The Yunnan Najiaying Hui people’s struggle to defend the mosque has similar historical precedents. In 1974, the conflict between the CCP and the Hui people in Yunnan escalated, and thousands of Hui people Muslims went to Kunming to protest the closure of mosques during the Cultural Revolution and demand religious freedom. The Hui people confronted the government and ended with the armed suppression of the PLA. A total of about 1,600 Muslims were killed, of which 866 came from Shadian, Yunan province.
 
 

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Najiaying mosque latest news: The Chinese police and armed military still control the Najiaying town, they locked the door of the mosque. Local hui people Muslim gather and try to prevent CCP secret attacks at night.
 
click and watch video:
https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw ... 1.mp4
 
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The Chinese Communist Party not only sent out mad dog-like police to surround the Najiaying mosque. Now, the Xi Jinping government has also sent out hungry wolf-like troops to suppress the Hui Muslim in Najiaying town!”
Local Muslim pray and say “ Allah is the most greatest” to protest.
 
click and watch the video: 
 
https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw ... T.mp4
 
 

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Stand Off! Hui Muslims Confront Chinese Police Over Mosque Demolition On 26th May 2023, Hui Muslims gathered outside the historic Najiaying mosque in Yuxi City, Yunnan Province to prevent Chinese authorities and riot police from the demolishing the Dome and Minarets of the mosque. The Chinese police were forced to retreat due to strong resistance and many Hui Muslims stayed outside the mosque overnight to prevent the demolition. Arabic signs, minarets and domes of mosques are being demolished, as the Chinese communist party carries out its 5-year plan to “sinicise” #Islam across the country.
 
 

 
 

 
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It's happening! Local Yunan Muslims gather to protest as the Najia Ying Mosque in Nagu Town, Tonghai County, Yunnan Province is being forcibly demolished. 

This is evidence of the Communist Party's individual how to attacks Muslims who living in China.
In 2018, internal documents in Xinjiang show that, Xi Jinping will destroy the Hui People muslim community after Xinjiang Concentration Camps.

The communists' trick is to attack one by one, slowly dismantling.
This is the time for Chinese Muslims to unite together, and This is the time for Global Muslims to unite together.
 

 
 

 
1. Local residents photographed from the building as the Chinese Communist government sent tower cranes, which entered the mosque compound and were preparing to demolish the mosque dome and minaret.
 
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2. Muslims confront armed police in front of the mosque while praying.
 
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3. Local Muslims knock down scaffolding erected by the Chinese Communist Party to demolish the minaret of the mosque.
 
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4. The Chinese Communist Party has illegally arrested many Muslims in Najia Camp. Video shows this Muslim being handcuffed by armed police officers before being retrieved from them by local residents.
 
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Today on a campaign trail by Turkey's Erdogan: 
* I get my orders from Allah 
* US President Biden ordered to topple me 
* Opposition will sanction Russia on US orders 
* Russian meddling into Turkish elections is a lie 
* West gone crazy when Hagia Sophia turned to a mosque

 
watch video:
 
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China’s War against Islam: From ‘mosque rectification program’, to Quran being burnt, pork being fed, Namaz and Hijab being banned and more

China's war on Islam includes a total ban on religious education, harsh suppression of religious scholars, burning of the Quran, destroying mosques and cemeteries, changing prayers and zikr, forbidding the hijab, eliminating Islamic customs, forbidding learning Arabic, erasing the Muslim identity of Uyghur children and more.
 
The Center for Uyghur Studies (CUS) published an 88-page detailed research paper on April 28, 2023, highlighting the scale of the Communist Party of China’s transnational war against Islam and resultant repression of Uyghur Muslims with a particular focus on the Chinese government policies in East Turkestan, more commonly known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

The report titled, “Islamophobia in China and Attitudes of Muslim Countries”, highlights numerous instances of China’s war against Islam. It also talks about how Muslim nations have maintained studious silence at China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Chinese-occupied East Turkestan or the Xinjiang province.

The research looks at the historical and systemic attempts made by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to “sinicize” Islam and Muslims from the inception of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. The paper also details the numerous facets of China’s conflict with Islam in East Turkistan during the past seven decades, most recently starting in 2017.

It also looks at China’s disinformation tactics in the Islamic world and the several propaganda techniques the Chinese state uses to keep Muslims from publicly criticising their treatment by China due to their religion. The report concludes with a chapter on the OIC’s failure to address the Uyghurs and the attitudes of Muslim-majority nations towards the Uyghur Genocide.

Uyghurs are a Turkish-Muslim ethnic group living in Xinjiang, the largest and most western of China’s administrative regions surrounded by Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. The Xinjiang autonomous region in China has had a long history of discord between the authorities and the Uighur population.

Islam and China

The research paper highlights how in China, Islam has been regarded as a foreign religion that came from outside China. Hence, there has been a view that Muslims as foreigners and backwards. Talking about how it originated, the research suggests that the hate for Muslims in the country began in 1949 with the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and only worsened during the past 70 years of the CCP rule.

The report said that dislike for Islam in China is at extremely high levels. The issue was made worse by the portrayal of Islam and Muslims in the Chinese state media. A favourable and acceptable international climate for dislike towards Islam in China was also created by the “Global War on Terror” that was declared following the 9/11 attacks.

Since Xi Jinping took office, the PRC’s hostility towards Muslims has increased. Particularly, the CCP’s work conference on religious affairs that took place in 2016 marked a high point in the specific dislike for Islam. Chinese authorities have initiated a statewide crackdown on different religions, especially those that are considered foreign (like Islam and Christianity).

Persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang seen as the most radical form of Islamophobia in China, says research

The research report by the think tank suggests that the most extreme manifestation of dislike for Islam in China has been the actions taken by Chinese authorities against Uyghur Muslims in East Turkestan or Xinjiang. Millions of Muslims have been imprisoned by the Chinese authorities under the guise of “re-education and rehabilitation,” and thousands of mosques have been razed in East Turkestan. Chinese authorities compare Islam to an “infectious disease” and Uyghur Muslims to “infected people,” highlighting the need to eradicate the faith, read the report.

The report explains the extent of the exploitation of Uyghur Muslims by Communist China 

The report states that Muslims in China have experienced discrimination as a result of the Chinese government’s overt and covert support of incidents where men and women wearing the hijab are mocked, barred from public spaces like hospitals and hotels and even denied employment. Muslim categorization of food as halal or haram is fiercely opposed. Islamic attire and customs are attacked and shunned because they were seen as foreign by Chinese society.

This research piece further highlighted how the practice of discrimination against Muslims in China, particularly with regard to the Uyghurs in East Turkestan, has assumed the shape of a government policy.

The anti-Islam campaigns initiated by the Chinese authorities

In their report, the researchers discuss how the Chinese government has been attempting to eliminate Islam since its presence in the Xinjiang province. It highlights the various anti-Islam campaigns, which include a total ban on religious education, harsh suppression of religious scholars, burning of the Quran, destroying mosques and cemeteries, changing prayers and zikr, forbidding the hijab, eliminating Islamic customs, forbidding learning Arabic, and erasing the Muslim identity of Uyghur children, carried out over the years by the Communist Party of China under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Prohibition on preaching Islam: The report states how Muslims of East Turkestan are not able to learn and teach their religion. Following the occupation of East Turkistan in 1966 until today, Muslim children are being mandatorily raised with communist ideology and Chinese culture at state schools. Chinese communists mandate that Muslim children learn atheism and communist ideology while closing down Islamic schools (Madarsa), eradicating Islam from the educational system.

After CCP assumed power in 2014, the Chinese government imprisoned Uyghurs who studied in Muslim-majority nations like Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey and mandated those who were still there to return. They also placed state officials in Uyghur homes to monitor them round-the-clock and completely forbid the parents from teaching their children Islamic practises like Namaz and the Quran.
 

A demolished mosque in Kashgar City of East Turkestan (Source: /)[/url] 
 
 
In 2017, a large number of Uyghur students at Al-Azhar University were forcibly returned to China by the Chinese authorities with the assistance of the Egyptian government.

Suppression of Maulvis: As the leadership views Islamic practices as crimes and the religious leaders as criminals, religious scholars are the group in Xinjiang that faces the harshest treatment at the hands of the Chinese communist regime. The report used data released by the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), which confirms that as many as 1,000 imams have been detained since 2014 as a result of their affiliation with Islamic teaching. Most of those arrested were sentenced to 15-20 years or life in prison terms.

The report further adds that since 2017, there has been a significant upsurge in the targeting of Islamist scholars. Many Uyghur imams and clerics have been detained, imprisoned, or sent to concentration camps in 2017. Those who weren’t in jail were forced to sing and dance in support of the communist party in front of the public.
 
 
 


Uyghurs Cleric dancing and singing in praise of CCP (Source: /)[/url] 
 
 
Burning of the Quran: The report highlights yet another strategy the CCP government employs in its war against Islam, which is the burning of their religious texts and the Quran. The report said that this practice has increased manifolds since 2014.

During China’s recent campaign against Islam in East Turkestan, people who did not voluntarily turn over religious materials to the police were subjected to severe punishments when they were found. Because of their fear, Muslims in East Turkestan were sometimes forced to dispose of the Quran by dumping it into rivers.

Since 2017, all Islamic textbooks and materials have been outlawed in China. All the religious literature and materials were gathered and burnt. Those who had such items were detained or transferred to jails or concentration camps.

Destruction of mosques and cemeteries: Chinese authorities also destroyed mosques or transformed them in addition to suppressing Imams. When the “Cultural Revolution” took place between 1966 and 1976, the policy was at its strictest.

In 2017, the process of demolishing mosques began once again. Under the “Mosque Rectification Programme,” the Chinese government led by Ji Xingping destroyed a large number of mosques throughout East Turkestan. Experts at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) estimate that 16,000 mosques have been destroyed since 2017, 8,500 of which have been entirely destroyed. This number accounts for 65% of the mosques in East Turkestan.
 
