Collapse Read »

Dr. Shabir Ally discusses the Quran 8:67, which has been widely misunderstood as promoting violence. He explains that this verse, often interpreted as criticizing the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) for taking captives instead of causing mass slaughter, has been misread due to classical commentaries and older translations. Dr. Shabir clarifies that the verse likely reflects a past practice among earlier prophets, as mentioned in the Bible, where captives were not taken but populations were decimated. The Quran introduces a new, more compassionate approach, allowing the release of captives for ransom and moving towards peaceful coexistence, a significant departure from prior traditions. He further highlights that the Prophet Muhammad’s actions at the Battle of Badr—choosing to release prisoners for ransom—aligned with this new direction. Misinterpretations of the verse arise from a retrospective justification by commentators, which contradicts the Quran’s overarching message of mercy and guidance as well as its encouragement of humane treatment, even during conflict.
 
 

 
Understanding Quranic Verse 8:67: Misconceptions About Captives and Peaceful Coexistence

The Quranic verse from chapter eight, verse 67, often raises eyebrows due to its perceived implications regarding captives in war. However, a closer examination reveals a nuanced message that promotes peaceful coexistence rather than violence. This article delves into the importance of this verse within its historical context, exploring its relationship with the actions of the Prophet Muhammad and earlier prophets. Understanding this verse can help dispel misconceptions about its true meaning and highlight its emphasis on mercy and forgiveness.

Contextual Background of Verse 8:67

To grasp the essence of Quran 8:67, it is crucial to place it within the historical context of the Battle of Badr. This battle marked a significant turning point for the early Muslim community, as they faced their adversaries for the first time on a large scale. The Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and his followers captured prisoners during this conflict, leading to a critical decision regarding their fate.

The Prophet's Dilemma: Captives or Slaughter?

When considering what to do with the prisoners, the Prophet consulted his companions. Abu Bakr advocated for compassion, suggesting they release the captives for ransom, while Umar argued for a harsher fate—execution. Ultimately, the Prophet chose to follow Abu Bakr's advice. However, this decision did not come without consequences. The next day, both the Prophet and Abu Bakr were left distressed over the potential punishment from God for their decision. 

Revelation and Guidance

Following this moment of turmoil, they received revelations that clarified the situation. God reminded the Prophet that taking captives was permissible under specific conditions, and it was not necessary to resort to violence. This was a significant shift from the actions expected of prior prophets, who were mandated to utterly destroy their enemies, as reflected in biblical texts like the Book of Joshua.

It is essential to highlight the critical aspect of divine mercy in this narrative. Although the Prophet's decision seemed initially misguided, God’s mercy prevailed, allowing the Muslim community to take the ransom and release the captives instead of incurring divine wrath.

A Shift in Understanding: The Past Tense Interpretation

Dr. Shabir emphasizes the importance of understanding the verse in the past tense, arguing that it speaks to the actions of earlier prophets rather than condemning the Prophet Muhammad's decisions. This interpretation is supported by early Islamic scholars, including Muqatil ibn Sulayman, who asserted that the command not to take captives until after slaughter was intended for previous prophets.

Lessons from Historical Precedents

Comparative analysis with the biblical context brings to light the differing approaches to warfare and captives. According to Joshua 6:18, capturing and killing were seen as a divine imperative. In contrast, the Quran conveys a powerful message of mercy and the sanctity of life, ultimately allowing for the treatment of captives with dignity.

The Larger Message: Coexistence and Prosperity

At its core, Quran 8:67 reflects a divine desire for peaceful coexistence, advocating for compassion and understanding even amid conflict. The verse counsels against pursuing worldly gains at the expense of moral integrity. Instead, believers are reminded that God desires the hereafter, urging Muslims to prioritize their spiritual obligations over materialistic pursuits.

Conclusion: From Misunderstanding to Clarity

The perceived violence within Quran 8:67 is a misconception rooted in historical context and traditional interpretations. Embracing the multifaceted nature of the verse allows for a more profound understanding that champions peace over hostility. The emphasis on post-Badr decisions signifies a divine shift towards mercy and forgiveness, guiding Muslims to navigate their moral responsibilities in times of conflict compassionately.

Ultimately, the lessons within this verse push us toward loving our fellow human beings and understanding their suffering, emphasizing that true strength lies in mercy and coexistence rather than violence. As discussions surrounding this verse continue, it is vital to approach them with an open heart and mind, seeking the true message encapsulated within the Quran's wisdom. Collapse Read »

Dr. Shabir Ally addresses a question from a concerned mother about her autistic son who is nonverbal and does not participate in prayers or attend the mosque. Dr. Shabir reassures her that in Islam, God holds individuals accountable only for what they are capable of, citing Quranic verses and hadiths to support this principle of divine justice and mercy. He explains that individuals unable to practice or believe due to their circumstances, such as severe autism, will not be held responsible on the Day of Judgment. Instead, they may be in a better spiritual position, as they are free from accountability and will enjoy eternal bliss in the afterlife. Dr. Shabir also encourages the mother to engage her child in ways suitable to his capacity, fostering belief and connection to the Muslim community as much as possible.
 
 

 
 
Understanding Forgiveness for Children with Autism: A Quranic Perspective

In a world where we often question the mysteries of life and spirituality, the concerns of parents with children facing challenges such as autism are pressing. A central question arises: Will a child with autism be forgiven by God, especially if they cannot perform religious practices like prayer? This article delves into the Quranic teachings addressing this sensitive topic, emphasizing God's mercy and justice. 

The Responsibility of Belief: What Does the Quran Say?

When pondering the question of whether God holds individuals accountable for their beliefs and actions, it is essential to understand a fundamental principle found within Islamic teachings. The Quran repeatedly stresses that God only holds people responsible for what they are capable of understanding and doing. For example, verses in the Quran suggest that one should "be conscious of God as much as you can" and that "God does not hold people responsible except for what they can bear." This establishes a vital foundation: accountability in Islam is tied closely to capacity.

The Role of God's Mercy

A crucial aspect of this conversation is the concept of God's mercy. The discussion highlights that even in situations where individuals, such as those with autism, may not fully comprehend or perform religious duties, God's forgiveness is still a guiding light. The Quran describes God as the most just judge. He understands human limitations, and His nature is fundamentally merciful. 

For instance, Hadith narrates that the “pen that writes down deeds is lifted” from individuals who are not in a position to act due to immaturity or mental incapacity. This notion tells us that in God's eyes, children and those facing cognitive challenges are not burdened with obligations they cannot fulfill.

Autism Spectrum: A Wide Range of Capabilities

It’s essential to recognize that autism does not manifest uniformly; it exists on a spectrum. Some individuals are capable of remarkable intellectual feats, while others may struggle with communication and social interactions. In cases where a child is genuinely unable to engage in religious activities or comprehend beliefs, the assumption is that they reside in a state of innocence regarding accountability before God.

For parents concerned about their child’s spiritual standing, it is comforting to consider that those with disabilities receive a form of grace that may not be extended to others. These individuals may not face the same responsibilities on the Day of Judgment, reflecting God's overarching kindness and justice.

Encouragement for Parents and the Community

While God’s mercy is an ever-present reality, parents are also encouraged to engage their children within the Muslim community. Encouraging participation at the mosque or in communal activities can be beneficial, even if these engagements are adjusted to fit the child's needs and capabilities. The effort to involve children, to help them understand their identity within Islam, and to foster their spiritual growth is invaluable.

Additionally, parents should seek support from their community and experts who can assist them in nurturing their child's understanding and connection to Islam.

The Promise of Paradise

Beyond this life, Islamic teachings provide hope and assurance. The belief in an afterlife filled with peace and joy awaits all believers, including those with disabilities. This reassuring concept emphasizes that all individuals will be free from any earthly limitations or challenges upon entering paradise.

The Conclusion: Embracing Faith and Hope

In light of the concerns parents have for their children with autism, understanding the principles laid out in the Quran can offer solace. The innate kindness and justice of God assure that those unable to fulfill religious obligations are not condemned; instead, they are embraced in mercy. For parents journeying alongside children with autism, engage in prayer and action within the community, cherishing the faith that transcends trials and tribulations.

In the end, the most profound message remains: God’s understanding of human nature is profound, and His forgiveness is boundless. Parents can find peace, knowing that their child's unique path—be it through silence or struggle—remains illuminated by God's infinite compassion. Collapse Read »

Dr. Shabir Ally and Dr. Safiyyah Ally explore the birth of Jesus as depicted in the Quran, highlighting his central role in Islam and the remarkable character of his mother, Mary. They elaborate on the two detailed Quranic narratives in Surah Ali'Imran and Surah Maryam, emphasizing the miraculous nature of Jesus's birth, his prophetic role, and the Quran's depiction of Mary as a chosen and revered figure. Dr. Shabir contrasts the frequency of Jesus's mention in the Quran, where his name appears 25 times, with Prophet Muhammad's, whose name is mentioned four or five times. The discussion also touches on the lessons from Jesus's birth, such as the importance of prayer, charity, and kindness to parents, showcasing these values as integral to Islamic teachings. Dr. Shabir notes similarities and differences between the Quranic and biblical accounts, with the Quran providing a distinct narrative that includes Mary's seclusion, her pain during childbirth, and the miraculous defense of her honor when the infant Jesus speaks to vindicate her.
 
 
 

 
Reflecting on Jesus: Exploring the Quranic Narrative

In the midst of the Christmas season, it's essential to delve into the central role of Jesus in Islam. The birth of Jesus holds a significant place in the Quran, shedding light on the story from a unique perspective. Dr. Shabir Ally guides us through the intricate details, highlighting the portrayal of Jesus and Mary in the Quran.

Jesus and Mary in the Quran

The Quran intricately weaves the narratives of Jesus and Mary in two chapters, showcasing their importance in Islamic teachings. Maryam, the mother of Jesus, is mentioned abundantly in the Quran, emphasizing her remarkable stature. Unlike chapters named after Jesus, the Quran's focus underscores the pivotal roles of Mary and the family of Imran, Jesus' grandfather.

The Miraculous Birth of Jesus

The Quran paints a vivid picture of the miraculous birth of Jesus through angelic announcements to Mary. Emphasizing Mary's purity and divine selection, the Quran narrates the miraculous conception of Jesus, surpassing human understanding. This divine event, echoed by angelic proclamations, sets the stage for Jesus' revered birth.