 
 
 


A mosque with its dome and minarets removed
 
 
Thousands of mosques have also been transformed into pig barns, restaurants, etc. The mosques that are left standing are exclusively retained for tourist and propaganda purposes; it is not permitted to enter them to perform religious services.

Zikr or prayers altered to venerate Ji Xingping: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forbade Uyghur Muslims from worshipping Allah and replaced the phrases in their prayers and Zikr (remembrance of God) scripts with those that honour Xi Jinping and the CCP.

In addition to mandating Imams to dance and sing communist songs, Chinese authorities have started efforts that mock Islam and Muslims. Anti-Islam signs and slogans have been plastered all over Xinjiang’s streets since 2017.

In prisons and concentration camps, these practices are all too common. The Muslim inmates are required by the prison and camp guards to thank the communist party and Xi Jinping after meals and to praise them before meals. Those who resent this are punished and denied food. Inmates are made to denounce Islam and make derogatory remarks about the Prophet.

Banning Hijab: Chinese oppression of Uyghur Muslims has been known for a long time. Earlier the Chinese police had imposed a dress code for Uyghur women, under which Muslim women are not allowed to wear long dresses. In 2020, photos appeared on social media showing police cutting the dresses of Uyghur women for being “too long”. It was also reported that Han Males are sleeping on the same bed as Uyghur Muslim women in China whose male family members, often husbands, are locked up in ‘re-education camps’ in conformity with a diktat by the Chinese regime.

In 2017, all Hijabi Uyghur women were sent to prisons and concentration camps. The “Qaraqash List,” a leaked document from the Chinese government, claims that many Uyghur women were imprisoned in concentration camps in the county of Qaraqash for donning the hijab.

Uyghur Muslims not allowed to follow Islamic traditions: Under the pretext of “fighting religious extremism and terrorism,” the Chinese government has since 2014 banned all religious practices. For instance, Islamic naming ceremonies, marriages, funerals, and Quranic recitations for the deceased have all been outlawed.

Arabic banned in China: Learning and teaching Arabic is deemed “religious extremism” in the post-2014 crackdown, and those who had done so in the past have been detained by the government. In East Turkestan, studying Arabic is currently strictly prohibited. Except for the government-run “Xinjiang Islamic Institute” (which was only left because the Chinese government needed to train imams loyal to the CPP and spread their message towards the Islamic world), there is not a single Arabic language school in the Xinjiang province.

Uyghur children’s Muslim identities being erased: One of the most anti-Islam efforts carried out by the Chinese communist state as part of the war against Islam in East Turkestan is the complete erasure of the Muslim identity of Uyghur children. Uyghur parents are sent to jails or concentration camps by the government, which forces their kids into state orphanages and boarding schools. Children are raised in these orphanages totally in accordance with communist ideology, transforming them into Han Chinese. Even the children’s Uyghur names are changed.
 

Uyghur Muslim children dressed in Han cultural clothing celebrating the Chinese new year
 
 
Chinese govt promotes ‘assimilation’ by forced Uyghur Muslim-Han intermarriage: On 16th November 2022, Uyghur Human Rights Project published a report on the measures taken by the Chinese government to promote intermarriage between Uyghur Muslims and Han Chinese ethnic groups. The means employed by the Chinese government consist of both incentivization and coercive actions underlines the report.

Since 2017, China has restricted or banned ethnic customs and Islamic religious rituals among the mostly Muslim Uyghurs in what they say is an effort to stamp out “religious extremism.”

Chinese regime forces Uyghur Muslims to eat pork under the initiative of ‘free food’: In 2020, an educator and medical doctor named Sayragul Sautbay revealed in a new book how Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang are forced to eat pork.

It is notable that pork is strictly prohibited in Islam, as it has been labelled as a Haram food.

Sautbay said that Muslims were made to eat pork, even outside detention camps. She informed that students in a school in Altay in northern Xinjiang were also force-fed pork and when many refused, the soldiers were sent in to take control of the situation. The educator stated that pork is being served to kindergarten children under the initiative of ‘free food.’ 

China using Uyghur Muslim spies to catch other Muslims who are violating ban on fasting during Ramzan

Last month a report emerged confirming that the Chinese authorities had employed spies to ensure that the Uyghur Muslims are not fasting during Ramzan.

The report stated that the spies that Chinese officials refer to as ‘ears’ are recruited from regular civilians, police officials, and members of neighbourhood committees, citing a police officer from a region close to Turpan, or Tulufan in Chinese, in the eastern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

“We have many secret agents,” the police officer told Radio Free Asia. As part of broader attempts to denigrate Uyghur culture, language, and religion, China started arbitrarily imprisoning Uyghurs in ‘re-education’ camps in 2017 and also prohibited them from fasting throughout Ramadan.

Additionally, the Chinese authorities banned most Uyghurs from praying in mosques, and even in their homes, during the Eid-ul-Fitr.

Despite such ‘atrocities’, China has not faced any repercussions for its ongoing totalitarian policies, which are most affecting the Uyghurs. The Islamic world, which has surrendered itself to the Chinese whims, has maintained a tight lip against China.
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40,000 Palestinians performed Al-Juma'a prayer at Al-Aqsa Mosque
 

 

 

 
 

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The Muslim community in Leicester perform Friday prayers at the siege camp outside the local Israeli arms factory Elbit in solidarity with the people of Palestine.
 
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China’s surveilling the phones of Uyghurs for “violent” content, like material that promotes self-determination,
Human Rights Watch says. 57% of content flagged was common religious material like Quran readings. China forced 1M+ Uyghur & other Muslims into “re-education” camps, experts say. Collapse Read »

This police officer converted to Islam. It gets better Since his converting, he’s read the Quran twice, fasted Ramadhan, never missed a prayer & he gets up around 3am to pray the Tahajjud. What attracted him to Islam? The love Muslims show & the commitment to their faith.
 
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37-year-old Qari Sheikh Abdullah was also blind and died on Wednesday while leading the Al-Tawheed Mosque in the US state of New Jersey. According to international media reports, the famous reciter Sheikh Abdullah Kamil had memorized the Holy Quran at an early age.
 
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David Fishman

Renovation of Two Chinese Hui Mosques in Yunnan and Sichuan: On-the-Ground Observations Background: The last time I visited Dali was 2015. I rented an e-bike and went up Erhai Lake, taking pics and checking out small villages. One of those was Meiba Village 美坝村
I had stopped there because Ctrip informed me there was a minor tourist attraction in the village - the Meiba Mosque. I was curious, because as far as I knew, Dali is a region of the Bai ethnicity, (白族) and the Bai people aren't Muslims. But this was clearly a Muslim village.
 

 
Turns out it was not Bai, but a Hui village, so there you go. The mosque was small. The front building was white, matching the local Bai architecture, with gold and green highlights, some Islamic window styling, a green dome & symmetrical green-accented minarets. (2015 pic)
 

 
 
 
Unfortunately I had no idea in 2015 I'd write about it in 2023. I didn't even use Twitter then... Over the years, I have cleaned my camera roll for space, so I only have these few pics of Meiba village left, including this last shot of one of the minarets. (2015 pic)
 
 
On Sohu, I found a travel blog of someone who had also visited the village in 2015, and had some additional pictures of Meiba, its mosque, and the prayer room - and interviewed people too. Mosque in background of first picture.
 

 


 

 

Anyway. Over last few years, with so much discussion about how Chinese gov't was targeting foreign-styled mosques for renovations, I've thought about the Meiba Mosque, with its dome and minarets... I saw in 2020 it was removed from Ctrip, and was also no longer on Baidu Maps.

And then in 2020, the travel site Yunnan Explorer posted a pic of the Meiba Mosque seemingly amidst renovations...the dome was already gone and the minarets were being taken down too. (This pic of the front building was taken from the courtyard with back against prayer hall)
 

 
Fast-forward to 2023. Last week while in Dali, I noticed the Meiba Village Mosque was now back on Baidu Maps! So we decided to visit and see what it's like now. As expected, the dome & minarets have now been replaced by pagoda-like structures and the Islamic styling is GONE.
 
 

 
 
Passing through the entrance into the courtyard, the back prayer hall has been completely leveled and rebuilt as a much larger, two-story structure based on Chinese temple elements. This looked very new - completed in the last six months perhaps.
 

 
when we went, there were children running around the village and playing in the mosque courtyard. The boys all wore little taquiyah. Some of the nicer houses had fancy entrance archways with Arabic (?) over the doorways. Otherwise it looked like the other Bai villages.
 

 
In the courtyard entrance was a list of villagers and how much they had donated for zakat (it was Ramadan at the time). 200-300 CNY seemed the norm. Notice nearly everyone is surnamed Ma 马, the dominant Hui surname.
 

 
Besides the renovated exteriors, and the new, large prayer room, there were several HUGE new houses and the roads were all paved vs. last time. And very clean. It was late afternoon and there were only a few children around, no one to ask questions, so we just got pics and left.
 

 
 
Next: Weizhou Town, Wenchuan County, Sichuan I found myself in Weizhou by accident...because I missed an exit on the highway. Believe me, you do NOT want to miss an exit in Western Sichuan...the next exit was 30+ km! Since I had come all this way, I decide to explore a bit...
 
 

There's not much in Weizhou Town - I visited a museum and a few parks and in 30 mins I'd just about seen the whole place. On my way out, I saw the local mosque on Baidu. The street view pic was from 2016, and it had green domes, so I expected it would have some changes too.
 

 
Sure enough, when I arrived, I found the entire roof had been changed, with the domes replaced with pagodas and the green + gold aesthetic swapped for a modern Chinese color palette. I had to check the old pics several times to ensure I was aligning correctly. 
 
 
2016 | 2023
 

 
 
 
I stopped to grab a bite at the halal restaurant on the street in front of the building and ask the ladies there some questions. "Hey is this a mosque? Baidu says it's a mosque, but it doesn't look like one" "Yes, this is the Weizhou Mosque" "Oh good, I couldn't tell at first"
 

 
"What happened to the building? It looks very different from the pictures on Baidu" "Oh, the government renovated the mosque" "When?" "Last few years" "Why?" "I don't know. They said it needs to look more Chinese. They spent a lot of money on the renovation...2-3 million RMB"
 

 
"Oh...are there many Hui in Wenchuan? I suppose not many?" "No, not many. Very few. Less than a thousand I guess" (Wenchuan County is part of Aba Prefecture, a Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Region in Western Sichuan; Weizhou is the county seat. Most people here are Qiang 羌族)
 
"After renovations, it's still used as a mosque?" "Yes. Hui people pray here, and have activities. It's Ramadan now." "When the government did the renovations, did they change anything inside?" "Oh, no, it's all the same as before." (I saw a Ramadan fast schedule):
 
 
 

 
 
She gestures to a passage on the side of the kitchen. "That leads into the mosque. You can go look inside if you're interested". I venture tentatively down the hallway, emerging in a tidy courtyard in front of a large building. There's a bucket of potatoes and some grain drying.
 

 
 
On a blackboard on the side of the building, I find a tally of the 2023 Ramadan contributions for zakat, just like in Meiba. It's a much smaller congregation here though. There's also a signup sheet for who will lead to break the fast each week (I think?) (请开斋名单)
 
 

 
The prayer room is on the second floor. A small sign outside indicates the salah times for the 5 daily prayers. The interior decoration is old and perhaps a bit worn, but very clean and dust-free. No one else is around.
 

 

 
I go back outside to eat and find the ladies preparing their own lunch. "Hey" I say, "Isn't it Ramadan? Can you eat now?" "Oh, we're not Hui" she says. "We just work here. We don't fast". "Oh...Is the owner Hui?" "Yeah" "Where is he? "He's busy. He has a lot of businesses."
 
On my 30+ km highway drive back to my original destination, I reflected on the two mosques. I really regretted in both cases that I didn't get to speak directly to any Hui people in those communities to find our how they feel. But anyway, here's how I sum up my thoughts now:
 
1. The Chinese rationale for the removal of domes and minarets of mosques in China has been public for a few years now; the stated objective of making the visual of the mosques conform to Chinese (and not foreign) architectural styles is clearly met by these renovations.
 
It's been noted that mosques with more Sinitic or styling seem less likely to be affected. For example, here's the Dujiangyan city mosque, constructed in 1934, with its green tiered pagodas, crescent moon and star, unchanged. My photo + file photo from http://chinaislam.net.cn
 

 
2. At least in the two sites I visited, I couldn't see any evidence that the usage of the mosque had been impacted (or that anything besides the outward appearance had been changed). They are clearly still places of prayer, congregation, and community for practicing Hui.
 
3. From a PERSONAL TASTE perspective, I think the Meiba renovation looks poorly proportioned and kinda ugly. The Weizhou renovation doesn't look bad, but also you can't even tell it's a mosque anymore. IMO, the Dujiangyan mosque's fusion aesthetic is a good blend of styles:
 
4. I don't fool myself thinking that I discovered anything with my little field trip that will change anyone's mind. Those that think it's a Bad Thing will keep thinking it, and those that think it's Totally Fine will do the same. They'll both see confirmation here I'd expect.
 
 
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click and watch the video:
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New York City's strength lies in its diversity and unity. NYC mayor continued his five-borough Ramadan tour last night, joining an iftar dinner in Queens. Ramadan Mubarak to those who are celebrating!
 

 
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An Uyghur captured in Egypt. Bilal Abdukerim, a master student in Al-Azhar, an applicant for UNHCR. He detained in Cairo on 22 March from home. He didn’t have any criminal record in Egypt, but he was threatened by Chinese police from his hometown. He was in danger of deportation.
 

 
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When AI programming and deep learning under the control of Centralized Microsoft, Uyghur Muslims genocide is not a topic, because Microsoft still wanna earn dirty money in China.
 
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Many people often ask me, 'Your Chinese is so good, how did you learn it? Do you know Uyghur?' On the internet, there are also people who frequently ask me, 'Since you are so against China, why do you still study and use Chinese? Why not write in Uyghur?' Although I always smile and brush off these questions, especially the latter one keeps coming up. After a while, I feel that maybe I should give an answer.

Today, I will talk about how I chose to learn Chinese and how I learned it. Also, what was my purpose for learning Chinese. This can be considered as a summary of my experience in learning the language and my motivation and goals for doing so.

To be honest, learning Chinese was not my choice but rather my parents' decision. They forced me to learn it!

I have mentioned this briefly in some of my previous articles; originally born in Quruqhay Township in Yili (Xinjiang), where I grew up with my grandparents. Around 1970 when I started third grade at a Uyghur elementary school there suddenly came a time when my parents visited from Hami to see us on vacation. They wanted me to go back with them to Hami city for schooling.

Going to school in the city had great appeal for me as a child growing up in rural areas even though leaving behind grandparents who raised me made it difficult for me emotionally; however curiosity led me follow along with them away from beautiful mountain village Quruqhay Township filled with clear waters and fragrant fruits through several days of horse-drawn carriage rides followed by long-distance bus trips before finally arriving at Hami Railway Area.

Completely unexpected were rows upon rows of pale dilapidated railway flats highlighting poverty-stricken self-built small courtyard walls high or low unevenly distributed throughout area's dusty narrow roads pitted year-round emitting odors every crossroads having at least one or two open-air toilets which made lose interest completely towards cities - accurately speaking - disgust arose within myself.

Furthermore almost no Uyghurs lived around Hami Railway Area where we resided only two or three families were present; since unable speak Mandarin (Chinese) thus confined inside home feeling deceived by parents' actions wrote secretly letter asking grandparents come rescue immediately after approximately one or two months later they appeared unexpectedly taking week-long visit bringing freedom returning back home Quruqhay.
 
However, the good times didn't last long. My parents came again, bringing with them more new clothes, candies and biscuits as material temptations. They repeatedly urged me to learn Chinese and described a bright future of growing up in the city. They told me that if I learned Chinese, I could work on the railway in the future with high salary and job security. Although I didn't quite understand what high salary and job security meant, under my grandparents' persuasion, I knew that working on the railway was much better than farming in rural areas.

Under my parents' sugar-coated bullets and promises of a better future, I followed them to Hami once again. But this time, I persisted.

In autumn when school started, I entered Hami Railway Elementary School No. 4 not far from my home to begin learning Chinese language from scratch since at that time I did not know any Chinese words.

At first it was very difficult for me; besides arithmetic problems which were easy for me because they are universal across languages ,I couldn't understand anything else teachers said or communicate effectively with classmates except through gestures or body language . However,I persevered knowing that hard work pays off eventually . After several months of hard work ,I began to understand spoken Mandarin ; by second semester ,I had already made it into top ten students in class .

While studying Uyghur script at Quruhay Primary School back then there were no other books available except Mao's quotations but at Hami where we studied Mandarin there were many different kinds of books available . With mastery over Mandarin language ,I read extensively all sorts of books which further piqued my interest towards learning Mandarin; a language opens up a window into another world -Mandarin opened up a new window for me.
 
The railway, like the military unit where I later worked, was a heavy area of ​​ethnic discrimination. As Uyghurs, whether it was my parents or my siblings and other Uyghurs working on the railway, we faced various forms of discrimination almost every day. This discrimination came from teachers, classmates, neighbors, leaders and colleagues in our parents’ units; these seemingly trivial discriminations had a profound impact on my growth.

The most disgusting and boring discriminatory issue that accompanied me for half of my life was when I first appeared in class with seemingly innocent but obviously provocative questions that made teachers and classmates remember for a long time: Why don’t Uyghurs eat pork? Why do Uyghur names are so long? Why are Uyghurs so barbaric? At first, I patiently explained them but found out they already had their own answers. After I finished explaining to them, they would still come up with insulting fabricated stories to argue.

What’s worse is that some classmates deliberately put food containing pork on my desk or in my backpack and drawers. When I reported this to the teacher, he always casually said it was just children playing jokes on you. Then the teacher also joked about how good pork tasted and asked why didn’t I try it? Helpless as I was left with no choice but to solve it myself - by fighting back; most of the time I won but there were also times when students called their friends over to gang up on me leaving me beaten black and blue.

The more discrimination we encountered made me want to master Chinese better than ever before becoming an outstanding student at school. However, this became another reason for promoting discrimination; every time teachers criticized poor-performing students using frequent statements such as “Look at Yilixiati (my name), an ethnic minority person who performs better than all of you in all subjects; aren’t you ashamed?”

During ten years studying at Hami Railway School ,I witnessed firsthand how difficult life could be for my parents despite earning slightly higher wages compared to other Uighur workers on railways which allowed us a slightly better standard of living . They did the hardest work yet earned lowest wages while facing daily humiliation due to racial prejudice.

I remember one day when mother returned home crying after being insulted by Han people at her workplace selling tickets at small stations along railways . Commuting railway staff can travel free with their commuting certificate while others have to buy tickets . That day she met an extremely vulgar non-commuting worker who not only refused buying ticket but also insulted her verbally . My mother retorted him back then he jumped up wanting hit her physically calling her old ignorant uyghur woman who doesn’t understand anything etc .

Every time something like this happened ,my parents would tell me seriously: “Son,I hope you study hard Chinese language well ,master knowledge well,hopefully one day you can sit down equally with them ; unlike us living our whole lives being bullied.” Seeing all this happening around me,I knew what they expected from me wasn’t just mastering Chinese language skills or getting a job working on railways,but rather achieving equality between Han people &Uighurs!

Although at that time,I didn’t fully understand what equality meant according to parent’s expectations,but through personal experiences&commonly faced prejudices among fellow uighurs around,it dawned upon me that mastering Chinese language&modern knowledge is essential.I naively thought,the various forms of prejudice against uighurs were caused partly because older generation uighur folks couldn’t speak chinese fluently,and partly because ordinary han people working along railways were too ignorant & uncivilized.So if i studied hard,mastered knowledge,i could prove uighur people weren’t inferior compared to han people,&change their views towards us thus achieving equality .