Lessons from the Quranic Narrative

Through the birth of Jesus, the Quran imparts essential lessons on prayer, charity, and honoring parents. Jesus' devotion to God and his exemplary treatment of his mother serve as timeless teachings for Muslims. The Quranic narrative resonates with the broader Christian perspectives found in the Gospels, emphasizing shared values and details.

Embracing Diversity at Muslim Media Hub

Transitioning to "Muslim Media Hub," Dr. Shabir and Safiyyah continue their mission of spreading positivity and understanding Islam. Their commitment to inclusivity and education shines through, creating a space for dialogue and appreciation of diverse perspectives.

As we reflect on the Quranic narrative of Jesus' birth, we are reminded of the universal values of love, devotion, and compassion that bind us together across faith traditions. The story of Jesus in the Quran serves as a beacon of hope and unity, bridging hearts and minds in the spirit of shared humanity. Collapse Read »

Dr. Shabir Ally delves into the context of the Quran 9:1, which proclaims freedom from obligations towards idolaters with whom treaties were made. Dr. Shabir explains that this declaration addresses a historical context where treaties ensured mutual safety between parties. When such treaties were violated by one side, the other was no longer bound by their terms. He clarifies that this verse is not a call to violence but a response to treachery, allowing the renegotiation of terms if the offending party repents and seeks reconciliation. He also connects this verse with surrounding verses, which emphasize upholding treaties with those who remain faithful to their agreements, highlighting Islam's commitment to fairness and justice in such matters. Dr. Shabir also notes that some classical interpretations have misrepresented the verse, suggesting it calls for ending all treaties with idolaters, which contributes to misunderstandings about its meaning. The discussion underscores the importance of interpreting Quranic verses within their historical and textual context to avoid misconceptions and promote a more nuanced understanding of Islam's teachings.
 
 

 
 
Understanding Quranic Verses: Misinterpreted Treaty Proclamation

In this analysis of a misunderstood Quranic verse from chapter nine, Dr. Shabir sheds light on the concept of treaties in Islam. The verse in question declares freedom from obligation towards those who broke a treaty with Muslims, clarifying that the broken treaty releases both parties from their commitments. Dr. Shabir emphasizes the historical context of treaties in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, where treaties ensured mutual safety from attacks. The verse serves as a proclamation of immunity from obligations towards those who breached the treaty, while leaving room for reconciliation if the other party repents and seeks to renew the covenant.

The Context of Treaties in Islamic History

The video delves into the significance of treaties in early Islamic history, highlighting the importance of honoring such agreements for peaceful coexistence. Dr. Shabir explains the implications of breaking a treaty, which would render both parties vulnerable to potential hostilities. By exploring related verses from Surah 8 and 9, the continuity and interconnectedness of these Quranic teachings become apparent. The verse's true message is revealed as a call for justice and mutual respect in contractual relationships.

Dispelling Misconceptions

Through an insightful discussion, Dr. Shabir clarifies the misconception surrounding the verse, where some misinterpret it as inciting violence against non-Muslims. He emphasizes that the verse simply acknowledges the breach of trust by the other party and affirms the freedom from obligations resulting from the broken treaty. The focus is on the importance of upholding agreements and offering the opportunity for reconciliation and renewal of covenants based on mutual understanding and respect.

Building Understanding and Unity

The dialogue underscores the broader theme of maintaining peace and honoring commitments in interfaith interactions. By examining the historical and textual context of the Quranic verse, Dr. Shabir encourages a nuanced understanding of Islamic principles related to treaties and alliances. The video concludes with a call for exploring further verses related to treaties, highlighting the interconnected nature of Quranic teachings on this subject.

In conclusion, the exploration of this Quranic verse serves as a reminder of the importance of integrity and justice in relationships, offering insights into the nuanced interpretation of religious texts. By dispelling misconceptions and promoting understanding, the discourse contributes to fostering harmony and mutual respect among diverse faith communities. Collapse Read »

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī
Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Juz’ 4: Sūrat Āli 'Imrān 96 – 200

& Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

1

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of what it contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Vol. 4

Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

translated by

Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Downloaded via sunniconnect.com.

The Publisher have books from both Authentic and Deviant scholars. The Readers are requested to be careful and differentiate such scholars to make sure about the Authenticity of the knowledge. The sufsim mentioned here refers to early stage sufism which is entirely different from what it is today. We recommend the reader to read the book “Devil’s Deception” by Ibn Jawzi for further clarification on this issue.

© Aisha Bewley

Published by: Diwan Press Ltd.

Website: www.diwanpress.com

E-mail: [email protected]

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publishers.

By: Abu ‘Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qurtubi

Translated by: Aisha Abdarrahman Bewley

Edited by: Abdalhaqq Bewley

A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN13: 978-1-908892-96-6 (Paperback)

978-1-908892-97-3 (Casebound)

978-1-908892-98-0 (ePub & Kindle)

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

CONTENTS

Translator’s note vii

Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200 1

Sūrat an-Nisā’ – The Family of ‘Imrān 1 – 23 155

Table of Contents for Āyats 276

Glossary 279

Table of Transliterations

| Arabic | Latin | Arabic | Latin |

|--------|-------|----------|-------|

| ض | d | ط | t |

| ظ | z | ع | gh |

| ث | t | غ | gh |

| ذ | dh | ف | f |

| ر | r | ق | q |

| ز | z | ك | k |

| س | s | ل | l |

| ش | sh | م | m |

| ح | h | ن | n |

| ت | th | هـ | h |

| خ | kh | و | w |

| د | d | ي | y |

| ص | s | | |

Long vowel | Short vowel

| Arabic | Latin | Examples |

|--------|--------|-------------|

| ا | ā | a [fātih] |

| و | ū | u [damm] |

| ي | i | i [kasrah] |

| ءا | aw | |

| ءي | ay | |

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

TRANSLATOR’S NOTE

The Arabic for the āyats is from the Algerian State edition of the riwāyah of Imam Warsh from the qirā’ah of Imam Nāfī‘ of Madina, whose recitation is one of the ten mutawātir recitations that are mass-transmitted from the time of the Prophet ⌈.⌋

There are minor omissions in the text. Some poems have been omitted which the author quotes to illustrate a point of grammatical usage or as an example of orthography or the usage of a word, often a derivative of the root of the word used in the āyah, but not the actual word used. Often it is difficult to convey the sense in English. Occasionally the author explores a grammatical matter or a tangential issue, and some of these may have been shortened. English grammatical terms used to translate Arabic grammatical terms do not have exactly the same meaning, sometimes rendering a precise translation of them problematic and often obscure.

The end of a juz’ may vary by an āyah or two in order to preserve relevant passages.

Sūrah ĀL ‘Imrān – The Family of ‘Imrān 96 – 200

إِنَّ أَوَّلَ بَيْتٍ وُضِعَ لِلنَّاسِ لَلَّذِي بِبَكَّةَ مُبَارَكًا وَهُدًى لِّلْعَالَمِينَ ﴿96﴾ فِيهِ آيَاتٌ بَيِّنَاتٌ مَكَانُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ ۖ وَمَن دَخَلَهُ كَانَ آمِنًا ۚ وَأَذَّنْ فِي النَّاسِ بِالْحَجِّ يَأْتُواكَ رِجَالًا وَعَلَى كُلِّ ضَامِرٍ يَأْتِينَ مِنْ كُلِّ فَجٍّ عَمِيقٍ ﴿97﴾ لّيَشْهَدُوا مَنَافِعَ لَهُمْ وَيَذْكُرُوا اسْمَ اللَّهِ فِي أَيَّامٍ مَعْلُومَاتٍ عَلَى مَا رَزَقَهُمْ مِّنْ بَهِيمَةِ الْأَنعَامِ ۚ فَكُلُوا مِنهَا وَأَطْعِمُوا الْبَائِسَ الْفَقِيرَ ﴿98﴾ ثُمَّ لْيَقْضُوا تَفَثَهُمْ وَلْيُوفُوا نُذُورَهُمْ ۖ وَلْيَطَّوَّفُوا بِالْبَيْتِ الْعَتِيقِ ﴿99﴾ ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يُعَظِّمْ حُرُمَاتِ اللَّهِ فَهُوَ خَيْرٌ لَهُ عِندَ رَبِّهِ ۖ وَأُحِلَّتْ لَكُمُ الْأَنْعَامُ إِلَّا مَا يُتْلَى عَلَيْكُمْ فَاجْتَنِبُوا رِجْسَ الْأَوْثَانِ وَاجْتَنِبُوا قَوْلَ الزُّورِ ﴿100﴾

The first House established for mankind was that at Bakkah, a place of blessing and a guidance for all beings. In it are Clear Signs – the Maqām of Ibrāhīm. All who enter it are safe. Hajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind – those who can find a way to do it. But if anyone disbelieves, Allah is Rich Beyond Need of any being.

It is confirmed in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim that Abū Dharr said, ‘I asked the Messenger of Allah ﷺ about the first mosque established on the earth and he answered, “The Masjid al-Ḥarām.” I asked, “And then?” He said, “Al-Aqṣā.” I asked, “How long was there between them?” “Forty years,” he replied, “and then the whole earth became a mosque for you, so pray wherever you are when the time for prayer comes.”’

Mujāhid and Qaṭādah said, ‘There was no house before it.’ ʿAlī said, ‘There were many houses before it. What is meant is that it is the first house established for worship.’ Mujāhid said, ‘The Muslims and Jews boasted and the Jews said, “The temple of Jerusalem is better and greater than the Kaʿbah because it was the place of the emigration of Prophets and is in the Holy Land.” The Muslims said, “The Kaʿbah is better.” Allah then revealed this āyah. How the House was built has already been dealt with in al-Baqarah. Mujāhid said, ‘Allah created the site of this house two thousand years before the House was built.’

He created any of the earth, and its foundations are in the seventh and lowest earth. As for Al-Aqṣā, Sulaymān built it.’ An-Nasāʾī transmitted this with a sound isnāḍ from ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Amr. The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘When Sulaymān ibn Dāwūd built the temple in Jerusalem, he asked Allah for three things. He asked Allah for judgment corresponding to His judgment and he was given it. He asked Allah for a kingdom which no one after him would have and he was given that. He asked Allah, when he finished building the temple, that anyone who approached it for the sole reason of praying in it would have his errors fall from him so that he would be like he was on the day he was born, and this was granted.’ There is some equivocation between the two hadiths because there was a long period of time between Ibrāhīm and Sulaymān. Historians say that there was more than a thousand years between them. It is said that Ibrāhīm and Sulaymān were the predecessors for what others built after them.

It is related that Ādam was the first to build the House, as was already mentioned. Then it is possible that one of his sons built al-Aqṣā forty years later. It is also possible that the angels built it with Allah’s permission. All of this is possible, and Allah knows best. ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib said, ‘Allah commanded the angels to build a house on the earth and to do tawāf of it before Ādam was created. Then Ādam built what he built of it and did tawāf of it and then the Prophets after him, and then Ibrāhīm completed its construction.’

…that at Bakkah,

Bakkah is the actual site of the House and Makkah is the rest of the town according to Mālik ibn Anas. Muḥammad ibn Shihāb said that Bakkah is the mosque and Makkah is all the Ḥaram, including the houses. Mujāhid said that Bakkah is Makkah. The bāʾ is replaced by the mīm as done in the word for ‘sticking’: lāzim for lāzib. Aḍ-Ḥaḥḥāk and al-Mu’arrij said that.

Then it is also said that Bakkah is derived from the word bakk,

which means crowding and Bakkah takes its name from the fact that the people crowd together in it during tawāf. Bakka means ‘to throttle’ and it is said that it is called that because it crushes the necks of any tyrants if they act unjustly towards it. ‘Abdullāh ibn az-Zubayr said, ‘No tyrant has ever directed evil at it without Allah breaking his neck.’

It is said that the name Makkah comes from its lack of water, and it is said that it is because it sucks (makka) the marrow from the bones through the hardship involved in reaching it. The verb makka is used for a foal suckling from its mother. A poet said:

It suckled (makkat) and no milk remained inside her.

It is said that it is called that because it sucks the one who does injustice in it, in other words destroys him. It is said that it is called that because people used to whistle (makkā) and laugh in it as in Allah’s words: ‘Their prayer at the House is nothing but whistling and clapping.’ (8:35)

a place of blessing and a guidance for all beings.

Allah made it blessed by multiplying the reward of action in it. Barakah is abundant good. It is in the accusative for the ḥāl modifying what is implied by ‘established’, or an adverb of Bakkah. It is a guidance for all.

In it are Clear Signs – the Maqām of Ibrāhīm

The people of Makkah, Ibn ‘Abbās, Mujāhid and Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr read this as ‘a Clear Sign’ in the singular, meaning a Sign of tawḥīd, referring to the Maqām of Ibrāhīm alone. They said, ‘The mark of his feet in the Maqām is a Clear Sign.’ Mujāhid explained it as referring to the entire Haram and believed that its Signs include Şafā and Marwah, the Corner and the Maqām. The others read it in the plural, meaning the Maqām of Ibrāhīm, the Black Stone, the Ḥaṭīm, Zamzam and all the sacred hallmarks. Abū Ja‘far an-Nahḥās said the reading with the plural is clearer because the Signs certainly

include Ṣafā and Marwah.

Another sign is that the birds do not fly over it when they are healthy and another sign is that when someone is hunting and the game enters the Ḥaram, he leaves it be. Another sign is that when there is abundant rain at the Yemeni Corner, there is plenty in Yemen, and when it is at the Syrian corner, there is plenty in Syria. When rain covers all of the House, there is plenty in all lands. Another aspect of it is that the jamrahs, in spite of what is added to them, remain the same size.

The word Maqām comes from the verb qāma, to stand, and so it is the place where one stands. The Maqām was dealt with in al-Baqarah along with the disagreement about it. It implies: ‘one of them is the Maqām of Ibrāhīm’, as al-Akhfash said. It is related that Muḥammad ibn Yazīd said that ‘Maqām’ is an appositive for ‘Signs’. A third view is that it means: ‘They are the Maqām of Ibrāhīm’ based on a known Arabic usage. [POEM] Abu-l-‘Abbās said that the word ‘maqām’ actually indicates the plural ‘maqāmāt’ because it is a verbal noun. We see in the Qur’an: ‘Allah has sealed up their hearts and hearing’ (92:8) where ‘hearing’ is in the singular. This is strengthened by the hadith which states: ‘Ḥajj is all the Maqām of Ibrāhīm.’

All who enter it are safe.

Qatādah said, ‘That is also one of the signs of the Ḥaram.’ An-Nahhās says that is a good opinion because people are swept away all around it and no tyrant reaches it. They reached Jerusalem and destroyed it but never reached the Ḥaram.’ Allah says: ‘Do you not see what your Lord did with the Companions of the Elephant?’ (105:1) One of the people of meanings said, ‘The form of the āyah is a report while its meaning is a command. It means: “Give security to whoever enters it.”’ The same usage is seen in 2:197. Along these lines, an-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit said, ‘Anyone who commits a wrong action and merits a ḥadd punishment and then takes refuge in the Ḥaram is safe,’ based on this āyah. Allah made security mandatory for those who

enter it. That is related from a group of the early generations, including Ibn Abbās and others.

Ibn al-‘Arabī said, ‘There is weakness in the statements of all who say this for two reasons. One is that they do not understand that the āyah is about the past and does not involve the establishment of a future ruling. The second is that they do not acknowledge that its security has been violated and killing and fighting occurred after that. What Allah states cannot occur differently to that statement. So that indicates that this must have been referring to the past.’ Abū Ḥanīfah disagreed and said, ‘Anyone who seeks refuge in the Ḥaram is not given food or water nor is any business done with him nor is he spoken to until he leaves.’ His being forced to leave is not consonant with security. It is related that he said, ‘Retaliation for limbs takes place in the Haram. There is also no security in this case.’ The majority of scholars say that ḥudūd punishments may be carried out in the Ḥaram. It is reported that the Prophet ﷺ ordered the killing of Ibn Khaṭāl while he was clinging to the drapes of the Ka’bah.

Ath-Thawrī related that Ibn ‘Abbās said, ‘If someone commits a crime that merits a ḥadd punishment in the Haram, it is carried out on him. If he commits it outside of the Ḥaram and then seeks refuge in it, he is not spoken to nor is business carried out with him until he leaves the Ḥaram and then the ḥadd is carried out on him.’ This is the position of ash-Sha‘bī. This is also the argument of Kufans. Ibn ‘Abbās understands that this is what the āyah means. He was the scholar of the Community.

What is sound is that by saying that Allah is referring to the many blessings granted to anyone who is there, whoever they are, as Allah also says: ‘Do they not see that We have established a safe haven while people all round them are violently dispossessed?’ (29:67) In the Jāhiliyya, those who entered it and sought sanctuary were safe from attack and killing as will be explained in al-Mā’idah. Qatādah said, ‘In the

Jāhilīyyah, whoever entered it was safe.’

This is good. It is related that an atheist said to one of the scholars, ‘Does the Qur’an not say: “All who enter it are safe”? We have entered it and we have done such-and-such. Is not the one who enters it safe?’ He said to him, ‘Are you not one of the Arabs? What does someone mean when he says that whoever enters his house is safe? Does he not say to those who obey him, “Leave him be”? “Yes, of course,” he replied. He said, ‘That is how it is with His words: “All who enter it are safe”’ Yahyā ibn Ja‘dah said that it means he is safe from the Fire.

This is not universal because we find in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim in the hadith of intercession reported by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī: ‘By the One Who has my soul in his hand, none of you can be more insistent in asking Allah for his rights than the believers on the Day of Rising who will ask Allah for their brothers who are in the Fire. They will say, “Our Lord, they used to fast with us, pray and perform ḥajj!” They will be told, “Bring out those you recognise.”’ The one who enters it is safe from the Fire by performing the practices connected with it, respecting it, acknowledging its right, and seeking to draw near to Allah Almighty.

Ja‘far as-Ṣādiq said, ‘Whoever enters it with purity, as the Prophets and awliyā’ entered it, is safe from Allah’s punishment.’ This is what is meant by his words ﷺ, ‘Anyone who makes ḥajj to this House and does not engage in sexual activity or wrongdoing emerges from his errors like the day his mother bore him. An accepted ḥajj has no reward but the Garden.’ Al-Ḥasan said, ‘An accepted ḥajj is that he returns abstinent in this world, desiring the Next World.’ He recited:

O Ka‘bah of Allah! The supplication of the one who seeks refuge is the supplication of one calling, in need.

He has bade farewell to those he loves and his home and come hovering between fear and hope.

If Allah generously accepts his striving,

he is saved. Otherwise he is not saved.

You are one of those whose intercession is hoped for.

Be kind to Wāfīd ibn Ḥajjāj!

It is also said that it means whoever entered it in the year of the Fulfilled ʿUmrah with Muhammad ﷺ is safe. The evidence is found in the words of the Almighty: ‘You will enter the Maşjid al-Ḥarām in safety, Allah willing.’ (48:27) It is said that the word ‘man’ (tr. as ‘all’) here refers to the non-sentient and the āyah is about the safety of game. This is odd. We see in the Revelation: ‘Some of them (minhum) go on their bellies.’ (24:45)

Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind

In the phrase ‘owed to Allah’ Allah uses the lām of the obligation and then reinforces it with “ʿalā” which is the strongest preposition in Arabic for making something obligatory. Allah uses the most comprehensive of the expressions of obligation to stress the right it has over us and the esteem owed to it. There is no disagreement about its obligatory nature. It is one of the pillars of Islam and is only obliged once in a lifetime. Some people said that it is obliged once every five years and relate about that a hadith which they trace back to the Prophet ﷺ. The hadith is false and not sound. The consensus invalidates their position.

‘Abd ar-Razzāq related from Sufyān ath-Thawrī from al-‘Alā’ ibn al-Musayyab from his father from Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘The Lord says, “I have expanded my slave’s provision and yet he does not visit me in iḥrām every four years.”’ It is famous from al-‘Alā’ ibn al-Musayyab ibn Rāfīʿ al-Kāhilī al-Kūfī from the children of hadith scholars. More than one related it from him. They include those who said ‘every five years’. Some said: from al-‘Alā’ from Yūnus ibn Khabbāb from Abū Saʿīd. There is disagreement about all of that.

13

The atheists deny the ḥajj and say that it involves removing garments, which is contrary to modesty, running, which is contrary to gravity, and stoning the jamarahs for no purpose, which is contrary to logic. They say that all these actions are baseless because they do not recognise their wisdom or cause. They are ignorant of the fact that it is not necessary for the Lord to make His slave understand all that He commands him to do nor to acquaint him with the point of the actions He requires of him. It is incumbent on him to obey, and he must obey without seeking benefit nor asking about the goal. This is the meaning of what the Prophet ﷺ used to say in his talbīyah: ‘At Your service, truly, truly in worship and slavehood. At Your service, God of the Truth.’