I worked hard,determined not fall behind,became top student in class,&with excellent grades ranked within top ten throughout school,enabling admission into prestigious HaMi No2 High School followed by Dalian Institute Of Technology.
 
 
After graduating from university, I returned to my hometown to look for work. My father asked me if I would be willing to work on the railway. He said he could talk to his leader about it and my younger siblings also encouraged me, saying that railway jobs had high salaries and good benefits, and everyone was in Hami. However, I firmly refused and told them about the various discriminations I encountered during my ten years of schooling as well as the dirty, chaotic, and poor environment of the railways which had already made me tired of working there. No, I never wanted to go back to the railway.

However, fate played a joke on me when I was unfortunately assigned to Shihezi after graduation where I became a teacher in China’s colonial pioneer corps - Bingtuan’s capital city.

As a recent college graduate with an arrogant sense of superiority due to being one of the best students at that time who thought they could point out flaws in everything and make sweeping statements with ease; coming here as a teacher in Shihezi gave me this feeling like because my Chinese language skills were fluent coupled with modern knowledge meant that equality should be achievable through ability alone. But what happened instead was that compared with discrimination against non-Han ethnic groups such as Uyghurs by railways (which is already bad enough), Bingtuan’s discrimination against these groups can only be described as equally severe but more insidious and blatant.

During decades spent teaching here while dealing with school leaders and colleagues alike; most Han intellectuals’ prejudice towards Uyghurs or other non-Han ethnicities runs deep rooted within them along with their own brand of ignorant arrogance.

This kind of ignorance makes them feel entitled towards enlightening us or civilizing us; our language culture traditions beliefs are all backward according to them so their mission is assimilating us into “Chinese civilization” making us become just like Han people who speak Mandarin rather than Uyghur speakers!

I remember after countless heated debates between myself & Han colleagues over time; one old teacher named Wang said: “Mr Yiliyasiti! In the past we used say ‘Heaven fears not nor does Earth fear anything except for an old Uyghur speaking Mandarin’. Today however? We know you guys learn Chinese just so you can deal with us.” This statement has been repeated many times since then sometimes vented out angrily sometimes sighed helplessly but sometimes even cursed at full throttle fueled by hatred!

With hopes held high wanting mastery over Mandarin learning knowledge realizing dreams for equal footing alongside Han people- 10 years studying hard behind closed doors mastering Chinese yet ultimately discovering how uncomfortable angry & indignant it made both my Han superiors & colleagues feel even going so far as thinking any dissenting opinions or resistance from myself constituted rebellion deserving punishment!

Nevertheless despite all this hardship endured throughout East Turkestan fluency in Mandarin did not change my status nor fulfill wishes for equality among Han people yet through learning Mandarin gained much knowledge understanding deeper historical context regarding imperial China grasping vastness profundity contained within its culture meeting genuine friends among enlightened open-minded individuals who truly understand freedom & equality concepts! Most importantly though- mastering Mandarin became most powerful tool enabling pursuit toward equal rights freedom standing toe-to-toe versus those advocating unity under imperialist rule actually achieving true parity long ago! Collapse Read »

A Saudi Arabian cleric says he has left the country for a safe location after concerns were raised regarding his whereabouts, according to a Twitter page attributed to him. Emad al-Moubayed had tweeted a video criticising recent reforms in the Kingdom.
 
watch video:
 
https://video.twimg.com/amplif ... E.mp4 Collapse Read »

Six Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces on Tuesday in a daytime raid on the occupied West Bank city of Jenin. An undercover Israeli unit was discovered in Jenin refugee camp and was followed by large military reinforcements with dozens of armoured vehicles and snipers
 
watch video:
 
https://video.twimg.com/amplif ... u.mp4
 
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Rabih bin Shleweh Alenezi, a prominent colonel in Saudi Arabia’s General Directorate of Public Security, announced his defection in a video he posted to his Twitter account, in which he cited violations of human rights in the Kingdom.
 
Collapse Read »

Video of children in Australia being taught how to pray in a mosque is going viral. Furiously parents accuse the school of brainwashing and Islamizing their children “Would muslim parents want thier children to visit a Church and pray to Christ?”, asked one parent.
 

 
 
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Egypt reopened the historic mosque of al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah after a $2.8 million renovation that began in 2017
 
watch video:
 
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The Adhan (Muslim call to prayer) is shrieked out in London today at ‘The Victoria & Albert Museum’ to mark the opening of the Ramadan Pavilion Project which aims “to represent the history of the mosque and Muslims in Britain”
 
click and whatch this video:
 
https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw ... E.mp4 Collapse Read »

Today morning Jamia Mosque Nairobi Committee members presented a donation from Kenyan Muslims to the Türkiye embassy in Nairobi to aid the victims of the recent earthquake in Türkiye. A small but heartfelt contribution to our brothers and sisters in Türkiye.
 
Collapse Read »

A mob of Hindu supremacists launched rockets towards a mosque, shouting "Jai Shri Ram" in Maharashtra, India. The current Indian government has taken a lax approach to punishing these criminals, which has only encouraged them to keep perpetrating such attacks towards mosques and
churches in India. Furthermore, some of the leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have provoked people to take part in these acts of hate during their speeches in public.
watch video:
https://video.twimg.com/amplif ... L.mp4
 
 
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Qinghai Xunhua area was holding basketball competition, but The Chinese military use the weapons to threaten the hui people and Tibet people. The point is: why don’t the EU or the US use the military to keep the security of stadiums like China? 
 
watch video:https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw ... J.mp4 Collapse Read »

Restaurant Name           Cuisine Type                       Address                                              Contact Number
The Halal Guys             Middle Eastern                Multiple locations                                          (347) 527-1505
Kebab Empire                  Turkish               815 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10017                         (212) 888-4100
Mamoun's Falafel         Middle Eastern               Multiple locations                                            (646) 964-5194
Kabab King                 Pakistani/Indian       730 9th Ave, New York, NY 10019                           (212) 581-3072
Taïm                           Middle Eastern                 Multiple locations                                               (212) 691-1287
Sammy's Halal         Middle Eastern                   Multiple locations                                                (917) 566-6310
Al Baraka                    Middle Eastern          862 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10017                            (212) 888-9588
Chickpea                    Middle Eastern                 Multiple locations                                                (212)  786-2068
Karam                        Middle Eastern           851 2nd Ave, New York, NY 10017                             (212) 355-5025
Wafa's Express         Middle Eastern            812 4th Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11232                                (718) 369-8868
Halal Kitchen           Middle Eastern                    Multiple locations                                                   (212) 686-6666
Bolivian Llama Party   Bolivian                            Multiple locations                                                    (212) 256-0073
La Goulette                Tunisian                             Multiple locations                                                    (917) 819-2139
Kwik Meal               Middle Eastern              45th St & 6th Ave, New York, NY 10020                          (212) 730-4690
Royal Grill Halal Food Pakistani/Indian         7th Ave & 56th St, New York, NY 10019                      (646) 535-1885
Biryani Cart           Pakistani/Indian                46th St & 6th Ave, New York, NY 10036                      (917) 744-7999
Gyro II                   Middle Eastern                  60th St & 5th Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11220                       (718) 439-7089
The Halal Spot      Middle Eastern                  465 6th Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11215                                 (718) 369-6569
King of Falafel & Shawarma       Middle Eastern               30th St & Broadway, Astoria, NY 11106                          (718) 838-8029
Brooklyn Halal Grilled Chicken & Gyro       Middle Eastern              28-05 Steinway St, Astoria, NY 11103                     (718) 777-1111 Collapse Read »

   ​China’s Ethnic Hui Community at Risk of Erasure

A joint submission to

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

for its

3rd Periodic Review of the Implementation by the People’s Republic of China

of the

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Submitting organizations:

Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD)

A coalition of Chinese and international human rights non-governmental organizations. The network is dedicated to the promotion of human rights through peaceful efforts to push for democratic and rule of law reforms and to strengthen grassroots activism in China.

[email protected]

https://www.nchrd.org/

Hope Umbrella International Foundation

An organization whose mission is to preserve the cultural, religious, and intellectual heritage of the Hui people. The organization also documents the effects of government policies that violate the human rights of Hui communities in China.

Date of Submission: January 15, 2023
 
 
Executive Summary

1. China’s Hui population in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—numbering over a million—has been among the groups targeted by crimes against humanity in the government’s counter-terrorism campaign in the region. Beginning in 2014 and escalating in 2017, this is the same counter-terrorism campaign that has received widespread international coverage for targeting Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic-speaking groups. The campaign has resulted in the detentions of a plausible estimate of more than 100,000 Hui in re-education centers, in addition to pre-trial detentions and imprisonments. The Hui have also been subject to restrictions aimed at eliminating “signs of extremism” that include what the OHCHR has referred to as religious and cultural expression protected under the Covenant, and intrusive surveillance of public and private life.

2. The Hui are an ethno-religious group of primarily Chinese-speaking adherents of Islam who are descendants of Han Chinese and immigrants from Central Asia and the Middle East via the Silk Road trade. A few ethnically distinct Muslim groups in China are also classified as Hui by the Chinese government. There are 11.4 million Hui in China according to the most recent national census, making them the third most populous of the officially recognized ethnic groups in China.1 Hui communities are concentrated in various regions in China, with the largest number in the northwestern provinces.

3. This submission also covers violations of Hui cultural and religious rights throughout China. Through the government’s “Sinification” campaign, authorities have tried to forcibly integrate religious groups into the government and Party system and to eliminate aspects of cultural expression that are seen by authorities as being incompatible with Han Chinese culture. Authorities have intimidated and detained lawyers taking up cases of Hui persecuted for exercising their cultural rights and censored online content about Hui and Islam, while permitting officials to foment hate speech and campaigns attacking Hui communities on Chinese social media.