The imāms related that Abū Hurayrah said, ‘The Messenger of Allah ﷺ addressed us and said, “People! The Ḥajj has been made obligatory for you, so perform it!” A man asked, “Every year, Messenger of Allah?” He was silent until the man had asked that three times. Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, “If I had said yes, it would have become obligatory and you would not be able to do it.” Then he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Those before you were destroyed for asking too many questions and differing from their Prophets. If I command you to do something, do what you can of it. If I forbid you from doing something, then leave it.”’ (Muslim)

This hadith makes it clear that when an obligation is directed to those responsible for doing it, it is enough that they do it once and it does need to be repeated. This differs from the position of Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī. It is confirmed that his Companions said to the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, is this ḥajj of ours for just this year or for all time?’ He answered, ‘It is for all time.’ This is a text refuting those who say that it is obligatory once every five years. The ḥajj was well known among the Arabs. It was part of what they desired because of its markets, social acceptability and being part of the Ḥanīfiyyah. When Islam came, they were told to do what they

The atheists deny the ḥajj and say that it involves removing garments, which is contrary to modesty, running, which is contrary to gravity, and stoning the jamarahs for no purpose, which is contrary to logic. They say that all these actions are baseless because they do not recognise their wisdom or cause. They are ignorant of the fact that it is not necessary for the Lord to make His slave understand all that He commands him to do nor to acquaint him with the point of the actions He requires of him. It is incumbent on him to obey, and he must obey without seeking benefit nor asking about the goal. This is the meaning of what the Prophet ﷺ used to say in his talbīyah: ‘At Your service, truly, truly in worship and slavehood. At Your service, God of the Truth.’

The imāms related that Abū Hurayrah said, ‘The Messenger of Allah ﷺ addressed us and said, “People! The Ḥajj has been made obligatory for you, so perform it!” A man asked, “Every year, Messenger of Allah?” He was silent until the man had asked that three times. Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, “If I had said yes, it would have become obligatory and you would not be able to do it.” Then he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Those before you were destroyed for asking too many questions and differing from their Prophets. If I command you to do something, do what you can of it. If I forbid you from doing something, then leave it.”’ (Muslim)

This hadith makes it clear that when an obligation is directed to those responsible for doing it, it is enough that they do it once and it does need to be repeated. This differs from the position of Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī. It is confirmed that his Companions said to the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, is this ḥajj of ours for just this year or for all time?’ He answered, ‘It is for all time.’ This is a text refuting those who say that it is obligatory once every five years. The ḥajj was well known among the Arabs. It was part of what they desired because of its markets, social acceptability and being part of the Ḥanīfiyyah. When Islam came, they were told to do what they

The atheists deny the ḥajj and say that it involves removing garments, which is contrary to modesty, running, which is contrary to gravity, and stoning the jamarahs for no purpose, which is contrary to logic. They say that all these actions are baseless because they do not recognise their wisdom or cause. They are ignorant of the fact that it is not necessary for the Lord to make His slave understand all that He commands him to do nor to acquaint him with the point of the actions He requires of him. It is incumbent on him to obey, and he must obey without seeking benefit nor asking about the goal. This is the meaning of what the Prophet ﷺ used to say in his talbīyah: ‘At Your service, truly, truly in worship and slavehood. At Your service, God of the Truth.’

The imāms related that Abū Hurayrah said, ‘The Messenger of Allah ﷺ addressed us and said, “People! The Ḥajj has been made obligatory for you, so perform it!” A man asked, “Every year, Messenger of Allah?” He was silent until the man had asked that three times. Then the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, “If I had said yes, it would have become obligatory and you would not be able to do it.” Then he said, “Leave me with what I have left you. Those before you were destroyed for asking too many questions and differing from their Prophets. If I command you to do something, do what you can of it. If I forbid you from doing something, then leave it.”’ (Muslim)

This hadith makes it clear that when an obligation is directed to those responsible for doing it, it is enough that they do it once and it does need to be repeated. This differs from the position of Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī. It is confirmed that his Companions said to the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, is this ḥajj of ours for just this year or for all time?’ He answered, ‘It is for all time.’ This is a text refuting those who say that it is obligatory once every five years. The ḥajj was well known among the Arabs. It was part of what they desired because of its markets, social acceptability and being part of the Ḥanīfiyyah. When Islam came, they were told to do what they

knew and to hold to what they recognised. The Prophet ﷺ performed ḥajj before the obligatory ḥajj. He had stood at ʿArafah and did not change the Law of Ibrāhīm that had been changed by Quraysh when they stood at the Mashʿar al-Harām, saying, ‘We are the people of the Ḥaram and do not leave it. We are the Ḥums.’ This was already explained in al-Baqarah.

One of the oddest claims that I have seen made is that the Prophet ﷺ performed ḥajj twice before the Hijrah and by that the obligation was cancelled for him because he had responded to the summons of Ibrāhīm when it was said: ‘Announce the Ḥajj to mankind.’ (22:27) Aṭ-Ṭabarī said, ‘This is unlikely. When it was announced as part of his Sharīʿah: “Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind,” then it must also have been a duty for him according to that injunction. If it is said that it is only addressed to those who have not yet performed ḥajj, that is arbitrary and specific and there is no evidence for it. If someone claims that those who performed ḥajj in the religion of Ibrāhīm are not addressed by this, it is extremely unlikely.’

The Book and the Sunnah indicate that the ḥajj should be performed in a person’s own good time, not immediately. That is the final position in the school of Mālik as Ibn Khuwayzimandād mentioned, and it is the position of ash-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn al-Hasan ash-Shaybānī, and Abū Yūsuf in one transmission. Some later Baghdadi Mālikīs believed that the obligation is immediate and it is not permitted to delay it when the ability to perform it exists. That is the position of Dāwūd. The sound view is the first one because Allah says in Sūrat al-Ḥajj: ‘Announce the Ḥajj to mankind’ (22:27) and al-Ḥajj is Makkan. He says: ‘Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by people.’ This sūrah was revealed in the year of Uḥud in Mādīnah in 3 AH and the Prophet ﷺ did not perform ḥajj until 10 AH.

As for the Sunnah, there is the hadith of Dīmām ibn Thaʿlaba as-Saʿdī of the Banū Saʿd ibn Bakr who came to the Prophet ﷺ and

asked him about Islam and he mentioned the shahādah, prayer, zakāt, fasting and ḥajj. Ibn ‘Abbās, Abū Hurayrah and Anas related it. There is a lot of mention of the ḥajj in the Sunnah. It is clearly obligatory. The hadith of Anas is better and more complete. There is disagreement about the date of this hadith. It is said that is 5 AH, 7 AH and 9 AH. Ibn Hishām mentioned from Abū ‘Ubaydah al-Wāqidī that it was in the year of the Ditch after the Confederates left.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr said, ‘Part of the evidence that the ḥajj can be delayed is the consensus of scholars that if someone able to go on ḥajj delays it for a year or two, and then performs the ḥajj some years after his ability to perform it exists, then he has performed the obligatory ḥajj in its time. All agree that he is not like someone who misses the prayer until its time has passed and makes it up after its time, or someone who misses fasting Ramadān due to illness or travel and then makes it up, or like someone who invalidates his ḥajj and then makes it up. It is agreed that if someone performs the ḥajj years after he is able to do so, he is not said to be “making it up”. From this we know that there is wide scope for the time of ḥajj and that it is not immediate.’

Abū ‘Umar said, ‘All who say that ḥajj can be delayed put no time limit on that except what is related from Ṣaḥnūn who was asked about a man who had the wherewithal to make ḥajj and delayed it for some years while he was able to do it and whether that meant that he became fāsiq by delaying the ḥajj, causing his testimony to be rejected. He said it did not, even if that delay was up to sixty years. If it was more than sixty years, he was considered fāsiq and his testimony rejected.’ So he made sixty years the limit. Limits are only stipulated in the Sharī‘ah by someone who can legislate.

Ibn al-Khuwayzimandād related this from Ibn al-Qāsim. Ibn al-Qāsim and others said, ‘If he delays it for sixty years, his character is not impaired. If he delays it beyond sixty years, his character is

impaired because the Prophet ﷺ said, “The lifespan of my community is between sixty and seventy. Few exceed it.” It is as if the requirement is made urgent for him in these ten years.

Abu ‘Umar said, ‘Some people, like Saḥnūn, cite as evidence the words of the Prophet ﷺ: “The lifespan of my community is between sixty and seventy. Few exceed that.” There is no proof in that because the words deal with the majority of the ages of the community, if the hadith is sound. It contains evidence for scope for this up to the age of seventy because that is still within the lifespan of the majority. It is not proper to call someone of good character and trustworthiness impious through such a weak interpretation.’ Success is by Allah.

Scholars agree that all are addressed in general. Ibn al-‘Arabī said, ‘Even if people disagree about the application of general terms, they agree that this āyah applies to all people, male and female, except children, who are excluded by the consensus that they are excluded from the obligations of responsibility. The same applies to slaves who are also not included. They are excluded from it by the words: “those who can find a way to do it.”’ A slave lacks the ability because his master can prevent him from doing it by his right of ownership and Allah put the right of the master before His right out of kindness to His slaves. There is no disagreement about this either in the community as a whole or between the imams. We do not hasten to affirm what we do not actually know. The only evidence regarding it is the accepted consensus.’ Ibn al-Mundhir said that most of the people of knowledge agree, with the exception of the odd person whose disagreement is not considered, that if a child or slave has made ḥajj and then the child becomes an adult or the slave is freed, they still owe the ḥajj if they can find a way to do it.

Abū ‘Umar said, ‘Dāwūd disagreed with most of the fuqahā’ of the cities and leaders of tradition about slaves and said that they are required to perform ḥajj. According to the majority of scholars,

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

however, slaves are not among those addressed by this command. That is because they do not possess freedom of action and cannot perform hajj without their master’s permission. That is the same as slaves not being addressed by the requirement to attend Jumūʻah in 62:9. It is the position of most scholars except for rare exceptions. Slaves are also excluded from the obligation of giving testimony in 2:282. They are not included in that. It is also possible that children are excluded from the command to perform hajj in this āyah even though they are included in “mankind” since the pen [recording responsibility] has been lifted from them. Women are excluded from the words: “You who believe, when the prayer is called…”, despite the fact that they are among those who believe, just as slaves are excluded from this. That is the position of the fuqahāʾ of the Hijaz, Iraq, Syria and the Maghrib. It is not permitted for them to deviate in the interpretation of the Book.

If it is asked, ‘If the slave lives in the vicinity of the Masjid al-Ḥaram and his master gives him permission, why is it not necessary for him to perform hajj?’ The answer is that this question is based on consensus and it may be that there is no reason for that. But since it is confirmed that this ruling is based on consensus, we use it as evidence for the fact that any hajj he performs while still a slave is not counted as the obligatory hajj. It is related from Ibn ʻAbbās that the Prophet ﷺ said, ‘If a child performs hajj and then reaches adulthood, he must perform another hajj. If a desert Arab performs hajj and then emigrates, he must perform another hajj. If a slave performs hajj and then is freed, he must perform another hajj.’

Ibn al-ʻArabī said, ‘Some of our scholars are careless and have said, “The hajj is not confirmed for a slave, even if his master has given permission, because originally he was an unbeliever and the hajj of an unbeliever is not counted. When he became a slave perpetually, he was not instructed to perform hajj.” This is unsound in three ways. The first is that we believe that the secondary rulings of the

Sharīʿah are also directed at unbelievers, and there is no disagreement that that is the view of Mālik. The second is that all acts of worship are obliged for him with respect to the prayer and fasting while he is a slave. If he had done them while an unbeliever, they would not be counted. The third is that unbelief is removed by Islam, so its ruling must also be removed. Success is by Allah.

those who can find a way to do it.

Ad-Dāraquṭnī reported that Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It was asked, “Messenger of Allah, should ḥajj be done every year?” “Rather it is one ḥajj,” he replied. He was asked, “What is ‘a way?’” He said, “Provision and a mount.”’ That is related from Anas, Ibn Masʿūd, Ibn ʿUmar, Jābir, ʿĀ’ishah, and ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb from his father from his grandfather. ʿAli ibn Abī Ṭālib related that the Prophet said: ‘Ḥajj to the House is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind—those who can find a way to do it.’ He said that he was asked about that and the Prophet said that it meant, ‘That you have the use of a camel.’

Ibn Mājāh also transmitted the hadith of Ibn ʿUmar in the Sunan as did Abū ʿĪsā at-Tirmidhī in the jāmīʿ. He said that it is a good hadith. According to the people of knowledge, the practice is that when a man has provision and transport, he must perform ḥajj. Things are said by the people of hadith about the memory of Ibrāhīm ibn Yazīd al-Khūzī al-Makkī. They transmitted from Wakīʿ and ad-Dāraquṭnī from Sufyān ibn Saʿīd from Ibrāhīm ibn Yazīd from Muḥammad ibn ʿAbbād that Ibn ʿUmar said, ‘A man went to the Prophet and asked, “Messenger of Allah, what makes ḥajj mandatory?” He answered, “Provision and a mount.” He asked, “Messenger of Allah, what is the state of the hājj?” He replied, “Dishevelled, ill-smelling.” Another rose and asked, “What is ḥajj?” He answered, “Clamour and shedding blood.”’ Wakīʿ said that ‘clamour’ is raising the voice with the talbiyah and ‘shedding blood’ is making the sacrifices.

Among those who said that provision and a mount are

preconditions for the hajj were ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, his son ‘Abdullāh, ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr, ‘Aṭā’ and Mujāhid. That is the position of ash-Shāfī‘, ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Aḥmad, Ishāq, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Abī Salamah, and Ibn Ḥabīb. ‘Abdūs mentioned something similar from Sahnūn.

Ash-Shāfī‘ says, ‘Ability has two aspects. One is that a person is physically able to do it and has enough money to achieve the hajj. The second is that someone is disabled in his body and unable to ride, but is able to have someone perform hajj on his behalf for a wage or without a wage. This will be explained. The one who is physically able is obliged by Allah’s Book to perform hajj by Allah’s words: “those who can find a way to do it.” The one who is financially able to do it is obliged to perform the hajj by the Sunnah on the basis of the hadith related about the Khath‘amī woman. As for the one who is able to do it himself, he is the strong person who incurs, in riding a mount, no hardship beyond his ability to bear it. If this is the case at a time when he possesses provision and a mount, he is obliged to make hajj himself. If he lacks provision and transport, or either one of them, then the obligation of hajj is cancelled for him. If someone is able to walk and has provision or the ability to earn provision on the way through their skill, such as leather work, cupping or a similar trade, it is recommended that they make hajj on foot, whether man or woman. Ash-Shāfī‘ added, ‘The man has less of an excuse than a woman because he is stronger.’ They consider this to be recommended, not mandatory. If the only way he is able to get provision is by begging from people on the way, it is disliked for him to perform hajj because he becomes a burden on people.

Mālik ibn Anas said, ‘If he is both able to walk and also has provision, he must perform hajj. If he has no mount but is able to walk, there is some question. If he possesses the necessary provision, he is obliged to perform hajj. If he does not possess it, but is able to

preconditions for the hajj were ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, his son ‘Abdullāh, ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Sa‘īd ibn Jubayr, ‘Aṭā’ and Mujāhid. That is the position of ash-Shāfī‘, ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Aḥmad, Ishāq, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Abī Salamah, and Ibn Ḥabīb. ‘Abdūs mentioned something similar from Sahnūn.

Ash-Shāfī‘ says, ‘Ability has two aspects. One is that a person is physically able to do it and has enough money to achieve the hajj. The second is that someone is disabled in his body and unable to ride, but is able to have someone perform hajj on his behalf for a wage or without a wage. This will be explained. The one who is physically able is obliged by Allah’s Book to perform hajj by Allah’s words: “those who can find a way to do it.” The one who is financially able to do it is obliged to perform the hajj by the Sunnah on the basis of the hadith related about the Khath‘amī woman. As for the one who is able to do it himself, he is the strong person who incurs, in riding a mount, no hardship beyond his ability to bear it. If this is the case at a time when he possesses provision and a mount, he is obliged to make hajj himself. If he lacks provision and transport, or either one of them, then the obligation of hajj is cancelled for him. If someone is able to walk and has provision or the ability to earn provision on the way through their skill, such as leather work, cupping or a similar trade, it is recommended that they make hajj on foot, whether man or woman. Ash-Shāfī‘ added, ‘The man has less of an excuse than a woman because he is stronger.’ They consider this to be recommended, not mandatory. If the only way he is able to get provision is by begging from people on the way, it is disliked for him to perform hajj because he becomes a burden on people.

Mālik ibn Anas said, ‘If he is both able to walk and also has provision, he must perform hajj. If he has no mount but is able to walk, there is some question. If he possesses the necessary provision, he is obliged to perform hajj. If he does not possess it, but is able to

āyah and to Allah’s words: ‘Hajj to the house is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind…’ This person lacked the ability because the hajj is enjoined on those responsible for reaching the House themselves and because it is an act of worship which cannot be delegated when the ability is lacking, just as is the case with the prayer.

Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir related from Jābir that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘By means of one hajj, Allah will admit three to the Garden: the deceased, the one who takes on hajj for him and the one who carries that out.’ Abu-l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad ad-Dārāquqnī transmitted this from ‘Amr ibn Ḥuṣayn as-Sadūsī from Abū Ma‘shar from Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir. The name of Abū Ma‘shar was Najīḥ. They considered him to be weak.

Ash-Shāfi‘ī said, ‘Regarding someone who is chronically ill, very sickly or very old, who finds someone able to perform the hajj on his behalf, he possesses a certain type of ability. There are two forms of it. One is that he is able to pay someone to perform hajj on his behalf. That person performs his obligatory hajj. This is the view of ‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib. It is related that he told a very old man who had not performed hajj, ‘Equip a man to perform hajj on your behalf.’ This position was taken by ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Ibn al-Mubārak, Aḥmad and Isḥāq. The second is that he is able to find someone to pay on his behalf and represent him in performing hajj on his behalf. According to ash-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad and Ibn Rāhawah, hajj is also an obligation for such a person. Abū Ḥanīfah said that the hajj is not obligatory for them. Ash-Shāfi‘ī cited as evidence what Ibn ‘Abbās related about the woman of Khath‘am who asked the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, Allah has obliged His slaves to perform hajj. My father is a very old man who cannot remain firm on a mount. Can I perform hajj on his behalf?’ ‘Yes,’ he answered. That was during the Farewell Hajj. One variant has: ‘He cannot remain upright on a camel.’ The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘Perform hajj for him. Do you think that if your father owed a debt,

āyah and to Allah’s words: ‘Hajj to the house is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind…’ This person lacked the ability because the hajj is enjoined on those responsible for reaching the House themselves and because it is an act of worship which cannot be delegated when the ability is lacking, just as is the case with the prayer.

Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir related from Jābir that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘By means of one hajj, Allah will admit three to the Garden: the deceased, the one who takes on hajj for him and the one who carries that out.’ Abu-l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad ad-Dārāquqnī transmitted this from ‘Amr ibn Ḥuṣayn as-Sadūsī from Abū Ma‘shar from Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir. The name of Abū Ma‘shar was Najīḥ. They considered him to be weak.

Ash-Shāfi‘ī said, ‘Regarding someone who is chronically ill, very sickly or very old, who finds someone able to perform the hajj on his behalf, he possesses a certain type of ability. There are two forms of it. One is that he is able to pay someone to perform hajj on his behalf. That person performs his obligatory hajj. This is the view of ‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib. It is related that he told a very old man who had not performed hajj, ‘Equip a man to perform hajj on your behalf.’ This position was taken by ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Ibn al-Mubārak, Aḥmad and Isḥāq. The second is that he is able to find someone to pay on his behalf and represent him in performing hajj on his behalf. According to ash-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad and Ibn Rāhawah, hajj is also an obligation for such a person. Abū Ḥanīfah said that the hajj is not obligatory for them. Ash-Shāfi‘ī cited as evidence what Ibn ‘Abbās related about the woman of Khath‘am who asked the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, Allah has obliged His slaves to perform hajj. My father is a very old man who cannot remain firm on a mount. Can I perform hajj on his behalf?’ ‘Yes,’ he answered. That was during the Farewell Hajj. One variant has: ‘He cannot remain upright on a camel.’ The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘Perform hajj for him. Do you think that if your father owed a debt,

āyah and to Allah’s words: ‘Hajj to the house is a duty owed to Allah by all mankind…’ This person lacked the ability because the hajj is enjoined on those responsible for reaching the House themselves and because it is an act of worship which cannot be delegated when the ability is lacking, just as is the case with the prayer.

Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir related from Jābir that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘By means of one hajj, Allah will admit three to the Garden: the deceased, the one who takes on hajj for him and the one who carries that out.’ Abu-l-Qāsim Sulaymān ibn Aḥmad ad-Dārāquqnī transmitted this from ‘Amr ibn Ḥuṣayn as-Sadūsī from Abū Ma‘shar from Muḥammad ibn al-Munkadir. The name of Abū Ma‘shar was Najīḥ. They considered him to be weak.

Ash-Shāfi‘ī said, ‘Regarding someone who is chronically ill, very sickly or very old, who finds someone able to perform the hajj on his behalf, he possesses a certain type of ability. There are two forms of it. One is that he is able to pay someone to perform hajj on his behalf. That person performs his obligatory hajj. This is the view of ‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib. It is related that he told a very old man who had not performed hajj, ‘Equip a man to perform hajj on your behalf.’ This position was taken by ath-Thawrī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his people, Ibn al-Mubārak, Aḥmad and Isḥāq. The second is that he is able to find someone to pay on his behalf and represent him in performing hajj on his behalf. According to ash-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad and Ibn Rāhawah, hajj is also an obligation for such a person. Abū Ḥanīfah said that the hajj is not obligatory for them. Ash-Shāfi‘ī cited as evidence what Ibn ‘Abbās related about the woman of Khath‘am who asked the Prophet ﷺ, ‘Messenger of Allah, Allah has obliged His slaves to perform hajj. My father is a very old man who cannot remain firm on a mount. Can I perform hajj on his behalf?’ ‘Yes,’ he answered. That was during the Farewell Hajj. One variant has: ‘He cannot remain upright on a camel.’ The Prophet ﷺ said, ‘Perform hajj for him. Do you think that if your father owed a debt,

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Allah ﷺ was among them and they saw him. It is also possible that this is addressed to the entire Community because His traces and signs and the Qur’an which he was given are among us in the place of the Messenger ﷺ, even if we did not see him.

Qatādah said, ‘There are two clear signs in this āyah: the Book of Allah and the Prophet of Allah. The Prophet of Allah has passed, and the Book of Allah remains among them as a mercy and a blessing. It contains its lawful and unlawful, and obedience and disobedience.’

The phrase ‘Whoever holds fast’ means someone who is patient and holds to Allah’s dīn and obeys Him. Then he is given success and rightly guided. Ibn Jurayj says that it means he believes in Him. It is said that it means, ‘Whoever holds to the rope of Allah,’ which is the Qur’an. The verbs aʿṣama and iʿtasama mean to hold to something to the exclusion of anything else. Anyone who clings to something is called ‘muʿṣim’ and ‘muʿtasim’. Someone who defends something is called ‘ʿāsim’. Al-Farazdaq said:

I am the son of the defenders (ʿāsimīn) of the Banū Tamīm.

[POEMS] Food is described as defending (ʿasama) someone from being hungry. The Arabs say, ‘the food kept him (ʿasama) from being hungry. That is why they call pottage (sawīq) Abū ʿĀsim.’ Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā said, ‘The Arabs called bread ʿāsim and jābir, and they also called it ʿāmir. [POEMS]

ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَلَا يَضُرَّ اللَّهَ شَيْئًا ۗ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَأُولَـٰئكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

102 You who believe! have taqwā of Allah with the taqwā due to Him and do not die except as Muslims.

An-Nahhās related from Murrah ibn ‘Abdullāh that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘The taqwā due to Him is that He be obeyed and not disobeyed, remembered and not forgotten, thanked and not shown ingratitude.’ Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It means not disobeying Him

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Allah ﷺ was among them and they saw him. It is also possible that this is addressed to the entire Community because His traces and signs and the Qur’an which he was given are among us in the place of the Messenger ﷺ, even if we did not see him.

Qatādah said, ‘There are two clear signs in this āyah: the Book of Allah and the Prophet of Allah. The Prophet of Allah has passed, and the Book of Allah remains among them as a mercy and a blessing. It contains its lawful and unlawful, and obedience and disobedience.’

The phrase ‘Whoever holds fast’ means someone who is patient and holds to Allah’s dīn and obeys Him. Then he is given success and rightly guided. Ibn Jurayj says that it means he believes in Him. It is said that it means, ‘Whoever holds to the rope of Allah,’ which is the Qur’an. The verbs aʿṣama and iʿtasama mean to hold to something to the exclusion of anything else. Anyone who clings to something is called ‘muʿṣim’ and ‘muʿtasim’. Someone who defends something is called ‘ʿāsim’. Al-Farazdaq said:

I am the son of the defenders (ʿāsimīn) of the Banū Tamīm.

[POEMS] Food is described as defending (ʿasama) someone from being hungry. The Arabs say, ‘the food kept him (ʿasama) from being hungry. That is why they call pottage (sawīq) Abū ʿĀsim.’ Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā said, ‘The Arabs called bread ʿāsim and jābir, and they also called it ʿāmir. [POEMS]

ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَلَا يَضُرَّ اللَّهَ شَيْئًا ۗ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَأُولَـٰئكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

102 You who believe! have taqwā of Allah with the taqwā due to Him and do not die except as Muslims.

An-Nahhās related from Murrah ibn ‘Abdullāh that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘The taqwā due to Him is that He be obeyed and not disobeyed, remembered and not forgotten, thanked and not shown ingratitude.’ Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It means not disobeying Him

Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī

The General Judgments of the Qur’an and Clarification of What it Contains of the Sunnah and Āyahs of Discrimination

Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Farḥ al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī al-Andalusī al-Qurṭubī

Vol. 4
Juz’ 4: Sūrah Āli ‘Imrān 96 – 200 & Sūrat an-Nisā’ 1 – 23

translated by Aisha Bewley

DIWAN PRESS

Classical and Contemporary Books on Islam and Sufism

Founded in 1971

Allah ﷺ was among them and they saw him. It is also possible that this is addressed to the entire Community because His traces and signs and the Qur’an which he was given are among us in the place of the Messenger ﷺ, even if we did not see him.

Qatādah said, ‘There are two clear signs in this āyah: the Book of Allah and the Prophet of Allah. The Prophet of Allah has passed, and the Book of Allah remains among them as a mercy and a blessing. It contains its lawful and unlawful, and obedience and disobedience.’

The phrase ‘Whoever holds fast’ means someone who is patient and holds to Allah’s dīn and obeys Him. Then he is given success and rightly guided. Ibn Jurayj says that it means he believes in Him. It is said that it means, ‘Whoever holds to the rope of Allah,’ which is the Qur’an. The verbs aʿṣama and iʿtasama mean to hold to something to the exclusion of anything else. Anyone who clings to something is called ‘muʿṣim’ and ‘muʿtasim’. Someone who defends something is called ‘ʿāsim’. Al-Farazdaq said:

I am the son of the defenders (ʿāsimīn) of the Banū Tamīm.

[POEMS] Food is described as defending (ʿasama) someone from being hungry. The Arabs say, ‘the food kept him (ʿasama) from being hungry. That is why they call pottage (sawīq) Abū ʿĀsim.’ Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā said, ‘The Arabs called bread ʿāsim and jābir, and they also called it ʿāmir. [POEMS]

ذَٰلِكَ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَلَا يَضُرَّ اللَّهَ شَيْئًا ۗ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّ فَأُولَـٰئكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

102 You who believe! have taqwā of Allah with the taqwā due to Him and do not die except as Muslims.

An-Nahhās related from Murrah ibn ‘Abdullāh that the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, ‘The taqwā due to Him is that He be obeyed and not disobeyed, remembered and not forgotten, thanked and not shown ingratitude.’ Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘It means not disobeying Him Collapse Read »

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If two men commit a like abomination, punish them. If they repent and reform, leave them alone. Allah is Ever-Returning, Most Merciful.
 
‘Two’ (alladhāni): it is the dual of alladhī. By analogy , one would say , ‘alladhayāni’ like raḥayāni, muṣṭafayāni and shajayāni. Sībawayh said that the yā’ is elided in order to differentiate between declinable nouns with nunnation and demonstrative pronouns. Abū ‘ Alī said that the yā’ is elided for lightening when one is safe from confusion in alladhānī because the nūn is not elided, although the nūn of the dual in declinable nouns is elide when it is in iḍāfah in raḥayā, and muṣṭafayā. If the yā’ had been elided, it would have resembled the singular with two. Ibn Kathīr recited ‘alladhānni’ with a doubled nūn which is the dialect of Quraysh. The reason is that the doubling takes the place of the alif of dhā as will be explained in al-Qaṣaṣ. (28:32) There is another dialect which has ‘alladhā’ with the nūn elided. This is the view of the Kufans. The Basrans said that the nūn is elided because of the length of the word when connected. Similar is the reading of ‘hadhānni’ and ‘fa-dhānnaka burhānāni’. The rest have ‘alladhāni’. Abū ‘ Amr has the aberrant ‘fa-dhānnika’.
 
‘Two’ is in the nominative for the inceptive. Sībawayh says that it means: ‘in what is recited to you: if two men among you commit it (meaning fornication).’ The fā’ is added to ‘punish them’ because the words have the meaning of a command because when ‘alladhī’ is connected to a verb, it is possible for it to have the meaning of a
precondition when nothing specific is applied to it. When a precondition is possible and nothing is defined, then it acts as a precondition and the fā’ is added, and what is implied before it does not act on it, as the precondition is not affected by what is implied or clearly stated before it. Then it is unlikely that what is implied before it acts on ‘those’, then the implication is not good.The accusative is permitted when a verb is implied, and that is preferred when the words convey the meaning of a command or prohibition, like: ‘Those who are with you: honour them.’ punish them. Qatādah and as-Suddī said that it means to rebuke and reproach.