4. “Poverty alleviation” is another Chinese government policy with a significant impact on Hui social, cultural, and economic rights. Officials have implemented two major poverty alleviation programs among Hui communities that require relocation: “ecological migration” and domestic “labor transfers” to more economically developed regions within China. In designing these programs, authorities have failed to conduct consultations with the communities that would be seriously affected. Officials have stated that the goals of these policies include assimilation of minority groups. These policies have forced the integration of ethnic minority communities into Han Chinese-dominant cities, where Hui find their employment opportunities limited to unstable and low-paying wage work.

5. Finally, this report covers violations of Hui economic rights in the context of forced labor in Xinjiang and the threatened deprivation of social benefits in both the Xinjiang counter-terrorism campaign and the nationwide “Sinification” campaign. Hui throughout China have also faced discrimination in the job market and the workplace, and this discrimination has worsened because of the stigmatizing effect of the government campaigns marginalizing and criminalizing Hui religious and cultural practices.

Chapter 1. Counter-Terrorism Policies Targeting Hui in Xinjiang

1.1 Targeting Hui for Exhibiting “Signs of Extremism” (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues pars. 12, 29)

6. Beginning in 2014 and escalating in 2017, the Chinese government’s “strike hard” campaign to counter “terrorism” and “extremism” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang or XUAR) has resulted in egregious violations of the social, economic, and cultural rights of the over one million Hui persons in region.2 Though the resulting crimes against humanity directed at Uyghurs and Kazakhs have drawn more widespread attention, China’s Hui population has also been among the targeted groups.

7. As part of the “strike hard” campaign, authorities have implemented a series of laws3 and policies that have been used to impose severe sanctions on a wide range of activities that government officials have designated “signs of extremism.”4 Authorities have rounded up members of the Hui community and held them in detention centers and re-education camps and sentenced some of them to prison for engaging in Hui religious and cultural activities such as praying at home5 or in mosques,6 watching7 or discussing8 religious content online, traveling to Muslim-majority countries,9 having funded mosque construction,10 going on Hajj pilgrimages,>11 being an imam, both with12 and without13 state licenses, and keeping religious paraphernalia in the home.14Such government measures targeting Hui persons for the above-listed activities violate their rights under the ICESCR to non-discrimination (article 2.2) and to take part in cultural life (15.1.a).

8. In further violation of the Hui community’s cultural rights under article 15.1.a, authorities have prohibited Hui communities in Xinjiang from engaging in religious and cultural activities such as observing Ramadan and Eid-al-Adha and have required Hui individuals to renounce their religion under duress.15 Authorities have required Hui families of those who had been detained in re-education camps to attend weekly flag-raising ceremonies16 and evening classes with “anti-religious” curriculum and demanded that attendees report on the religious observance of friends and family, threatening to send those who failed to report to a re-education camp.17
 
 
1.2 Detention of Hui & Mistreatment in Detention (Articles 11 & 12)

9. As part of the counter-terrorism campaign beginning in 2014, Hui in Xinjiang have been detained in pre-trial detention centers and re-education camps and sentenced to prison. The Chinese government has made little information public about the number or ethnicity of those detained in the campaign. In the absence of official data, researcher Gene Bunin has found that many witness testimonies from former detainees who later fled to Kazakhstan mention that Hui were detained alongside them in Xinjiang; Bunin also found that a report of 43 persons detained in Xinjiang in one predominantly Hui village of 60 households was comparable to expert estimates of the proportion detained in Uyghur communities in Xinjiang.18 Using researchers’ conservative estimate of 10 percent for the proportion of those detained in Uyghur communities,19 it is plausible to estimate that perhaps more than 100,000 Hui may have been deprived of liberty in connection with the campaign in Xinjiang.

10. The conditions in which Hui persons have been held in custody have resulted in serious violations of their rights to an adequate standard of living (article 11) and to physical and mental health (article 12). Uyghur, Kazakh, and other majority Muslim groups have reported significant physical and psychological abuse in custody,20 and reports indicate that Hui in custody have been subject to similar treatment,21 such as being crowded in squalid conditions of around 40 detainees to a cell with space so limited they could only sleep in shifts, being deprived of sunlight, and malnutrition so severe that detainees suffered from life-threatening anemia and weight loss.22 Like other detainees, Hui have been handcuffed and shackled for long periods,23 with at least one account having emerged of a Hui man dying in detention after being restrained in a tiger chair for 78 hours.24

1.3 Surveillance in Public and Private Life (Articles 2, 10, 12, & 13)

11. The detentions described above underpin a broader system of surveillance and restrictions aimed at eliminating the aforementioned “signs” of religious “extremism” in public and private life in the XUAR. The implementation of such policies has violated the rights of Hui individuals to non-discrimination (Article 2.2) These measures include close scrutiny of the movements and activities of Hui and other non-Han persons residing in the XUAR through security checkpoints,25 forced inspection of social media history,26 random cellphone checks,27 home inspections,28 regular questioning by police in person and over social media,29 and assigning public employees to stay in homes to monitor for religious observance and other “signs of extremism.”30

12. To facilitate monitoring by local authorities, Hui persons have also been subjected to discriminatory travel, residence, and employment restrictions, with reports of local authorities selectively requiring Hui to return to their registered hometowns.31 Authorities have also prohibited Hui from relocating within Xinjiang by reportedly refusing to register them as new residents.32

13. Authorities have also subjected Hui persons to physically and psychologically intrusive surveillance of their private lives. As part of the “becoming family” homestay program, public employees have reportedly monitored people in their homes for long periods of time with highly intrusive methods—continuously taking pictures of their activities, asking children about their parents’ activities,33 and even sleeping with families in their beds.34 The program constitutes a serious, coercive disruption of family life (Article 10.1) and also violates the right to enjoyment of mental health (Article 12.1) and to ensure the religious and moral education of one’s children (Article 13.3).

1.4. Recommendations

14. We urge the Committee to recommend that the State party:

Indicate any concrete steps taken to adopt comprehensive legislation or to review the existing laws, including “counter-terrorism” legislation, for eliminating discrimination and violations of social, cultural, and economic rights against ethnic groups including the Hui.
Provide information on the measures taken, and their effectiveness, to combat widespread social stigma and discrimination against ethnic and religious minority groups, including the Hui, in the country’s counter-terror campaigns.
Provide statistical data on children of ethnic or religious minorities including the children of Hui persons, who have been separated from their families, without adequate care, when parents are taken to “vocational training” camps.

Indicate the measures taken to improve access to health-care services, particularly among persons living in rural ethnic minority regions, including the Hui regions, and detainees and prisoners.
Provide information on the measures taken to ensure the freedom of Hui parents to determine the religious and moral education of their children.

Chapter 2. Discriminatory Policies and Practices Violating Hui Cultural and Religious Rights

2.1 “Sinification” Policy Undermines Hui Religious Freedom and Identity (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues par. 30)

15. In CESCR’s List of Issues, paragraph 30, the Committee asks the state to “indicate the measures taken to ensure that the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of ethnic minority groups is not undermined by the assimilation policy of the State party, known as “Sinification.”

16. Much of the Sinification campaign has targeted the Hui people, which appears to be authorized and coordinated via secretive directives35 from the PRC State Council and the United Front Work Department. Implementation of the campaign has had the effect of expunging communities of their connections to Hui culture, religion, and each other so thoroughly that some leaders view the erasure of a meaningful Hui identity within another generation as being a likely possibility.36

17. A classified 2018 State Council directive called for eliminating signs of Arab cultural influence in Islamic venues, dress, and religious observance, prohibiting waqf charitable funds from being independently held and administered by local Islamic communities, and barring Islamic organizations from running programs involving minors—from kindergartens to Arabic language schools and study abroad programs.37

18. Among the forms of “Arab influence” being targeted for removal since 2016 are Arabic lettering and motifs on buildings, in public areas, and in people’s homes.38 Islamic dietary restrictions have also been targeted as an unacceptable expression of Hui identity: since 2016 across China, restaurants and groceries have been forced to remove halal signage,39 and by 2019 authorities in Ningxia, Beijing, and elsewhere were no longer allowing food, dairy, and wheat producers and restaurants to certify food as halal.40

19. The Sinification campaign also aims to prevent transmission of cultural and religious heritage across generations. Minors under 18 have been prohibited from entering mosques and other religious venues in many areas, and Arabic language and Islamic schools have been shut down by authorities. In Gansu, extremely limited quotas for Arab language and religious instruction have made it impossible for most children to access instruction.41

20. In 2018, the Chinese Islamic Association—the state-sanctioned leadership organization for Islamic religious leaders—released measures regarding the Sinification of mosques and Islamic doctrine.42 The policy was referred to as the “four entries,” and directed local officials to ensure that “four” things make their “entry” into Hui, Uyghur, and all other mosques: the national flag, the Chinese constitution and laws, core socialist values, and Chinese traditional culture.43 Mosques were reportedly required to raise national flags,44 which were often accompanied by slogans exhorting patriotism, ethnic unity, and social stability.45

21. The “four entries” also heralded the intrusion of official surveillance into the religious and private life of Hui. Surveillance cameras have been installed by local police to monitor activity inside mosques in Ningxia and Henan.46 Hui have also been expected by the government to report on the religious activities of friends and families, with monetary rewards offered to informants.47

22. Authorities have sought to introduce the last two “entries”—core socialist values and Chinese traditional culture—through Hui religious leaders. Imams are only able to openly preach contingent on whether they demonstrate loyalty to the government’s Sinification program.48 Mosques without licensed imams have been shut down entirely.49 Officials in Ningxia and Henan now require imams to attend monthly training sessions regarding Party ideology and official policies governing ethnic minorities; for renewal of their imam license they must pass yearly tests regarding Party ideology.50 Imams are closely policed to monitor their deviation from officially prescribed interpretations of Islam.51

23. Meanwhile, the Sinification policy seeks to change the very beliefs of Islam by inserting “core socialist values” into the religious doctrine itself. The state-led China Islamic Association began leading conferences in December 2020 for the purpose of generating official re-interpretations of Islamic theology from the perspective of Confucianism and “core socialist values” so that they can be in line with “Chinese traditional culture.”52 Officials have worked methodically to remove signs of Arabic influence from mosques: the call to prayer in Arabic was prohibited in at least Ningxia and Gansu and replaced with the sound of a siren; as with all other buildings, Arabic inscriptions and motifs were removed from mosque walls.53

24. The Sinification measure that has provoked the strongest reaction in Hui communities is the forced demolition of mosque domes and minarets and their replacement with traditional Chinese roof designs.54 Authorities have retaliated against those opposing the demolitions. Following mass protests in Tongxin, Ningxia over the attempted removal of a mosque dome in August 2018, authorities visited each Hui household in the community requiring each to give consent to the replacement of the dome, issuing threats such as job loss for family members who were public employees.55

2.2 Intimidation and Detention of Lawyers Taking up Cases of Hui Cultural Rights (Article 2, List of Issues par. 4)

25. In its List of Issues (paragraph 4), the Committee asks the government to provide information about the intimidation of lawyers taking up cases of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Chinese authorities have harassed, threatened, and detained lawyers for representing Hui clients charged in connection with their religious identity or activities. Instead, authorities forced Hui detainees to be represented by government-appointed attorneys.

26. One Hui interviewee told CHRD in 2022 that in 2017, a lawyer was disappeared by authorities in Xinjiang for several days after being engaged to represent Hui religious leader Jin Dehuai, who was convicted for separatism based on religious activities such as preaching in his home, encouraging proselytizing, and organizing religious conferences with participants from abroad.56 The lawyer canceled representation after being released by authorities.

27. The same interviewee informed CHRD that authorities in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 2019 warned lawyers against attempting to represent Hui defendants who had been detained for their refusal to consent to the government’s removal of a mosque minaret. The defendants were members of the leadership committee of the Weizhou Grand Mosque in Ningxia’s Tongxin county,57 Consequently, the defendants were assigned government-appointed lawyers and later convicted for “criminal syndicate activity.”58 Charges involving “criminal syndicates” have allowed for expedited prosecution and lower levels of judicial scrutiny under a major national anti-corruption campaign initiated in 2018 known as “Sweep Away the Dark Forces and Eliminate the Evil” (saohei chu’e).59

2.3 Internet Censorship (Article 15; List of Issues par. 31)

28. Chinese internet regulations have led to the selective censorship of content from Hui internet users while allowing denigrating and hateful speech about Hui and Islam to proliferate on social media. This combined with the encouragement of hate speech by public figures in official positions has contributed to worsening discrimination against Hui persons in Chinese society more generally.

29. In March 2022, a state ban on independent publication of “religious information” online went into effect, allowing only officially registered organizations vetted by the government to publish information online about “religious doctrine, knowledge, culture, or activities.”60 Prior to this ban, websites and online platforms popular among users in the Hui community had already been shut down.

30. For example, the website Zhongmu (www.2muslim.com) was shut down when a user-posted an open letter to Xi Jinping calling for the release of political prisoners was reposted by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences scholar Xi Wuyi on Chinese social media platform Sina Weibo as evidence of Hui subversion.61 The website had been online for over 13 years and included forums for 77 local communities throughout China, and former users searching for “Zhongmu” on Chinese social media found that searches on these platforms produced no results, thus preventing them from reconnecting.62 In addition to Zhomgmu, the personal websites of leading Hui cultural figures such as imam Li Yunfei and writer Zhang Chengzhi were shut down in 2020 and 2021, respectively.63

31. Individual Hui Internet users have also encountered censorship online. Researchers reported in a 2018 study that Hui users frequently found that their online posts about Islam or official ethnic policies were deleted or their accounts blocked, while state-approved imams have been allowed to discuss Islam online.64 Such targeted censorship has effectively prevented Hui persons from freely exchanging ideas and information on the internet.

32. While websites and Hui Internet users have been censored, discriminatory and hateful speech about Islam and Muslims has flourished on Chinese-language social media platforms. Academic experts have observed that such anti-Muslim rhetoric online has been indirectly encouraged by state media, which almost always portrays Muslims as the grateful beneficiaries of state programs or as violent extremists.65 Studies also find that social media platforms selectively fail to remove Islamophobic content clearly in violation of platform policies,66 which experts note is itself a reflection of suspicion of Muslim groups among Chinese authorities67 because authorities have significant control over what content appears online.68 Islamophobic hate speech also comes in the form of vicious online attacks against social media users identified as Hui, which has caused many Hui internet users to avoid engaging on issues related to Islam online.69

33. Government officials are often both the source and propagators of some of the most vitriolic comments about Muslims and Islam on Chinese social media. Scholar of Marxism at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Xi Wuyi (mentioned above) has led numerous online campaigns against accommodations for or acknowledgment of Muslim members of Chinese society.70 Another government figure who has mobilized online followers to target the Hui community is a government propaganda and cyberspace official named Cui Zijian, who said it was part of his “professional and patriotic duty” to lead a 2017 online campaign to shut down the construction of a mosque in Hefei, provincial capital of Anhui.71 The status of such officials as in government capacity further legitimates hate speech about Muslims in mainstream discourse.
 
2.4 Recommendations

34. The Committee should recommend that the State Party:

• Provide information on the efforts undertaken to promote and protect the culture, religion and language of ethnic minority groups, including the Hui, and show how the measures taken to ensure that the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of ethnic minority groups including the Hui are not undermined by the assimilation policy of the State party, known as “Sinicization.” Please also comment on reports that the State party has attempted to eradicate the culture, religion, and language of Hui through the destruction of sacred cultural and religious sites and bans on engaging in religious activity.
• Provide information about avenues for accountability, redress, and compensation for lawyers and law firms subject to intimidation, detention, and retaliation for taking up cases of violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Also provide information on the measures taken to provide an enabling environment for lawyers and human rights defenders to advocate and promote economic, social and cultural rights, particularly for Hui persons.
• Provide information on any measures taken to ensure the free exchange of ideas and information online without interference to the enjoyment of Hui persons to cultural rights and religious freedom.

Chapter 3. “Poverty Alleviation” Policies Disperse Hui Communities and Facilitate Cultural Assimilation

3.1 Political Goals and Effects of “Poverty Alleviation” Programs (Articles 2, 11 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

35. In its List of Issues (paragraph 24), the Committee asks the Chinese government to “specify the efforts made … to involve the affected individuals and communities in designing and implementing various poverty alleviation projects, especially those entailing relocation and resettlement of residents[.]” CHRD finds that few, if any, such efforts have been made with Hui communities.

36. Chinese officials have implemented two major poverty alleviation policies among Hui communities that require relocation: “ecological migration” and domestic “labor transfers” to more economically developed regions within China. “Ecological migration” has been touted by President and Party Chairman Xi Jinping as part of a series of the government’s ethnic minority policies that would create “mutually embedded social structures,” “intermingle ethnic groups,” and “guide people of different ethnic groups to correctly understand ethnic relations and issues.”72 Meanwhile, officials involved in a 2020 “labor transfer” recruitment effort targeting Hui workers cited the importance of “ensuring social stability and harmony” and “strengthening national unity.”73

37. In practice, such policies force the integration of ethnic minority communities into Han Chinese-dominant society, where they find employment opportunities limited to unstable and low-paying wage work. In designing these programs, authorities have failed to conduct consultations with the Hui communities that would be seriously affected by their implementation. The Chinese government’s implementation of “ecological migration” and “labor transfer” policies has violated the rights of Hui persons to an adequate standard of living (article 11) and/or to participate in cultural life (article 15). The design and execution of these programs have also negatively impacted the rights of the Hui persons to non-discrimination (article 2) by targeting Hui for dispersal to achieve political goals.
 
3.2 “Ecological migration” (Articles 2, 11 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

38. The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region (Ningxia) hosts the world’s largest planned “ecological migration” project in terms of people affected. Begun in 1983, the government has relocated more than 1.1 million residents, out of a total of 7.2 million people in the region to achieve “environmental” and “poverty alleviation” goals.74 Scholars have contended that the policies are also a cover for dispersing and dislocating ethnic minority groups.75 Ecological migration projects have been used to disperse hundreds of thousands of ethnic minorities in other areas: 710,000 people—72 percent ethnic minority—were resettled across 506 resettlement areas in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region between 2016 and 2020. The design of the resettlement plan emphasized relocating people from Zhuang, Miao, Yao, Maonan, and other ethnic minority groups and resettling them in mixed communities to promote “ethnic unity.”76 In Ningxia, although Hui make up 35% of the population, the majority of those resettled have been Hui.77

39. In one example, journalists found that Hui were forced to abandon independent farming for poorly remunerated jobs on industrial farms when 7,000 of them were relocated from Yejiahe Village in the Xihaigu region to the newly established Miaomiao Lake Village.78 Authorities denied farm subsidies and water pipelines to households that chose to remain.79 The relocated villagers were not compensated for the land they relinquished in their original village, and they were required to pay a “resettlement fee” of 14,000 RMB (USD $2,100) per household.80 Local officials told Chinese media that in exchange each household received 300 square meters for housing,81 but journalists found that relocated families of as many as eleven people were living in 50-square-meter, 2-bedroom apartments.82

40. Despite government promises that some families would be able to support themselves by farming allotted land in the new village, officials forced families to lease their plots to an agricultural company at low rates that the company allegedly stopped paying after the first year.83 A quarter of the 350,000 people84 relocated between 2011 and 2015 were not allotted any land for farming.85 Officials justified this by insisting that proximity to highways and urban areas amounted to an improvement in quality of life and encouraging residents to work in nearby cities.86 Officials boasted a high employment rate at 93 percent, but these figures were contested by local residents who reported that men were unable to find construction work and families relied on government loans to meet expenses.87 By 2021, Chinese media reported that garment work had been brought onsite to the village in a trailer.88

3.3 Domestic “labor transfers” (Articles 2 & 15; List of Issues par. 24)

41. The other major “poverty alleviation” policy resulting in relocation and dispersal for Hui communities is the practice of domestic “labor transfers” coordinated by authorities in Ningxia89, Gansu,90 Qinghai,91 and Yunnan,92 where majority-Hui communities are concentrated. Government officials run these programs in conjunction with companies and other cities or regions seeking workers.