A group said that it is castigation and being harsh without reproach. Ibn ‘ Abbās said, ‘It is attacking with the tongue and hitting with sandals.’ An-Naḥḥās said that some people claim it is abrogated. Ibn Abī Najīḥ related that Mujāhid said that this and the previous āyah existed at the beginning and then were abrogated by the āyah in an-
Nūr. An-Naḥḥās said that it more fitting that it is not abrogated and it is obliged to punish them with rebuke, saying, ‘You committed this, sinned and opposed Allah’s command.’ Scholars disagree about the interpretation of the prepositions ‘they’ (fem.) in the previous āyah and ‘two’ here. Mujāhid and others said that the first āyah is about women in general, muḥṣanāt or not. The second is about men in particular, and the dual makes the category of men clear, muḥṣan or not. The punishment of women is imprisonment and that of men is castigation. This is what the words demand and the words deal in full with the types of fornication. That is reinforced by what His words in the first, ‘your women’ and ‘you’ in the second. An-Naḥḥās preferred that and related it from Ibn ‘ Abbās. As-Suddī, Qatādah and others said, ‘The first is about muḥṣanāt women, and so includes men who are muḥṣan, and the second is about men and women who are virgins.’ Ibn ‘ Aṭiyyah said, ‘ According to this, the meaning is complete, although the expression of the āyah is unsettled about it.’ Aṭ-Ṭabarī preferred that but an- Naḥḥās rejected it, saying that it is unlikely that the feminine preposition would dominate the masculine. It is said that a fornicatress is imprisoned rather than the man, but hey are both castigated. Qatādah said, ‘ A woman is imprisoned and both are castigated. This is because a man needs to earn and work.’ Scholars disagree about the position according to the hadith of ‘Ubādah which clarifies the rulings of fornication as we made clear. ‘ Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib’s position, in which there is no dispute, was in agreement with it. He flogged Shurāḥah al-Hamdāniyyah with a hundred lashes and stoned her afterwards. He said, ‘I flogged her by the Book of Allah and stoned her by the sunnah of the Messenger of Allah g.’ Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, al-Ḥasan ibn Ṣāliḥ ibn Ḥayy and Isḥāq said that. A group of scholars said, ‘Someone previously married is stoned without being flogged.’ This is related from ‘Umar and is the position of az-Zuhrī, an-Nakha‘ī, Mālik, ath-Thawrī, al-Awzā‘ī, ash- Shāfi‘ī, the People of Opinion, Aḥmad and Abū Thawr, holding to
the fact that the Prophet g stoned Mā‘iz and the Ghāmidiyyah woman without flogging them, and to what the Prophet g said to Unays, ‘Go to this woman and if she confesses, stone her.’ He did not mention flogging. If it had been prescribed, he would not have been silent about it. The response to that was that he was silent
about it because it is confirmed by the Book of Allah. It is not impossible for him to have been silent about it since it was well known and there is a text on it in the Qur’an since Allah says: ‘A woman and a man who commit fornication: flog both of them with a hundred lashes.’ (24:2) This includes all fornicators. Allah knows best. This
explains what ‘ Alī did by adopting it from the caliphs and no one objected to it. The answer to this is that he acted by the abrogated and left the abrogating. This is clear.
They disagree about the exile of unmarried people in addition to flogging. The position of the majority is that they are exiled as well. The Rāshidūn caliphs, Abū Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthmān and ‘ Alī, said that. It is the position of ‘ Aṭā’ Ṭāwus, Sufyān, Mālik, Ibn Abī Laylā, ash- Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad, Isḥāq and Abū Thawr. Ḥammād ibn Abī
Sulaymān, Abū Ḥanīfah and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ash-Shaybānī said that it is abandoned. The evidence of the majority is the hadith of ‘Ubādah and that of Abū Hurayrah and Zayd ibn Khālid in which the Prophet g said, ‘By the One who has my soul in His hand, I will decide between you two by the Book of Allah. Your sheep and slave-girl should be returned to you.’ He flogged his son with a hundred and exiled him for a year. The imams transmitted it. Those who do not think that there should be exile use the hadith of Abū Hurayrah about the slave-girl in which flogging rather than exile is mentioned. ‘ Abd ar-Razzāq mentioned from Ma‘mar from
az-Zuhrī that Sa‘īd ibn al-Musayyab said, ‘‘Umar exiled Rabī‘ah ibn Abī Umayyah ibn Khalaf to Khaybar for drinking wine where he joined Heraclius and became a Christian. ‘Umar said, “I will not exile a Muslim after this.”’ They said, ‘If exile had been a ḥadd punishment of Allah, ‘Umar would never have abandoned it. The text which is in the Book is flogging and increase beyond the text is abrogated.’ In reply to this, the hadith of Abū Hurayrah is about slave-girls, not free people. There is a sound report that ‘ Abdullāh ibn ‘Umar beat his slave-girl for fornication and exiled her. As for the hadith of ‘Umar, he meant for wine, and Allah knows best, since Nāfi‘ related
from Ibn ‘Umar that the Prophet g flogged and exiled as did Abū Bakr and ‘Umar. At-Tirmidhī in the Jāmi‘ and an-Nasā’ī in the Sunan transmitted it from Abū Kurayb Muḥammad ibn al-‘ Alā’ al- Hamdānī from ‘ Abdullāh ibn Idrīs from ‘Ubaydullāh ibn ‘Umar from Nāfi‘. Ad-Dāraquṭnī said that ‘ Abdullāh ibn Idrīs alone had it and the only reliable person who has it from him is Abū Kurayb.Exile is reported in a sound transmission from the Prophet g, so no one can debate its validity . Whoever differs from the Sunnah argues with it. Success is by Allah. What they said about increase over the text being abrogated is not sound. There can be an additional ruling to the basic one. There are many instances of this about things which are not in the Qur’an. This was discussed in al-Baqarah. Those who disagree about exile do not do so about exiling free males. They disagree about exiling slaves or slave-girls. Ibn ‘Umar was one of those who thought that they should be exiled: he flogged a slave-girl for fornication and exiled her to Fadak. It is the position of ash-Shāfi‘ī, Abū Thawr, ath-Thawrī, aṭ-Ṭabarī and Dāwud. They disagree about ash-Shāfi‘ī’s position about exiling slaves. Sometimes he said that exiling slaves is subject to doing an istikhārah, sometimes he said that it is for half a year, and sometimes he said that it is a
year to a different town, as aṭ-Ṭabarī said. They have two positions about exiling slave-girls. Mālik said that men should be exiled but not women or slaves. The one who is exiled is detained in the place to which they are exiled, as from Egypt to the Hijaz, Shaghb, Aswan and the like, and from Madīnah to Khaybar and Fadak. That is what ‘Umar ibn ‘ Abd al-‘ Azīz did, and ‘ Ali exiled people from Kufa to Basra. Ash-Shāfi‘ī said that the minimum is the journey of a day and a night. Ibn al-‘ Arabī said, ‘The basis of exile is that the tribe of Ismā‘īl agreed that someone who committed something wrong in the Ḥaram should be exiled from it and so that became a sunnah in their
dīn. That is why the sunnah of the people was that when someone committed something wrong, they were exiled. That continued in the Jāhiliyyah until Islam came and then it was confirmed only in the case of fornication.’ Those who did not think that exile applied to slaves used the hadith of Abū Hurayrah as evidence. That is also because exile then becomes a punishment for the owner who is denied the use of the slave during the period of exile. That is not in keeping with the usage of the Sharī‘ah. None but the perpetrator should be punished. Allah knows best. Furthermore, Jumu‘ah, ḥajj and jihad which are Allah’s right are cancelled for him because of his master. The same is true of exile. Allah knows best. When a woman is exiled, that could be a cause for her falling into the very thing she was expelled for, which is fornication. Exile might act as a cause of her being exposed and possibly ruin her. That was the reason for not letting her leave her house and for her praying in
it being better. This restricts the generality of the hadith about exile to the aspect of welfare that is witnessed in it. It is a topic of disagreement among those who deal with uṣūl and thinkers. One group took an aberrant view and said that flogging and stoning are combined in the case of an old man while a young man is flogged.
This is based on holding to the word ‘old man’ in the hadith of Zayd ibn Thābit who heard the Messenger of Allah g say , ‘When an old man and old woman fornicate, stone them completely .’ An-Nasā’ī transmitted it. This is unsound because in another hadith he called him ‘previously married (thayyib).’ If they repent and reform, leave them alone.‘If they repent’ of fornication and ‘reform’ with respect to what they do afterwards, ‘leave them alone,’ meaning do not castigate them. That was before the revelation of the ḥadd punishments. When the ḥudūd were revealed, this āyah was abrogated. What is meant by ‘leave them alone’ is not emigration but being shunned and left alone. That is abasement for them because of their disobedience and because of the ignorance in the other āyah. Allah is Ever-Turning means that He makes His slaves turn back from acts of disobedience. Collapse Read »

15 If any of your women commit fornication, four of you must be witnesses against them. If they bear witness, detain them in their homes until death releases them or

Allah ordains another procedure for their case.
 
  In this sūrah, Allah mentions being good to women and giving them their dowries and He also mentions their inheritance together with that of the men. Then He mentions being harsh to them in the case of any fornication they may commit of so that it might not be imagined that a woman be allowed to be lax where chasteness is
concerned. Allātī is the plural of allatī and it is an undefined feminine noun which is definite. It is not permitted to remove the alif-lām from it to
make it indefinite and it is only complete when connected. As we already mentioned, it has three dialectical forms and a plural: allāti without the yā’ but with the kasrah, allā’ī with a hamzah and keeping the yā’, and allā with the hamzah elided. When you make the plural plural, you use allawātī for allāti, allawā’ī for allā’ī. It is related from them as allawāti without the yā’ but with the kasrah. Ibn ash-Shajarī said that. [POEMS WITH FURTHER GRAMMATICAL EXAMPLES] Fāḥishah here means fornication. Faḥishah is an ugly action, and it is a verbal noun like ‘āqibah and ‘āfīyah. Ibn Mas‘ūd recited ‘bi-l-fāḥishati’. ‘Your women’ means Muslim women, not those related by lineage. It explains the state of the believing women. The same usage is seen in 2:282. That is because an unbelieving woman might be connected
to women of the Muslims by lineage but would not not be subject to this ruling. four of you must be witnesses against them.
This means four Muslims. Allah requires four witnesses to 346 fornication in order to make it hard for the claimant and to veil people. Requiring four reputable witnesses to fornication is a firm ruling in both the Gospel and the Qur’an. Allah says: ‘But those who make accusations against chaste women and then do not produce four witnesses: flog them with eighty lashes.’ (24:4) Here He mentions four. Abū Dāwūd reports from Jābir ibn ‘ Abdullāh: ‘The Jews brought a man and woman of theirs who had committed fornication. The Prophet g said, “Fetch me the most knowledgeable two men among you.” They brought him the sons of Ṣūriyā and he asked, “What do
you find in the Torah about the business of these two?” They said, “We find in the Torah that if four testify that they saw his penis in her vagina like a stick in a kohl bottle, then they are stoned.” He asked, “What keeps you from stoning them?” They replied, “Our authority has gone and we dislike killing.” So the Messenger of Allah
g summoned the witnesses and they came and testified that they saw his penis in her vagina like a stick in a kohl bottle, and the Messenger of Allah g commanded that they be stoned.’ Some people say , ‘The witnesses in fornication are four so that there are two witnesses against each of the two parties, as is the case in all rights, since a right is taken from each of them.’ This is weak. The oath deals with property and suspicion in the qasamah, and it does not apply here. The witnesses must be male since He says, ‘minkum’, and there is no disagreement in the Community about that, and they must be of good character because Allah stipulates
good character in sales and retraction, and this is a greater matter so it is more fitting here. This is part of applying the general to the restricted in evidence as mentioned in the fundamental principles of fiqh. They cannot be dhimm_ī_s, although judgment can be made against dhimm_ī_s. That will be discussed in al-Mā’idah. Abū Ḥanīfah added that ‘four of you’ is about the husband when he is one of the witnesses in slander and does not carry out the li‘ān. This will be
explained in an-Nūr.
 
four of you must be witnesses against them.

This means four Muslims. Allah requires four witnesses to fornication in order to make it hard for the claimant and to veil people. Requiring four reputable witnesses to fornication is a firm ruling in both the Gospel and the Qur’an. Allah says: ‘But those who make accusations against chaste women and then do not produce four witnesses: flog them with eighty lashes.’ (24:4) Here He mentions four. Abū Dāwūd reports from Jābir ibn ‘ Abdullāh: ‘The Jews brought a man and woman of theirs who had committed fornication. The Prophet g said, “Fetch me the most knowledgeable two men among you.” They brought him the sons of Ṣūriyā and he asked, “What do
you find in the Torah about the business of these two?” They said,“We find in the Torah that if four testify that they saw his penis in  her vagina like a stick in a kohl bottle, then they are stoned.” He asked, “What keeps you from stoning them?” They replied, “Our authority has gone and we dislike killing.” So the Messenger of Allah
g summoned the witnesses and they came and testified that they saw his penis in her vagina like a stick in a kohl bottle, and the Messenger of Allah g commanded that they be stoned.’ Some people say , ‘The witnesses in fornication are four so that there are two witnesses against each of the two parties, as is the case in all rights, since a right is taken from each of them.’ This is weak. The oath deals with property and suspicion in the qasamah, and it does not apply here. The witnesses must be male since He says, ‘minkum’, and there is no disagreement in the Community about that, and they must be of good character because Allah stipulates good character in sales and retraction, and this is a greater matter so it is more fitting here. This is part of applying the general to the restricted in evidence as mentioned in the fundamental principles of fiqh. They cannot be dhimmīs, although judgment can be made against dhimmīs. That will be discussed in al-Mā’idah. Abū Ḥanīfah added that ‘four of you’ is about the husband when he is one of the witnesses in slander and does not carry out the li‘ān. This will be explained in an-Nūr.
 
If they bear witness, detain them in their homes

This was the first of the punishments for fornication. It was at the beginning of Islam. ‘Ubādah ibn aṣ-Ṣāmit, al-Ḥasan and Mujāhid said that. That lasted until it was abrogated by the punishment after it and then that was abrogated by the āyah in an-Nūr and stoning for someone previously married. One group said that the corporal
punishment was first and then was abrogated by detaining but the order in recitation is different. Ibn Fūrak mentioned that. Detaining used to be in houses at the beginning of Islam before there were a lot of criminals. When they were a lot and their strength was feared, a prison was constructed for them. Ibn al-‘ Arabī said that.
Scholars disagree about whether prison is a ḥadd punishment or threatening with a ḥadd. One position is that it is threatening a ḥadd and the second that that is an actual hadd. Ibn ‘ Abbās and al-Ḥasan said that. Ibn Zayd said that they were forbidden to marry until they died as a punishment for them when they had unlawful sexual intercourse. This indicates that it was a ḥadd punishment and indeed more severe. However, that ruling ended with the punishment prescribed in the other āyah, according to the difference in the two interpretations about which was first. Both had a term in the words of the Prophet g in the hadith of ‘Ubādah ibn aṣ-Ṣāmit: ‘Take from me. Take from me. Allah has made a way for them: a hundred lashes and exile for a year for a virgin and a hundred lashes and stoning for someone previously married.’ This is like Allah’s words: ‘Fulfil the fast until the night appears.’ (2:187) When night comes, the ruling of fasting is removed; it is not abrogated. This is what is stated
by accurate later scholars from among those who study fundamentals. Abrogation occurs when there are two contradictory positions which cannot be combined. It is possible to combine imprisonment and ignominy , and flogging and stoning. Some scholars said that abuse and ignominy remain with flogging because they are not contradictory and can both be combined against the same person. There is consensus that imprisonment is abrogated. It is permissible to apply abrogation to the like of it. Allah knows best. Collapse Read »

Every Muslim living in USA must vote. Please do not vote for anyone in favor of genocide and injustices in the wold. Your vote is like the drop of bird that washed to extinguish the fire in which Ibrahim was thrown or like the little money old lady wanted to buy yousaf with . Collapse Read »

Australian ruling Labor Party Senator Fatima Payman said that the prime minister’s decision to indefinitely suspend her from the party’s caucus after supporting a motion in parliament to recognise a Palestinian state had left her in “exile.
 
 

 
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The Chinese government is trying to change the Eid customs, prayers and traditions by making Uyghurs consume food along with Chinese people [and] adding Chinese elements to the Eid festivals, thereby removing the Muslim Eid elements.
 
 
On an important Muslim holiday last month, police and security officials in China’s far-western region of Xinjiang set up camps to keep an eye on Uyghurs, took Uyghurs to see communist-themed films, and visited Uyghur homes to make sure they weren’t practicing Muslim religious activities.

The moves around the Qurban Eid, also known as Eid al-Adha or the Feast of the Sacrifice, which fell on June 17 this year in Xinjiang — one of two official Muslim holidays in China — appeared to be attempts to undermine the observation of the Muslim holy day, outside experts said. 

Chinese authorities are trying to weaken Uyghurs’ ethnic and religious identity and forge their loyalty to the Chinese state and the Communist Party, while maintaining security, the experts said.

“It looks like they are trying to Sinicize Eid,” said Erkin Ekrem, a professor at Hacettepe University in Ankara, Turkey, and vice president of the World Uyghur Congress.

“The Chinese government is trying to change the Eid customs, prayers and traditions [by] making Uyghurs consume food along with Chinese people [and] adding Chinese elements to the Eid festivals, thereby removing the Muslim Eid elements,” he added.

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A screen displays Chinese President Xi Jinping near a mosque in Kashgar, northwestern China's Xinjiang region, June 4, 2019. (AFPTV)

Before 2017, when the Chinese government started cracking down on religious activities in the predominantly Muslim region, men would observe the holiday by visiting mosques for special prayers, cooking meals, spending time with relatives and welcoming guests to their homes. 

Since then, authorities have also forbidden Islamic dress for women, beards for men, and Muslim names for children. They have also prevented Uyghurs from fasting during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan and encouraged the consumption of pork and alcohol, which Islam forbids.

Chinese national consciousness

On the eve of Eid, Ma Xingrui, Communist Party secretary of Xinjiang, visited communities in Urumqi, the region’s capital, and asked residents to strengthen Chinese national consciousness and insist on the Sinicization of Islam.

Public security officers celebrated the holiday with Uyghurs and other ethnicities in Xinjiang and promoted “the common consciousness of the Chinese nation,” the Xinjiang Daily reported on June 19.
 
The Keriye County Public Security Bureau in Hotan invited teachers at area primary schools, students and parents on June 16 to participate in social activities at a police camp to “build strong Chinese national consciousness and celebrate Eid,” the report said.

On the same day, police in Qitai county in the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture invited Uyghur “relatives” with whom they had been paired up under a previous monitoring program to visit a museum to watch communist-themed films.

On June 17, members of the Public Security Bureau in the prefecture’s Manas county visited Uyghur homes and danced with residents, who had no choice but to join in, the news report said. 

“The police showed their concern for the public by their actions and also planted the seeds of national unity deep in everyone’s hearts,” it said.

Assimilation policies
 
 


Henryk Szadziewski, director of research at the Uyghur Human Rights Project, said public security agents interfere in Muslim holidays like Eid al-Adha to push assimilationist policies in Xinjiang.

Uyghur identification with Turkic culture along with a belief in Islam and related social and political values are considered a threat because they are outside the control of the Chinese state, he told Radio Free Asia. 
 

 
Attendees watch video of a Muslim praying during a government reception held for the Eid al-Fitr holiday in Beijing, China, May 13, 2021. (Ng Han Guan/AP)
 
“China’s policies are intended to weaken those kinds of affinities outside which are beyond the borders of China and to ensure Uyghurs allegiances are pinned to the Chinese state and, of course, the Chinese Communist Party,” Szadziewski said.

But the Chinese government separates Islam in China from Islam in the rest of the world, Erkin Ekrem of the World Uyghur Congress said. 

“In China, the Sinicization of Islam is being carried out vigorously,” he told RFA. “They are trying to create a nation away from Islamic beliefs and customs.”

“Deemphasizing the religion adding in this secular Chinese national consciousness [is] meant to delink Eid al-Adha from its religious origin,” he said. “That is one of the aims here.”

Translated by RFA Uyghur. Edited by Roseanne Gerin and Malcolm Foster. Collapse Read »

If a woman fears indifference or neglect from her husband, there is no blame on either of them if they seek fair settlement, which is best. Humans are ever inclined to selfishness.But if you are gracious and mindful of Allah, surely Allah is All-Aware of what you do.(4:128) Collapse Read »

I will not be attending Netanyahu’s address and will instead join families of the hostages taken in the October 7 attack. I vehemently object to giving the Prime Minister a platform when his failed leadership has brought so much death and destruction to Palestinians and Israelis.
 

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Today, I'm boycotting Netanyahu’s address. We don’t need a PR stunt — we need Netanyahu to stop bombing Gaza & secure a ceasefire deal so the hostages can come home. The U.S. must stop unconditional military aid & work toward a long-term peace for Israelis and Palestinians.
 
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