42. These “labor transfer” programs have displaced hundreds of thousands of people at any given time. In 2020, the Ningxia government had coordinated the “labor transfer” of 817,600 residents to work in the coastal province of Fujian and other parts of China as of August.93 In Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 550,000 out of 2 million total residents of the province was working as transferred labor outside of Gansu, according to numbers reported in 2020.94 Some of these local governments have been engaged in labor transfers of their residents for decades—Ningxia and Qinghai began enlisting residents to work for companies in coastal areas such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Shanghai as early as 2005.95

43. Although there is no available official data tracking the exact number and proportion of Hui people involved in “labor transfers,” there are indications that the Hui people in particular are significantly impacted. A free trade-zone official from Ningbo met with government leaders from both the Ningxia region and Linxia Prefecture in Gansu Province in 2020 to recruit Hui workers specifically, citing the importance of “ensuring social stability and harmony,” and “strengthening national unity.”96 Such “labor transfer” coordination is discriminatory as it targets Hui communities to achieve political goals.

44. We do not currently have evidence that these government-coordinated labor transfers are coercive in nature, in contrast to the labor transfer programs organized by local governments in Xinjiang (see Section 4.1).97 However, surveys suggest that the transfers are neither planned nor implemented in consultation with the affected communities, who have found that labor transfers disrupt social and cultural life in undesirable ways.

45. One 2014 study of the labor transfer programs in Zhangjiachuan Hui Autonomous County in Gansu province found that the 70 percent Hui population preferred to continue individual farming and to earn income without having to leave the region and work in other parts of the country.98 A survey of Muslim “labor transfer” participants from Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu province found that transferred laborers faced language barriers, difficulty finding Halal food, and lack of accommodation for religious observance, particularly for those traveling to eastern coastal cities where there was not a significant Muslim presence.99 Despite their preferences, such communities have become dependent on the labor transfer system for income—in 2021, remittances from labor transfers were more than half of local GDP in Zhangjiachuan county (1.77 billion RMB out of 3.39 billion RMB).100

3.3 Recommendations

46. The Committee should recommend that the State Party:

Specify the efforts made by the State party to involve the affected individuals and communities in designing and implementing various poverty alleviation projects in ethnic Hui regions, especially those entailing both temporary (as in the case of labor transfers) and permanent relocation of residents (as in the case of ecological migration), and to carry out those projects in accordance with its obligations under the Covenant. Please provide statistical data, disaggregated by region, on the number of land expropriations carried out and the number of persons relocated accordingly.
Provide information on the steps taken to address the reportedly persistent discrimination faced by ethnic minority persons with rural household registration in accessing employment, social security, housing, health care, education and other social services.

Chapter 4. Violations of Hui Economic Rights

4.1 Forced Labor in Xinjiang (Articles 6 & 11; List of Issues par. 16)

47. There is evidence suggesting that Hui detainees in Xinjiang (see Section 1.2) have been subjected to forced labor: Hui persons have served for periods in and around Ürümchi at Wujiaqu Prison and Badaowan Vocational Education and Training Center where forced labor has been documented;101 in one case, authorities have sent a Hui person to work in factories rather than allowing them to return home after being released from re-education camps.102

48. Xinjiang authorities have also promulgated official policies intended to forcibly displace residents for the purpose of performing forced labor as part of a political and cultural reform program. In 2018, the Yanqi Hui Autonomous County government in the XUAR issued Document No. 99 outlining a government-administered system of coercive relocation for labor, stating that “those who are transferred for work are not allowed to return without permission,” workers would be assessed based on “ideological education,” and administrative units would report on their progress in ideological training to the local Political Legal Committee and the Public Security Bureau.103

49. The scale of detentions of Hui and other Muslim-majority persons has also directly impoverished entire communities in the region. For example, a 2020 report describes 43 men in a village of around 60 households in Tacheng prefecture being sent to re-education camps. Without their labor, the main economic activity in the village, farming, was largely discontinued and the families remaining in the farming community no longer have sufficient income for necessities.104 Thus, the mass detentions have infringed on the right of the families of the detained to an adequate standard of living (Article 11).

4.2 Deprivation of Social Benefits, Rights to Work and Education (Articles 6, 9 & 13)

50. Chinese government officials have denied or threatened to deny public education, pensions, and other social benefits to compel Hui persons to comply with certain counter-extremism policies. This is in violation of their rights to work (article 6), social security (article 9), and education (article 13). For example, a Hui woman in Karamay prefecture in Xinjiang was threatened with the loss of her pension and her son’s minimal living allowance if she did not renounce her religion.105 In some cases, officials have coerced Hui migrants in Xinjiang to other parts of the regions to return to their registered residential locations by denying employment and public education for their children in the cities where they had been found work and lived for a long time.106

4.3 Employment Discrimination against Hui Muslims (Articles 2, 6; List of Issues par. 15)

51. Hui have historically faced discrimination in the job market and the workplace. In recent years this discrimination has worsened because of the stigmatizing effect of government campaigns marginalizing and criminalizing Hui religious and cultural practices described in preceding sections. A 2020 academic study found that Muslim job seekers in China are more than 50 percent less likely to advance beyond an initial interview than Han Chinese job seekers, discrimination that would primarily affect Hui, Uyghur, other predominantly Muslim groups. The study also found that despite government mandates to prioritize ethnic minority applicants, state-owned enterprises are as likely as private companies to engage in discriminatory hiring.107

52. More recently, such pervasive discrimination has been compounded by religious restrictions in the workplace imposed by local authorities as part of the government’s nationwide crackdown on religion in general. Since 2015, civil servants, teachers, and other public sector employees in Xinjiang have been banned from fasting during Ramadan;108 Hui make up approximately 9 percent of the population of Xinjiang of the population. As early as 2018, in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, public sector employees have been prohibited from appearing at work wearing the white caps Hui men customarily wear.109 Around 2016, the Chinese Communist Party warned its members of disciplinary measures if they believe in any religion, with state media publicized cases of CCP officials being subjected to disciplinary penalties for harboring religious beliefs.110

4.4 Recommendations

53. The Committee should recommend that the State party:

Provide information on any specific steps taken to ensure that no alternative or parallel system of forced labor is still in place, provide information on the steps taken to address reports about forced labour and physical and mental abuse of detainees allegedly involved in the so-called “vocational training programmes” operated by the State party, including through vocational training centres, for surplus rural workforce, particularly Uighurs, Tibetans, Huis and other ethnic minority groups; and indicate what support is provided to families whose primary breadwinner is sent to such centres.

Provide information on the trends in coverage of each social security scheme during the reporting period and the efforts made to expand the coverage of social security schemes, particularly among rural ethnic minority (including the Hui) migrant workers and workers in the informal economy or with non-standard forms of employment.

Endnotes:

1 According to the 2021 China Annual Statistical Yearbook. Cited in: https://baike.baidu.com/item/% ... ence-[4]-2699-wrap

2 China Internet Information Center, August 1, 2021.Available at: http://www.china.com.cn/opinio ... shtml

3 PRC Counterterrorism Law; XUAR Implementing Measures for the PRC Counterterrorism Law; PRC Criminal Law; XUAR Religious Affairs Regulation; 2017 XUAR Regulation on De-Extremification.

4 “新疆局地组织民众识别75种宗教极端活动” [“Local Xinjiang Authorities Organize Public to Identify 75 Signs of Religious Extremism”], Sina, December 14, 2014. Available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014 ... shtml

5 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

6 Chang Xin, “Xinjiang Woman Struggles to Care for Her Grandchildren,” Bitter Winter, February 11, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/woman ... n/%3B Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

7 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhengxiu,” May 14, 2022.

8 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhixue,” May 14, 2022.

9 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Xuexian,” December 27, 2019; Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Yuanlan,” December 27, 2019; Xinjiang Victims Database, “Wang Yali,” December 28, 2019.

10 Xinjiang Victims Database, “Ma Zhongbao,” December 18, 2018.

11 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

12 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

13 Li Zaili, “Monetary Reward Offered for Muslim Man’s Recapture,” Bitter Winter, November 21, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/monet ... ture/

14 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

15 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

16 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

17 Xiang Yi, “With Husbands in Camps, Hui Women Struggle Taking Care of Families,” Bitter Winter, January 4, 2020. Available at:  https://bitterwinter.org/hui-w ... lies/

18 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

19 Jessica Batke, “Where Did the One Million Figure for Detentions in Xinjiang’s Camps Come From?” ChinaFile, January 8, 2019. Available at: https://www.chinafile.com/repo ... -come

20 Gene Bunin, “Because you had to do it very quickly, or you could be punished,” Art of Life in Chinese Central Asia, November 1, 2019. Available at: https://livingotherwise.com/20 ... hed/. Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

21 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

22 Li Zaili, “Muslim Woman Reveals Details of Her Life in Detention,” Bitter Winter, October 30, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/musli ... tion/

23 Li Benbo, “Released from Xinjiang Camps but Forced to Lie About Them,” Bitter Winter, February 24, 2020. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/relea ... hem/. Li Zaili, “Imam Forced to Recite CCP Policies,” Bitter Winter, October 18, 2018. Available at:https://bitterwinter.org/imam- ... cies/

24 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... ghur/

25 Darren Byler, “Do Coercive Reeducation Technologies Actually Work?,” Los Angeles Review of Books (Blog) , January 6, 2020. Available at: https://blog.lareviewofbooks.o ... work/

26 Gerry Shih, “China’s crackdown on Uighurs spreads to even mild critics,” Associated Press, December 28, 2017.

Available at: https://apnews.com/article/ap- ... 09ce8

27 Li Zaili, “CCP Monitors, Punishes Comments on Social Media,” Bitter Winter, December 28, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/ccp-m ... edia/

28 Li Zaili, “Volatile Times Ahead for Muslims in Xinjiang,” Bitter Winter, September 5, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/volat ... iang/

29 Darren Byler, “Do Coercive Reeducation Technologies Actually Work?,” Los Angeles Review of Books (Blog) , January 6, 2020. Available at: https://blog.lareviewofbooks.o ... work/  

30 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... ims/. For general information about the “Becoming Family” program, see UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, pars. 100-101. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/de ... t.pdf 

31 Gene Bunin, “Xinjiang’s Hui Muslims Were Swept Into Camps Alongside Uighurs,” Foreign Policy, February 10, 2020. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020 ... hur/. Li Zaili, “Imam Forced to Recite CCP Policies,” Bitter Winter, October 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/imam- ... s/%3B

32 Li Zaili, “Muslims Pushed to the Fringes of Housing Market,” Bitter Winter, November 25, 2018. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/musli ... rket/ 

33 Xiang Yi, “Xinjiang, Where Even Buildings Tell Tragic Stories of Muslims,” Bitter Winter, December 18, 2019. Available at: https://bitterwinter.org/xinji ... lims/

34 Ivan Watson and Rebecca Wright, “The Chinese policy that makes Uyghurs feel like hostages in their own homes,” CNN, May 8, 2021. Available at: https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/08 ... html. For general information about the “Becoming Family” program, see UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China,” August 31, 2022, pars. 100-101. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/de ... .pdf. See also University of British Columbia Xinjiang Documentation Project, ““Hundred Questions and Hundred Examples”: Cadre Handbooks in the Fanghuiju Campaign,” accessed January 11, 2023. Available at: https://xinjiang.sppga.ubc.ca/ ... ooks/

35 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html. Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html  

36 Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

37 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... .html

38 Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... stics

39 David R. Stroup, “The de-Islamification of Public Space and Sinicization of Ethnic Politics in Xi’s China,” Middle East Institute, September 24, 2019. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publicatio ... ftn4. Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Huizhong Wu, “Sign of the times: China’s capital orders Arabic, Muslim symbols taken down,” Reuters, July 31, 2019. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/articl ... Q0JF. “China’s repression of Islam is spreading beyond Xinjiang,” The Economist, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.economist.com/chin ... iang. Keith Bradsher and Amy Qin, “China’s Crackdown on Muslims Extends to a Resort Island,” New York Times, February 14, 2021.Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/0 ... ml%3B Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

40 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... .html

41 Gerry Shih, “‘Boiling us like frogs’: China’s clampdown on Muslims creeps into the heartland, finds new targets,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... .html

42 “中国伊斯兰教协会“四进”清真寺活动在京启动” [“China Islamic Association “Four Entries” Initiative Launches in Beijing”], Xinhua, May 18, 2018. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/polit ... 4.htm 

43 “中国伊斯兰教协会“四进”清真寺活动在京启动” [“China Islamic Association “Four Entries” Initiative Launches in Beijing”], Xinhua, May 18, 2018. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/polit ... 4.htm 

44 Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Matthew Chitwood, “China’s Crackdown on Islam Brings Back Memories of 1975 Massacre,” Foreign Policy, April 11, 2021. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021 ... obia/

45 Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html. Alice Su, “China’s new campaign to make Muslims devoted to the state rather than Islam,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2020.Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world- ... gansu

46 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

47 “China’s repression of Islam is spreading beyond Xinjiang,” The Economist, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.economist.com/chin ... iang. Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

48 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

49 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

50 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 2019 Annual Report, November 18, 2019, pg. 110. Available at: https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chi ... N.pdf

51 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

52 China Islamic Association, “Holding Fast to Our Country’s Direction of Islamic Sinification: 5-Year Plan of Work Outline (2018-2022)” [“坚持我国伊斯兰教中国化方向 五年工作规划纲要 (2018-2022)”]. Available at: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/yqRJy1eNTNZdEqq8n12MKg.

53 Alice Su, “China’s new campaign to make Muslims devoted to the state rather than Islam,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2020.Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world- ... ansu.  Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... tics. Steven Lee Myers, “A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China,” New York Times, September 22, 2019. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0 ... html.

54 “被政府盯上的穹顶 宁夏韦州清真大寺对峙事件原委” [“Mosque in the Eye of the Government: the Story of the Ningxia Weizhou Grand Mosque Standoff”], BBC Chinese, August 10, 2018.Available at: https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/s ... 6943. China Aid, “Ningxia Plots to Destroy Mosques,” February 20, 2018. Available at: https://chinaaid.org/ningxia-p ... ues/.

55 Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... down. Nectar Gan, “How China is trying to impose Islam with Chinese characteristics in the Hui Muslim heartland,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2018. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/chin ... stics

56 CHRD interview; for more information about Jin Dehuai, see Xinjiang Victims Database, “Jin Dehuai,” September 15, 2019.

57 CHRD interview; for information about the demolition of the Weizhou Grand Mosque dome, see Emily Feng, “‘Afraid We Will Become the Next Xinjiang’: China’s Hui Muslims Face Crackdown,” NPR, September 26, 2019. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26 ... kdown

58 PRC Criminal Law, Art. 294.

59 Supreme People’s Court Monitor, “The New Campaign to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil,” January 31, 2018. Available at: https://supremepeoplescourtmon ... evil/

60 互联网宗教信息服务管理办法 [Measures on the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services]. Available at: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/cont ... .htm. English translation: 

https://www.chinalawtranslate. ... tion/

61 “中穆网疑刊载海外留学生致习近平公开信遭封杀” [Zhongmu.com website taken down, suspected due to overseas student’s posting of public letter to Xi Jinping], Radio Free Asia,December 12, 2016. Available at: https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/ ... ified

62 CHRD interview with Hui scholar, July 2022.

63 CHRD interview with Hui scholar, July 2022.

64 Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang, “Anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise in China,” Washington Post, May 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... this/ 

65 Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang, “Anti-Muslim sentiment is on the rise in China,” Washington Post, May 12, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... his/. Bailey Marscheck and Kangyu Mark Wang, “Islamophobia on Chinese Social Media,” China Data Lab, September 25, 2018. Available at: https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/ ... dia/. David R. Stroup, “Good Minzu and bad Muslims: Islamophobia in China’s State Media,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 27, Issue 4, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.co ... 12758

66 Wang Shuaishuai, “How Hate Speech Falls Through the Cracks of the Chinese Internet,” Sixth Tone, November 23, 2022. Available at: https://www.sixthtone.com/news ... rnet-

67 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... rget. “Islamophobia in China: A ChinaFile Conversation,” ChinaFile, May 14, 2019. Available at: https://www.chinafile.com/conv ... china

68 Mary Gallagher and Blake Miller, “Can the Chinese Government really control the internet? We found cracks in the Great Firewall,” Washington Post, February 21, 2017. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com ... wall/

69 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... arget

70 Phoebe Zhang, “No halal please: meet China’s pig vigilantes,” South China Morning Post, February 9, 2019.

71 Viola Zhou, “‘When are you going back to Arabia?’: How Chinese Muslims became the target of online hate,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2021. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia ... rget. Gerry Shih, “Unfettered online hate speech fuels Islamophobia in China,” Associated Press, April 9, 2017. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/ap- ... 424fa

72 中共宁夏回族自治区委员会书记 [Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary], “全面贯彻落实党的民族政策 谱写新时代宁夏民族团结进步事业新篇章” [Fully implement the Party’s ethnic policy: write a new chapter advancing national unity in Ningxia in the new era], 求是网 [QS Theory], September 16, 2018. Available at: http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/q ... 1.htm

73 宁波保税区人社局公众服务 [Public Services, Ningbo Free Trade Zone Human Resources and Social Security Bureau], “我区赴甘、宁两地做好回族务工人员关爱和劳务对接工作” [Ningbo FTZ visits Gansu, Ningxia to advance Hui worker care and labor transfer project], 搜狐 [Sohu], October 19, 2020. Available at: https://www.sohu.com/a/425773701_100020442

74 王志章, 孙晗霖, 张国栋 [Wang Zhizhang, Sun Hanlin, Zhang Guodong], 生态移民的理论与实践创新:宁夏的经验 [A New Theory and Practice of Ecological Migration: The Ningxia Experience], Shandong University Journal, 2020 Issue 4, April 5, 2020, pp. 50-63, p. 56. Available at: https://www.journal.sdu.edu.cn ... 5.pdf  

75 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

76 周映 [Zhou Ying], “广西易地搬迁安置点经验做法获国家发改委表扬” [National Development and Reform Commission Praises Guangxi’s Experience and Handling of Relocation Settlements], 广西日报 [Guangxi Daily], November 23, 2022. Available at: http://gx.news.cn/newscenter/2 ... 6.htm

77 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html  

78 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

79 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

80 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

81 邝亮桢, 张浩哲 [Kuang Liangzhen, Zhang Haozhe], “庙庙湖村：生态移民的扶贫之路” [“Miaomiao Lake Village: Ecological Migrants on the Road to Escaping Poverty”], 中国甘肃网 [Gansu China Net], August 4, 2017. Available at: http://gansu.gscn.com.cn/syste ... shtml

82 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

83 Edward Wong, “Resettling China’s Ecological Migrants,” New York Times, October 25, 2016. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/intera ... .html 

84 王志章, 孙晗霖, 张国栋 [Wang Zhizhang, Sun Hanlin, Zhang Guodong], 生态移民的理论与实践创新:宁夏的经验 [A New Theory and Practice of Ecological Migration: The Ningxia Experience], Shandong University Journal, 2020 Issue 4, April Collapse Read »